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
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LOST IN REPRESENTATION(S)



A speculative work in philosophy of mind with wide epistemic entailment interweaved with a polemic attack on human rationality as it is currently celebrated.

By the unheralded and accidental philosopher:

M. Brian Palmer, BSc, BEd, MA (copyright implied as of 4/4/2020)

Table of Contents

Chapter 1: Introduction To Method	9
How do I (you) Read this Work?	9
More Overwrought Philosophical Conventions	17
A Polemic Concern: The A-rational Conception of Quantity	20
Closing Remarks about Method	28
 Chapter 2: What Is Meaning?	 30
My Transparent (as possible) Metaphysical Position	33
1. <i>Philosophical Realism</i>	35
2. <i>Representational Theory of Mind</i> (RTM)	36
3. <i>Naturalism</i>	37
4. <i>Physicalism nee. Materialism</i>	39
5. <i>The Ontology of Quantity: What are numbers exactly?</i>	40
 Chapter 3: Defining The Main Thesis	 42
What is Information?	50
Proof: The Most Abused but Always Useful Argument Winning Word in any Dogmatists Toolkit	56
More Cultural Meaning Unicorns and The Myth of Benign Effect	53
 Chapter 4: A Fractal Derridean Easter Egg	 60
Solving the First Interpretive Problem associated with Quantum Theory: Indeterminism	68
Even More Warrant – Solving The Measurement Problem (Or, what “hears” a falling tree when no one is around for the “sound” of it)	71
A Negative not Positive Epistemic Revolution is now at hand	73
The Relative Cardinality of the Set of all Self-Paradoxical Sentences	77

Solving the Problem of the Missing Intension of LIFE (With an account of <i>original abstraction</i> thrown in for good measure)	78
`Logic is Parasitic on MEANING, as Viruses are Parasitic on LIFE	81
A Political/Ideological Aside	84
Chapter 5: Building the Terminological Toolkit to show How Humanity is ‘Lost in Representations’	85
Truth’s Proof Pudding: Norms, Veridicality and Satisfaction Conditions	90
The Normal Belief Fly in the Logical Belief Ointment	99
The Endless Conflation of Truthfulness with Truth	101
A Prohibitive Structural Ordering and Evolutionary Indexing of Intentionality Mediated Satisfaction Conditions (otherwise called norms)	106
Searle’s Directions of Fit – Just the Beginning	109
Debunking Linguistic Arbitrariness	115
Debunking CTM	116
More Irreal Flies in the Realism Ointment: Illusions and Hallucinations	121
And Now, Back to Searle	124
Money as Real Absence – The “Marriage” of Value to Everything as Nothing at All	127
Wrapping Up Things with Searle Ribbons and Austen Bows	129
Chapter 6: Baby Steps Forward: Applying and Extending the Tool Kit	132
A Problematic Structural Account of Norms by Example: Gender and Sex	132
Tyler Burge’s <i>Origins of Objectivity</i> : The Neo-Empiricist Cognitive Science Centred Revolution	135
Correcting and Extending Burge Like a Derridean Would – O.I. as the Detection of “Everything”	139

What are Concepts and Conception Really – The “Post-Ontological” Glue of <i>Reality-as-Perception</i>	142
And Now . . . Back to Burge	144
The Norms of Culture – Leaping Off the Deep End, Into the Clouds	149
Three (wildly) Prohibitive Categories of Cultural Norms	150
Marriage Norms – A Whimsical Analysis	152
It is Not a Fact that in North America We Drive on the Right Side of the Road	154
The Image of the Skull – A study in Diachronic Meaning Paradox	156
A Rational Pre-Scientific Conception – <i>Original Sin</i> as Naive Cognitive Science	158
Where Lies the Essence of the Gap?	160
No such thing as Mental Illness	163
A Final “Perversely” Funny Example, or How Even Marginalized Haters Gotta Hate	165
Chapter 7: The Epistemic Character of Norms and the Mind-Body Problem	168
The 2 Fine Points of Rational Concern about Norms and the Body-To-Mind Tipping Point (<i>Original Intentionality</i>)	168
Problem 1 for Rationality as Practised: The Body-to-Mind Tipping Point	171
EMERGENCE: The Most Shamelessly Used Empty Physicalist Metaphor Ever Proposed	173
The Para-Relational Metaphysic of CHANGE	176
The Shape of Para-Knowledge	181
Problem 1 Restated: ‘Physical Information’ is a Wicked Misnomer	183
Problem 2: The Black Box Spectrum of Norm Emergence: Certainty to Relative Accuracy to Absolute Arbitrariness	188
The “Level” Playing Field	191

Going Up and Coming Back Down Do Not Commute	194
A Bonus Third Problem: Facts rely more on Right Ontology than Right Ontology relies on Facts	197
Chapter 8: Some Norm-Level Teased-Apart Pet Peeve Examples of Being <i>Lost In Representations</i>	199
Overwrought Claims For Wide Human Forms of Ideal Rationality	202
It Won't Happen to Me (Unless I Want it to)	203
Is Water Hardness an Objective or Subjective Measure?	204
Is All Lying Bad?	206
Can we really have confidence in confidence intervals?	206
What is the point?	209
If Stereotyping is Bad all Scientists are Natural Racists	210
Revisiting the Sex-Gender Divide	211
We are all "Dudes"; Let's Try Abiding a Bit More, OK?	216
'Beauty is truth, truth beauty' is a damned lie?	218
Reputation: A Wolf in Sheep's Clothing, The Most Normalized "Truth-Making"	220
WASTE: A Negative Unicorn invoking Inconsistent Value Senses across Differing Contexts	221
A Final Pet Peeve Example	226
Aren't Many Bike Racks Being Installed and Used Incorrectly?	229
Other Sources Waving the Flag at endless forms of Human Irrationality	233
Chapter 9: Solving The Demarcation Problem of Science as a form of Ideal Natural Communication	233
The Problem of Demarcation of Science from Pseudo-Science	235

The Unicorn of all Unicorns: IDENTITY	236
A Limited, But Quasi-Physicalist, or Pre-Ontological Definition of REALITY	238
The Ideal Practice of Science as a form of Ideal Communication of Particular to General Nature	240
The “Screen” of Knowledge is a Plurally Divergent Same-Level Para-Meaning Structure, Not a “Flat” Ground for Facts	241
This is what Numbers Really Are	245
De-incommensurating Quantum Theory and Relativity: Revisited	245
How are Absolutes Made “Seeable” out of Differences, exactly?	246
A Problem is being Defined, More than a Solution Offered	247
The Fallacious Reasoning Behind ‘It from Bit’ Theorizing	247
Is the Derived Data/Non-Derived Data Dichotomy Also False?	249
A Hard Explicative Choice to Make	251
Two Roughly Inter-substitutable Meaning Spectrums	252
The Demarcation of Science from Pseudo-Science as a Model of Ideal Communication between a Mind or Minds and the Non-Derived Data of Nature: Finally	253
The Communicative Tip to Finite Existence	253
The Communicative Tip to Life	256
The Communicative Tip to Mind	260
The Universe Learns as a Whole	261
The Noble First Mind: Epistemic Humility Perfected by Omnipotent Independent Design (Via: The Disembodied Cartesian Soul)	262
What is the Role and Proper Placement of Conception, Naturalistically Speaking?	263
Quantity and Quality: Opposites or Derridean Same-Differences or Both and Neither?	267
No Ideal Mind is ever Possible	269

Matter Walks and Matter Talks	271
The Return to Original Intentionality as Original General to Particular Universal Communication	276
What Would Voltaire Say?	277
Lost in Translation, again	278
More Thinking Slow, please	279
How to Rationally Re-inflate a Flat Earther	281
Chapter 10: The Climate Crises Strawman: A Meta-Structural Example of the Endless Irrationalities of Normal use of Naive, i.e., Divide and Conquer Reason	283
The Real Cause of All our Looming Crises?	285
How Do They Separate Out the Climate Change's Causal Signal?	288
The Methodological Problem in a Nutshell	290
Whack This Mole	292
The Neglected Periphery of the Climate Crises Debate	292
The Pointlessness of the Blame Game	293
The Highest Scale "Geometrical" View of the Irrationality of the Debate	295
Why Has the Debate Been So Superficially Constructed?	297
The Emperor's New, New Clothes	299
How to Make the Pro Conclusion Knock-Down: Economics as Bereft Science	300
Knitting the Pieces of the Sweater Together	303
Why The Sane Bet is that Climate Crises is Real	306
A Needed Coming Day of Collective Mourning?	307

Chapter 11: Denouement and Summary	308
The Denouement: The Argument Consciousness is Forever Unrepresentable in any Physical Model yet is always invoked as the Proper Missing (“Meta-Negative”) Epistemic Background of any and all such Theories, but only in an Eigen-Scale Relative Way Determining a Fractal/Plural Epistemic/Pre-To-Post Ontological Derridean-Counted Spectrum.	317
The Reverse Order Base Case: Why Do Bicycles Not Fall Over (When Ridden by Minds, at Least)?	319
The First Reverse-Order Inductive Step: From Conscious To Original Non-Conscious Mind	320
The Second Reverse-Order Inductive Step: The Big Bang Singularity	321
Postscript	324
(Rough) Glossary	325
(Rough) Citations, and External Notes	330

Lost in Representation(s)

Chapter 1: Introduction to Method

How do I (you) Read this Work?

This is an excellent question, and I wish I could provide a clear account of the most fit method to best absorb my intended meanings aptly, first *at* and then *beyond* the purely literal level—and yet still stay present to the parallel but equally challenging rhetorical and hyperbolic aspects of this work. There is always a direct and linear enough form of interpretation on offer, but also an indirect or non-linear, yet still sub-metaphorically apt form of *intended* meaning conveyance in play (so one not ideally rational at all in any purely logical sense, yet not irrational, perhaps “trans-rational”).

Let’s start with my heavy use of brackets and em dashes (‘—’) and other abuses of stylistic and grammatical devices meant to introduce clauses, sentences or “tone” that inevitably distract from following the embedding and more linear narrative. I have tried to minimize these uses, but they have purpose that belies their bad form. In part these eruptions track my own stream of consciousness as I write, as I *narrate inwardly*. Often these disrupt any easy following of the original sentence, but assume it is at these points you have to do the hardest work to understand the divergent meanings brought so clashingly together. These interjections ask you, as I ask myself when I write them down, to take the road less seemingly pertinent to the thought being expressed, if only to glimpse the larger semantic network (as isolated statements fall together into the structures and models of logic and meta-logic towards entire ideological or metaphysical frameworks) so to see where we fall off into other problems of philosophy and science, even into relatively incommensurate conceptual frameworks.

I wish that people were less concerned to stay on the narrow epistemic paths some current and *arbitrarily normalized* forms of writing dogmatize, so when any meaning diversion at hand seems overwrought I ask of you to first take in the interruption, note the divergence in linear semantic scope (see there is a path to take that we won’t, but for peering around a loaded corner) be present to the vaster web of all possible meaning, the unfathomable rebus-like structure of all representation and *experience* of meaning. Yes, it is terrifying to try to fit into one mind, let alone into many. Finally, having honoured the epistemic diversion, return and reread the original sentence without the interjecting clause or bracketed material. My hope is, if nothing else, the many traces left dangling—as paths unexplored but doors laid open—remind you that in your own quest to know that while you may find more certainty in the truths of some narrowly favoured *fashionable* view that wisdom is only possible by taking in all the inconsistencies only seen across the widest possible view, one taken *species sub aeternitatis* (Latin for ‘under the aspect of eternity’). I follow a narrow and linear enough inferential path

in this work but also hope to shine a broad and diffuse light on how this mind-body debate is problematically embedded within a much wider and deeper “paradoxical” spiral of historical, ideological and theoretical development; one that never speaks for any final epistemic resting place nor totalization, only against both. I surmise and will argue peripherally in this work that hope for finalizing this or any other epistemic project by some universal totalization using only reductions to logic is not a hope rationally well formed.

However, you will read this entire work as you do . . . or don’t . . . never exactly as I ask or even as you **will**, as PERSONAL WILL (the concept) only represents to me an illusory and ultimately, a futilely reactive measure conceived as a cultural ideal against the relative and near absolute lived impossibility of ever staying on any singularly intentional (i.e., mentally intended) track without limit in the traditional *psyche-logical* sense. Hence the need for the personal will’s *a posteriori* conception: to assure us that in being identified as a person *essentially* (falsely, on so much late evidence and argument¹) we exist as finitely embodied and autonomously delimited particulars (individuals) with identities (as both persons **and** embodied objects) even while any brief moment of autonomy in thought is endlessly undone as the norm, both when awake (where thoughts arise unbidden) and when “unconscious”^{NOTE} (where dreams and other visions arise unbidden).

NOTE: What a problematic term: ‘the unconscious’. In the psychological “arts” looking to me more glossing metaphor than well delineated scientific concept. I might prefer to use the term “sedimented” or repressed content due to functional insufficiency or “self-corruption” in place of positing well beyond necessity yet another unicorn mind-part for both science and philosophy of mind to (endlessly fail to) explicate (exactly because it does not exist as such at all). I, instead, would replace the empty entailments owed to any assumed real existence of such a complex but so well walled-off repository of content with one of many levels of functional tipping points instead (so the idea of “*the unconscious*” proposes a category mistake; it is not a thing, more a process, simply a normative sub-relation to certain Sartrean “bad faith” contents, describing an existence-to-person-to-culture-back-to-person reaction driven by certain irrational defaults inherent to human nature we keep failing to confront to our own collective detriment). This idea of a well-delineated inner place of hidden “self-knowledge” that one may *by its “un” defining always fail to access*—but that is otherwise born of denial and repression, so more properly yielding up as a kludge of otherwise similarly insistent once-conscious, still irrepressible, yet perpetually needing to be re-silenced content—seems to float a semantically opaque and logically perverse term at many points to my thinking. The related empirical problem is cogent evidence suggests we can perceive some X and so be in a whole-body sense *aware* of X in terms of how we behave, yet still not be self-reflectively conscious of X (so not yet more “fully” aware, not really “seeing” an X, even when the “looking” has otherwise functionally or behaviourally succeeded). So, one supposes, we can also unconsciously “perceive” about an even more private, further *arbitrarily* walled-off inner world in the same fashion, yet somehow *analogously* always fail to represent this to our self, identity, ego, etc., just as we can fail to see a bird on a cliff face we know we are otherwise looking directly at, but can’t yet resolve as a categorically “ah ha!” sort of seeing (an expert bird-watching teacher is, then, as much a doctor of the hidden soul as any psychologist or psychiatrist). But this analogy is already patently weak, as we, when we fail to see a bird we are looking right at, have not simply repressed either this present, nor an earlier seeing at all! So, explaining this fatal difference in analogy between the contents of “unconsciousness” versus

those of nonconscious “seeings” reduces to the trivial fact that as we don’t and **can’t** carry the outer world around *inside* our bodies we must move around *within* the world to look at and (conceptually/categorically) see different parts of it, instead. In strict opposition, for the inner or mental world as it is to date still largely assumed wholly functionally “contained” *within* the body/brain we, of course, never lose access to it as a well-circumscribed whole—we carry our entire inner world of content, repressed or not, materially inside ourselves as we go about our perambulations—but may still, even though those contents go everywhere we do, arbitrarily misplace or self-deny access to some of these always incredibly close to hand contents (the most purely subjective “parts” of the mind) in like fashion none-the-less. Further, even if some or most of our inner world’s parts are introspectively hidden from us they always remain at the same literally physical and abstractly psychological “distance(s)”, while the world is always looked at and possibly seen over both unbounded and endlessly variable (if not much more pragmatically limited) physical distance alone (differently by sensation blending into perception and finally into conception). However, if these inner and outer worlds together exhibit an analogous and categorically shared same-capacity for prior or posterior forms of “un” or nonconscious awareness, **and** we may always—*ceteris paribus*—be made more fully “conscious” of the contents owed us from either the world in terms of explicit representation or implicit introspection, **and** this is always mediated by one and the same brain and body, then why suppose we have two different objects or problems at all, and not the same one in some complex, but here-to-fore not known but knowable, so not yet understood but understandable relation of inversion? **So, what we might have instead are two aspects of the exact same phenomena where the exact same core and forever sub-conscious functions are sometimes turned outward and other times inward, so not towards different “worlds” at all, just aimed at different levels of targets all found only *within* the same one world, i.e. the always been a physical world of real concrete objects and a psychological world of real abstract/functional “objects” taken in *prima facie* terms (so it is the aiming *differently* that makes the difference, not just what is aimed synchronically at or just what widely causes the narrowest of effects diachronically).** The more profound, the deeper difference, then, is that the inner world only ever gives up its objects—careful with the sense of ‘objects’ here—it is widely assumed, first as bare and so categorically uninterpreted experience, and only secondly as the experience of some still outwardly unexpressed literal inner and/or expressed outer content only much later in evolution or development as/through *language*. Very differently in ontological/metaphysical terms, for all non-living/non-thinking physical objects it is assumed—also in some logically inescapable definitional anti-symmetry—no experience-involvement is necessary to confer existence on lifeless and mindless things such as rocks (Realism). Regardless, although the entailed sources, *the representational targets* of many experiences often or largely arise from mixed inward and outward causes, in many special cases they appear to arise more purely inwardly (think of pure and unwilled inner acts of imagination or recall, and to a significant degree of all spontaneously, and for this, *unplanned* informal acts of intending or meaning). These inward and always assumed self/ego/person/identity caused subjective sources—all too often fallaciously coined as *willed* rather than *unwilled* mental states—are not as obviously nor directly caused by their targeted objects as most shared outer perceptions clearly are (assuming REALISM is true). As such they are not identical to reliably caused perceptive and/or sensory states, seemingly, at all?! These most forward looking and unbidden “imaginings” or “remembering’s” or “first intentions/meanings” do not seem in any pure and direct or transparent synchronic sense to involve nor require the presence of any real objective target serving as either the proximally intimate or distal cause of those special experiences or content; it’s just that: *thought arises* (we can imagine a cat on a mat when there is neither cat nor mat nearby, but then cats cause that possibility by their wider potential to be perceived and remembered as such first, but, *falling off the logically reducible cliff*, we can even imagine impossible things on a non-mat too!). So finally, of course, these most existentially rarified mental states can’t ever be caused intimately and proximally by any of their targets if those targets invoked are unreal or impossible, such as unicorns or faster than light travel (and of course, as Descartes

saw, we build the impossible out of the possible without touching anything but our/the inner world to start). Importantly, the converse is true in the outer world: we must always directly access—*ceteris paribus and unwilled*—real (mind-independent) concrete objects and their properties when leveraging our found behaviourally-driven and always diachronically evolved bio-functions, even if there is no “fully” conscious representational content for/of that event/object produced at all, just some behaviour that would not have otherwise occurred had we not encountered these objects. But, in the final analysis we physicalists believe the inner world is always and totally caused by the outer world, diachronically at least, so somehow inner, narrow first causes are still only due wide external causes even for the fact their widest sources may no longer be around at all, with most if not all of their original objective grounds now absent too (I can think about and “move around” in the memory-model of my home as easily as the real one once exposed to it enough, and I can still do this well for a long while after, *even if my real home burns down in the meantime*). This all seems very logically perverse and epistemically intractable to me, i.e. that something no longer *physically* present might have its wide external effect so delayed over time, yet still, later and now even over its total *positive* absence still narrowly—as some total *negative* presence—internally and intimately reliably cause, *still only physically*, long after both it and its own prior causes are gone, or more trivially and slightly less problematically, when it is beyond direct perception now but once was and might be again (never mind how we do this for impossible or non-existent but future-possible things!). So, this is precisely how the mind-body problem is lately being *re-defined* in “never the twain shall meet” terms. Waking and sleep are equally permeated by endless functionally borne sorts of always interpretable and arbitrarily shifting acts of consciousness *and* nonconsciousness; we simply in many cases “fail_to/succeed_in_not” seeing what we are obviously otherwise looking right at. Alan Watts has much more to say about this than I ever could.

Solving the mind-body problem in physicalist terms and by this, one hopes, explaining the nature and source of consciousness as a corollary, involves nothing more or less than grounding both inward and outward sources of experience and interpretation of them to some same one kind of always real substance and universal but always closed causal interdependence, but to also in doing so explain how the mental often so easily invokes or re-invokes its targets by their relative or even absolute absences as just described (in the note) above, and as we will see later perhaps, for this, *fatally over determines rationality itself*. The mind easily conceives of and by this both at times under-determines and/or over-determines what exists, even towards what couldn’t ever exist but for in imagination or in the trivial, *the existentially fraudulent* creation of superficial effigy (marking a harder but narrower form of the mind-body problem, one begging a logically constructed semantic theory that gets summarily blocked by Frege’s Problem).

Yet the mind isn’t, it is always assumed, physically over-determining itself or other things at all in doing what is nearly the exact same thing structurally when it is representing what doesn’t exist now but once did (but for the fact of some unintentionally created non-artificial kind of “effigy” cogently evidencing the “once existed” claim already *just lying around waiting to be discovered and speak of the real past as some post-existential inductive base case*; think: fossils, etc.). Let me rephrase that: we don’t worry about conceiving of things that once existed but don’t exist now, yet this is structurally the same, if not the *obverse* problem of imagining about what could never exist as existing, or imagining what it turns

out might be created (think of Sony Walkman's, money and human rights, etc.). Yet, in all cases the things we represent here of the past or of the future don't really seem like they could cause a damn thing NOW either, but for in these material leavings we use to infer their past real existence, or in those very thin material traces first allowing something only imagined to be made real because of what already unproblematically exists, if only at some near or far point in the future.

The skeptical problem here telling against both external and internal forms of "memory" is Bertrand Russell's 5-minute hypothesis:

"The **five-minute hypothesis** is a skeptical hypothesis put forth by the philosopher Bertrand Russell that proposes that the universe sprang into existence five minutes ago from nothing, with human memory and all other signs of history included. It is a commonly used example of how one may maintain extreme philosophical skepticism with regard to memory."²

This last concern, I think, assimilates not only with internal and external inferences to the farther past, but to both inward and outward cases of live perception as well, *if only because we are in computationally interpreting the unity of experience always finally dealing with the perception of the very near universe as it was about 0.2 seconds ago!* When dealing with the mind-independent past, of course, the partial existential over-determination due to inferring the real existences and essences of extinct objects or events is never justified by any trans-existential facts as for imaging impossible objects, just by real "thick" or "natural" as opposed to fake, "thin", artificial or "surface" effigies (in this describing the past-looking or retrodictive use of reason).

The very status of the past and future as real materially instantiated states of being is also dragged in here (and the scandalous problem of induction); how the past and future are to be determined as materially real is as much an aspect, or perhaps an entire other guise of the mind-body problem. Here another asymmetry rears its head: we can in theory travel to a relative future by leaving Earth, accelerating a bunch and then returning to Earth with more acceleration, but no similar means of travelling to the past seems at hand; yet in our minds we are certain of the dated existences of many post-real things, but on this analysis can we never really know this at all in any intimately material and experiential sense. But for these more real "effigies" that serve as base cases of inductive proofs, we only ever know about extinct things (physical or biological) in a conceptual/categorical sense (and because of this aren't we wrapping back around to the problem of unreal things already?).

It seems to me that the mind-body problem has also been defined deeply in terms of the virtual/irreal-real dichotomy and perhaps fails to be solvable in the same way the many sub-aspects/sub-senses of this rough and naive dichotomy are also not well understood or used to mean consistently at all (e.g. a "virtual" image is real, not irreal, yet its objects can never be touched or be a real and tangible material cause, but a doctored photo can always be touched, so all or some critical part of its content is virtual, and even that adulterated content might have a power to cause that belies both its tangible

supervenience base and intangible intentional nature). To quickly plug this rabbit hole by refusing to go any deeper than this: we get even more sub-bifurcations for real and unreal/virtual things when we consider what might come to exist as a simple matter of inevitable universal dynamic course (the predictive or future-looking use of reason) and, differently, when we consider what would not otherwise come to exist were it not first imagined and then created on purpose by us or some other minds.

The way the mind-body problem is clearly embedded within these perhaps even bigger problems seems itself meta-intractable and may even define a logic-flouting circle (who can say as all philosophy finds are more negative results, while science already assumes it has the answers in well-lit sight). The empirical evidence for a real/unreal(virtual) gap “really” existing—*The Appearance-Reality Gap*—seems knock-down, but then we can’t unwind the mind-body problem without also explicating the nature and material sources of the general appearance-reality gap and of all its particular gappy instances. But, if as I am going to argue, we can’t help find the mind-body problem embedded within the appearance-reality gap problem how do we know the lauded methods of science are not simply twisting up the logical knot more, rather than ever hoping to unwind it?

I will mostly not use ‘unconscious’ at all, so never meaning it in either the therapeutic or existential sense in this work. I deny it has any real non-metaphorical objective or categorical being, we just can’t always “see” what is right in front of us, but where the problem of *now*, not other minds, but *other content* ultimately reduces to the problem of how we can “~~unconsciously~~” *without a fuller, a more generally reflective self-awareness* perceive some otherwise successful and particular intentionality-mediated sub-awareness of some real and directly tangible (objective) or intangible (subjective) X, so still be generally self-reflectively conscious (and fully awake) and yet fail to see all that is equally ***right in front/”front” of us***, respectively, outwardly or “inwardly”. So, as long as we are alive we are always in a wider and deeper sense possibly disposed to become “conscious” of any or all ideas we take into, or create by the psyche, we just don’t and can’t when asleep ***or*** awake always represent all we otherwise might have representational access to (what is reflected is only a sub/re-embedded “popping out” of what is universally projectable outward, but must otherwise be locally and “inwardly” encoded inside first).

If subjectivity reduces wholly to objectivity then there is no “unconsciousness” any more than there is an absolutely intangible form of causation for consciousness. Instead, there is just more of the objective world we can look at but not always see (even and particularly when others “see” what we can’t yet) in two different functional “directions”, but always in one substance-thing. As such not seeing what one is looking right at is simply a failure of some content at one level of function to tip to a higher level, and so become the content of another function, a more fully conceptualizing or integrating one.

Thoughts arise, unbidden and insistent, the rider on this universal stream is not the horse but becomes it, water is not the stream it makes up, but becomes it . . . the quiet mind is not an empty container, it is a decentering of inner looking back to encompass all of unreflective outer being both before and

after the small self could ever see itself or other. The will is thus a court jester, aping truth but never telling it, but for the purview of its own unconsciousness, which it too often denies just to know itself better.

This perpetual overrunning of the will is demonstrated not only in the endless thinking of unwilled content but also in the unstoppable reflexive or “knee-jerk” valuing of that same content when we find ourselves fully seeing it (in naive or *too fast* judgment, what I will soon refer to as *naive or divide and conquer use of reason*), but for those rare and supposed always freely chosen moments in which some act of the supposed same self as that will declares itself mental first cause directing all the currents of *The Logos*, and for this assumption is never seen as endlessly at this current’s mercy, so by this also ignoring *the will* is always bedfellow to an un-sleeping and depth-less chaos. If we pay close inner attention we see *the willed* arises as unbidden and spontaneously as *the unwilled*, but for the naming it differently, so any act of “will” always covers up an unbidden thought of epiphenomenal meta-character: ‘let **me** take the reins for a while’, even though it is the thinking cart that is driven by the behaving horse most, if not all of the time.

The naive and un-mastered mind presents as an overflowing geyser of the unbidden masquerading as a self-consciousness, proposing a fathomless and depth-less ***within***, but one constrained very narrowly by the biological ego—the solution to the problem of consciousness, not the opening—the cap to the always bursting well. The will simply enters this stream from time to time to play at (empty) identity games. So, regardless as to my exhortations, regardless as to your own biases, intentions, and visceral reactions, meanings will likely multiply beyond necessity in you as being wholly due to me but expect to get as much wrong in your understanding as I will get wrong in my meaning intentions. I have also now interfered with the very possibility of affording you a purer approach by this simple conceit; that my method’s madness is what matters as much to the meaning well as the meanings taken; the medium’s meaning style is the message too.

That media (vehicle) and message (content) are endlessly and intractably entangled seems a trivial claim to me (but not to the materialist computationalists, of course), but that my confrontations against the centrality of logic in serving knowing, and that the interleaved and mostly tacitly expressed themes, memes, styles and slowed down methods of communication I am proposing are not meant to replace logic but to re-extend it, is not. Therefore, my meanings lie both within and beyond all the propositions, arguments, and shameless metaphorizations, and might always say more than that deemed as said by other “experts” or even as confirmed by me. Even I, in the final analysis, am only better discovering my meaning as I write this, as it goes it comes, as it comes it goes, so by the time you have left a engrammatic trail of bread crumbs to some (mind palace) house in the forest and return from inner nature to the detached idealism’s of culture—monetarily freed from the chthonic nature of the deep dark woods of the chaos ***within***—I will have already moved on (and on (and on (. . . .

But I (not this far-indexing avatar you must construct, but the living person you will likely never know) remain *in perpetuity* the only arbiter of whether or not what someone (anyone) else says I meant is what I meant then (or can mean better now); that some paraphrase of my content is to the best of my recollection and current thinking what I actually meant, or failed to mean at all, or meant in some multivalent way both well and poorly always returns as an endlessly re-open-able question that only I can try to answer, but never with finality.

So, I remain in perpetuity the only fit arbiter of my intended and modified meanings as must be the default ethical case for all coherent enough meaners (think on this, do you allow for it, or stomp on it with your power, i.e., with your always too zealous but unjustified “normal” reactivity?).

This introduction, this appeal for you to adapt a way of interpretation that is anathema to how you have likely been implicitly predisposed (now by almost 3000 years of forms of increasingly one-sided kinds of epistemic, normative, and ontological absolutism, some due to human biological nature, some to lack of ideological imagination) starts with its intent to mean by warding off—by asking for a break from instant criticism on the basis of a truth functional assessment of just those propositions so disposed intrinsically to bear objective truths (all the purported “facts” of science I drag in). I beg for this in part because at the level of meaning on my own opaquely provided and largely deferred semantic theory and theory of mind, which speaks of an epistemic integration in agency beyond paradox whereby the quality of collective experience and not just the truth status of certain privileged propositions matter as much to knowing well demands this (philosophers call this epistemic “charity”, but it is only given narrowly and begrudgingly in academia lately in my experience). There is no final resting place in logic on offer here, nor in your experience of my attempts to mean alone, but both are to be reintegrated in some way that must transcend just the logically purified thinking, writing and talking to the sorts of de-centred being that have always been the sought for goal of the perennial wisdom traditions (and their practitioners claims of ‘doing philosophy more authentically’).

Meanings may variously reduce to a plurality of truth functional logics in normatively useful ways, but on my account are somewhat epistemically degraded and ethically diminished by the process of reduction unless there is a return of the bereft fragments forward—those we call certain or probably true knowledge—to a renewed and wiser re-centring in an always open-ended meta-skepticism. Importantly, doing this requires the all-too-rarely demonstrated ability to be present to what is without the need to first (or lastly) conceive and judge it in language at all. One does not understand (after taking in the original representations) until the “I” lives with the thing in question without any representational distance, so both prior and posterior to what is given to naive perception. When one has an actual mountain to mind for the direct seeing of it, one’s mind is literally on the mountain (is what I, Ken Wilber and William James, and I’d expect many more, think). In naturalistic terms this is cashed out as due to the many mountain-conveyed causes from the past that have been selected for structuring behavioural fitness in the present—causes are both timeless and indexed, local and non-local. For *Naturalism* we re-perceive any new mountain as of *all mountains ever existing and/or*

previously perceived. Live representations of the facts of any mountain's particular or universal essence both add and detract from the experience of it, if only for always mixing in both and standing between. Only when you "become" the mountain can you truly know its nature as your own. On my integrative view we should always expect to find more paradoxes and inconsistencies as meta-knowings even as removing such paradoxes is in other reasoned guises lately the only King crowned to rule all literal knowings (as space-time-scale-less facts).

Deeper knowing, I believe, beckons to move beyond even the best forms of expressed use of reason to novel forms of experience; while we need pass *first* through the many logics we must accept we can never permanently reside in any of them with any absolute consistency, coherence and correctness. We intuit (we "humans" are psychologically defined and overrun by) a need for absolute certainty and control as the relative forms of each are instantly self-defeating (they always find themselves in some logical or material war against the other or the self). This God-mocking and all too rapacious human pursuit of certainty and control appears in the Bible as *Original Sin* and has now turned to the late epistemic need for conceiving only of finite being, also due wholly—I believe—to a deeply hidden psychological, not logical or empirical motive. This is especially evident as we continue to push the poles of the rational-irrational opposition too far apart into their own inner structures through either conceptual analyses or empirical inductions. Instead, I wish to provide an analysis of an original and universal problem (one I propose still has a naturalistic explanation) owed to (the concept) PSYCHE, so one only contingently and locally a problem owed first to *homo sapiens*, but always one necessarily and inevitably arising for some contingent species at some non-local universal tipping point. This inevitable problem of the insistence of universal psyche is now deeply embedded into the general methods of human rationality but it also speaks of a wider irrationality in the current forms of folk metaphysics and associated methods of conferring social and political power.

However, as there is no way to escape the need to be logical along the way there is also no way of warding off the easy claims against this work of hypocrisy, opacity and self-refutation (of the epistemic kinds) in its aims to leap over logic back towards unrepresented meaning, and not fall to assessing its meanings as some logical model by just its valid (or strong) syntax and sound (or cogent) content. I am trying to demonstrate the inherent and irreducible problem of declaring "man as the measure of all things" and tie this to the deepest and most denied (but painfully obvious to me) causes of our looming environmental and cultural problems (and also to unpack my metaphorization of ORIGINAL SIN) within the narrower context of The Representational Theory of Mind (RTM).

More Overwrought Philosophical Conventions

I am also using the fairly common philosophical convention throughout that a capitalized word, unless context determines otherwise based on more typical or universal writing conventions, is meant to invoke the concept and all that would soundly fall under its *extension*—i.e., the set of all objects picked out by the concept as given by its *intension* or “definition”. Invoking the concept by all-capping a word is contrasted with using the same word as a term. A *term* in philosophy is a part of speech typically referring to something singular, basically a generic name. Besides capitalizing terms to mean their concepts and not some in place particular referent or placeholder for one I also use other philosophical/linguistic text modifying conventions such as ->“<- scare quotes ->“<- to variously mock a term, to coin one, to suggest a tongue-in-cheek use or simply to acknowledge that the term is vague as I have used it but where I have no intention of fixing this vagueness (so assuming I have no argumentative need to in this work, yet might have some hope I can meet that need in other forums). I also use single quotes of terms to differentiate the *use* of a term to mean from the *mention* of the term as just its arbitrary string of symbols. While the anti-philosophical crowd might rail against such esoteric burdens being placed on their interpretations this convention speaks directly to my larger thesis as well. As other distinctions besides *Use-Mention*, such as *Content-Vehicle* or *Vehicle-Target* or *Content-Target* turn out to matter deeply in saying rationally (the logical use of reason game) as opposed to metaphorically (the empty language games of rhetoric or other forms of verbal sophistry) then this one does as well, even if no one can pin down or agree upon exactly what this distinction is, or how it most consistently operates.

For the fine arguments to be made palatable here for the non-philosophical it often matters very much towards best meaning in propositional communication not to conflate how sentences like ‘there is a cat on the mat’ versus, ‘I named my dog ‘cat’ ‘ (“I named my dog, ‘cat’”?) leverage the stringing together of ‘c’ & ‘a’ & ‘t’ and the sound made doing by this very differently. Both the need to make such a distinction and the immediate problem it creates for other grammatical conventions should be apparent (if not, keep re-reading the last two sentences until you “see” the difference between using a word and mentioning it; until you see there are two, not one ‘c-a-t’s in play, one a living thing, the other just a namesaker, if one follows Russell just a disguised description, or if one follows Kripke and Donnellan evoking a baptism of necessarily rigid designation made by always uniquely identifying material first cause taken across all possible worlds). I also tend to variously capitalize, italicize or scare-quote memes or technical phrases, “isms”, “ologies” or general problems (as terms) in common use and broad import in philosophy the first time I use them, but then fall back to normal text, unless I am trying to add tone for emphasis, or to shift the pace of reading to match what I felt on the writing. I also *italicize* and use Title Form for the names of books or other works of art and use **both bolding** and *italicizing* together for special emphasis (I actually prefer to use ALLCAPS as a form of, not shouting but EMPHASIZING, but this conflicts with standard academic practice, and is largely editorially poo-pooed). I doubt all this matters very much—look for perfect consistency of declared uses at your own interpretive peril except as an in-place example of the sorts of epistemic need that drives the creation of such conventions in the first place, and so already “proves” their value.

I will in this work as its largest aim attempt to debunk the “man is the measure of all things”^{NOTE} meme

NOTE: And I am going beyond the standard interpretation of Protagoras here. I am taking this meme to mean something closer to “human *reason* is the measure of all things”, thus endorsing absolute faith in the means and ends of the human epistemic project meant to reduce understanding of nature *in toto* by the methods of mathematics, philosophy, and science. A fuller translation goes, “Of all things the measure is man, of the things that are, that [or “how”] they are, and of things that are not, that [or “how”] they are not.”. The source of this quote is Plato’s Theaetetus. I’ll assume you can find copy without much effort.

by walking a knife’s edge using my antagonist’s own methods and metaphysics against them by saying well enough on those same terms what shows--no matter how ideally rational individuals might be--this is no hedge against the worst collective forms of irrationality emerging in concert at a higher level. A much too one-sided promotion of individual over collective ends is as much a cause of our current collective excesses as anything. Worse, many of these excesses are exactly those deeming this the golden age of use of reason and faith in knowledge, all with its concomitant “proof” of control over the natural world that at the same time licences us to degrade the very same world in ways that can only predictably lead to collapse on scales we have never seen before. What I see as the most irrational values, methods, and social and epistemic aims are likely those by which your own denial of the endless threat of chaos is superficially maintained. That I might be proven right is no consolation, not needing to be right would be the better place to be, just as not needing to be apologized to is so much better than experiencing even the most sincere and heartfelt apology.^{NOTE}

NOTE: I find less and less value in receiving apologies as many lately seem built over norms of superficial politeness masking subtle forms of passive-aggressiveness to the very different kinds of values I might promote to avoid the worst outcomes for global civilization, i.e. those focused on each of us accepting personal and proactive responsibility for the fate of the entire collective into the future celebrating/*freely choosing* a LESS is MORE ethic, rather than deferring this responsibility to some “system” (you know, the one that created and continues to further the problem by its implicit design and metaphysically and value-laden but always *begged* premises). Lately this need for *personal-ownership-of-all-collective-problems* value is too rarely spoken of. I will, however, accept apologies for you failing to do this. I will also state the only reasoned solution, given not only the positive evidence but general foolishness of trying to predict the future overall that is wisest (even if it turns out unneeded): Voluntary Global Austerity. If we expect to be allowed to produce material wants beyond any real need without limit in unchecked wealth stockpiling and “save the planet” (what rubbish, it’s not the planet that needs saving, it’s the human soul, as always) then I fear every other effect towards solving these **many looming crises** is just more all-too-literal pissing in the oceans (seas, lakes, rivers . . .). Instead, the on-offer solutions to the harms of our excesses still fall to perpetuating the very systems, methods and metaphysical assumptions (many elitist and over 300 years old, solving problems that don’t exist anymore based on ideas of human capacity that are also outdated and denied by evidence; see Steven Pinker for just one cogent example³) that have created the problems we have as legal endorsements. Particularly this seems obvious in terms of our unhinged and irrationally premised (infinite growth???, purely rational agents???) economic system.

There will inevitably be a certain amount of unavoidable glossing and hyperbole in this, but these are emotional topics so leaving emotion out seems to miss the point of feeling's own base embodying role in meaning well. Read this work as you will but try not to get lost in the representations as facts. I am not an anti-representationalist but would offer a corrective to the technical notion of MENTAL REPRESENTATION. What conventional philosophy sees as physical states purely cleaved from their targets I see more as echoes variously focused in on from within as lagging traces of whatever caused them without, always derived from an unbounded field of outer-to-inner cause-effect complexes, so never offering up some categorically pure and wholly arbitrary separation of what is represented from what represents, or from the rest of the universe (or even from what is prior and posterior to all of that). My view of mental representation is an always mixed local and non-local one, anti-Newtonian or anti-mechanistic, and meta-paradoxical or "pre-ontological". In my masters research paper, I argued that much of cognitive science is trapped within an implicit model of the mind as a container for thoughts or ideas in the way Newton conceived of space as an absolute container for things and events moving along some absolutely independent and yet still universally shared stream of time. The infecting spectre of Cartesianism is well documented as a cause of some current epistemic perversions and continues to endlessly infect debate even as its premises are explicitly denied by the materialists often blindly continuing to invoke Cartesian notions such as lead to the problem of the homunculus, the Cartesian Theatre, or a hidden interaction problem, but the infecting spectre of Newtonian views of space-time corrupt philosophy of mind to a far greater extent in ways few seem to notice on my account, but this is not argued for directly in this work, only entailed peripherally.

A Polemic Concern: The A-rational Conception of Quantity

This is also a polemic, so not purely argumentative or discursive work. My deepest concerns are ethical, teleological, and about how our abuse of the natural environment, intended or not, anticipatable or not, blameworthy or not, speaks immediately to our irrationally motivated *effective* ends in spite of all our otherwise well celebrated rational means. A cursory account that resituates the problem of rationality into some fringe models is also waved at in various places (Don Beck's Spiral Dynamics⁴ and Ken Wilber's Integral Theory^{5,6} largely, but Hegel⁷ was the first, perhaps, to promote a spiral of consciousness evolving over paradox, i.e., as the dialectic⁷). These models anticipate the inherent limits of the scientific world view as just another leap up the developmental spiral evident in the evolution of consciousness as the finite out of the infinite. No reasons are given for claims arising from these models as logical argument, just pure defiant assertion. Only a war by words against the accidental and largely denied war our methods of control impose on nature will do here. I fear our too rapacious forms of reason would

have the very world consumed to nothing rather than admit by its own methods that all forms of certainty and control are illusory, temporary at best. The only forms of control and certainty that ever work absolutely and finitely are “self-destructive”, but here the equivocation of SELF covers both a pathological denial of existence as we find it and the door to its transcendence. The essence and being of finite things are more immediately accountable ontologically (meaning: *in their essential being*) if the infinite is also “real”, the order of explanation is just inverted in a way inconsistent with Big Bang Cosmology. But, proposing a “Big Bang” only answers *The How In/As Time* not *The Why*, while proposing a real infinite answers *The Why* but destroys all sayings as to how ever being lastingly meaningful; so, *only logically* forced to. We already decided the boon of our self-conscious use of reason grants us a place in a finite universe arising from a sub-finite source (a real nothing). But then it seems we need to endlessly daisy chain together more turtles. Yet, assuming a real infinite explains the problem of induction without much recourse or deep thought (the concepts LAWFUL REGULARITY and INFINITY are deeply inconsistent; there may be habits of a near-infinite nature, but never immutable and universal laws).

I am also concerned to apply what I am coining here as the *General Derridean Concern* about a certain denied character of Western rationality. I suspect many take Derrida’s deconstructionism—as it is applied to texts—as intended only for texts, so appearing in the final analysis as yet another empty turn made in some language game in the informally pejorative sense beyond what Wittgenstein meant. However, I suspect that as Descartes often equivocated about his ultimate views on God so Derrida may have felt his views were meant to fall through to the objects so represented but hedged in a similar spirit. I will make no such hedge and assume his general concerns about Western metaphysics are even more *apropos* when applied to the objects represented than of the representations so reified. In this alone we might start to see that human language is less imperfect in representation than is assumed by most theoreticians who are tacitly or explicitly still motivated by some form of Fregean-inspired logicism.

“The basic argumentation always attempts to show that no one is able to separate irreplaceable singularity and machine-like repeatability (or “iterability”, as Derrida frequently says) into two substances that stand outside of one another; nor is anyone able to reduce one to the other so that we would have one pure substance (with attributes or modifications). Machine-like repeatability and irreplaceable singularity, for Derrida, are like two forces that attract one another across a limit that is indeterminate and divisible.”⁸

If any rational method is guilty of flouting this concern it is making a sin against rationality as Derrida must be proposing if he assumes he is also making rational claims. Then, there may be nowhere more deeply than in logic’s attempt to reduce quantity and mathematics to pure logical function over the Peano-Dedekind Axioms where this concern first arises. This is shown when one asks the metaphysical question as to whether or not that literally first and best of whole numbers, what is represented by ‘one’, or ‘1’, or just ‘|’ or ‘/’ or ‘\’, etc., so representing the most minimally essential finite cardinal

quantity to stand opposed to nothing (which is also to stand opposed to everything else as a delimited or unrepresented, or undivided and uncounted “other”, all to serve as epistemic background to the original datum). How exactly does this *irreplaceable singularity* when added to itself (more properly only when succeeding itself and not zero for the first time) become another entity of the same *Type*, but now different-meaning *Token*? Isn’t it “equally” just the same one-ness *used* twice, where its re-application always occurs over some pure time-difference rather than in one space-event *in the counting or the putting of things into one-to-one correspondences by their concepts*? How can we ever rationally iterate in the pure way logic claims to, to a new irreplaceable singularity named—among many other signs: ‘two’ if Derrida’s concern is always rationally apt? If in this use of classical logic we really capture something of what quantity is **and** Derrida’s concern falls through to its referents then doesn’t the machine-like repeatability and irreplaceable singularity of one-ness become as much an entire feature both embedded in and encompassing two-ness as its own recapitulated “same-different” one-ness, or does the difference between ONE and TWO become only what logic requires: for two-ness to be unequivocally not that same one-ness in any way but for it being the end of some self-succession, so now standing both beside and outside itself but now over just a pure difference, and where Derrida is wrong (or I am wrong about his message aptly falling through texts to their supposed material targets)?

Derrida is, I believe, arguing that there are no such pure differences ever possible, only relative ones whose separate essences always reside in some (possibly paradoxical) tension due to a necessary and ineliminable return to the essence due only the original instantiation, but in ways that then belie the conceptual extensional purity that we end up promoting (two-ness in logic finally owes its essence only to itself, never to the one-ness it succeeds). But the Derridean tension that arises after TWO is perfectly cleaved by its own logical essence from ONE by SUCCESSION in seeing how two-ness still retains in its essential character a same-different form of original one-ness in its ability to be predicated of sets of things exactly as one is, and just as arbitrarily—i.e. a two-ness categorizes as its own one-making concept (but for the different *logical* meaning) both at a distance from one-ness for categorizing differently and absolutely **but also at no distance at all** in sharing the problem of ontology and vanishing abstractness in predication equivalently (assuming as some do, that numbers are properties of sets). And these Derridean tensions can be shown to happen in more than one way. For example: every whole number is infinitely greater than zero in a precisely equivalent logical way (For any x an element of the set of positive whole numbers, $x/0$ is either logically undefined or represents “infinity”) yet only 1 ever has to make this step from nothing to some thing as part of its intensional/definitional essence (as the original “logic” took things ‘0’ was just a placeholder for where we start counting, so the paradoxical move from a real nothing to a real one-ness is glossed, i.e. somewhat perversely ‘0’ is assumed a Whole and Integer number, but not a Natural number, as nothing in nature is it, or could ever be it, but this is not *naively* supposed the case for all other positive whole numbers). From there we simply repeat the succession of that same one-ness as the same **now magically finite** difference between ZERO and ONE, over and over, but is this really a rationally justified move?

This feature of cardinal number of abstracting away from all the material it qualifies over, for example, taking ‘two of X’ as one and another one of X in strict correspondence to ‘1’ and ‘2’, is always made with a necessary “distance” between objects, but where distance is really always in Einsteinian space-time, not—but for a conveniently endorsed folk illusion—ever just in Newtonian space or just over some Newtonian time. So, is the same one object viewed at different space-times in some two otherwise inter-translatable non-inertial frameworks not also a two-ness if both views are in the translating effectively see-able from some third framework *species sub aeternitatis*? Are there not relativistic cases where observers looking in representation from each other’s frameworks can only make sense of this situation as if there are always many relative and not just one absolute version of each primary property for objects essentially? Is this not already the case with relativistic time, length, and mass dilation? Are there not two (or many) lengths, two (or many) times of transit, two (or many) masses, so two (or many) objects simply bound not by one quantified essence but only by the one “fact” of the lawful translation of frameworks? Where is the pure one-ness of the relativistically counted object we call the universe found exactly? For now only at the Big Bang, and in the opposite “direction” marked by the unbounded limits of observation of those parts of it now moving away faster than light, so there is really only a one-ness in the material story of all closed *observable* causes, or as naively inferred from the unity of experience, but then all things become the same one thing except for the evolution of points of view, not ever for what is viewed at some special point as some absolute thing as a pure one-ness by essence. If there is no absolute temporal or spatial simultaneity possible how can we ever be certain some event of counting, in naive perception at least—which always assumes an absolutely shared Newtonian frame of reference where two objects exist side by side in the same relative space at the same time (rather than at very remote spaces at the same time, where pragmatically the counting becomes imagined, not actual, not *close*)—is absolute in the way the non-Derridean reading of quantity assumes?^{NOTE}

NOTE: The Derridean poles of QUANTITY are really ONE and NOTHING, not ONE and ZERO. ZERO is a disingenuous hedge, a way to exploit the infinite without honouring it. The very idea of a real nothing is absurd once any thing is found to exist in any sort of way by the experience of it, or just as that experience, dated or not (and Descartes’ *Cogito* went some of the way to showing this).

Conventional thought assumes this: a thing is a thing that is always just one thing essentially, and so we coin all things minted together as due just “one turning” (the etymological interpretation of ‘universe’). Any mundane event of counting takes some energy (and some time, and is made over some concrete or abstract “space”) but by this never adds matter to the counted above and beyond the pre-existing matter of the objects so qualified (and the matter of heaping the to-be-counted objects together only adds to the total count mass proportionately as its own *as if* “one” mass). The neatest trick of counting seems to rest on the mysterious capacity of minds to variously treat that “same” heaped-but-always-at-some-tangible-and-conceptual-distance matter as both plurality and unity from different mereological/conceptual scales, so if any set is ever owed a cardinality essentially it is only temporally

and after being abstractly bound together as a plurality quite arbitrarily and very intangibly. There is always some other scale or some other conceptual parsing in which parts and/or wholes are as easily shorn apart and never to be seen as a natural plurality or unity at all, otherwise lumped in for counting with things that share little to nothing of essence with them *but for the fact that some mind is counting as arbitrarily and as generally as possible*. At the limits, in the most general and least sophisticated forms of counting, the sort a manic child might perform by counting every thing it sees or touches—even counting sub-parts of wholes as belonging to the same level as the whole towards some countable infinity (so already counting like a Derridean) nothing of the essences of any of the objects so arbitrarily counted in this way could ever seem to play any role in determining the tie to the essence of the number so ascribed to any such set's cardinality.

But there is a pseudo-contradiction hiding in this result too. What is always left to be explained is, 'why this set, why this conceptual level, why these objects in it (what are objects???)'. What really prioritizes the choice between counting some parts at some lower level or instead counting some set of higher-level wholes made of them as the right things to be owed all these same-different cardinalities so arbitrarily? Part of the answer, of course, lies in a theoretical account of how the machinery of intentionality combined with symbol grounding facilitates conception, so counting it seems is inherently often an act of passive or naive but always arbitrary bringing together at or across some mereological scale, one that while it never alters the essence of the things it binds has *at least* invoked some tacitly preferred (so a *value*) loci of essence in the background to motivate the choice of appropriate level at which to start binding (already here, a constructionist view of ontology of number is motivated, but we are physicalists, so . . .).

What, then, makes the mereological shift entailed by some different choice of counting-perspective sometimes radically indifferent to essence at or across any or all levels of parts or wholes, and at other times heeding to essence more necessarily when motivating a more scientific form of counting (when counting natural kinds or measuring with S.I. units, for example)? If no act of counting is supposed to add anything to the essences of the members of the set counted but some minimal essence needs always be consistently invoked from the background if the counting is to remain logical (non-Derridean), the essence owed of any application of some cardinal number could only belong to the set's extension via its intension, the argument goes. For example, when some completely arbitrary set of two objects has a two-ness ascribed to it this ascription is only made "tangentially" to the essence of what two-ness predicates it with necessarily, but this essence then only seems applicable over some purely intangible, i.e., over a forever causally walled-off representative distance. Yet a materially causal explanation of QUANTITY is also required to cash out the physicalism and the epistemic faith in measurement and the logical models and theories we build by measuring, but as the way numbers are defined logically allows them to be so arbitrarily predicated of sets of things without any necessary ties to how essence only sometimes types tokens of some kind, would seem to rule this possibility out summarily.

It seems to me that all current Fregean or Humean derived attempts to reduce numbers to set theory in terms of 1-to-1 correspondences between their concepts is defined in terms of an immateriality and a-

casualness so pure as to be summarily made inconsistent with any possible physical account by definition. If there is no need for the essence of some cardinal number to ever physically touch that which a mind is otherwise binding it to and in addition this binding is also assumed made over some further pure separation of symbol meaning to target, it seems perverse to me to expect to be able to then build a model of the mind that ontologically expects all and any act of counting to reduce to some fine physical instantiation from this *immaterially doubled-down* starting place. So, I would instead argue that while the use of numerals as symbols is logical, perhaps the real targeted quantities in their instantiated material forms always defy logic in some relative way, and this is missed (denied) by how counting has been defined as only allowable in a non-Derridean way. It seems to me, metaphorically speaking, that if there is no real Derridean tension between the instantiation of ONE and its endless iterations there is also no possibility of finding any tangible causes in the predication of cardinality at all, and in perpetuity. The problem of the ontology of quantity, I think, must be more directly assimilable to the mind-body problem via the explanation as to how choice of what to count is made so arbitrarily regardless as to any involved causal essence of what is so counted, as well as in saying how conception materially works in the background, which could not work as arbitrarily as counting sometimes does in always at least tacitly leveraging some background essence in making the choice of what to bind by saying how this binding is made a logical one. This is not a contradiction *per se*, but it proposes a confused expectation that any proffered functionalist account of mind is doomed to have to reconcile: what kind of function could operate over the material inputting of some non-zero background material essence as a real background or structuring cause and then produce an output *that by definition* fails to “touch” or materially bring together material essence as due physical cause at all?

If instead, Derrida’s concern falls though as I surmise it does (but only for the sake of the war of words, not to make a deduction) then what is only represented by ‘2’, but isn’t at all what 2 is, is already a mixed thing that could never stand apart from all other quantities along some line, as 2 is as much a force that attracts 0, 1, copies of itself, 3, . . . indeterminately, although always looking from its place of metaphorical a-line-ment as some precise and purely cleaved off instance made in some logically perfect proportional succession (remembering that the root of rationality is ‘*ratio*’, which means what ‘reason’ does in English, but as first expressed in Latin, so now yields to 2 English senses, thus forever defining with some *Derridean-style* semantic tension between sub-meanings *transparently*). I think at some fine enough point we must disavow the assumed pure arbitrariness between symbol and target/meaning assumed by most semantic theoreticians (if I am right about what Derrida was indirectly right about, belabouring the point as I take one side then the next without warning) especially if we assume to find some fine contingent and *matter-only* first or “original” cause in the natural story explaining both the possibility and experience of counting as we have found (or constructed) it.

What it seems to me we must do to even start the mathematizations is carve the entailed paradoxical relational essence of quantity away *by irrational fiat* to just a functional notion (as much so that no thing can be in two places at once and counted as such, or two material things in the same place at once, although bosons, which are material and have consistent material causes and effects, including

interacting with mass, do so without recourse and no one seems to mind about this in terms of how particles in the same physical space are to be counted differently in Bose-Einstein versus Maxwell-Boltzmann statistics). But MATHEMATICAL FUNCTION is largely derived from the biological notion defined though the experience of living things exhibiting telos', so is already conceived in pseudo material (psychological and intentional) terms and not something the non-living and mind-independent universe does representationally at all; it is determined as matter without any goals by a supposed random walk, only first becoming locally undetermined against the second law of thermodynamics as life (LIFE being yet another open mystery as to essence and first causes). So perhaps there is a relational account for the construction of numbers along the lines of Derrida's concern possible? But, how would we know, having decided we already have what we are looking for; a finite and purely functional reduction for quantity, rather than defining numbers inside-out by an infinite set of expanding delimited relations? Seeking the second method would, of course, make doing mathematics a purely irrational enterprise, if only in appearance. Instead, we define (again, by fiat) mathematics as the prototype and exemplar of all rational enterprise yet might be doing so only on the deeply irrational assumption that the succession from zero to one is of the same essential character as that from one to two, etc.

The problem for the assumed better use of reason behind promoting logic by and for eliminating paradox also requires the divisibility of the continuum (the real number line from 0 to 1) serve as a representation of the infinite even as a real infinity is anathema to the metaphysics of science directly in proportion to its sub-discipline's relative claims to epistemic fundamentalism, with physics assumed the most fundamental and purely deductive science of all. Yet, doing this denies the radical indeterminacy always inherent in making choices out of any infinite set (a real material infinity would just as likely offer up things beyond any determinable ordering in time or space, as beyond time no change in space is even possible, it's just everything all at once and nowhere or no when at all, or no things no where at all, at no times, no how . . .). The real trick here is to say how the finite resources of mental representation transcend not only their own essential finitude, but also allows for something materially based that not only conceives of the infinite in abstraction on its own logical if not more purely abstract terms, but when its ontology is finally provided also reduces in explanation back to something finite, if only unbounded by the practical limits of space-time, of the only as far as we know just visibly bounded universe itself (so a countable infinity is allowed as some futile practice, yet the uncountable ones fall within the same continuum between 0 and 1 as far as we know). If Derrida's concern is valid and does fall through to its material objects as representational targets as well, then the real problem in explaining how measurement of primary properties made relative to internally consistent empirical standards (the S. I. units) yields absolute knowledge of nature so cogently as it would appear to might be premised on a false or *too purely aesthetic* choice, so on an a-rational notion, i.e. (*and again*) that the difference between zero/0 (a lie representing a real nothing) and one/1 is the same as that between one/1 and two/2, at least in the additive/functional sense by which the natural numbers are first constructed, i.e. *definitionally and pragmatically, but not by this ontologically or epistemically cashed out* (see: Bennaceraf⁹ and others).

In the end I believe Derrida is as right as I am about what he really intended, so by scandalous glossing analogy entailing while representations are assumed purely divisible, in ontic terms, from what they represent in conventional approaches to cognitive science and linguistics they are really—in the ineliminable residues of analyses and logical definition—in some vanishing and perhaps unrepresentable way always bound to each other inseparably as well. But this would seem to make the non-existent have to exist, and worse, make the past caused as much by the future as the future by the past. In other words, although non-Derridean use of reason would have us construct the numbers out of a real nothing that is not itself a quantity by repeating in succession the irreplaceable singularity that is represented by any and all finite one-nesses in the symbolic replacement of REAL NOTHING with ‘zero’ or ‘0’, the fact we can iterate new entities without limit (both without and within, and even in 2 dimensions as complex numbers) may not yield the *a priori* tool for absolute epistemic determination as we assume for it in applying its methods to science by so simply tacking on the right consistently relativized units to their right numerals for the scale at hand. Instead, mathematics may only really offer up a relative and rationally fallible application, one whose epistemic limits are not only due to human cognitive limits, but to some kind of Derridean limit (such as the far-ended one Gödel’s Theorems offer up?). Consider at least all those differential equations which can be set up but not solved, and matters such as $P=NP?$, the three-body problem, etc. Are these methodological failings due to limits of our reason or the proof of an irreducible limit to how real objects correlate, or “lie upon” their logical-scientific models in terms of predicting their behaviour as *determined by quantitative measurement*, so ultimately due to a one-sided philosophical view of QUANTITY (and perhaps QUALITY in turn)?

This act of Western-derived reason, the collapsing of truth only into models representing primary qualities by relativized and internally consistent S. I. unit-attached quantification's (that as much defined the Modern Period) may actually be based on a more deeply a-rational premise (but one *still* inevitably and unavoidably made for the very progress of science and better use of reason this allows, but only ever showing the way to its own transcendence). In turn the epistemic traction that math yields to science might be more contingent than the intuitions that justify use of pure primary quality quantification over less universal and fundamental forms of quality as the sign of epistemic superiority the more “fundamental” sciences assume; those also being the epistemic ethics that promote reductive views most of all. When taking the Derridean concern to heart cashing out a materialist ontology for numbers seems even more elusive and would seem to demand even more faith in staying the course than experimental scientists already demonstrate in holding to their own preferred method of empirical quantification, that being induction with its concomitant scandal. The scandal is that no deductive method justifying the cogency of induction seems on offer, rather the very possibility has been well argued against^{10,11}. Of course, taking a quick peak from the side of *Philosophical Idealism*, the Platonists look no better as all they have done is to build an untestable straw-world of perfect straw objects no materialist could but renounce out of hand. Yet, the application of mathematics by observation to just primary qualities seems to clearly work best at achieving a method that appears profoundly and progressively epistemic in the most stripped-down possible *prima facie* terms, and this must matter and be explained even if we are ultimately a-rational in how we construct numbers in only logically

conceptual terms. This “bad” or “a-rational” use of rationality in the short run still clearly led to a better understanding of many mysteries of the natural world, if not to the lasting certainty and control we also, much more irrationally hoped for going in.

Closing Remarks about Method^{NOTE}

NOTE: As this work has been released as a first (now second) draft I have placed most of the non-citation notes in place, as much because I want them read, but this might change in an imagined final published work, so I have not addressed this style point in this section as it is currently prohibitive, but still intentional.

Two final points about method, perhaps directed at those non-philosophers that stay the course of this admittedly difficult, stylistic rule flouting and all too verbose work. In these anti-intellectual times (isn't that all times?) philosophy often appears as the whipping boy for poor or “over” use of reason (even among other academics as I have sadly experienced; while they expect my respect for their disciplines they often denigrate mine as if I must naturally do the same in my work as some kind of apology for perpetuating the discipline at all). Yet no one can believe or express a damn thing and no scientist can conceive of any experiment or its interpretation without first believing before/beyond the evidence; all hypotheses start as philosophical propositions, as just one example. Many also trade in the empty meme that philosophers make the simple unnecessarily complex (hence, the informal perjury owed in playing *Language Games*) and try to make the irreducibly complex inappropriately simple, but this is the obverse of the actual case. To believe at all already requires holding a web of often ~~unconscious~~ not reflectively or occurrently conscious, or at least tacit beliefs, at least a significant proportion of which are false, false, false. No one's naive model of the world is either valid or sound, so any believing starts as naive or folk philosophy and scientists in particular who claim they are not doing any philosophy seem most deluded of all, much more so than even the densest and most anti-intellectual of lay people. What philosophy in the West does, in already assuming realism about some kind of appearance-reality gap—hence skepticism being its proper core if not most self-defeating position (but for the ethical need for it) is to show, as Socrates did so annoyingly he was put to death for his successes, many of the most naively taken concepts we all endorse, IDENTITY, FREE WILL, JUSTICE, RIGHTS, TRUTH, GOD, etc. are in fact the hardest to define (and end up seeming the most representationally unreal, such that agnosticism should be the norm, yet rarely is, such are the demands of a too naive—a *divide and conquer* use of reason).

Even Science is coming around to endorse such claims, mainly with their own wholly negative evidence, i.e., in finding no clear material basis for many of our most cherished concepts either. All this means, if nothing else, is we have more faith in our beliefs and norms than reason or evidence behind them most

of the time. Western philosophy also has had great success at reducing some of the most superficially complex phenomena of nature to explanation by lawful relations holding between lower scale simples to relative non-mysteries. However, when it does this generally for some well delineated domain of inquiry it simply spawns a new science. The very progress in number and kinds of science is the best evidence for the centrality and epistemic importance of philosophy; our residual epistemic failures are the negative but necessary background of all positive scientific knowings; hence it being called *the negative science* by some. Doing philosophy well is hard, taking a path of great resistance always risking deep epistemic folly, but there is often more value in the path of greatest resistance, especially when the contingent general nature of the knower has evolved to almost always follow the easier *biological* path, even and especially when that leads to blind “self-destruction” in the name of psychological positivity, a wolf a sheep’s clothing.

So!: I expect you to work for my meanings as a rich and challenging meal of many layered courses, some of which I have designed to be unpalatable, so not to have to spoon feed you, as much because I seek to distract you from the inevitable reactions you may experience as you discover the sacred cows you cherish most blindly are being tipped over, summarily, apolitically, and without remorse.

Finally, while I respect the needs of clarity and brevity and calls for use of the simplest possible language and style I also fear this rallying cry has lately done as much to make the best of possible meaning opaque just to serve *status quo* power, rather than to serve any needed development in forms of meaning at all. Practised too slavishly this prevents any expansion and development beyond the limited forms of “communication” by which the brain-eating masses are fed palatable but endlessly ambiguous metaphors and analogies that do as much to obscure as reveal hidden meanings we all need take to heart if the species is to survive its many excesses. To this end I am trying to create new forms of language and new styles as much by refusing to dumb down my meanings to make them more palatable as tasty brains for lazy narcissist zombies, which vanishes them into memetic meaninglessness in the process. My message is complex, as is the meaning-method, at times beyond necessity to be sure (and as much because were I to simply state the problem as I see it, it would be worse understood for its obviousness, for the collective denial ideology of any kind always risks promoting, but I must first somehow confront to further my meanings at all). Somewhat stubbornly as well, having made the hard and now lifetime effort to learn the relatively precise meanings of these many technical terms I reserve the right to use them as the apt meaning-compressions they are. Meanings arrived at without doing any definitional and off-line thinking-work are not worthy meanings at all, just apings of what one already believes (or should believe) without much justification, or transient titillations and largely empty memes meant to make the reader feel much more informed than they actually are. I have also designed this book to support untrained readers with the task of parsing this semantic and stylistic complexity, so to lift you up to my meanings of greatest concern and not just dumb down my meaning so that you can know something new by knowing not a damn thing I have meant at all, but just what you have filled the w/holes of your misunderstanding and wilfully practised ignorance with, fit to go back to your brain-

eating as if the zombie metaphor in *The Walking Dead* were not aimed at you (at all of us, really) most of all.

As a shameless metaphor: I intend that my meanings justly bathe in an ocean of real paradox, the universe of both real and unreal things and their problematically interleaving mental state vehicularized propositional webs. These meanings are aimed for being communicated to you a-logically or equally “trans-logically” **as epiphanic experiences that only you can confirm by opening a second channel back to me**. As only I am (or could ever be, they are **my** meanings after all) or in the general case, as only that ‘I’ indexed to the original meaning-intention to communicate could be (those might be **your** meanings) some “I” is always the final if not endlessly fallible and varying arbiter of any meaning being soundly communicated by it. In this reading that is probably just you and the avatar you must create to see me through. Until then the fact that you might fail to endorse my propositions out of the gate—before I endorse that you have my meanings straight first—says more about your unwillingness to try to understand why I don’t believe as you do and so makes communication impossible from the very start. The risk, of preaching to the choir, or worse, furthering the dogmatically dominant position of popular quasi-epistemic fashion in reactivity (the tyrannical power derived from “normal” but false belief) is that many of my propositions, I expect, will prove inconsistent with the invisible biases and opaque metaphysical assumptions over which your values and beliefs are already constructed so differently from mine.^{NOTE}

NOTE: Ultimately this is a problem not **just** of culture or difference in education, but is an intrinsic feature of the unseen, denied and denigrated developmental *Spiral of Consciousness* in which the scientific viewpoint is only another step up a fractal ladder, not a final resting place for proof of the value of human rationality, but I redundantly digress.

Chapter 2: What Is Meaning?

This is a work about MEANING taken widely but is also narrowly about the supposedly most rational methods we have of furthering the lived experience of meaning’s implicit impulse towards communicative and epistemic ends. So, by the most inclusive use of the term ‘meaning’ I may be—unless otherwise clear about some finer aspect (sense) of the term’s broader sub-meanings—not just referring to some particular literal meanings, but also to the universally shared character of the experience of all meaning and its exchange, that magical and I fear all too rare moment of deeply felt *in-sight* that marks communication of otherwise superficial knowledge of the supposed truth of

propositions to an ever deepening understanding of the referents of those same propositions. Only visceral confirmation in conscious experience ensures that any said meanings have been coherently, consistently, and completely communicated. By this I do not mean to endorse Platonism (or any other of its structurally related positions all falling under the rubric of *The Problem of Universals*) but simply aim to be transparent about how the series of deeply divisive and unresolved philosophical puzzles that are the background of this work also serve as the trans-paradoxical background of my intended meanings and “meaning-methods”.

Picking up a thread: To see further how the earlier revealed need to sometimes refer to the concept instead of its singular term is well motivated *for meaning as well as possible* consider the term ‘unicorn’. This is one of the favoured unreal objects of my universe along with the near-tangible reality of Sherlock Holmes, who may turn out materially immortal even if we all die. The term ‘unicorn’ refers to nothing real at all (nor does Sherlock Holmes, of course, but for how believably real he seems). Those many effigies of imagined unicorns are not “real” unicorns, just as a stuffed effigy of a horse is no horse, but for being called one. But, when I say ‘bulk water is composed of molecules of H_2O ’ I mean ‘molecules of H_2O ’ to refer to something actual even though I can’t directly see, touch or otherwise sense them. Confusingly for the very naively philosophical I can *always, ceteris paribus*, see, touch and feel a unicorn effigy, but never a single H_2O molecule. Because ‘*ceteris paribus*’ literally means: ‘with all other things being equal’, this summarily rules out cases where you have a unicorn effigy in reach but are blind-folded and duct-taped to a chair as ever rationally assimilable to the case of not being able to touch a single H_2O molecule, just to be really clear about not tolerating the sort of replies that lay people might very confusedly impugn as ‘just about semantics’. It is never “just about” semantics when each party is actually trying to understand the other. Instead, it is always and only about making an honest effort in getting the semantics right first. Refusal to submit to this need is a refusal to be rational.

So, I have no idea what people really mean when they say stupid things like this to sound smart, just like I have no idea what people think they mean when they say, ‘you are over-analyzing’, which is another favoured meme endlessly leveraged by brain-eating zombies who clearly have no idea what you or they are talking about. Meaning (in the limited sense of semantics) and analysis of those meanings is not ever something to be over-done or impugnable as “just about semantics”, seriously, I have no idea why people take these sorts of objections as rational, they are meaningless, a-rational at best, anti-rational at worst, so always leveraged by those most given to irrational forms of “argument”, i.e., fallacious ones. What matters is whether or not one has analyzed well or poorly, and saying something is “just about” semantics seems like playing a childish game of stonewalling by invoking a sense of some term in play its meaner never endorsed as some juvenile and pointless straw man, or in refusing to invoke the one the meaner clearly intended by context alone, all to win an argument without any communication ever happening.

I find it hateful that such memes continue to be treated as rationally argumentative when their clear purpose is to dissemble and the conclusion I now draw when people use them against me is that they

are threatened by the very fact they fail to understand me, are unwilling to admit any ignorance, and I am happy to punish them for this. Without *ceteris paribus* clauses inductive science risks saying too much or nothing at all, such as when someone says in reply to some counterexample of an inductively evidenced theory, 'Well, that's simply the exception that proves the rule'. I often use this idiom like I use Descartes' "clear and distinct idea", i.e., with some backhanded comical derision. I may seem too verbose and pedantic in my often-bizarre writing style, but I assure you there is method behind that madness, *ceteris paribus*. This is part of the reason I insist on being the sole arbiter of my meaning as I am rarely not speaking without a tongue firmly in my cheek and will admit my best ideas are at least as "clear and distinct" to me as Descartes' were to him ;).

Linguistic situations where effigies and their proper objects get confused risk a superficial gloss entailing a sameness of interpretation of terms (especially for 'real' or 'exists') where none should ever be inferred. This is especially true when proposing a naive theory of meaning, a "folk" semantic theory. When I use the term 'unicorn' some will argue I am not using a name or term at all, just a placeholder for the concept (UNICORN). As UNICORN has an empty extension (there have never been, aren't and never will be real unicorns with magical powers) but not an empty intension (for now, again, basically a definition) a path is cleared to improve on use of language in more transparently rational ways. While most philosophers might understand that when I type 'unicorn' I am not using a singular term, other more contentiously unreal things are more apt to be misinterpreted on this basis. For example, I would argue that while there is no personal God that GOD is still a very important concept, and one for which its extension may yet be found full, even if all its possible intensions are rationally and empirically self-denying. Such is philosophy. The fine point here is that only UNICORN is a real *abstract* thing, but no unicorn will ever be deemed real at all, concretely or abstractly.

The general target of my polemic, then, is an inherent and possibly ineliminable irrationality evident not only in lay social discourse, but more tellingly in the application of math, science, and technology for furthering civilization as a now global economic/value enterprise. A specific target condemns the increasingly problematic ways capitalist ideology irrationally determines and leverages KNOWLEDGE and VALUE. These easily predictable problems and their obvious causes should be transparent to all, but somehow they are not; there seems a collective denial over our inescapable status as "fruit flies in a jar of sugar water".^{NOTE}

NOTE: Many high school students, less lately I fear, performed this simple *hands-on* experiment in high school biology (I did). Take a small number of fruit flies and place them in a mason jar with some holes in the lid and some sugar water. Each day count the subsequent number of flies and plot this on a population versus time graph. What you get is the classic population boom and then collapse of small, isolated populations with only initially sufficient finite resources in closed environments. Of course, our environment is somewhat more open-ended and resilient (which is a cause for hope, but not an excuse for denial) but it is not infinitely so according to the very metaphysics which also apparently licences all our ideologies of certainty and control, largely those of materialist science and technology.

In those of you less inclined to be epistemically humble as Socrates set the standard, allowing yourself to both deeply feel and understand our shared problems and blind risks may appear as an amorphous threat to your identity. But then you must consider the fact that much of science and philosophy can find no grounds to say what IDENTITY is, so entailing that PERSON and IDENTITY have empty extensions, just like UNICORN. This, however, only doubles down on the problem, what I think was also meant by the coining of *Original Sin*, but where the updated message is, ‘it is a sin to think that you’re **not** God as well as to think you are’. My meanings are intentionally meant to elicit some cognitive dissonance in those who believe otherwise, but in a way that hopefully leads to the sought for confirming epiphanies, not the widespread propositional endorsement of any of my literal claims necessarily. The base literal claims are simply the subliminal whispers together becoming some consciously understood “sound” exactly as their contents become unheard again. They shore up the sought-for experience then roaring with my intended meanings as those epiphanies I hope to create in you—by proxy—via your voluntary reinterpretation of this encoding, even if I can never conform for you that you’ve had any of it right.

My Transparent (as possible) Metaphysical Position

This, then, is (obviously) also meant as a polemic work, as I’ve admitted. However, it is derived from my own work in philosophy of mind and so was written by a vetted master in philosophy, but is also meant as biting and remorseless social commentary. It is critical of my discipline ethically, corrective in addressing its too purely analytical methodology, but I am also staunchly defending the value of wisdom over just the efficient use of instrumental reason as that is what I love the most. In so far as I am making arguments, many of them based on uncontentious if not widely embraced or appreciated conclusions about the nature of both human rationality and irrationality, it is immediately subject to critiques of its own logical structure and base evidential claims, as well as impugning my somewhat necessarily opaque but authentically held metaphysics. This work’s aim is not mainly to pass muster as a philosophical work at just the academic level of analysis and rebuttal as there is a surplus of the metaphorical and rhetorical in my thrust that matters more to my meaning than just my use of analysis, logical inference, or empirical evidence.

As part of my polemic target is to aim at those—I have intimated that this sin is widely owned by even the most demonstrably rational of us, myself included—who fail to be transparent about their metaphysics I would be a hypocrite of wide self-inconsistency were I to fail in this as well. The foundational content I selectively drag in defines both the hard and well delineated core, but also the

vaguely inter-categorizable soft flesh of what are largely preconceived ideas that will go missing in this work, so I am “carting the put before the horse” in this. The epistemic givens over which I am, somewhat disingenuously, integrating my trans-rational arguments towards my main thesis (that human rationality as it is currently practised is dangerous in a “garbage-in-garbage-out” and Occam’s razor violating sort of way) offer—in spite of my damning any hope of a perfected rationality—a partial vindication of rationality by some revision of its means in the widest and deepest practice of it, even as I use these same means with suspicion and some derision, i.e. as if the only means are logical ones. So, while the conceptual space in which I work is technically well-defined this does not mean there is some clear series of further entailments one could draw in terms of other “isms” being begged in, so assume nothing but what I am pointed about. I am simply taking the core thrust of some currently popular academic approaches and stating the associated metaphysics, but I also try to be clear about where agnosticism, realism, or irrealism about co-entailment’s arise in my own thinking, if only to leave a door open to make some positive claims about rationality by being rational in a partially reason-denying way. I have ordered these isms below as much as possible in terms of their deepest ontological priority. The more foundational ism’s come first, as much for being more self-agnostic at their own level, while those under them take up less equivocal and more fine stands, and so carve out a more limited ontological and epistemic position. But, even here I offer no certain ground, just more endlessly shifting sands, at least if my invocation of Derrida and what I have named *The Derridean Concern* is cogent.^{NOTE}

NOTE: “Already we are very close to Derrida’s basic argumentation. The basic argumentation always attempts to show that no one is able to separate irreplaceable singularity and machine-like repeatability (or “iterability,” as Derrida frequently says) into two substances that stand outside of one another; nor is anyone able to reduce one to the other so that we would have one pure substance (with attributes or modifications).”⁸

My ultimate metaphysical and theoretical views seem unlikely to be extricable from this, but I hope if nothing else to pave a different way forward in terms of the many paradoxes and problems I am arguing are themselves the trans-rational basis of novel epistemic structure and method, so a basis for thinking beyond the law of non-contradiction without just doing art or fiction. My aim is not to promote an idealism or any other kind of obscure or anti-realist language game (no matter how my meanings might be taken, even allowing they are empty) but to provide some groundwork towards the claim that rather than being in an ontologically explicative position in terms of interpreting the many (assumed sound or cogent) data of science an argument can be forwarded we are actually in a “pre-ontological” phase of knowing. In other words: we have the data at hand to unwind the appearance-reality, or mind-body, or semantic non-existence/existence (intensional) problems on realist and even materialist terms, but this requires not more efforts at monistic ontological totalization, such as reconciling QM to (Special and General) Relativity (GR) by some *Theory of Everything* (TOE). Rather, the irreconcilable metaphysics that so differently motivate the microscopic and macroscopic views of universal material dynamism, as just one example, are only to be made whole by seeing these epistemic domains tip over the same empty extensional core of concepts such as IDENTITY, SELF, and INFINITY or NOTHING. In the process non-

existence becomes another positive form of Being, and questions that largely go begged as to what “happens” before the Big Bang (which need to answer questions about the “internal” phase space of the singularity in terms of physical information, which metaphorically-speaking is about the most complex or least probable message the universe is sending to itself through us to be decoded) get—not answered but re-situated in the new pre-ontological view that emerges (all sound and fury, perhaps).

From here, I think, the current epistemic project fails to honour each and every form of existing, intending and thinking in more purely experiential and less absolutely value-laden or propositional terms; the pathological pursuit of certainty and control in only the name of proving the transcendent value of reason has no place as the pure centre of agency here, human or otherwise (and the very concept HUMAN BEING goes empty as well). Here are the declared metaphysics in which my arguments are situated (and they still are my favoured/needed ones, mostly).

1. *Philosophical Realism*

Realism, somewhat vaguely, is the philosophical view that what is real is only what exists in a completely mind-independent way. Realists do not grant “real” existence to things it turns out only “exist” in the mind, so are **just** ideas (*Idealism* is the contrasting view that everything real **is** just ideas). Minds might be the very thing we wish to be realist about, as I am sure is the default folk view. Realists worry that the intrinsic nature of the mind may contaminate claims for realism by its conceptual schemes already going beyond what exists, such as is essential to even begin to write fiction, or to dream. The problem for realism is not so much about concrete things intimately presented to the senses, perception and cognition, but largely comes in with abstract entities or relational (secondary) properties, like colour. Realism often asserts itself in contrast to *Skepticism*.

I am largely endorsing realism, and a sort of realism that balks at claims such as ‘colours don’t exist’ or ‘time doesn’t exist’, which must be proposing strange sorts of non-existence if taken literally (and of course, these claims are specially qualified, but often in question begging ways). I have no problem with saying things like ‘unicorns exist, but only exist “really” in the mind’, but if numbers exist (and I think they really do) I expect them to really (not “really”) exist in a way unicorns never can. Where my realism starts to look perverse is on my account of what the mind is, which is something “like” the universe, but turned “inside-out”. But I also feel I can be, and ultimately am agnostic (a pseudo-epistemic irrealist?) about the entire realism/irrealism debate. In the end I am endorsing a realism about all we directly perceive at least; that what we perceive directly is real even if our interpretations concerning what is real of it conceptually, propositionally, or indirectly ‘gang aft a-gley’¹². I will mainly, when being most rhetorical, polemic, and *trans-rational but still sub-metaphorical* take a hard reductive, monist materialist and hyper-realistic view of things, as the too facile and memetic popularization of this one-sided and non-burden-of-proof bearing ontology (Reductive Physicalism) is to my mind a subtle and partial cause of the ism I see as the closest bedfellow of Logicism, i.e., Scientism. I believe the most

pernicious form of Scientism is (mainly the most literally meant and reductive versions of) Computational Theory of Mind (CTM).^{NOTE}

NOTE: Reminding you again: there is always some unavoidable need to take a near-hypocritical stance in order to adapt the metaphysics of one's polemic focus as the starting point of an admittedly mixed quasi-logical and quasi-metaphorical critique, so my larger argument is not quite a pure reduction to the absurd (but it does aim to show the widest possible collective form of agency in our supposed use of rationality that is absurdly and invisibly irrational, given the evidence and arguments I bring to bear). This Maxwellian-demonic method, however, is not just meant to expose a regression (or fragmentation) of these many instances of paradox into some non-Derridean language game, but also to collect them extensively as one structural case leading to a prohibitively inductive meta-analogy, and then to a further meta-abduction, or *best explanation from a new "ortho" view*.

Scientism' (remember the *use-mention distinction*?) also justly labels such problematic historical events as the dogmatic and unjustified promotion (but for supporting certain politico-ideological ends) of Larmarkianism in the now extinct Soviet Union, or debunked practices like Phrenology, among all too many examples, many of them live propositions, like the anti-vaccination movement, or the Flat Earth Society.

2. *Representational Theory of Mind* (RTM)

This is the view the mind functions largely via mental states serving to "re-present" aspects of the mind-independent reality out of which minds evolved in the first place. There is a lot of unfortunate confusion possible here as RTM in its widest scope is agnostic as to the ontology of mind and the outcome of *The Internalism-Externalism Debate*. I, too, am trying to be relatively neutral as to the ontology of such states in this work, as well as neutral to the debate between Internalism and Externalism, except when arguing as a Physicalist would. *Internalism*, the much older view, claims all mental state content is realized internally as narrow content, typically only by the brain, and *Externalism* claims mental state content is realized internally/narrowly only in part, but also in ineliminable causal conjunction, or *widely* in terms of the nature of what is so represented, i.e. "meanings ain't just in the head"¹³ (although this immediately risks making the problem of how minds represent non-existent things worse, or at least "wider" as well). The main thing I am strongly endorsing is a non-vanishing realism about mental states, but not that such states reduce to just material states of the brain (even though I often deliberately argue as if that were true for the *reductio*) nor that any sound theory of mental state content is to be found in any purely logical system derived by "perfecting" natural language. I have already railed against CTM in its most hyperbolic and burden-of-proof-denying form as the worst version of Logicism and Scientism I see, but I do not because of this reject the view wholesale that many aspects of cognition are justly computational, only that the most evolved aspects and potential for mind and consciousness

never reduce to just making computations over matter, be they quantum, classical, linear or parallel computations.

On my deeply ethical and experience-centred view the nature of the mind (of any mind, or just Mind) and consciousness may always go beyond both representation and what is represented. So, while I am taking a wide view and might take seriously a phenomenology-first view of RTM the most dominant sub-position under RTM is called *Intentionalism*. Intentionalism takes a strong view that the contents of experience always determine the phenomenal character of experience. This choice is forced by *The Mirroring Thesis*: there is a change in phenomenology if and only if there is also a change in representational content, a bijection that according to the law of non-contradiction may only run one way in material/causal terms; otherwise, another buried and denied “real” material paradox. Those views which are first order in terms of taking a strong content-first view of the mirroring hypothesis fall under the theoretical rubric of *Representationalism*. The important thing to keep in mind is that endorsing RTM is not the same as endorsing representationalism (or intentionalism for that matter), although many in Cognitive Science and elsewhere probably conflate these isms unreflectively.

3. Naturalism

I am endorsing Naturalism in this sense: that only the communal practice of a properly rational science provides the tools to undercover the nature of all or anything that exists (including how we represent things that don’t). Here ‘properly’ refers to how we go about vetting and ranking content and practitioners, admittedly a big problem (as much because we have pushed the irrationality pole so far away from the reified rational centre). However, my view of what a “proper” science is includes subjective practices such as meditation or contemplation. Ken Wilber has the best arguments for why objective science by itself is a bereft science, so I defer to him here⁶. I am not endorsing anything supernatural here, unless you think institutions like Buddhism already promote supernatural thinking, which is certainly the case for culturally accidental Buddhists (like lapsing Catholics, they identify with some of the content, but none of the experience, the first lapsed group lack any experience of God, the second of “No God”) but not for those who take up the practice with total devotion and some significant success (where here any representational talk of success or anything else about some process leads directly to exhortations of ‘neti, neti’, of course).

The difference is that for subjective science the world explored is purely *within*, not meaning what ‘inside’ means at all. The “WITHIN”, however, “covers” the inside (and in some epistemically literal paradox is also “painted” outside onto all things that exist—in space-time at least) but is not at all directly concerned with either lower or higher physical (space-time) scales of manifest reality in the sense, respectively, atoms or galaxy clusters are taken to be (we are certainly composed of atoms at lower scales, and galaxies are composed of us at higher ones, but nothing taken phenomenally or representationally is captured of the *within* by this). Even electrons may turn out to have a *within* (see:

Neutral Monism, Panpsychism, and others) although a vanishingly phenomenal one that is hard to see as ever combining over scale¹⁴. The only way to purely access this realm is by unchaining one's small consciousness from thoughts or other value-laden forms of objectivity tied to the needs of the body, which is also in the actual practice to deny objective science (at least the literal practice of objective science while **within** is impossible, as the practice of subjective science is equally impossible while taking measurements or compiling formula, theories, models or statistics). Just as objective science must denigrate the subject to extract facts of the world (down to the sub-atomic level at least, where it bites back) so too a subjective science will have to denigrate objects to get at its "truths", but these truths are purely experienced in unrepresentable ways, even if RTM is objectively and subjectively true of what is otherwise materially inside and outside!!!

However, because I do not ultimately think hard materialism/physicalism (or dualism, for that matter) is true it is an open question as to what the terms "substance" and "fundamental" mean for any ontological account premised. If either of *Ontological Pluralism* or *Levelism*, both subsuming the view many ontologies might be required, are or can be made consistent with Naturalism then I'm endorsing that. There are at least three "quasi-real-substances" on my account: matter, life, and mind (but they are not to be fundamentalized in the same "direction", only over a complex, a literally paradoxical series of "complex inversions" of thingness and relatedness across scale). I am somewhat aligned with Spinoza's views, but I am also attracted to Russellian Neutral Monism and various dual-aspect ontologies. However, in the final analysis my endorsement of ontological or epistemic pluralism is not my final resting place for ontology or epistemology, just the most comprehensive position one can and should take to be grasped by the need for a pre-ontological approach in the first place. In other words, I think we are premature, looking out from all or any popular or unpopular metaphysical positions, in believing we have the right grounds from which to do any sound ontological or epistemic work at all yet (so our many metaphysics are "pre-metaphysical" as well). The problem to solve can only be seen by thinking of the mind-body problem sub-metaphorically **and** trans-rationally, but in some still quasi-reducible material way once we can say what numbers are, and what empty concepts are, and how perception totalizes them as appearing within just one world given to many isolated subjects as a naive monism (but always over a subject-object perspective-taking and asymmetric causal duality once minds exists).

I have already mentioned the lynch-pin metaphor: The mind-body problem is **the defining** material paradox, represented in sub-metaphorical analogy here as a Mobius strip (maybe a Klein Bottle would be a better analogy, but is less well known as a geometrically paradoxical object). The fine analogical tie is found in how both a Mobius strip and a body-mind apparently overflow their own eigen-dimensionality (in a trans-dimensional sense); both exhibit the quasi-paradoxical property of manifesting in space-time as a general one-surface (a Mobius strip presents as one sided, a mind-body as one substance) but a one-sided-ness also exhibiting a diametrically-particular two-sided-ness for the same-one surface (diametrically opposing points of the Mobius strip's one surface, dual aspects for body-mind). A body-mind (equally a mind-body) is not to be, in my thinking, accounted for by any on-

offer ontology, or by just some or all of them stitched or kludged together; deeper metaphysical work is required first (and Derrida more than most has pointed the way, even if he did not see this far). But I deeply believe we are right to start by assuming an irreducible and epistemically cogent debt owed to those guiding intuitions taken from Physicalism that inspired the Naturalistic Project for the philosophy and science of mind, but we must take wing from there, perhaps like Icarus.

Here I get as close to endorsing physicalism/materialism and a more expansive form of naturalism as I am willing to go, but to make my meanings clearer I'd first need to redefine what matter is in terms of the problem of numbers and expand the scope of naturalism to before the Big Bang and after the end of time, mainly in terms of *physical information (data)*, more precisely and less conflated). My view of naturalism is transcendent, so we may as well call it Transcendental Materialism or Transcendental Naturalism; I am skating on hot ice here, of course. If naturalism is the soundest epistemic project and can be completed at all then nothing can be left out to tell the story without gaps on my account, including all belief, rational or not, so no domain of human agency that professes to know should have its content excluded from serious consideration, even if all its propositions are soundly determined false in some more purely logical and objective model.

Naturalistic Science, with its embedded methods of logic and mathematics, ideally provides a model to translate intuition derived from methodologically determined forms of experience into a specialized semantic web of propositionally sound and complete facts that continuously improve our knowledge of reality in terms of what exists by saying both how it exists (synchronically, or *in, or at a time*) and how it came to be casually (diachronically, or *across time*). So, I am also endorsing realism about knowledge and causation here, even though my final and transparent view is that there is no such thing as mind-independent fact, just better belief, and would probably side with Hume if pressed about cause and effect. I am also largely endorsing semantic holism, but only as a popular current meaning in philosophy, not necessarily as a finished semantic model. If semantic holism turns out the wrong model then how representations mean (here invoking the symbol grounding problem and problem of intentionality in various proportions) changes and perhaps undoes my entire argument. However, as I am not largely concerned with what representations are ontically but, first, very concerned with where and how they originally appear and only then with how their further evolution in terms of kinds of satisfaction impacts whether they are used rationally or not I hope objections here are largely moot. I am also endorsing an ontologically neutral representational theory of mind in the background, so certainly NOT computational theory of mind in any purely reductive materialist sense.

4. *Physicalism nee. Materialism*

I am also largely endorsing *Physicalism*, but with my tongue firmly clenched between my teeth. Physicalism is also called *Materialism*, but this term is often confused by lay people with *Conspicuous Consumerism* so has been re-coined (additionally, calling a mass-less boson material seems imprecise,

but bosons display physical effects . . .). Physicalism, *nee*. *Materialism* is the view all that exists exists only as matter or “sub-stance”. This entails explanations concerning how we can perceive or otherwise think about abstract or other seemingly materially non-existent objects can not invoke any psychological terms in their final models, logically or evidentially. This requirement has been the main downfall of all semantic theories to date, although were this not the case philosophy of language would suffer greatly for funding and research projects.

5. *The Ontology of Quantity: What are numbers exactly?*

In this paper I try to expose a number of naive conflation even the best educated often display in their own *well-intentioned* epistemic behaviour. The most basic is the claim that many people do not licence an explicit acknowledgement of the trivially uncontroversial claim that what one knows and what one believes are not the same thing (it’s really no wonder this is the default case; the possibility of universal epistemic humility died with Socrates, and lately all belief has been reified to “knowledge” by social media as “speaking one’s truth”). A spill-over problem is the related general conflation of what represents (typically a sign or symbol “vehicle” for some content) with what is represented as content (which bears the meanings) where the referential terms of the content provide the intentional targets of said representations. So, there are really three (four, soon enough) variously separable parts to mental representations: vehicles, contents, and targets. Here, philosophers are often shown as guilty as lay people in their conflation.

Consider this example: For all too many literate people, even those with relatively high competency in mathematics and logic there is always the possibility that most think of the quantities and operations respectively represented by numerals and logical symbols as granting a material ontology of numbers transparently, i.e., they think the question as to what numbers are is absurd. They are exactly just all these materially made symbols and operations (forgetting that in history there was not always one universal system of enumeration and logical operation) so they are deeply conflating what represents, all the ultimately **radically arbitrary** symbols that define the Arabic (decimal) place value system, with what those symbols are taken naively to represent. Most also fail at seeing there is nothing essential in our choice in using ten symbols (12 would’ve been methodologically better, actually) but for the contingently useful mapping at “hand” that bearing ten fingers lends to this choice as a natural abacus. This was certainly the case with my twenty-something nephew who just completed a science degree in psychology, go figure.

Of course, to a philosopher or philosophically informed mathematician or scientist the ontology of quantity first reduces, if not both soundly and completely, to set theory and the *Peano-Dedekind Axioms*, but this just shifts our metaphysical concerns to the nature of the axioms and sets, or finally (with some gap-filling hand-waving) to the nature of things such as Russellian classes. What is a set or class exactly in lieu of any mind by which its intensionality and extensionality is intuitively determined?

These are questions well beyond the purview of most academics, although this doesn't stop them from using math as they see fit, often in a cart before the horse kind of way (using the numbers to "prove" the hidden biases, not dispel them). This is a strangely peripheral issue in philosophy in ways I find telling, even potentially damning to the core set of metaphysical assumptions I am aping. The problem here is to say how the notion of a unicorn (or God or infinity or nothing) or for just one example, the number 7, in being so conceptually exact in relational definition and logical or cultural use can vary so radically in terms of assumed underlying ontological and existential dependencies and essence.^{NOTE}

NOTE: Numbers are defined into being within the deductive operations made on sets, unicorns are fictional horses with a narwhal's horn and—the real problem—magical powers, but doesn't mathematics as things stand perform its own kind of magic for no one can explain why numbers play such a central role in the supposed epistemic superiority of science, any more than they can find a horse with a skinny twisted horn and magical powers.

What has proven impossible to date is to provide any singularly explicative basis that goes any of the way to saying why a non-existing abstract object like a unicorn (or God) is unreal, yet something like the number 7 (what is only **represented** by '7', but is not its target) is assumed **necessarily**, on physicalism being true, as materially real. There need be some transparently physical manifestation of numbers explainable in science or philosophy that makes them as real as other abstract concepts like TRUTH, JUSTICE, RIGHTS, etc., yet doesn't entail the same for unicorns or a personal God or infinity or nothing. However, for unicorns the project is simply to say how the same mechanisms that represent numbers so soundly fails in the case of non-existents; thus, explaining misrepresentation as an error case of mental representation more generally along the way. Yet, to my thinking and as things stand the essence of a unicorn and of whatever '7' represents appear more similar than disparate, the utility of unicorns may not be epistemic (it is always meta-and/or-sub-epistemic, at least within consistently and coherently bounded fictional or cultural contexts) but there is utility in use of the term none-the-less.

So, the apparent wide and deep epistemic utility of numbers may also turn out more contingent than essential, as for any fiction. This alone is suggested by the fact that most human agency is still not explicitly determined by any sort of *prima facie* logical calculation at all (except for assuming CTM, which is begging the question) but as much by a-rational or irrational as rational means, and this is more damning to the normal utility of numbers than unicorns. This problem variously knocks up against *The Hard Problem of Consciousness*, otherwise, 'the hard problem', i.e., how does inert unfeeling matter evolve in some random walk according to natural laws so to be caused to realize actual felt experience by sensation, perception or cognition (let alone the experience of the representation of unreal things as real)? Why the problem of numbers is relatively ignored; specifically, why this problem has little to no popular attention drawn to it in terms of the empirically endorsed views of mathematicians, *which still favour Platonism by a wide margin*, is beyond me (but, I suspect more of that inescapable collective

human irrationality is at work here as well). If the dominant view of mathematicians, Platonism, turns out correct, this view is deeply inconsistent with Physicalism (and the other views fair no better for being purely materialist as each defines numbers in relation to minds and so each non-Platonist account also rests on the solution of the mind-body problem as a proper part, so yield prohibitively derived models at best).

What physicalist leaning philosophers and scientists seem to owe right out of the gate is some accounting for this felt and culturally derived inconsistency, in so far as it arises from demonstrated and well-vetted (even prototypically rational) expertise and daily immersion in the realm of mathematics in demonstrably tractable and reliable ways. If physicalism is right then numbers (not just their symbols, which are trivially material) are material things, no matter how purely relational and vanishingly substantial they may appear in such guises as imaginary numbers, or in even more abstract domains such as the mathematics of infinity, yet in the philosophy of mathematics no such by fiat materialist or realist ontology emerges in kind as science currently and popularly promotes the view. This seems very epistemically perverse to me in ways that, were rationality fully behind its recognition, would make it a central philosophical project, not the fringe one it seems.

Chapter 3: Defining the Main Thesis

The title of this work is a metaphorically sympathetic nod to the movie *Lost in Translation*. There is an apt metaphorical resonance between that movie and this work, as the all-too-human epistemic tragedy risked in both cases is the unsuccessful sharing of *meaning by intentionality*.

The term ‘intentionality’, while etymologically related to both the sub-type of private mental states informally called intentions and to the speech acts making them public, has a very different technical use in philosophy. Informally we take intentions to be thoughts or speech acts in which we “mean to” or “intend to” or more simply promise to perform or to withhold some further act as part of the satisfaction conditions of the intention’s most apt expression. The creation of the technical meaning is motivated in part to disentangle the inevitable conflation of semantic (referring variously to the meaning’s content, vehicles and targets) and agential (behavioural) aspects owed to mental states in informal or lay talk. For example, mental states realized by neurons are lately assumed the vehicles of thought, while sound, physical marks, or ostensive signings are three possible vehicles for conveying the same content differently and inter-subjectively; each particularly used in taking private content to public content through some kind of transfer of an internal mental state back to an external physical state encoding (remembering, we are all physicalists here, each mental state is nothing but a “disguised” physical state). Instead, PHILOSOPHICAL INTENTIONALITY refers to the universal character of almost all

mental states to be about, to refer, correlate, correspond, or in causal semantic theories to be caused by, and by this “aimed at” or “about” their objects.


The Problem of Intentionality in philosophy of mind is related to *The Symbol Grounding Problem* in cognitive psychology and *The Mind-Body Problem* shared by science and philosophy. Solving the first problem answers the question as to how we or some other sufficiently complex biological organism originally perceives at all via *just* physically realized mental states embodied by some kind of brain composed over some or many neurons. Further down the phylogenetic road the second problem addresses how the shape of an otherwise fully arbitrarily chosen symbol or sign could come to mean something about an object—one it otherwise bears no necessary or contingent epistemic or causal relation to at all—as an intrinsic feature of the system of representation and so is largely concerned to say how a symbolic or semiotic language works where the pointing or “saying” rubber first hits the road. Worse for physicalist theories of mind, which tend to reduce all aspects of mental life to just physical 3rd person facts about the brain (which leads directly to the *Hard Problem of Consciousness*¹⁵) is explaining how a mental state can be about something that doesn’t exist at all, but in non-question-begging, non-circular and—typically—purely logical terms.

The physicalist’s theoretical problems also revolve around *Frege’s Puzzle* from the philosophy of language¹⁶, which describes cases in which the substitution of co-referential terms like ‘Superman = Clark Kent’ under propositional attitudes such as ‘believes that’ changes the sense of the meaning in a way a purely logic based semantic theory immediately fails to account for. For example, Lois Lane believes Superman is strong, but also believes that Clark Kent is weak. Logically, if we substitute ‘Clark Kent’, whose singular referent is identical to that of ‘Superman’ shouldn’t we conclude that Lois actually believes Clark Kent is strong too? ‘But!’, she would protest (as well as laughing off your protestation that ‘Clark Kent *is* Superman!’) when she says that Clark Kent is weak she really means it and means it literally. Is she being irrational or is meaning something that can never simply reduce to logic alone? No one can say for sure now, if ever, in spite of over a century of trying since Frege first posed his own version this problem in terms of Phosphorus and Hesperus (what are also informally named, separately and respectively, as The Morning Star and The Evening Star, but looking through a telescope shows is just one thing, the *planet* Venus, although the Babylonians knew this well before the Ancient Greeks believed otherwise!) and by some of the most lauded philosophers of the late 19th, 20th and 21st centuries. This possible feature of sentences to fail logically when co-referential terms are substituted for each other is called *Intensionality*. Part of the issue is her definition of Superman tacitly includes the false belief he is not Clark Kent, so problems with intensionality are often associated with the definition of the concepts invoked. This reduces Lois’ irrationality to one of conceptual misadventure and helps show why intensions are often thought of as the logical definition of concepts (she is inevitably conceptually wrong in tacitly defining the concept SUPERMAN to include the property of NOT BEING CLARK KENT, but not irrational for this, not illogical, just reasoning from false implicit premises).


However, this iota of progress is short lived as the further analysis of CONCEPT only spins out into its own fragments, so the precise meaning of INTENSIONALITY is currently quite elusive and variable. Further, the King concept named ‘concept’, i.e., CONCEPT, which is really closer to CONCEPT OF CONCEPTION or CONCEIVING is the only obvious one I can recall that is a member of its own extension (there is no CAT in the extension of CAT, just all the cats, but CONCEPT *is* in the extension of CONCEPT) which makes the intension of CONCEPT residually inconsistent with all other concepts in the extension of CONCEPT (if you follow)^{NOTE}. I suspect this is reflected in the fragmentation of ways in which CONCEPT gets analyzed in being made to “look” at itself in a way no other concept seems to require; all other concepts look to CONCEPT as King (except maybe NOTHING).


NOTE: In a peak ahead this only strengthens Tyler Burge’s denial that perceivers must first bear certain concepts with necessary content (as physical mental states) before being able to perceive at all—*think here of Kant’s* preconditions for perceiving space and time—as what now seems necessary on the regressive and fragmented terms of analysis on offer here and widely in philosophy is that what any perceiver first requires is materially bearing a *meta*-self-referential kind of universal (Platonic, even) mental state that achieves a general representation of MENTAL STATE before any particular concept-borne content can get represented at all *explicitly*. While there seems a nugget of truth in this for self-reflective forms of experiencing meaning (I think Brentano would endorse this analysis as close to defining his *intentional in-existence*¹⁷) this is very much putting the universal cart before the particular horse in a meta-implausible way, although I believe is actually a clue to the need for and structure of my teased pre-ontological approach. One only has to stand between 2 facing mirrors and take in the visual regress that results, then imagine by analogy that what perception really does (beside the evolution from past to now, there is one from “future” to now) is start from such a quasi-infinite regressive plurality as the “source” (variously: The Logos, The Big Bang, God, Being, Chaos, Dedomena, the background vacuum state of virtual particles, *insert your favourite glossing or gap-filling metaphor here*) and collapse it back (over quantum indeterminacy, Nature’s way of solving *The Problem of Buriden’s Ass* universally) into/as a totalized singularity (granting the unity of experience as of one reality) to begin to see the real datum of interest. This datum is the complex structure of representational epistemic regress and/or “tipping” that we see differently depending on whether we theorize about mind up to the emergence of concepts from original intentionality, so proposing some kind of analog or proto-conception that is vanishingly symbolic, or simply assume concepts are needed to perceive and try to say naturalistically (so glossing the problem of original intentionality) how they come to be realized as mental states only when the symbol grounding problem is solved. For the second case, of course, we re-inherit the problem of saying how babies and many other animals can do analog math or perceive objects at all in not having symbolic language. For the first case all we do is collapse the mind-body problem to the finer point of original intentionality, but have according to Burge no obvious place or need for concepts here, so entailing mind has no *necessary* use for them. The knot(s) in philosophy of mind tip and flip in explanatory character as a Necker cube of incommensurate cross-intuitive premisings, what increasingly shouts out for hypothesizing a relativistically spectral locus in space-time—on naturalist/physicalist terms—for *original conception*. In the first draft of my masters research paper, I attempted to show “geometrically” in a series of unfolding diagrams how, specifically, the perception-cognition tipping point and entailed meta-functional character of conception may have been relatively misconceived. Conception is not just a functional leap, it is another realization of the “onto-novel”, the next pre-ontological Derridean leap from life to (human) mind; the only tipping point after perception is to conception/self-consciousness, but this only makes sense when *original intentionality* (marking the first

emergence of some particular animal mind) is reinterpreted as generally emerging at the *Big Bang Singularity* (BBS), which also shows how everything the universe ever does is cognitive, so cognition is the *emerger*, not the emergent! The baby was summarily excised and only tepid bath water was left. I have included that original series of diagrams here without any explanation. The message behind this series is that it is all cognition, or none of it is. Perception only tips to conception, but the whole series of such tips taken from the BBS until now is a universal, so not uniquely human at all, cognitive process. Here is another instance of paradoxical 3+1 epistemic structure: indication₍₁₎, perception₍₂₎, conception₍₃₎, with cognition₍₊₁₎ now recast in spectral “ortho-reorientation”, instead of: indication₍₁₎, perception₍₂₎, cognition₍₃₎ and *where the hell does conception₍₊₁₎ go?*




How Burge "Cashes Out" the Perception-Cognition Border





(This diagram compares, contrasts and somewhat attempts to reconcile Dretske's explicit physicalist model for *original intentionality* with Burge's, which is tacitly dualist.)



The raft of problems owed solutions from here have not been satisfactorily resolved either, but to my mind the structurally dual and ontologically perverse character of the higher scale mind-body problem appears as a pure analog to the lower-scale problems dragged in with the default philosophical view for the role for conception and concepts, but only if re-expressed in terms of their diametrically opposed external and internal aspects. The *extension* of a concept is its set-categorical membership account, i.e., the set of all objects, real or otherwise, that fall under the concept. It seems the set of all objects picked out by a concept are its external and “concrete” body, while the definition of the concept is its internal and abstract “mind”. Perhaps the relative structure of the two tipping/meeting points (body <--> mind, intension <--> extension) is simply—metaphorically-speaking—inverted as one first thinks of body, then mind when one is looking across evolutionary or phylogenetic history, but one must first grasp a concept’s intension in development (ontogeny) before successfully placing the right objects into its “body”. There is some complex inversion over a naturalistic tipping point on offer here, but a “pre-ontological” one.

Optional Reiteration: The title of this work is meant as a metaphorically sympathetic nod to the movie *Lost in Translation*. There is an apt metaphorical resonance between that movie and this work, as the all-too-human epistemic tragedy risked in both cases is the unsuccessful sharing of ***widest and deepest possible*** meaning via intentionality.

These all-too-common failures to communicate start as simple tragedies of failed intentionality in cases where one or both parties assume success but where the wrong meanings end up taken. In cases of non-dire meaning-exchange failures of this kind rarely cause lasting harm, and are easily corrected for when the downstream consequences unfold, ‘You got me fat-reduced cheese? I meant “light” cheese in the sense of something not too pungent, oh well, cheese is cheese.’ In dire circumstances failures to communicate can be lethal, such as when a failure to convert units properly leads to an airplane being under fuelled on a long ocean flight; but in these cases, there are often extra ***ideally rational*** steps taken to prevent exactly the kinds of failure to communicate experience shows have such dire consequences, so these dire kinds of failures of intentionality are relatively rare in properly rational societies. However, there are more subtle forms these failures may take where an imbalance in social or economic power ultimately decides which literal meanings are endorsed in spite of the clear failure to communicate at all, or in extreme cases, where none of the intended meanings are even allowed as the “policy”; the novel *1984* proposes a dystopia of such communicative abuses (how far off are we from this?, not very I’d surmise, at least in terms of current problems with social media and political partisanship).

The concept MEANING is a fairly vague term, as is COMMUNICATION, which is why philosophers and scientists speak of SEMANTICS and INFORMATION-EXCHANGE instead. I am assuming the semiotic (sign based) or symbolic (grammar based) and expressly communicative aspects of MEANING are only a subset of all possible ***meanings*** for use of ‘meaning’ in the sense that some meanings may be felt and never representationally expressed, ~~unconscious~~, *nonconscious* or simply wrongly motivated or otherwise inexpressible as simple truths. A simple example of how meaning can go beyond semantics is in the use

of tone, which is often used to deny or negate the literal content expressed. Depending on context and tone this sentence has one, or two diametrically opposed intended meanings book-ending a literal one, or in the best case for some fan, three literal ones:

‘Nice throw. You can get that ball, OK Mike Trout?’

What is Information?

I am also working with the intuition that most literal (as opposed to meta-literal) communication involves the exchange of some well circumscribed “information”. In fact, I suppose I am defining it that way in this work but use of the term ‘information’ and the concept INFORMATION is also quite polysemous and its various technical senses are often inconsistently and improperly used. In physicalist terms biological communication always involves some extraction of physical data at the level of sensory registration according to *The Mathematical Theory of Communication*¹⁸ (Shannon’s Theory) but at some point spills over into representation as content—information proper, or “(true)information”—so becoming semantic information in the process (or as natural information, if not expressed in a symbolic language).^{NOTE}

NOTE: Buried in the evolutionary interstices of this easy to state but hard to materially delineate transition—the one first taking **just** physical differences (data) to intentional content in some first mind—hide many if not all the mysteries of the mind, consciousness and intentionality. I, however, think this is overwrought and way off the mark, but as an empty if not useful conceptual placeholder.

The pernicious and widespread conflation of uses of DATA and INFORMATION in and across academia and lay society certainly gets in the way of people from one discipline or walk of life talking meaningfully with others, particularly as the epistemic domain moves from the hard to softer (or “special”) end of scientific concern (Physics → Chemistry → Biology → Psychology → Anthropology → Politics → Sociology → Folk “Sciences” etc., and just for bulk example as no fixed or comprehensive hierarchy is on offer here). I address these issues in my masters research paper, *Original Intentionality: Origins of Representational Mind*.¹⁹ DATA, as a *representation* of physical difference, can be derived (non-natural) or non-derived (natural); keep close to mind the vehicle-content-target triumvirate lest endless conflating and equivocating occur, data is not the target, dedomena is, a datum is a representation, not a target (I don’t think as many academics invoking Shannon’s Theory understand this as they really should). Prior to the first appearance of minds all data is assumed to be non-derived (if a datum falls in a forest of dedomena and no one is there to represent it, does it inform? If so, of what, to whom, and

how, to what end?). Semantic Information is either Natural, (True)Information, or Non-Natural (Paul Grice's Non-Natural Meaning²⁰). When people typically use the term 'information' we tacitly assume they are invoking (true)information, but are often only dealing with derived data, especially when dealing with cultural artifacts. Just to be very clear: false beliefs are never direct information of anything at all, just a form of misinterpreted derived or non-derived data. A belief must be true to be counted as information in the sense it is equated with knowledge. However, on learning that a belief is false the original data involved may often be reinterpreted at another level to become "meta"-information. Think about what happens when you figure out you have been lied to, for example.


So, if there is a failure to exchange meaning there is also a failure to communicate (true)information, but data is always on offer and only rarely (if ever) is no data taken away in some attempt to communicate. What *Lost in Translation* tries to show in part is simply translating or aping a literal exchange, no matter how well expressed is not enough to ensure the original intender's meaning was taken at all. While many go around making literal exchanges all day with confidence their meanings have all been soundly taken I fear this is mostly an illusion. What passes for communication much of the time is often just the semantically mute practice of social grooming (or, at least, their linguistic behavioural replacements in humans, who no longer socially groom each other as widely or intimately as other primate groups) or reflexive behavioural endorsement of memes or the re-expression of informal norms shared by those you already consider part of your tribe. I believe ideal communication requires multi-channel asymmetric confirmation of intended or intentionality-mediated meaning content by explicit and mutually endorsed experience of truth assessment only after terms have been mutually disambiguated first, and only in a bi-converse sense: Party A can endorse that party B has soundly taken their meaning based partly on B's semantic and other behaviour, but not simply because party B self-endorses this, and vice versa, so we are always dealing with possible meaning regression as well as meaning convergence or isomorphism. As most exchanges involving language occur as and over only a single back and forth channel this makes ideal communication not only much rarer but provides the basic empirical grounds for claiming that many of our celebrated practices of communication are actually anti-communicative or at least only superficially effective at the level of unreflective behaviour, and therefore not always fully rational, if rational at all. ^{NOTE}

NOTE: Implicitly weaved throughout this work is a model of communication that is much harder to achieve than the ones people think they already have well to hand. Implementing it requires a complete change in the way all important public discourse, media, and education currently work. Practising this model requires much more time and situational complexity in ensuring meaning has been conveyed than is typically granted (and a rational tool kit that is absent in a great majority of even most college or university graduates, sadly). It begins by requiring at least two ongoing channels of parallel communication; one simply for naively interpreting the literal content, the other assessing the meta-content about how the interpretation of that content is going (Think of Voltaire, 'Define your terms, if you wish to converse to me.' How often does this happen *first* in social discourse meant to be rational?). Most importantly, it is **only** the original meaner who is owed the right to say their meaning has been successfully conveyed or not. Does anything I have described here sound how most meaning disagreements or agreements go?

To further clarify the kinds of intentionality in meaning that are my central concern I also break the intention to mean into non-derived (natural) and derived (non-natural) forms. The non-derived form of the intention to mean, of the intentionality inherent in natural meaning (\rightarrow natural information), is originally conveyed passively and without any guiding telos (so is simply the not-impossible outcome of some very improbable random walk of 10^{80} protons²¹) from mindless nature to the creation of minds first through material and then (ta-da!) biological evolution. Only when culture emerges is the intention to mean more radically conveyable from mind to mind semiotically or symbolically; this requiring and anticipating the (meta?) intentionality of non-natural meaning. The first leap, from non-living to living turns—at some still undetermined downstream point of life’s evolved functional complexity—non-derived data into natural information, the second takes this natural information from living but non-thinking to living **and** thinking things as semantic information. This second much more seemingly profound communicative leap always works over both non-derived data (sensory, i.e., mechanically or reflexively leveraged data encodings or registrations) and derived data (percepts and concepts), so leverages both natural and (true)information on the way to full-blown non-natural meaning. However, these categories are rarely purely isolated from one another either extensionally or functionally (as Burge sagely reminds us). While the distinction I am drawing is fairly hard and fast, it is drawn only orthogonally not diametrically (nature-to-mind is “at right angles” to mind-to-mind). Body and mind are nothing but “matter in motion”, so they are always self-ontologically and self-ontically entangled as body-minds in lieu of any abstraction that otherwise grants each some purer functional, ontic or ontological independence in the proposed models. There is, as Derrida might say, ‘never one new kind of categorical thing standing purely outside the other as just a copy of that same category of thing’. I might add ‘there is never one new material category of thing standing outside the other as an **ontically pure representation** of that same one thing’, at least if Physicalism is true or Derrida is right, or both.

Part of the problem here, one I think is a feature in many debates in cognitive science, is we often seem to want to conceive of and epistemically stuff certain reified divisions, like mind/body or perception/cognition into very fine evolutionary leaps that otherwise beg for coarser and much more complexly interwoven ontic sub-categorization. Here, we see this in the analysis of semantic information into three sub-types, while the corresponding *forced* capacities addressed are just perception and cognition, with sensory registration now excluded (it’s contents are only data). This is because *Sensory Registration* (not *Sensation*, which is a vague term invoking too many levels of abstraction simultaneously) is not considered a form of **semantic** information encoding but only of data encoding tied to reflexive and mindless bio-function. The result is that two trinities, the first very new, that would otherwise seem to dovetail naively (data{non-derived sources}, natural information{mixed sources}, non-natural meaning{derived sources} \rightarrow sensory registration-perception-conception) are now made to fall apart to serve very old forms of assumption, about, well, the role and place in the world for concepts; one that typically assumes only human cognize (with the Newtonian view of the mind as a container for a stream of thoughts lurking perversely but invisibly in the background).

The state-of-the-art view of Tyler Burge requires that original intentionality (my non-derived intention to mean) only occurs with the novel emergence of psychological norms, which never reduce to just bio-functional norms on his vociferously made account. Only living things of the right kind of complexity and psychological agency are deemed mind-bearers, so for Burge the mind has tipped only when natural information (already a mix of naturally non-derived and derived data) has become non-trivially represented as (true)information. However, where a body tips to become a mind is not necessarily the same place a mind tips to become a conscious experienter. I think the diagram below shows the problem suggestively if not accurately (I think there is something real but perhaps ultimately unrepresentable here, but only on our current favoured metaphysic, not on the right pre-ontological one I would champion). It is like a Necker Cube, always flipping over the placement of first conception in terms of its role in language—changing the point of view “geometrically” in a way that makes a lie of the premises it now falls away from when some *by fiat* evidential or argumentative tipping point undermines the assumed role and placement for concepts and conceiving one starts with. Typically, this occurs in the swing from favouring rationalist to empiricist approaches, or back again. Today the neo-empiricists are “winning”.



(At the centre of each cube the “line” from Sensory Registration to Cognition passes through *Original Intentionality*. I think the paradox the placement of concepts invokes is a pseudo-problem due the false conception of COGNITION as a local and contingent function, when I see it as a universal feature/telos of the entirety of Big Evolution. Of course, this does not tell us why/how babies and some animals do analog math. However, making the vector of evolution a cognitive process obviates the Necker Cube like character of the debate (largely between Rationalists and Empiricists) even as it supports a pre-ontological account where at each tipping point the new question becomes how does the implicit proto-thing finally become the explicitly tipped (emergent) thing. Here invoking the notion of these transitions being fractal boundaries “solves” this problem and might help you make more sense of the fourth diagram provided above.)

So, I am more concerned to start over *first* with how particular rational meanings are ideally communicated rather than with how meaning is lived through embodied experience more generally and less reflexively, but still wish to push back against the prioritization of these two aspects of MEANING in which one is assumed to be the *de facto* explanatory basis of the other. To me, the popularized Western view is dangerously biased towards a tacit model in which meanings that are communicated logically are the only epistemic foundation possible for explaining the experience of all other possible meanings; I call this view Logicism. One has only to consider all the cries of “this has been proved”, or “that has been disproved” from people who have little to no training in philosophy, let alone any well-vetted or comprehensive formal logic or mathematics training, to see the problem with “normal” uses of the term. Here PROOF often takes on a radically different appearance as some kind of magically justificatory sonic hammer that pounds in the self-evident essence of some *belief-nail tout court* (but likely only given to its exhorter as some “clear and distinct idea”).

Proof: The Most Abused but Always Useful Argument Winning Word in any Dogmatist’s Toolkit

PROOF, of course, begins as the methodological duality of deduction versus induction, the first fuelled by intuitions unprovable within the very models they motivate (so always givens) but capable of achieving necessarily, 100% certain results in ideal cases, the second by defining, observing and measuring the properties of interacting objects in bounded and controlled systems (alter only one variable at a time!) and feeding the extracted quantification or qualification of properties into functions, relations, or novel and largely graphically determined categories. These statistical or probabilistic applications are meant to reveal otherwise hidden relationships at higher or lower scales of order. Inductions, however, are notorious—but few seem to be aware of this—for their being at best only probably true (but still possibly certainly false).^{NOTE}

NOTE: In switching from deduction to induction we largely switch from pure math to mathematical science, although there is mathematical (still deductive) induction as well; nothing real ever seems as purely cleaved into categories as the intuitively neat conceptual divisions would make it. And let’s not forget the “scandal of induction”, that there appears to be no independent deductive means by which we can be certain in the general cogency of any inductive method.

Initially, we invoke only primary properties at the level of physics and chemistry but then blend these over some fractal/scale boundaries into, or with secondary qualities and bio-functional valences, then on to psychological and cultural norms and values, as we cross from chemistry to biology to psychology (MATTER to LIFE to MIND or perhaps EXISTENCE to INTENTIONALITY to MEANING?). From our many

valid and sound deductions and cogent and strong inductions we infer or intuit theories or models that amount to best explanations (abductions), ones that always assume that the basic objects and relations invoked need be as simple, symmetrically interrelated and as few as possible (Occam's Razor, or Ontological Parsimony).

Sadly, most people wield the word 'proof' like a rhetorical singularity, not the verificational multi-discipline pluralism it actually is, and I have faint hope that allowing people to use words they completely fail to understand the reference of, but often solely based on their ability to use social power to persuade others over first submitting their beliefs to some much clearer form of verification, will ever move the cause of *ideal* human rationality forward. I find people's willingness to use the word 'proof' like an argument-winning hammer so ignorant of all its well vetted methods and limitations akin to how most people without any medical, or even science backgrounds beyond grade 10 none-the-less go around diagnosing each other with mental illnesses and other more purely ideological failings (Lefty, Fascist, Lib-tard, Narcissist, Sociopath, Precious Flower, etc.) without reservation in direct proportion to their lack of credentials for being fit to so diagnose or judge (let alone for any or all of the sub-disciplines of the therapeutic psychological arts, many of which fair poorly at justifying their most deeply held assumptions, for this barely able to rationally defend their diagnostic or treatment models).

This hardly looks like good use of reason to me, but it is deeply normalized in Western culture (even before Facebook and its ilk made the problem so much more transparent, *but did not create it*) and I think exposes a general "pathology" inherent in our collective and supposed valuing of reason. What appears to me is that we largely value reason lately in just the use of rational methods (instrumental reason), but nonetheless are often blindly promoting certain ends over others *just because that's what we've always done and when we started doing it, it was clearly the right thing to do then, so it must be now as well*, so all too rarely as an appropriate means for justifying what ends *and* means are most rationally coherent right now. Is any institution, let alone science, really transparent about their metaphysics and motives? I think not. Given that we make unbounded epistemic progress overall but in fits and starts, the knowledge we've equally gained in general is that most of what we believed to construct power over has turned out false, typically half of it over a generation in medicine I've been told, as a supporting anecdote.

Surely philosophy, at least, admits to and expects such failings as part of its methods, which is a great strength of the discipline and not the weakness the ignorant and anti-intellectual suppose. Is this empirical fact of epistemic progress in the face of endless fallibility and revision describing a paring away to radical and lasting insight or a harbinger of regress to total ignorance amongst all facts and all lies? Who can say, so tipped on a knife's edge is the belief/fact distinction in the first place, especially in so far as this maintains our current relative and largely contingent, hierarchical power relations in society? For example, how many are aware that the modern police state in North America was largely created with the then rational ends of retrieving runaway slaves by violent means? Is it rational, even with the best of modifications, to allow this still unavoidably embedded ethic to continue to insidiously infect its

current means and ends invisibly, even as the demonstrated biases objectively inherent to the system are well denoted in the light of day lately (even police officers of colour are guilty of this bias it seems)? We see the same problem in all the cries that men objectify women (valence:= BAD) where the evidence suggests that much more correctly it is *people that objectify women* (and more and more, men are being objectified similarly). The better use of reason could only occur when we first see the clear need, shining on its somewhat necessarily opaque path, to recreate our institutions **and values** (!!!) from scratch and to let many small new ones compete with the old, let new-value communities decide based on what they experience, not on what power has always decided ahead of time is best for them often from dark and pessimistic origins. Does the political, medical, or legal system owe us any less for its many irrational origins it still blindly adapts for purely instrumental use, lately creating the very opposite of what it aims for (except for the rich or powerful) but for controlling the representations, often only in appearance, not widely in reality as the notion of HUMAN RIGHTS otherwise supposes.

More Cultural Meaning Unicorns and The Myth of Benign Effect

Without any doubt the worst deeply normalized practice I see, the most irrational core of our normal ethical behaviour is that of promoting the value of REPUTATION over just trying (and hopefully succeeding) to be good (at least, accountable to our failings) regardless as to what other people or groups of them might think. What never seems to be in practical purview is that it **should** matter more if a reputation is earned than if the content of said reputation confers power just because of its ethically and normatively positive seeming's (and this point offers just one case of the garbage-in-garbage-out problem). This is just the egoistic version of the equally irrational claim that reality is **just** appearance. The concept REPUTATION belongs in the same best-to-be-abhorred pile as WASTE, as neither of these things can really causally exist in nature the primary way they are allowed and assumed to "exist" in culture, i.e., benignly, where their lasting and now very wide negative effects are largely ignored and denied even as they are being brought pointedly to our attention. Both need be banished from normal endorsement as valuable (reputation in the positive sense, waste in the benignly invaluable sense) in my opinion (assuming idealizing rationality **and** ideal use of reason requires it).

I often refer to WASTE in the context of what I've coined *The Myth of Benign Effect*, which is the unreasonable hope that something novelly produced, either natural or artifactual/artificial could somehow be intrinsically and lastingly benign, or worse, always necessarily beneficial, so always produced out-of-the-gate without any needed *proactive* restrictions on its use in place, or even a recognition of the likely need for some down the road restrictions in *reactivity* (when the proverbial cat is often so far out of the proverbial bag as to never be made or allowed to go back in, a perversion of the very essence of cats!). So much wisdom is to be found in lately neglected childhood fables, yet these stories' wise warnings seem lost from our purview lately: *Pandora's Box*, *The Emperor's New Clothes*,

Little Red Riding Hood, etc. Cutting off access to the unsettled and often unsettling meaning of metaphor in this way, cutting out the beautiful heart and churning gut of reasoned meaning as a tacit consequence of the bereft promotion of a cold-headed logicism is to cut off access to wisdom at its knees.

This myth of benign effect promotes two interleaving views (one diachronic, the other synchronic). The first that some novel object can be assumed to never exhibit harmful effects now, the second, which embeds the first assumption, is to deny the possibility that some otherwise relatively benign object is not likely (falling to ‘will inevitably’, as all poisons are cures, it is always a matter of context and dose) to contingently show unintended and harmful causal effects over productive and consumptive tipping points (perhaps necessarily) either. And to be very clear on another abused concept, NATURAL: all that exists is **necessarily** natural in the sense of “of Nature” if ‘natural’ is not to become a referentially opaque unicorn. The artifactual/artificial are just a normatively imposed sub-set of the natural, but this distinction is typically reified to a diametric opposition, to a purely objective distinction, one only motivated in turn by the equally normative endorsement of FREE WILL, and the assumed, but I think increasingly unjustified Western valuing of the ‘man is the measure of all things’ meme.^{NOTE}

NOTE: I recently heard something close to this from a *Star Trek* episode, *Discovery* I think: ‘SAFE is a relative concept. Its meaning takes on opposite senses over differing contexts’. This is more of what I think Derrida was getting at.

I suggest the growing negative impacts of unchained technological innovation and over-production of wants as needs are as much driven by this tacit (false) assumption as a deeper, but not the deepest cause of the Climate Crises—the deepest cause, I will argue elsewhere, is our current set of values and false beliefs, most tied to 300-year-old ideas of economic means and ends. It seems we fail over and over to embrace the empirically derived wisdom—the paradox that whether some potion is poison or cure is more a matter of dose and context than essence. The very idea that some scientist declared the discovery fentanyl was a hundred times more potent than morphine a good thing and no one blinked, let alone some other scientist declaring the discovery carfentanil was **TEN THOUSAND TIMES** more powerful than morphine (but somehow also claiming neither foster severe addiction as heroin does, yet another opium derivative—one of the first!!!—and the poster child in terms of caustic effect) is just one case in point. At least we have the decency to call this a crisis (but they are really crises too) and not the Opiate “Change”. But all this may be due (**huge gloss here!**) I believe, to nothing but a lazy mapping of our default primate natures (and novel dopamine systems)—set to resolve social conflict within a dominator and entirely local (“flat”) social group—onto the complex stratified hierarchies that inevitably emerge in leaps of scale as populations increase in size but tend to maintain the same sort of in-group to out-group identification in terms of barest familial or tribal ideology.

The problem with familial or tribal ideology (with any and all ideology on my wider account) is that half of what any family or tribe believes is always a morass of absurdly empty and arbitrary practices and values that amount to nothing more than symmetry breaking and categorical reduction to one side of some norm so each member of the group can be certain of all the tribe believes, evidence or natural desires to the contrary be damned. Of course, there is some deep psychological need being met by this, but I do not think this is well articulated or generally acknowledged, although calling it *Original Sin* seems close to the mark. One sees this most problematically in the fact the current ideological power always sees itself as correcting the grievous mistakes of past cultures and ideologies, yet never supposes it will inevitably fall to the same excesses (so never plans for this inevitable end, rather becomes tyrannical exactly because of its denial of this inevitability going in *and coming out*) let alone to assume its own core beliefs are *necessarily* similarly constructed over as many falsehoods as truths *right fucking now!*

This problem, I think, is inherently intractable in purely objective terms, even if all who endorse a progressive thrust in human history towards THE GOOD still justly argue each truly novel leap in cultural development is “better” than the one it transcended, such as the all-too-recent Enlightenment era creation and subsequent unbounded extension of human rights and freedoms represented, but are now threatened (largely because, sadly, rarely do the added *responsibilities* entailed ever get as much press or defence). It is really not surprising those who are most oblivious to the lack of justificatory force behind their beliefs, right or wrong, are often the most vociferous in defending them, and it is even less surprising we spend so much time debating often pointless differences in norms reality easily confers more than enough space to exist side-by-side unproblematically. I believe the ultimate reason we spend so much time in conflict over what often reduces to made up nonsense, exactly while we ignore the real problems, is because to really address the deeper conflicts and existential problems we must first confront the horrifying and repressed sense we have much less control over anything in reality than the aforementioned core Western ideology ‘man is the measure of all things’ so problematically and unjustly supposes. ^{NOTE}

NOTE: For example: What goes on consensually in the bedrooms of legal adults is nobody’s business but theirs, but please keep it that way, the sexual impulse is always chthonic, too much light on or tolerance of its extremist forms of expression, consensual or not, and it risks becoming unhinged—see the Internet and what apps like Tinder are doing to the valuing of intimacy for details. The problem of IDENTITY looms large here as well and given the growing problem of antibiotic resistance I fear so-called casual sexual activity risks becoming as dangerous to civilization as distracted driving already is.

For the ***Environmental Crises*** we reduce the risk of furthering hidden and possibly destructive environmental or cultural tipping points driven by the many excesses of human industry to ***just*** one

“change” in the climate. In part this is to make it palatable and basically understandable to the ignorant masses who can barely conceive of themselves outside of the towns they live in and the very small tribes they belong too, but I think does more to promote fear counter-productively (to make selling reactive and not proactive solutions easier) than to expose the depths of what we currently risk in very short temporal order given the clear light of evidence shining down from many areas of transparent and relatively easy to understand scientific concern. I think that to call what we face a “change” is like saying that death is just another day in life. To call it just one thing, is like saying an octopus is just one of its tentacles.

These are what Horst Rittel calls “Wicked Problems”²². Of the wicked problems our flies-in-a-jar problem seems the wickedest, especially when one also sees how the problem of original sin drives this. Original sin, when cast as our unrealistic (and still unexplained in terms of its source) psychological need for certainty and control, is so widely and deeply ingrained in all of us, and so not at all well understood or acknowledged as possibly **THE** central problematic in our default psychological natures—and therefore also endlessly denied on its own terms—that in our endless efforts to achieve the certainty that gives us psychological power and (wildly overstated) material control over the chaotic nature of change we double down on controlling those things most arbitrary and ethically inert, all the while ignoring the worst **obvious** effects of our supposed rationally and freely chosen excesses, lately to the peril of the entire collective and most other sentient beings who inhabit Earth with us (and from whose complex and possibly epistemically intractable material and biological interdependence's all the riches of our technologies and sciences are often so thoughtlessly extracted).^{NOTE}

NOTE: I want to immediately ward off any objection to this evidencing some apocalyptic biases acting in me. When people wail that we are killing the planet this is just more irrational and unjustified hubris of the sort that has perennially dominated the social discourse of all ages in times of wide social crisis. Human beings simply do not have the power to stop the inevitable courses of nature (especially if one takes the physicalist view of material evolution as a random walk of contingency of 10^{80} protons out of lawful necessity over 13.8+ billion years as accurate!!!) let alone somehow unravel all of creation. All we risk is the end of post-modern civilization or a dystopic regression of it (and I doubt we can even make ourselves instantly extinct—deliberately or otherwise—collective and merciful death may prove too good for our “evil” ways. Nature as a whole will do that slowly, grindingly and inexorably, and always was the only thing capable of doing so). Once bacteria exist anywhere in this universe they become the indomitable basis of life itself. Nature is more than capable of taking all the shit we dump into it and repairing all the lost but contingently weaved forms of entropy defying function and learning the lesson of the mistake of creating (by accident, of course) our currently piss-poor kind of self-reflective consciousness in this too egoistically hedonistic and blindly over-consumptive human mode. The inevitable, but *always paradoxical-causally relativized* poisons that we manufacture in this sham attempt to perfect reality against the arbitrary and all too primate-nature-driven values we now impose on nature without constraint are the fodder by which new complexity and a new and better era of self-reflective consciousness may enter the world. Our time as this self-supposed transcendent creature of reason may prove us nothing but failed harbingers, like the first proto mammals that appeared in the fossil record well before any extant mammalian classes, but just as quickly vanished.

Our collective crime, as much obscured by the hyperbolic claims of most environmental or social warriors is simply to risk squandering a wonderful opportunity for modernity (and rationality) that could last millennia, rather than just a few hundred years after the Enlightenment (which will then become the cause of our final failings, not the cure of our original natural fallibility). One of the five^{NOTE} other

NOTE: Recently I read a paper suggesting a missed 6th extinction, so that would make the pending one a 7th, in analogy to the seven S.I. base units . . . perhaps 7 really is a magical number?

massive extinction events—the previous one, I read about this somewhere that escapes my memory—is hypothesized as caused by a single species of phytoplankton that grew out of control and choked most of the oxygen out of the oceans, causing over 80% of extant species to go extinct (however, I also recently learned these same organisms were responsible for stabilizing the Earth’s ocean chemistry and thus facilitating complex multi-celled forms of animal life really taking off in the Cambrian Explosion! See: every poison is a cure at some other level of abstraction!). From our ashes will come the flames of new natural creativity. Of course, many, and I am one, feel the evolutionary door really open to us is more purely subjective, i.e. **within** (not meaning *inside*, at all) along the lines of the many contemplative and meditative traditions, yet in our unjustified bias to promote materialism (both senses) we reduce and so dangerously denigrate the experience of **within**, the new unbounded realm human subjectivity really opens up into, to just physical states of the brain (and from there it gets worse as the brain is reduced to a computer, at best a *Universal Turing Machine* with its current state uploadable as raw data for some program as a form of immortal “life”). It is hard not to see the avoidable suffering we risk in denial of our collective challenges *and* opportunities always being the way (The Path?) we are pushed into this opening nonetheless, but by suffering poorly when we could be suffering well (with a nod to Depeche Mode’s sage advice). I take some comfort (and horrible awe) in the probable claims that existence is nothing but this same drama playing out over and over, over many kalpas worth of space-times, only otherwise abiding as (non-dual) Being until “God” gets too bored with omniscience and omnipotence and so plays a game of hide and seek with itself “once again”, *a la* Alan Watts²³; the finite out of the infinite . . .

Chapter 4: A Derridean Easter Egg

Optional Reiteration: So, I am at this point more concerned to start over with how particular rational meanings are ideally communicated rather than with how meaning is lived through embodied experience more generally and less reflexively, but still wish to push back against the prioritization of these two aspects of MEANING in which one is assumed to be the *de facto* explanatory basis of the other. To me, the popularized Western view is dangerously biased towards a tacit model in which meanings that are communicated logically are the only epistemic foundation possible for explaining the experience of all other possible meanings; I call this view Logicism.

I do not defend any counter-thesis here concerning whether experience (→ empiricism, which all alone → skepticism) or representation (→ rationalism, which all alone → idealism) is the deeper source of knowledge. I think absolute knowledge is ultimately a unicorn (so, is a thing that does not “really” exist, but in relative effigy); there is just better belief and forms of believing, so knowledge is always held relative to ineliminable paradoxical foundations, such as in how Quantum Mechanics (QM) makes a lie of determinism even as it is the best model of local material reality we have, i.e. the one that **determines** the (probabilities of) future states of certain bounded sub-microscopic systems with the most impressive accuracy and precision on record. Or, with General Relativity (GR) treating the past and future as also pre-determined, maybe always “existing”, even as Einstein’s rejection of space-time as a Newtonian container/substance at one level of abstraction reappears in the recasting of the gravitational/accelerative effect of matter as curving space-time (and in three+ dimensions that always entails curving substance, so space-time-(scale) is that substance, but Einstein did not take that as a *reductio*, but a *redemptio*).

My—in this work, somewhat undefended view of things is we really have many ineliminable paradoxical circle(s)/spiral(s) with the incommensurateness between QM and GR just the grandest exemplar, but not as circles/spirals with centres facing opposed and pushed away circumferences, but where each term of the pole may be, over shifting contexts, both centre and circumference, and where seeing this depends on first untangling the ontological-epistemic knot at the intentional heart of the spiral of evolving consciousness; where the universe as a whole first “sees” the world it is as a small mind. Meaning-as-experience is just as fairly *and in some paradoxical form of equality* the prior source of all these logical meanings. For example, when one first grasps why x^0 is necessarily equal to 1 for all x not equal to zero or infinity (by working out the implications of the logical definition of exponents and filling out the missing entailments that are consistent with these definitions, but not contained in them) this is confirmed as much by some felt epiphanic insight (it surely was for me, and I can remember that moment, where and when it happened, with persistent and seemingly unwavering engrammatic detail). The Western archetype is that ‘aha’ moment Archimedes’ apocryphal exclamation of ‘Eureka!’ best captures when he immediately intuited the law of displacement for rigid non-absorbing bodies placed in a volume of liquid “simply” by taking a bath with a desire to solve the problem Hiero of Syracuse proposed about the votive crown already in his mind. Logic alone, without some confirming experience given by its proper use in some well delineated and properly rational and appropriately regulated and vetting value community is mute in terms of truth as

Wittgenstein has so persuasively argued. Sound use of logic is always socially situated so never free (in determining its most ethical use) of its dependence on the prior existence and nature of minds, at least as things stand. There seems no possibility of expressed knowledge without minds, let alone for a totally isolated mind. To become a conscious mind is always to first experience meaning as the barest kind of intentionality towards an other as a perspective-taking self (even if only behavioural agency through biological function based on irreducibly novel and emergent psychological norms is the hallmark of original intentionality, as Tyler Burge has convincingly argued in *Origins of Objectivity*). Only later in development or evolution can a mind first experience the intention to mean to others what it first experiences as walled-off thought-experience, so also before it can be expressed in propositions, and yet in some way still very tight to the general emergence of symbolic and recursive language. Does Language presage thought, or thought language? 'Neither or both' seems as good an answer as 'just one or the other', at least as far as these mysteries remaining unanswered in perpetuity "says".

While humanity clearly values and honours the methods of rationality in so far as instrumental use of reason goes, I fear it fails more and more in addressing the inevitable problem of garbage in → garbage out, which makes even the most valid and inclusive model of reality into a beautiful but unsound dream; where is the wisdom in this, as the once heralded better part of reason? If the environmental crises are real and human caused, then what does that say about the soundness of our favoured and all-too-rational models, regardless as to their validity or soundness, in so far as they underwrite the manifest productive thrust of our so-called higher values, our productivity, our creativity, and our supposed endlessly progressive utilitarian or consequentialist agency? Any so-called rational enterprise that so blindly disregards the all too real possibility of our looming crises and all too easy to pinpoint causes (in spite of the supposed unresolved status of the popular debate, which to me has been moot for some time) is a poor kind of truth maker. I am as much in this work by example, so both explicitly and implicitly, arguing for a different method for apt meaning convenience **and** communication in philosophy to be instilled in all people, one I hope that is less vaguely and purely emotionally evocative in metaphorical terms than art is, but more than just logic, so asking for more than just the hope my key propositions are true, and my web of meaning propositions be found eternally coherent, consistent, and complete (which is nothing but a SELF-destructive pipe dream on my view of things).

It is not impossible on my view of MEANING that all my propositions may be false (I certainly don't believe all of the metaphysics I endorse but that is how any *reductio* always goes) yet to see my meaning trans-cogently, trans-soundly, i.e. metaphorically aptly (metaphoraptly???) conveyed by re-experiencing it in these many re-presentations, not just holding to or endorsing or rejecting it piecemeal and only propositionally, but in a lived experience that causes you to act differently in the world so as to allow the world to be what it may best become in lieu of all our unrealistic expectations for it based on the illusory forms of certainty and control we seem to endlessly pursue to our collective peril exactly when our ideological bent falls to monistic, and naively logistic insistence. I aim for a global ethical epiphany against reifying any and all difference in ideology, one borne by a transparent re-situating (and then de-centring) of rationality as the centre of human agency within the currently denied Derridean

circumference of the neglected pole of its all too Western binary, that being the denial of the perniciousness (and purpose) of inevitable and intractable human irrationality; as necessary and essential to the psyche of the world as to human beings (if we are mad, so too is the universe). Deeper in time still this Derridean binary must be re-embedded *in naturalistic terms* within the historical presumption of the a-rational origins of the novel property of human minds as *self-reflective* (The a-rational is neither rational nor irrational, but prior to yet casually anticipating the possibility of both, i.e. a-rationality is the mind-independent state of non-thinking, non-living being we assume for promoting a purely objective realism, in picking *just* (a gloss) the Western metaphysics over a purely subjective idealism, largely encapsulated in the Eastern metaphysic (a wicked gloss)).

I obviously beg for and gloss over too much here as my epistemic expertise does not extend to the history of all ideology in any significant way. So, I am all too easily over this ignorance lumping the Far East Asian and Indian metaphysics under one umbrella as a diametric foil for the Enlightenment defined Western view of things. If I must argue for the superficially evident claim the Western view, if only in its economic and techno-scientific values, is dictating many if not most of the values of collective global agency lately and my entire argument fails for not doing so, then so be it. However, remembering the (trivially) polemic and (substantively) trans-rational methods I am much more transparent about I do not think that I am using the Occidental versus Oriental division in ways that are meant to deny further sub-ideologically historical or even metaphysically purer independent origins without clear limit. If I were attempting to mean the same as a Far East Oriental I might just as easily parse the Indian metaphysic with the European one owed to the Ancient Greeks (or if Indian, the Far East Asian with the European). This, I do not believe changes the special metaphorical thrust of my argument here, which is more about use of naive reason as a universal human “pathology” than of reifying use of reason in regard to favouring the metaphysics of any one cogently isolated ideological population over any other.

So, I see Secular Materialist, Theist or Deist, or Taoist or Buddhist (or other Dharmic ontologies) as equivalent on this basis. The paradoxes we face start as binaries **only** because of how we use reason naively and “normally” (and the proximal cause of this must lie in perception’s leveraging of all those differences, the morphic data of sensory registration intentionality is built upon); the paradoxes mattering most in my metaphysic are ultimately plural, or fractal, so there is no one or even plural set of complex divisions sub-categorizing the gross parallel emergence of all extant ideology at about the same time in history without overlapping extensional and intensional residue. This is because of the inevitable and constant blending of ideas and practices caused by the nomadic character of human life that is easy to anticipate but impossible to trace out in detail, except by painstaking back-inference. This problem of seeking radically pure diachronic categorizations over an all too **obviously** messy and always synchronically lived empirical reality seems to me akin to the one Aristotle struggled with in trying to say whether essence belonged most to form or substance as well as the one Umberto Eco points out in *A Theory of Semiotics* when demonstrating why the strict tree-like hierarchies of Linnaean species categorization ultimately fail at being logically comprehensive and unambiguous.

But: I must on the above basis ask this question:

Has it not occurred to anyone but me that as the historical empirical evidence suggests (within the confidence intervals of its inevitably vague determination as a set of induced “facts”) both of these “orthogonally” opposed (instead of ‘diametrically’; there seems no easy to access prefix or antonym for taking a measure of difference of identity “at right or fractal angles” as opposed to the more pure definitional opposition given by ‘diametric’) and deepest metaphysical views all appear almost simultaneously—at their collected relative order of magnitude—a few (~5000?) thousand years ago that this is yet another literally manifest universal paradox (a living and teeming clue?). I would argue the relative and naive emergence of these deeply lived metaphysical inconsistencies were, at *its* very collective origin (as with so many paradigm shifting scientific and mathematical discoveries, which turn out rarely due to single geniuses, but are often discovered in parallel by two or more investigators) even then offering an ontic opening to an inevitable post-rational step forward for the best possible ends of self-reflective consciousness.

The problem is for rationality to grasp (perhaps only in experience and never in representation) the inescapable if not logically unpalatable need to re-articulate and then transcend its own now very widely vetted use and likely unavoidable reification of logic as the *sin quo non* of its essence (rather than the “red herring” I will argue later it might be). Although we move forward into future history lately by our worship of the law of non-contradiction as if both the Oriental and Occidental views could never be true at the same time I fear it is irrational to expect to be able to totalize our representations of reality into some monism given the current ongoing integration of these ideologies in many healthy and authentic, and probably also unhealthy or inappropriate ways (and not forgetting for most of Western history and still amongst the philosophically unwashed, dualism is often the naively felt ontology). Totalizing ideology, it seems, entered this world wholesale as a plurality (and stubbornly remains one). I fear we are unwisely always trying to reduce the deeper nature of being into only one of (many of) its (plural and not just dual) Derridean Poles, to our own endless spiritual malaise over this hidden and neglected (complex) binary:

What is most fundamental is most substantial (taken as a logical bijection, so also the identity leveraged *tacitly* by monist materialists of both the reductive and non-reductive kinds).

What is most fundamental is least substantial—so also—What *seems* most substantial turns out least fundamental (taken as a metaphor: The Maya Hypothesis).

I propose both of these claims are satisfied by some totalized version of “all that exists” *all at once* even if their sentential representations can’t both be logically or literally in any perceived local material or (true)representational terms at or “inside” some same space-time event, so only in a special sense. To define this special sense first requires using an appropriately disambiguated sense of the term ‘reality’. In what follows I will try to begin, if not complete that disambiguation. The special sense in which the

binary above is—not true, but “meta-true” is, I *believe*, also **not** ontological but “pre-ontological”. The idea is simple enough: since we’ve had language, culture, and ideology and began asking big questions about Being (:= sum of all dated real existences), about where all this cosmic furniture came from, where it is going, what things are in their identities as given by their essences, the nature of change and causation, etc., we’ve had to implicitly assume a kind of blind epistemic faith and hope as any answers provided always *in some sense* end up referring to realms beyond any possibility of direct and local perception. When the explanations come from, or are directed at lower scales of being we naively reciprocate the felt substantial intimacies of naturally *found* living as an embedding in an apparently unbounded environment naively experienced *closely* as full of things and their independent and inter-dependent dynamisms by projecting a scaled-down expectation to find more of this same *found* substantive mereology in bare and basic structural essence, if not to delimited isomorphism.

One inherent problem with this intuition is while any whole given to perception is sometimes nothing more or less than the sum of its smaller scale parts as a contingently emergent matter heap easily categorized by reduction, is that when wholes become functional they also become more than this sum, more than just a heap, they bare emergent properties. This simply recasts how and why atomism has won out, but only a battle won in terms of explaining heapings, not the war in terms of explaining function. The problem with atomism, where it seems to have lost the war, begins as we hit the scale of the atom and lower. The representational view of reality discovered inverts, mocks and blocks any further scaling down of the found substantive (and always fractal) mereologies of perception, but this is not what we expected to find going into these very, very tiny realms. We assumed this project of quantifying indirect observation of the otherwise impossible to see (and this point is critical, even if just a contingent or a conditional instead of necessary limit) would take us to that which was most fundamental in the final and smallest forms of substance. We assumed—and still do—our models actually take us right through and so to the very *far*, i.e., to the even smaller scale “other” side of the appearance-reality gap, and in doing so are dispelling it from epistemic concern even as we “pierce” it by extracting all these indirect observations and measurements, those grounded in a very impressive background story of various kinds and kludges of various forms of logical inference mixed with certain facts and methods.

But is that what we’ve really done, or are we just begging the question here?

Instead of a smaller version of the middle-scale living world, but for it being assumed bereft of intentionality or consciousness (think: Leibniz’ Mill)²⁴ we find a view of what we’ve already assumed must be a true representation of “the real” that defies objectivity itself and speaks more of seamless and paradoxical (Derridean?) wholes seamlessly undergoing many forms of plurally parallel evolution of often, one supposes on the physicalism, radically unobserved and purely pre-material quantum systems (described by the uber-universal wave equation as it operates *infinitely* in a mind-and-vitality-independent world as a totalized objectivity in the absence of any subjectivity). And even as we approach this logic denying level of the supposed real let us not forget at each smaller scale of part-

whole dynamism what we've already found is most of substance's felt embodied effect is due only to surface, not depth interaction—these many chemicals, i.e., electromagnetically borne surfaces—and so matter has already been well drained of most of its substance; inside all matter what we find at lower scales turns out mostly empty space. And yet, somewhat counter-perversely the more we look up into larger scales although we seemingly find even more outer—rather than inner empty space the more we keep looking up the more we seem to find, and also lately exhibit a desperate need to find even more to shore up our most cherished models further, i.e., the 95% of expected substance only to be found in dark matter/energy.

On many wide, albeit metaphorical interpretations of the quantum realm the very idea of independent or pure objectivity vanishes and this has already been popularized in many new age books equating aspects of quantum theory with—what exactly?—well nothing more or less than *The Maya Hypothesis*. This is close to a logically fallacious appeal, but these close enough analogies need explaining as much as we need an explanation for how a physical state could ever really represent a non-existent object only in/by matter. At least: the present denial of our expectations going in, when compared to those actual aspects of the supposed quantum reality beyond the gap it turns out we've found, tellingly mirrors the binary set I've proposed; we go in assuming the first pole and find ourselves then promoting the second (in the subjective sciences, such as meditation aimed at enlightenment the opposite must then be true. We start by assuming all is surface illusion and then find a form of experience that transcends all the dualities nowhere and in or at no time, only yielding to *non-fundament* and radical *insubstantiality*).

This endless casting off of conceptual dualities by recursive language, many of them either defined by ongoing empirical paradoxes going in (mind-body problem) or demanding rationalist ones on coming back out (the measurement problem, entanglement) to me speak of nothing more or less than that these irresolvable incommensurate dualities (and their all-encompassing, but by that woefully inconsistent semantic super-webs) are what (should re-)define the gap in meta-representation, and also shows it still relatively impenetrable; yet we keep otherwise supposing it is directly penetrable and *has already been penetrated*. The problem with assuming informational approaches to semantic theory (and I think this is the right way to go, at least for naturalism) must then rest tellingly in the fact that any conveying of physical information always reduces to the encoding of differences, never absolutes, yet if we start with The Maya Hypothesis and perform the right kind of more purely subjective science it appears we can resolve all dualities, but only in non-representative, and so never representable forms of experience, not in any language so not in any theory or model either (so, I suppose, only in the essential experience of whatever really does lie before/beyond *reality-as-perception*). So: which is more fundamental?, and which more substantial?; neither taken together or apart it seems, yet . . . that's not right either, at least until we return to the world of reality-as-perception at the middle scale from some right kind of Thuraya state first.

This point is critical: perception begins as an informational duality of *close* function extrinsically parasitic on a materially delimited background and intrinsically on a set of assumed laws, a universal

“alphabet”; the begged metaphor (if one does the work to expose the entailed metaphysic) is of data out of *Dedomena*, where now all foundation and substance are swept under yet another idealist rug, but one I fear still causes many ‘it from bit’ theoreticians to seek models premised across inconsistent metaphysics, still methodologically relying on too reductive and too logical forms of materialism to somehow cash out their disguised idealisms.

Instead, I think the required and universally sought-for epistemic solution/correction is staring us right in the face and given the brilliant and shocking simplicity of this claim I can offer no rational reason why those pioneers of QM failed to see or seriously consider what I am about to propose. What they seem to have done instead is to miscast the real targets of their oh-so-very-precise-and-accurate modelling of the atomic and sub-atomic, all because they assumed they had pierced the gap, when all I think they have really done is to mathematize it into a fine residue, to a plurally and fractally recapitulated “3-point” or “tripartite opening and endless possibility of reopening” (given by the relative eigen-diameters of the BBS and Planck’s Length, the scale of the smallest free-living cell and the Berkenstein bound of the material brain). I believe, and it is also consistent with my larger metaphysic and model of mind, that rather than dissolving the gap with QM we have, by problematically assuming all scientific knowledge equally targets and pierces the gap in the same “flat” epistemic sense I have waved at, simply doubled down on it.

What I believe is much closer to the truth is what Quantum Theory really is, is a literal model not of a law of wider and deeper reality (so not about deeper substance nor foundation at all) but a model of the contingently necessary *emergent* pseudo-law of how things *must (can only now?)* manifest in “reality” as “seeing’s”, but where the sense of ‘reality’ now invoked is one that only begins and ends as, yes, in somewhat mysteriously precise terms:

$$\frac{\text{“pre_and_cis-reality(irreality}_0\text{)}/(\text{gap}_0\text{)}/\text{reality as middle-to-close perception (looking back in time)}/\text{appearance-reality gap}/\text{middle to far perception as reality (looking forward in time)}}{(\text{gap}_{0/1})/\text{trans_or_post-reality(irreality}_{0/1}\text{)}}.$$

Pay close attention to the first and last use of subscripts **and** prefixes. There is a Derridean reading entailed here by the use of pre/cis-reality(irreality₀) *going into the “pre-ontological”* and trans/post-reality(irreality_{0/1}) *coming out of it (on the other-same side)*. If a definition of paradoxical “identity” is allowable then: irreality₀:= irreality_{0/1} **and** irreality₀:= ~irreality_{0/1}, but only in different “directions” across what I can only contextualize here in analogy as a Mobius strip, or as a better-fit but less known para-object, a Klein-bottle “model” of the mind. The additional prefixing, from ‘pre/cis’ to ‘trans/post’ (or “cis/pre or ‘post/trans’ equivalently) is meant to show that irreality₀ is “identical” to irreality_{0/1} in a straightforward pre-to-post sense (indicated by the subscript ‘0’), i.e., in the sense that *as far as we*

know the place we came from before we were born is the same place we return to when we die. The extra ‘trans’ prefix is meant to indicate, counting as a Derridean, that irreality_0 is also “non-identically identical” to $\text{ireality}_{0/1}$ (indicated by the extra subscript ‘1’ in ‘0/1’). It is non-identically identical in the sense quantity, only unrepresented or a “degraded” being before *close* perception, emerges and is only conceived of as all the numerals et. al. in *far* perception when it first maps itself across, i.e., *trans* all gaps, where the quasi-concrete/quasi-abstract material twist defining the empirical appearance-reality gap first occurs at the eigen-scale of original mind, that being the scale of the atom (more details of the material source of this twist or “fracture” can be found in my introductory talking head video: <https://www.academia.edu/video/kAQLZk>).

Going forward when I use the term ‘*reality-as-perception*’ or anything close to or not too far from that, I mean this! The grey highlighted part is what traditionally passes as naive or folk reality, but is always, in being bound in both a limiting and delimiting sense (as the observable universe) only a cork finitely bobbing in a much deeper and wider and always infinite pre-and-post ontological “ocean”.

Solving the First Interpretive Problem associated with Quantum Theory: Indeterminism

Immediately an account of the rationally troubling probabilistic and indeterminable nature of observation-driven wave collapse into only one final state follows from this “correction” of the term ‘reality’ (it’s a dozy of a correction, a very “scary” one indeed). What QM speaks of is not, wholly at least, of a deeper and totalizable reality. I believe it is also, partially at least, speaking of some universally intrinsic and contingent form of real (and empirically determinable) “material self-limiting” also. So QM only emerges in this partial sense in lock-step with proto-perception at its proper or characteristic scale of bare atoms (but for the developmental lag between its essential appearance in sensory registration and its first consciously experienced representation). Combined with my soon-to-come explication of perception where I claim it is originally a wholly general, and not particular capacity at all (to start), offers a cohesive and satisfying reinterpretation of the many damning metaphysical question surrounding QM such to show more why the questions are better obviated than answered, in this somewhat poorly formed by classicalism, i.e., *divide and conquer use of reason*. Nature as perception, nature as reality, reality as the perception of nature is and has always to date been about the universe “guessing better than chance” as to which new finite forms might emerge to first become seeable and only then to be seen in this special sense of reality as arising out of an always infinite background, except for the meta-binding of this entire background by non-locality, by universal entanglement. So entanglement is also grounded and explained as a quasi-feature of perception and is also not directly tied to the nature of reality behind the gap at all either, rather dis-entanglement is what is “really” guiding naïve reality into coherent regularity, but as much or more non-locally than locally—and that is it only by nature yields up perception of absolutes at all!. Reality is a balance point always

stuck between pure chaos and pure order by the anarchic insistence of the Logos from both a realm “before” and another “beyond”).

Vital (living) seeing only starts at the scale of first perception, as I will argue more soon, because life is a *found* embedding of function naturally made within wide and stable energy fluxes due to the internal essence and fact of the BBS’s nature being parasitized by life (reminding you the BBS has no external essence at all as a *real nothing*). Life is what first (*originally*) realizes a quasi-concrete and quasi-abstract instantiation of a real inside and outside, which is a meaningless dichotomy when applied only to cold dead (not even capable of ever dying!) matter. All non-intentionalized matter is in this sense always neither inside nor outside itself or the things it manifests as, it simply *all-together* monistically abides across all scale, *even as it changes categorically*!

This entails in very strong *prima facie* terms that any and all forms of “seeing”—conscious or not—are also contingently impossible below this scale due to the induced plausibility all the material precursors in fact minimally needed *a priori* for “seeing”—which also first non-intentionally emerge into being from below up, at, and only then spilling over their own similar atomic scales to the macro-scale—must also act as *a posteriori* ontic limiters on what contingent functions they may realize in the random walk that first puts them together in some “intelligent” but mindlessly lawful way. We have no evidence that life somehow begins wholesale at higher scales and only then refines down (we don’t think the universe as a whole, galactic super-structures, galaxies, stars, etc., are alive!)—so I will take that as evidence of absence—yet we have endless evidence that life has largely evolved up in scale *as in any reductively-speaking sense does all categorical novelty* (in Big Bangs, Stars, and Galaxies by first over-creating, symmetry-breaking, energetically freeing, near uniformly dispersing . . . reversing this whole process by “pre-cooking” with a lowering temperature in an ever expanding “kitchen” . . . only then *finally and mainly* fusing protons and exploding the meal wide and far when the “oven” finally implodes under its own gravity!). And so, there is an easy conclusion to draw here and for some reason it has rarely been considered: “seeing” could only ever emerge bottom-up at some contingently necessary space-time-scale, and is forever limited by some “causal attractor minima or inflection point” and therefore could never ontically occur at lower scales at all (or in a less complex background space, or at earlier times) and the lower-scale possibility of multiply realizability for both what is seen and what sees is essentially blocked by this limit as well. Another way to parse this claim is to debunk the very notion of indirect observation or unobservables. What is unobservable falls to what is impossible to see, but what is not ever seeable could not logically be called an unobservable in any representational sense; it is simply forever “before” seeing because mundane seeing is naturally always beyond ever reaching it.

I am, of course, peripherally speaking above of all the empirically and unproblematically “real” extant and extinct forms of background physical complexity presaging the very possibility of the emergence of the cellular and neural complexity sufficient and/or necessary to first see reality by such a small slice of the same reality at all. What is missed is that “reality” takes a Derridean pre-ontological step even as it

first sees, and if seeing below this scale is thus made pragmatically, if not fatally impossible beginning just below the scale where the universe first sees by some life, then why are we so certain that QM targets reality more deeply as SEEING can't even or ever exist below this scale, let alone any actual *seeing!!!???* How, being a realist-materialist of the most parsimonious or even naive kind do we expect to see, even "indirectly", of what at its own level of ontology *and* onticity is denied any material possibility of seeing even existing there, exactly? The much more parsimonious interpretation is that all QM targets is a limit (as much showing how ONTOLOGY need be re-conceived) even if something of deeper "reality", something pre-ontological still shines through, i.e., quantity as degraded or *infinitesimal* being.

Incredulous, ridiculous, patently wrong.

Perhaps, but perhaps the real resistance to *believing* this claim will not come from evidence or arguments at all, but will be tacitly meant to prevent the collective-esteem hammering entailed, so blocking the felt **ETHICAL** and existential terror entailed in realizing we have been wrong about at least some (but I think—all—to a meta-relative degree that itself will expose a coherent meta-structural account) of the proper targets of modern science in a very spectacular and metaphysically damning way all along (especially in regards to furthering endorsement of the 'man is the measure of all things' meme, unless *measuring wrongly* is what was sought for). I shouldn't need to explain to you the wider nature of our rational collective failings if I am right about this special sense of reality and that nothing has been epistemically crossed of the appearance-reality gap in the way naively supposed, *yet*, but instead has simply been focused right down onto at the very final-(first)-knowledge blocking scale at which seeing becomes contingently possible (and where a new and necessarily concomitant "onto-law" emerges in step). The further entailments in terms of epistemology I can only begin to wave at.

For example, I do, however, still think the standard model is about reality "sub-gap" to a partial and still very epistemically significant degree and is at least a *quasi-justifiable* back-projection of our always rationally sought-for fundamental substantive mereology, but now in what should be re-conceived of as a pre-ontologically novel form of "super-duper" indirect or *virtual* observation, but even here the model simply explains how these things appear to what is really more an *inner-ontic* form of perception, and so one still never available to or about outer perception (which doesn't, and *can't* exist below the gap at all). String theory, as much because of its endless teases but persistent intractability seems to have found its targets somewhere in between and speaks, I think, of unrepresentable aspects of infinity, of the real "sub-reality" that actually lies below the gap, that being nothing more or less than an infinite field of degraded being, of "sub-substance". Here is where we find all the "real" (not just the namesake kind, the entirety of kinds of) number, but they are not only to be counted (or ordered, pointing out yet another dual aspect, here belonging to the essence of enumeration) in a non-Derridean sense, but also in Derridean one.

Our intuition towards logicism, however, is of course what allows us to carve out the laws logically. It's just that they are no longer, accepting my account, laws of deep reality, but just of the universe as it

must *originally* appear to perception. Additionally, this sub-matter must also be seen as exhibiting a coming into being by Derridean forms of “counting and ordering dynamisms”, so the sub(pre/cis?)-universe also counts and orders in a relative non-logical as well as an absolutely logical fashion (all number and all they do together is simply a totalized but always degraded form of being in the sense of Cantor’s dust, always filling in, but never full enough to touch anything . . . until the first act of perception). So, in a very real sense until the universe in this pre-perceptive phase has counted enough over the tension of seamless originality and iteration at the sub-substance level can it as this endlessly infinitesimal dust ever fill in enough to first become universal seeing **and** seen *all at once* (and also be my origin for objectivity, still close enough to Burge’s).

Even More Warrant – Solving The Measurement Problem (or What “Hears” A Falling Tree When No One Is Around For The “Sound” of it)

Consider this clarifying claim for more justification:

QM is only discovered by first assuming and following the Western pole of the foundation/substance binary, but at its most sound and pointed epistemic ends makes a lie of the Western pole by now aligning more with its supposedly incommensurate metaphysic, the Maya Hypothesis, in easy to grasp interpretive terms (what was assumed most fundamental now no longer looks mereologically substantial at all and seems to mock realism by this). One of the deep challenges to realism and the assumed mind-independence of theoretical results is expressed as *The Measurement Problem*. This is the problem of saying what makes the wave function collapse in cases where it seems only a human being’s, or some other mind’s willed (*intentionality mediated*) act of measurement/observation determines which of many otherwise self-interfering or entangled states result, but where were no measurement made all possible final states would continue to co-exist and co-evolve as a seemingly paradoxical whole.

The paradox for realism is best captured in the Schrodinger's Cat thought experiment (no cats are ever harmed in the running of this experiment, the harm is only thought about, never rendered). A cat is sealed in an observationally impenetrable box with all the air, food and water it needs. The cat’s ultimate fate is determined by the random outcome of some probabilistic decay of radioactive material that is set to trigger the release of a poison or other immediate cause of the cat’s death, but as the box is observationally impenetrable we have no way of knowing the state of the cat until we open the box and look. Realism leads us to assume that regardless of the box being closed, at any time in the evolution of this quantum system the cat must *really* be either dead or alive, even if we can’t know *certainly* without opening the box. However, the formalism of QM entails until we look the cat *really* seems to be in state of being *both alive and dead*—in contradiction of the law of the excluded middle,

and so rationality denying. The problem is this requirement for measurement/observation to force the superimposed (entangled) quantum states to collapse to only one final probabilistic state begs back in the assumed walled-off subjectivity by this apparently inescapable need for a mindful observer of some kind to collapse the universal wave function or some local sub-part of it, *even when QM is assumed a purely objective theory, so necessarily untainted by any form of subjectivity!*

But now we can now explain this puzzle as well.

The reason the subject sneaks back is exactly because this model is really only epistemically targetable at and precisely to the scale at which the subject first possibly emerges as matter (so perception, in a fashion, not only bootstraps itself up over a sub-material realm of real quantity, it also bootstraps up the entire tangible and intangible universe, *not ontologically but pre-ontologically*). The fact that you can't take the subjectivity out of what you only got to by assuming a purely 3rd person objective view going in is not the epistemic perversion it seems, it is simply shouting out exactly what this model is really about: the very physically self-constrained scale determining the possible, but always contingent origins of subjectivity (and in a Derridean sense, the original *reality-as-perception* objectivity too). By reinterpreting the "problem" in this fashion it offers up a trans-rational "proof" that while subjectivity is made out of pure objectivity, it is also exactly at its emergence trans-actively entangled with its own matter as a *quasi*-epistemic/ontic limit, so QM is not granting representational access to universal lawfulness as we've supposed, only "ortho", "eigen", or same-scale emergent law; trans-rational paradox unwound.

Not buying it (not *understanding it*, or perhaps not *wanting to?*)? Then let me say it again with rule-flouting emphasis to help the import sink in, all so the epiphanic insight might finally be felt:

THE REASON THE SUBJECT SNEAKS BACK INTO QUANTUM THEORY IS EXACTLY BECAUSE THIS MODEL IS REALLY ONLY EPISTEMICALLY AND *ORIGINALLY* TARGETABLE AT AND PRECISELY TO THE SCALE AT WHICH THE SUBJECT FIRST POSSIBLY EMERGES AS/IN/BY MATTER (SO PERCEPTION IN A WAY NOT ONLY BOOTSTRAPS UP OVER BOTH A SUB-MATERIAL REALM OF REAL QUANTITY, IT ALSO BOOTSTRAPS UP THE ENTIRE UNIVERSE, *NOT ONTOLOGICALLY BUT PRE-ONTOLOGICALLY*). THE FACT THAT YOU CAN'T TAKE THE SUBJECTIVITY OUT OF WHAT YOU ONLY GOT TO BY ASSUMING A PURELY 3RD PERSON OBJECTIVE VIEW GOING IN IS NOT THE EPISTEMIC PERVERSION IT SEEMS, IT IS SIMPLY SHOUTING OUT (EXACTLY AS I AM HERE) EXACTLY WHAT THIS MODEL IS REALLY ABOUT: THE PHYSICAL SELF/OTHER-INTERFERING ORIGINS OF SUBJECTIVITY, AND BY THIS OFFERS UP A TRANS-RATIONAL PROOF THAT WHILE SUBJECTIVITY IS MADE OUT OF PURE OBJECTIVITY IN SOME QUASI-SENSE, IT IS ALSO EXACTLY AT ITS EMERGENCE TRANS-ACTIVELY SELF/OTHER-ENTANGLED AS A *QUASI*-EPISTEMIC/ONTIC LIMITING, NOT THE DELIMITING OF REPRESENTATIONAL ACCESS TO UNIVERSAL LAWFULNESS WE'VE SUPPOSED; trans-rational paradox unwound.

I hope I am getting closer to you understanding what ‘pre-ontological’ means here as well; the term ‘ontological’ need be replaced not because it doesn’t mean well but it has sadly been used to mean wrongly so this taint will always be owed it, hence the need to stop talking about reality in terms of substance alone, which really only exists concretely in perception, but to talk about sub(pre/cis?)-and meta(post/trans?)-substance as well, *instead!* And if you can intuit where I might head at the other end of the scale of perception as modelled not by QM, but GR you might anticipate I will argue conception is intrinsically trans-material in a post-ontological essence, thus already providing an epistemic ground to explicate how a mind can represent the non-existent as easily and in the same way as it does the extant or extinct. The Mind, or just minds, do so by going beyond substance but to a different kind of fundamentality, that of purely insubstantial consciousness itself (so a pre-ontological account speaks of pre-and-post irreal substance as well as real substance).

So, ontological work as it has been historically practised is shown wrongly conceived as only referring to the question of finite number and kind of substance. This wrong use has, in one sense—by generally *over-determining* the proper fine target of its model as lying below the gap, in another sense also particularly *under-determined* its own real eigen-target—the scale of the contingent possibility of original subjectivity—in some coarse grade *projective absentia* (the image is very well in focus, but has been shone on the wrong screen, and although the subjectivity was denied going in it has re-asserted itself coming out *and so, subjectivity was always the negative and unrepresentable epistemic background target of the model, hence and **explaining** the measurement problem*). The sense in which ‘ontology’ has been declared rationally usable by fiat is ultimately self-denying once this special sense of *reality-as-perception* is invoked and taken to epistemic heart (so always speaking of perception both *close* and *far*, and of the real and irreal, of the extant, extinct and never-existing, **AND OF THE GAP LARGELY UNPENETRATED AND INTACT!**

A Negative not Positive Epistemic Revolution is now at hand

And here is the epistemic revolution lately so moanfully sought for, but one I fear will be rejected out of hand by the deepest form of madness lying at the heart of both the universal and human psyche; it will be denied because it makes a lie forever that any hope for certainty or control is warranted on any of our current metaphysics, instead it denies this is ever possible but as an illusion in what we also wrongfully call all of reality.

However, even if the feeling of despair over making this *monumental* collective failure in the best possible use of reason must be confronted and will be unpleasant for all our institutions to adapt to, I am also offering a door to a new kind of integrative and trans-logical epistemic theory to guide us to a better epistemic future, just as much. The key that unlocks the paradoxes of perception re-represented

as what is equally *a very literally taken matter instantiated self-knotting-and-blocking* as the proper representational quasi-target of QM, unlock much more in post-epistemic revolution turn. This twisted approach to re-interpreting QM also unlocks an even more comprehensively novel approach, a radical corrective for (so not just a full-stop denial of) furthering epistemology, but one that is no longer evidentially, in such flat or transparently aim-able terms as we've otherwise to date supposed, understood as one ever looking beyond or through the gap, but where much hard and exciting integrative work need be done to tease apart for each science where in the trans-real (pre and post finite space-time-scale) its contents' targets really lie, but only after correcting for all the other interpretive errors currently perpetuated for both QM and GR. But that will not be done here, and neither I nor any one person will do it all; either all of us minds will take a part or . . . ?

From this pre-ontological view the problematic term 'reality' first reduces only to what appears in outer perception as confirmed by either some well-vetted science of objective representation or by some equally well-vetted science of subjective, or a-representational/trans-rational experience, but never all at once, and certainly not offering up any sort of logically non-contradictory epistemic totalization. The mistake we've made is in our faith that the unexplained epistemic traction granted by mathematizing observations of primary properties falls through the appearance-reality gap directly, thus by-passing any sort of problem akin to Maslow's hammer. The only justification for this "flat" or planar view of the contents of science I can see is in its predictive and explicative successes, but isn't this begging the question (isn't that just possibly due a cosmic law of large knowings?). If this thing I rename (still: 'reality') now re-includes the gap but with its nature recast over some radical difference *and* difference at its characteristic scale of emergence (all due to an ineliminable but unappreciated fallibility naturalistically inherent to perception or other intentionality laden function, or simply a consequent matter of the kludging of complexity that passively arises in the random walk of the visible universe) and is to be a rationally meaningful term at all (perhaps *for the very first time*), then I believe it can only be in this special re-interpreted sense that also takes to heart what I'm proposing QM "really" epistemically only quasi-targets, i.e., the very origins of the cell's ability to become the very first subject by embodying a tacit model of perception in its DNA and developmental machinery right from the get go!

So, while we currently believe that perception can both directly and indirectly show us how reality "really" is behind direct experience (so leaping over/through the gap to represent unobservables) that assumption is misguided; there is no non-empty conceptual sense in which indirect access to a more mundane and basic mind-independent reality occurs at all (as things stand, it becomes a problem of mass re-interpretation of the epistemic data, not a wholesale rejection of all assumed knowledge) so all of the reality we think objective science accesses is really just indicative of a science of the reality of how things come to be in *finite* experience in lieu of any difference between direct and indirect observation (and there are only observables as *neti neti*). Instead all representation and experience are always and forever direct enough, but for often being universally made over vastly expanding or vanishing space-time-scales and are better described in terms of being *close* (direct ideal perception of present stable bodies or events is very *close*, where each subject is always *closest* to its own thinking or experience) or

“far”. For example: all recall or imagining is in some sense equally *far* objectively even when *close* subjectively as the targets of recall or imagination are typically not tangibly present in these kinds of occurrences, but some are *closer* for being memories in the nearer past (or for being easier to confirm by revisiting the still extant objects in question) and all thinking is both as *close* as seems possible to its proper subject (and seemingly infinitely *far* from all other subjects, but that might not be right?) for any immediate experience of it, but also variously *far* for its targets being differently causally located across space-time, or not located within space-time at all. Purely imaginary (non-existent) objects are simply effectively infinitely *far* away in both space and time, but are always “seen” through all the much *closer* representations that are borrowed to predicatively ground the unreal thing as a pure form with no substance (which I’ve already borrowed the term ‘effigy’ for).

These many dated but otherwise real borrowings are linked in some always future-oriented semantic web that allows the unreal/irreal to be in this vanishing sense directly perceived, but only as absences filled in as effigies, which amount to *just* “surfaces”. Thus, in this speculative model there is never misrepresentation, just representation from so *far* as to never be made tangible but as/by some “finite volume of *farthest* vacuum” only ever “filled-in” in an *as if* sense (the sense in which abstraction is still concretely realized, but by the entire background minus its proper datum, and *but for the absence of any physical essence*). All real “unreal” things, such as sociopathic imaginary detectives and magical flying horses, must be filled with stuff even as the real “real” ones are, but where the stuff to fill these vacuum objects is always borrowed in being sustained as a looking-through all the *closer* things it owes some, if not all of its purely intensional essence to (if not for the predication of it ‘not existing’, a property that could never “really” be applied to anything at all, and so is logically mute) if we are to “see” it at all.

The universe, like any favoured or lived attachment to ideology, can change radically over time without contradiction in its moment to moment and always impermanent particularity (i.e. dated *close* materio-inductive propositions can be true at one time, yet false at another without risking the stain of logical contradiction, and this must make up the practical bulk of moment to moment empirical reality) so why not the general universe as it is in itself taken in the space-time-scale-less, the universal or near Platonic sense? Maybe the universe—the world—reality—Being—existence—etc., is a pre-and-post-existential paradox that perception first reduces to a perspectival monism (hence the naive intuition to ontological monism) but only in the now well-enough articulated (I hope) pre-ontological sense.

We endlessly fail to take to heart and so endlessly forget the epistemic imposition from quantum mechanics (and Shannon’s Theory) of an unavoidable and seemingly irreducible methodological dualism owed to representation in the formalisms of these quantifications aimed (but off the mark) at the foundational level (i.e. the ones that most often yield probabilities as pluralities, and not ever one-to-one determinisms; the mixed objectivity and subjectivity requirements implied by the character of the measurement problem and Shannon’s theory quasi-equivalently)!

We forget the folk and inescapably felt view, always more dualist than monist.

We forget that causal-semantic theories of perception in leveraging the physical notion of information (data, really) have deemed knowledge only constructible from pure difference (represented data out of unrepresentable phenomena, always positing an ontically real foreground **and** a mysterianistic background) and never obviously from absolute essences (but for defending a naive direct realism in parallel and invisibly) but we still insist on the ontological monism and it's entailed epistemic totalization.

Why?

In this we seem to have redefined original sin as some kind of *Universal Naturalistic Fallacy*: we perceive the world as one thing and **just** as isolated subjects *normally*, therefore all of what we perceive or conceive of as real is to be determined and known as **just** one thing too, and in only one way. Again, Why? Well now because that **ought** to be the case for its simplicity and reification of egoism alone in place of a truly objective consideration of alternatives which don't just assume over this universalized **ought** as a necessary universal **is** that experience is always and only a unity for all other experiencers or possible forms of experience, so due only to the insistently singularized and singularizing character of *normal* naive human subjectivity alone. At least we certainly seem to value ontological monism and epistemic totalization more than the other options for some reason I suspect is rotten at its core (one ultimately due to the irrationality inherent to the universal psyche).

So, where language tends to paradox we should now also take this meaning "meta-literally" by "integration over paradox", and not just by vindicating one pole and denying the (ultimately plural) others by **just** naive or *divide and conquer* use of reason. Where we see language failing logically and even in its tendency to play at empty language games I see it possibly meaning most transparently, but trans-logically and still "sub-metaphorically", hoping to block the sense in which most analytical philosophers would use 'metaphor' pejoratively. For example, if logical use of language and reason combined with empirical evidence (here, already integrating over the empiricist-rationalist "paradoxes") proclaims there is no such things as free will or identity or any command centre in the brain (so no homunculus or soul), etc., then why not take that at face value? We seem to endlessly beat the horses of many transparently dead epistemic ends for not seeing the general way we have normalized use of reason leads only to a web of endlessly spun out and unresolvable paradoxes if we always insist on promoting the "law" of non-contradiction above all other possible epistemic laws.

This empirical fact of widespread negative results in conceptual analysis (but for those that fall to realist science) should, at some point, be taken as either a collective *absurdio* of the very project of perfecting human rationality or as justifying the positive claim that such paradoxes are themselves the very basis from which new more than "perfectly logical" thinking or experiencing might emerge. In this case the

absence of non-contradictory evidence is not the evidence of absence of deeper meaning, but the meta-evidence if language so logically used always leads (looking meta-inductively at all current knowledge claims, at least) to paradoxes that said paradoxes need to be taken seriously at their own collective level of meta-structural analysis if language can actually represent reality at all (but, of course, I can never argue for this logically having made my trans-logical bed, do you see the problem and that it is ultimately one due to dogmatic fashion—Logicism—in verification, not the required one of looking at the other “trans-rational” pole(s) of the law of non-contradiction?).

The Relative Cardinality of the Set of all Self-Paradoxical Sentences

Here is a quick argument by analogy to support this claim empirically and descriptively (what means do I really have left, but for sub-metaphors of the type I claim I am using novelly and thereby defending the fair use of in this work *even as I use them somewhat opaquely*). Many might naively take it there appear more Rational numbers than Integers, but this is wrong of course; these different sets have the same cardinality as countably infinite sets that may be put in one-to-one correspondence in spite of the naive intuition there appear to be many more rational numbers (infinity is weird, the Hilbert Hotel always has room for more, even when it is full²⁵). People untrained in the mathematics of infinity also have a much harder time grasping that the cardinality of Real numbers profoundly (on logic’s own terms, and I will grant logic much to start) exceeds that of both the Integers and Rational numbers combined. For starters, if you add the cardinality of the Integers to that of the Rationals you get the same cardinality; countable infinity + countable infinity = the same countable infinity, as if $1 + 1 = 1!$.

But things get weirder still, as the Reals, composed of all Rational (which by now also include the Integers) and Irrational numbers (those numbers not expressible in any finite or repeating decimal expansion, and so never representable as a finite integer ratio involving one finite denominator and one finite numerator) then tips to exhibiting way more irrationality than rationality (but **remember**, here the terms ‘rational’ and ‘irrational’ bear no connection to the quality of the cognizing involved, irrational numbers are—it turns out—not insanely conceived as the pejorative eponym once suggested, they simply can not be expressed as any finite ratio, so they really should be called non-finitely-ratio-able numbers, but some will naively take a confused pejorative reading here). Now, let’s talk about the next and most intuitively perverse step. The hardest kind of Real Irrational numbers to grasp are called Transcendental numbers, yet they often appear as the lynchpins of mathematical science and use of reason ($\sqrt{2}$, π , e , Φ , i.e., the fractally defined golden mean, etc.). For this next set it is very hard to determine certain membership, but it is clear that if the logical trend continues (uncountable infinity is weirder still) there are more Transcendental numbers than all the other Irrational (and Rational) numbers combined. Remembering there are already many more Irrationals than Rationals and these taken as a whole, the Reals, are a whole level of infinity more than all of the Integers (in going from

countable to uncountably infinite sets) this supposed *a priori* fact is hard to reconcile with the superficial *a posteriori* appearance in experience that the opposite seems naively true: Whole number enumerations are by far the most common in practice, i.e. they appear in experience more often, Integers less so, Rationals less still, while Irrationals are hardly ever seen (maybe more occasionally spoken of) and—finally—but for π and its brethren, Transcendentals barely show up at all. Yet this appearance is not the reality, right?

“On this page, we'll show that the rational numbers are countable, then show that the set of all numbers that can ever be named is countable; we'll then go on to show that the real numbers are uncountable. We'll also show that the set of all numbers which can ever be named has measure zero, and from that conclude that, if you threw a dart at the number line, the probability that you'd hit a number which could be named would be zero.”²⁶

What if proposition kinds are structurally like number kinds? If Logicism is right then all numbers may be reduced to unique propositions made within the intuitively and least sufficiently given inferential and epistemic constraints of the Peano-Dedekind axioms, so a dis-analogy is not obviously being proposed here. The naive view, I suspect, is that there is way more non-paradoxical than paradoxical sentences ('This sentence is false') or at least that only the non-paradoxical ones offer up any epistemic value, but has anyone studied this? I doubt it, because Logicism has already deemed the empirical study of paradoxical propositions or webs of such propositions fit for the rationality dust bin as the meaningless error cases of language, its *mis*-representations only (when I might call them *missed*-representations) but only by dogmatic fiat it seems to me. If there are more paradoxical than non-paradoxical sentences possible at what tipping point does this grant evidence that paradox is a real and essentially targeted feature of language (and so in turn at some perspectival tipping point *physical* reality must be as well, now shown by the bulk of language representing it this way) and so miss asking the question as to what all these paradoxes (horses and effigies) might best represent generally about the deeper sources of reality? I have no at hand answer to the question beginning this paragraph, but neither I'd suspect does anyone else, all for lack of trying. Here especially, absence of evidence of the possible larger cardinality of the set of paradoxical sentences is not evidence of absence. Maybe you can fund a research project to answer this question? I'd like to see you try and not have your rationality questioned.

Solving the Problem of the Missing Intension for LIFE (with an account of *Original Abstraction* thrown in for good measure)

Here is yet another very simple and mutually supportive argument by analogy, one that is meant to show some justification for inverting some of our cherished valuations otherwise appearing as factual claims but that may simply evidence more cases of treating oughts as is'.

Another empirical/conceptual mystery that remains unsolved, but for in the endless hand-waving, is to determine the full intension of the concept LIFE. On physicalist terms there is no material difference between a body that is alive and one that is, assuming some sharp transition, now dead. Rather LIFE becomes a purely functional notion. Living things all, *ceteris paribus*, must independently as those very lives consume other living things (except for the ethically pure micro-Gods called chemoautotrophs), reproduce, etc. . . .

Life may be superficially defined (providing the concept's naive but insufficient intension) as:

"the condition that distinguishes animals and plants from inorganic matter, including the capacity for growth, reproduction, functional activity, and continual change preceding death."

But, as with many other infamous conceptual analyses propositional loopholes and empirical counterexamples always forestall the completion of the extensional work in non-ambiguous ways. For LIFE, a peripheral problematic is in deciding whether viruses are alive or not. However, if we strictly stick to the dictates of naturalism then the evolutionary temporal ordering of emergence matters as much as some *a priori* consideration of viruses as if they could ever exist independently of any prior living thing, or if it is enough for them to still be seen as alive even in some intensionally ambiguous dependence. Given the mechanism by which viruses actually develop, so not owning any **independent** means of development, their status as alive could only ever be defined parasitically on the general fact that other fully living things already exist with their developmental machinery intrinsically in place fit to exploit. Thus, the question as to whether viruses are alive is not well-formed (for equivocating over the ambiguity rather than summarily seeing its irresolvable status in terms of viruses is already enough to say 'nay, not alive', if only with the irrevocable rider of 'probably not' appended) but suggests the key turn in the definitional solution lies in the nature of the developmental machinery and its genetic encoding, but this is, of course, mistaking effect for cause.

We are trying to define LIFE generally as a pure effect not by its contingent material causes or functions, so as a pure material difference, even as we acknowledge no measurable in-place, particular or local material difference is ever to be easily found (it seems we look for the definition of LIFE in the same place as MIND, where the light shines on some difference that is also defined on other terms as no difference at all; seems a form of epistemic sadomasochism to me). We can, however, narrow in on the sources of the functional activity, which when the life in question is thriving always violates the 2nd law of thermodynamics in terms of its internal environment, so I think our missing intensional piece is to be found here. I addressed this lacuna speculatively in my master's research paper and offer a recap here but leave out the full account of the connection to BEHAVIOUR to shorten the exegesis. If LIFE is now defined as internalized 2nd law denying agency embedded within the universe as a whole determined by function (redefining BEHAVIOUR along similar lines) then viruses are ruled out, even accepting the poorly formed question is meaningful, because they can not achieve such violations internal to their

own bodies in isolation (i.e., **outside**); other cells must do this for them by first taking viruses or their genetic material **inside** their “bodies”. So, the deepest defining essence of LIFE is due an original and yet fully physically realized and embedded inside-ness emerging as a feature of the entire universe, not just in regards some local part of it, if only by/as *Original Abstraction*. But, as there is no difference at all in terms of the onticity or supposed ontology of what is inside and outside any cell, just seamless matter, then there is also nothing to be found locally that screams out ‘I am that emergent essence of vitality’; rather we must immediately switch our epistemic perspective to one wide enough to take in the universe as a whole, both over time and in space and up and down all scale (even though that is a contradiction of relativistic terms).

The missing intensional piece defining life belongs not to the inside of any independently living thing but only to the non-local and emergent embeddedness of some material parts of the universe (tellingly at the middle scale) now offering up a real quasi-concrete and quasi-abstract but universal instantiation of a real “inside”, but with the totality of what allows the real difference to emerge physically only to be found in a complete physical explanation of the entire universe and this is, of course, not only impossible to offer here, it is a project barely begun.

The tease I offer here is, again, to point to the mysterious and unexplained source of the BBS’s paradoxical (at least unfathomably improbable) original data phase space, one of near infinite energy—which would tend to swamp out all and any material difference, yet with an intrinsic and perfectly balanced and minuscule (infinitesimal?) residual difference yet in place (representing the most improbable message the universe sends to itself in the existing, living and meaning about this). This improbable and perfectly tuned (by God?) difference is the very one which drives the later (post inflation, and post *Cosmic Microwave Background* (CMB) event) collapse of hydrogen gas into stars and bootstraps the production of all the prerequisite material complexity without which life would never so spontaneously and insistently arise on such an otherwise humble, even **mundane** planet as the Earth turns out to be. So, the missing intensional piece is not only about a quasi-concrete and quasi-abstract binding of the local and non-local. Alive is something the entire universe becomes generally even as only some rare and finite things attach to it as bearing the property essentially, and so life’s real cause is deeply entangled in mysteries concerning the origins of the Big Bang’s nature “beyond” space-time, a very *far* representation indeed, perhaps like those of unicorns, but in reverse, from now to the deepest past rather than from now to the furthestmost future as I whimsically supposed previously was the material source allowing the “seeing” of unicorns by effigy.

All empirical mysteries ultimately become the mystery of the source of the intrinsic nature of the Big Bang singularity.

At least if, as it currently does, so much of our current theorizing on mind in both philosophy and science assumes an informational solution derived from Shannon’s Theory of Mathematical Communication (MTC) as the right reduction or supervenience basis for all promised but elusive knowings.

Of course, perhaps you see the way out even now? I previously offered that reality as we've intuited it ontologically only seems to be indirectly accessed by what science shows lies beyond the gap, but I've claimed we are misled in this. I claimed instead we are mainly (with the '*quasi*' rider prefixed) gaining knowledge of reality as an explanation as to how appearances become the unity of experience, so the Big Bang is no longer just a model of a hidden or past reality; it is really as much (in part) a very *far* model of perception in kind! So, QM is a *far* version of the past of perception and GR is a *far* version of its future, and the pre-ontological tease has been furthered.

Logic is Parasitic on MEANING as Viruses are Parasitic on LIFE; each parasite only thrives respectively because MEANING and LIFE already are more than any parasite thriving on them could ever be.

Returning to the argument by analogy. Having plugged the intensional hole in the concept LIFE and showing why the question as to viruses' status as living is moot I have the analogical base to apply to the case of logic and so re-centre paradox as residing not at the negative periphery but at the very positive heart of MEANING, where the conceptual pair of pairs of abductive concern are:

LIFE(local manifestation in matter)-INTENTIONALITY(non-local universal embedding over a real *inside-outside*). . .

anticipating and preceding . . .

MIND(local manifestation as brains)-MEANING(non-local paradoxical transcendence).

The analogy runs as follows: as viruses are parasitic on life, so logic is equally parasitic on meaning, and not the other way around as assumed, i.e. that logic shows itself as the tool explaining away from paradox the necessary and *a priori* best means to knowledge implicitly is only a vestigial residue of meaning, not its heart (with its dual evaluative forms peeking through at the origins of sensory registration as yes/no or presence/absence function transducers forwarding endless guesses about some generally local *this* or *that*). The evolutionary idea, explicitly expressed as CTM, is that nature in the creation of brains builds logics into its very architecture as realized by the neural interconnections and computational functions contingently selected in promoting survival behaviour (which often look only quasi-rational to start, with many irrational free-riders) first passively and unconsciously in terms of needs, but in us special cognizers falling over to underwriting recursive language (whereby we are first able to separate logical wheat from all the background irrational chaff) and overflowing as culture.

On this analogy logic is the true "virus on meaning", not paradox or misrepresentation as most models presuppose. Importantly and ingenuously: none of this is meant pejoratively as even I (must) continue in

using and endorsing the use of logic as a necessary step towards better knowing as the best starting toolkit for proving the value of reason and to realize some more ideally rational methods of communication. But, equally importantly and vehemently, I also wish to argue that logic only falls out of the depth-less source of meaning-experience at its periphery and does not define its core but as a dependent trace of deeper affective domains (much of it potentially beyond any representation, encompassing even all the unknowable unknowns) and so is not what defines its core, rather some ineliminable and undiscovered, yet discoverable metaphysical paradox is (so entailing the need for the pre-ontological project). I am not arguing against use of logic, nor against its relative strengths in justifying knowledge, but I am rejecting the essentialist and *a priori* claims about its origins and ultimate value to culture. I am arguing instead that better use of logic as a whole be picked up by all and only then reintegrated back into experience, but as much into experience of the lately conventionally denigrated realm that ultimately lies, not inside or just as matter, but *within*, and so, in unravelling the lived paradox, transcending it. In other words, the real font of meaning does not flow forward just narrowly in evolution by that ray of essence naive realism assumes always passes through from perceived to perceiver; yes, the story first falls from unproblematic forms of certain and very *close* sensory registration to original perception, but by definition it can never manifest in data morphisms and their certain status in leveraging fit function alone. MEANING in the widest and deepest sense is made bereft in the reification of logic alone, because as for LIFE, MIND represents a universally integrated non-local phenomena as well as all these many particular and seemingly isolated ones.^{NOTE}

NOTE: There have recently been experiments with Siamese twins (not cited here) that demonstrate their consciousnesses are seamlessly shared, both (and “equivalently” as one) experiencing as one and two simultaneously without residual paradox or rational dysfunction (so also invoking a Derridean ontology for numbers) and in spite of the total failure for this to be reconciled with the naive understanding of IDENTITY or PERSON—or even BODY on any purely logical and material terms. It seems the sense of isolation adhering to our naive experience of thinking/being may be simply due to the relative lack of inter-mediating data and information channels between our bodies and not due to some inherent inability of mind and thought stuff to cohere across all material difference. Open more channels and the consciousnesses can intermingle without further ado, but in doing so individuality fades into the plural chimera it always is/was.

If there are minds realized by brains then there is a **MIND** realized too (here not the concept but meaning a **BIG** or universal mind). If, as I argued for LIFE, the universe is also equally the thing that becomes alive universally and essentially as much as only in all its particular living things, its continued evolution is fit to establish a further real (but always fractal) boundary beyond INSIDE-OUTSIDE. The universe redoubles the original process, but always “meta-orthogonally” in some relatively furthered paradoxical casual-material independence as well as in the ontologically flat and just conceptual diametric opposition.^{NOTE}

NOTE: Think of the concept of spin in *The Standard Model*. In this realm of the real, physical particles may intrinsically “spin” through 720 abstract degrees even as an extrinsic change of only 360 outer degrees is made. I am proposing ontological/ontic “turns” of an analogical kind. The living mind is the universe so twisted back upon and interfering with itself, but always shining through untwisted as well.

In doing so the universe re-extends itself over and radically through a new emergent boundary, that now being (INSIDE-OUTSIDE)-WITHIN, but where *within* is not itself an embedding but the very opening back to the infinite source that we only mistakenly attribute as an aspect of just our “special” consciousness’ but is really the light of (insert your favourite shameless metaphor here, but remember as a physicalist your God is a real nothing) shining through as the phenomenal. This is as close to my full pre-ontological account as I will get in this table setting work; BODY-MIND and body-mind’s are in metaphorical analogy, respectively speaking, universal and particular Mobius strips made in some complex inversion of all matter across life back to some specially formed matter recomposed at a higher level of functional abstraction over life as an embedded and then twisted back upon itself “hyper-surface”. There is not any pure appearance-reality *gap*, nor ever pure *representations* fit to cover it, there are instead, anti-respectively, turned inside-out relativistic material *echo*’s made across an existentially complex twist, all made in leaps of quantum mechanical self-measurement against an always plurally/fractally relativistic delimiting and *bringing together* (i.e., as/by conception).^{NOTE}

NOTE: So, as with models of space *and* time as container *and* stream becoming replaced by a model of space-time as a singular substance, so too do many philosophical puzzles otherwise made into categorically pure dichotomies need be corrected. This naively pure impulse set to pull the poles of all dichotomy apart like wings off a fly (all to choose the best means of flight, but only knowing what is destroyed by its residual representations determined as pure conceptual value, never by the unmediated experience of flight as a fly) is simply an error due to pushing language too far through the rabbit hole of Logicism and failing to see the grand but diffuse and not easy to integrate universal paradox that logic is really situated in; the gap and representations of it are a seamless entity as one “reality”, each informs the other but only in vanishing episteme-logical traces, all of which become half-lies/half-truths at a higher level even as they ground TRUTH at the lower. Only unrepresented re-experience as an integration shows how they have been so sorely and counter-productively pulled apart in what I am proposing is a meta-epistemic need to put them back together as if they were never essentially apart (i.e., body + mind -> body-mind/mind-body).

We need start a new project: to seek an echo theory of mind meant to unwind in explanation only an appearance-reality twist, neither gaps nor pure representations will be found in the new model, but these concepts still serve as our best hope for a good starting place as a leaping off point, but not just by furthering the Logicism. By this we both salvage the best parsimonious and appropriately skeptical hopes of some naturalistic form of physicalism, but also see the path to its transcendence as in the process of building this new model we also include and transcend all other current opposing ontological

ideology as really only been done to date in a pre-ontological mode, in spite of our shared belief (now a slim hope) we have always been doing ontological work. Perhaps it is time, like with the too pure categorical distinction made between mind and body, to put all such paradoxical poles back together, to go back to the point in which these poles were split and reintegrate and rename: we are always body-mind's (or mind-body's), dual aspects that appear like the same but opposed **one/two** side/s of a Mobius strip. What is missing is the key to unwind the pre-ontological material paradox, and I have a notion of how this looks as well but have no intention to provide that exegesis here as at best I can only chip away at the metaphysical presuppositions that would otherwise stop me from even starting.

A Political/Ideological Aside

Has it—following the integrative thread into the recent history of conflict between certain diametrically opposed political ideologies—also never occurred to anyone but me that when the Cold War was at its peak we were even then also ready to move through the integrative door? It is really required that one of *Capitalism* or *Communism*, or *Democracy* or *Socialism* must win out over the other for all times and people? Maybe the best course has always been about allowing both (all dual or plural) systems to (meta-plurally) co-exist and entangle purposively rather than have just one “win” for all times in spite of the general ideological and administrative uncertainty (and relative lack of administrative control) we must accept to take this step? In particular, while I can only—according to right use of the law of non-contradiction—over some finite but nonzero amount of space-time, endorse just one or the other way as the best ideology to redress some particular event, I can still take turns if reason persuades me differently in the new light of a new day and in the next event defend and access the ideal methods and values of the opposite ideology, *but only if both institutions may co-exist administratively and concretely first in the same polis while equally valued!* Ideologies can surely co-exist in representations without material paradox, so why not their general (disposed) agencies, even if not ever for exactly the same indexed individuals in some indexed moment of some logically forced—but ideally: free and rational—personal choice. Shouldn't all ideological premises, aims, and methods not first bask in the light of all the impersonal evidence that should matter to this choice without needing to (first or after) pave the rest of the world as just one ideological superhighway?

Why can't ideology only take control in proportions more appropriate to in-the-moment-rational local fit, rather than as dictated just by universal collective fiat masquerading as the product of reason, especially when we all know unhinged power is really the only force that wants this?

This problem of conflating the particularly appropriate uses of ideology with the general universal valuing of them based on just the law of non-contradiction is becoming increasingly destructive at the level of politics in most democratic states (so endlessly conflating the ethically particular with the

ethically universal, and disavowing all the messy but inevitably needed *ceteris paribus* clauses appended to any inductively determined “law”). It is not that one of the *Left* or *Right* ideology should win for all time, but that the head of the snake be cut off, both views and their preferred methods (if rationally justified on their own local merits rather than by non-local power-seeking partisanship) must be allowed to coexist in actual governance; or, at least, it seems that way to me. These increasingly accelerating and severe swings from left to right (and back (and forth) and (. . .)) appear increasingly infantile and destructive. Yin and Yang being torn apart always creates a space for the worst dysfunctions of these poles, be that *Fascism* or some version of wolf in sheep’s clothing 1984-like control of language, i.e., mindless meme borne dopamine-system-feeding and all too tribal and counter-productive political correctness that mostly serves surface over substance. Both of these political forms of pathology are becoming increasingly unleashed in my opinion, but here the difference between how things are lately given to us in appearance and how they are in reality are best captured between the dire tone of most news stories contrasted with Steven Pinker’s claims in his two most recent books^{3,27}. I think the very question as to whether humans are getting ethically, morally or behaviourally better or worse is a paradox all on its own; we seem better in general fact, but worse in our particular shared beliefs about this, in spite of the empirical evidence Pinker provides that would seem knock-down for humanistic progress.^{NOTE}

NOTE: But back-sliding on many humanistic measures and values is surely now taking root: see about the relative health of poor middle-aged American males for one telling example.

Can we trust the facts or experiences at all? Or rather, is what makes the facts suspect some more deeply hidden irrationality or just the logicism?

Chapter 5: Building The Terminological Toolkit To Show How Humanity Is “*Lost In Representations*”

No matter the diversions and sidetracks, the movie that inspires the title of this work is always a touchstone for the narrative, and we return to it now. In the movie the meanings lost/sought for are not just literal ones for which translation fails trivially, they are also deeply personal or subjective—so defined in dependence to minds in relation to values. In this work the meaning lost/sought for is (should be) impersonal or objective—so defined by Realism—yielding to—in theory—knowledge independent of the purely contingent nature of minds or any of their presupposed values. In the West and increasingly

in the East this knowledge is largely determined by the methods of science and mathematics (logic?). The deeper analogy to draw is how our current reification of representations beyond their limited initial role as appearances of reality^{NOTE} may currently be undermining the best hopes we have for our all too recently discovered and lately preferred epistemic methods, that of mathematics, philosophy, and science. We, have, to put the main thesis of this paper into a succinct metaphor, become “*lost in representations*”. I can now turn more directly to disambiguating and defending this thesis.

NOTE: Do I really have to argue for this claim? Apparently yes. The number of times that I have recently had some brain-eating-zombie zealously endorse the claim that ‘reality is appearance’ is terrifying to me. Has no one read the Emperor’s New Clothes lately? What should be universally endorsed as a core unproblematic hypothesis tied to the inherent and all too evident problems of human nature and perception is that there is *clearly* some central epistemic value in defining an appearance-reality gap over which perception operates that does not need defending by any sophisticated account based on fanciful metaphysics or philosophy at all, just basic grade 10 science and shared experience. One should endorse the problem directly if one is paying attention **at all**, even in the most trivial sense possible (such that innocent people still go to jail for crimes they never committed and guilty ones often go free in some perverse anti-karmic proportion; a main reason the death penalty is grievously unethical!). The empirically motivated appearance-reality gap is a well justified distinction supported by the empirically well-established fact that the senses (never mind human cognition) are endlessly unreliable and easily spoof-able (consider the craft of magic or *advertising*), as are things like naive mathematical intuition in particular (Susie buys a bat and a ball for \$1.10 in total. The bat costs one dollar more than the ball. How much does the ball cost?). And then there is all the lying. Further, growing evidence suggests that what we perceive is as much a hack or construction of reality projected onto substance based deeply on our prior expectations as part of our genetic heritage, so derived from possibly irreducible biological biases arising from our initial bio-functional embodiment as *just* animals long before we were language-bearers. The lack of any universal means of epistemic verification, peer review notwithstanding (a tradition that itself has fallen under great negative scrutiny lately) and lack of means on top of that of vetting malicious intent or deeply vetting presented qualifications, let alone a means to define a hierarchy of apt qualifications in terms of areas and levels of education, has simply been overrun by social media and not improved on as was supposed and perhaps too naively hoped for. The “truth” is becoming dangerously unhinged from its owed dependence on the real substantial and lawfully dynamic aspects of a supposedly tractable reality that is often opaquely given by misleading appearances. The necessary justificatory ties meant to ensure the soundness or cogency of the implicit models from which these representations are meant to take their meanings as objective facts seems to have vanished from normal purview. Without spoiling my own narrative the deepest concern I wish to draw out is the Occam’s razor violating irrationality inherent in promoting any model that is opaque to its metaphysical assumptions or intuitions in so far as its meanings inevitably invoke normative assessments and practices (both informal and formal) as part of the methods of determining the soundness of said objective facts. “Normal” is the only tyranny humans have ever really faced, as I see things.

Optional Reiteration: The title of this work is meant as a (now) *sub*-metaphorically sympathetic nod to the movie *Lost in Translation*. There is an apt *sub*-metaphorical resonance between that movie and this work, as

the all-too-human epistemic tragedy risked in both cases is the unsuccessful sharing of meaning via intentionality.

Optional Reiteration: So, I am at this point more concerned to start over with how *a* particular *subclass of* rational meanings are ideally communicated rather than with how meaning is lived through embodied experience more generally and less reflexively, but still wish to push back against the prioritization of these two aspects of MEANING in which one is assumed to be the *de facto* explanatory basis of the other. For me, the popularized Western view is dangerously biased towards a tacit model in which meanings that are communicated logically are the only epistemic foundation possible for explaining the experience of all other possible meanings; I call this view Logicism.

With my general epistemic method (aiming at the middle of the trans-logical/sub-metaphorical for my meanings), transparent polemic intent and my (variously ingenuously and disingenuously endorsed) metaphysical bases sufficiently delineated we can proceed to the second preparatory phase of the larger argument; explicating the two conceptual tool-kits essential for making the argument that although rationality as it is normally and informally practised may always involve use of “reason” it is hardly ever ideally rational (the garbage-in garbage-out problem). Thankfully, here I require only half as much extra imaginative creativity as I will borrow conventions articulated by Searle, and in turn some of those Searle took from Austin in so far as they show the value of Searle’s conventions in helping to extend Austin’s account of Speech Acts. Speech Acts are at a higher level, semantically speaking, as their satisfaction conditions always ask for more of the world than their propositional content be true; they expect the world to be changed when satisfied, so impose a telos. None-the-less speech acts were, when Austin wrote his book (and probably still are) of relatively neglected purview for inclusion in the favoured semantic theories of both science and philosophy. While Austin is not really proposing a theory he was (and still is) describing a proper part any semantic theory worth its salt must also explain. When combined with my following prohibitive toolkit meant to delineate the fact-norm distinction the target of my central critique can finally be well defined. I begin by providing an account of Searle’s notion of *Direction of Fit*²⁹ of intentional states^{NOTE}, and additionally an account of how it minimally extends Austin’s treatment of speech acts³⁰ (plus a whole lot of random seeming but *right-where-they-belong* side musings).

NOTE: Between me, Burge, Searle, Chalmers, Russell and Nagel (and many others) you may easily find a shared hard core of ideological presupposition about the mind’s likely ontology, if only in a negative sense in regard to hard and reductive forms of physicalism. You may also discover that the problem of intentionality, or better yet of *original intentionality*, which aims to say what material, causal and *kind* of satisfaction conditions determine—in the ideal not the particularly actual (so we are looking for a prototypically sufficient avatar, maybe one extant now, not the literal “first mind”; also, ‘first mind’ probably promotes a misnomer if IDENTITY is a unicorn)—when the first mind appears in some abstract “epistemic spirit”. Prohibitively, a working extant exemplar is something close

to bees or maybe shrimp. This first mind is said to emerge concomitantly with the first act of non-derived and non-trivial mental representation, so equally represents the first material instantiation of a mental state.

The finest ontic point of ontological disagreement about the mind, assuming a casual form of naturalism is being pursued to some degree by most parties also seems to fall in its most specific structural/functional/substantially-fine materiality to this idealized event of *original intentionality*.

At least, this is how I am localizing the existential tipping point in time on Earth. So, an intentional state *is* a mental state, and these are also representational states in the most pure and non-derived sense that RTM assumes. There are non-mental representations that exhibit intentionality, such as photos or the smoke of a fire, but these “representations” and their “intentionality” are derived from minds after the fact, not before it. You can assume that when I am using the word (term) ‘representation’ going forward that I am also likely referring to a concomitant mental state and therefore equally to an intentional state. However, one need be careful as—remember—there is cogent evidence we can have *non-conscious* (not meaning “~~unconscious~~”!!!) mental, i.e., *non-conscious* intentional, i.e., *non-conscious* representational states. Original perception is often defined as the first and most basic act possible for any mind, but with no entailment perception starts with consciousness or even awareness, except in the barest behavioural or agentive sense (*as if*). But always keep in mind the term ‘representation’ is often used in cross-referentially opaque ways, missing the mark of its otherwise most precise technical and non-trivial senses and most accurate contextual epistemic uses—even by academics—unless extra care is taken (2 channels of communication, vetting of successful meaning conveyance by the meaner initiated by the queries of meanee, etc.).

On any use of the (now self-redundant) term ‘mental representation’ we could be referring, *again*, to either the vehicle (for example, the sound wave of a word or sentence in some language, or the marks making up a well formed string of symbols on a piece of paper) or the often image-like content (a ghostly fringed glimpse of the last place we saw our keys, or the mute inner “sound” of the thought ‘there is a cat on that mat’) or just the targets of the referential terms in the content or syntax (i.e. the actual cat on the actual mat, his name is Bob). Finally, use of the term might just be meant to invoke more rarely but with near equivalence in general meaning the following categories, the *satisfaction conditions*, *veridicality conditions*, or *norms* naturally associated with the semantic fitness of the representative function at hand. Then there is the meaning due to the whole shebang, which like one definition of the universe may simply be the sum of all it contains—the more reductive view—or is something above and beyond all this (like the uninterpreted but still apt experience of the original eureka-like “meaning experience”, what contains all *by some felt epiphany* but is never itself any of what is contained).

Talk about mental or intentional states often defaults to just talk about them as vehicle-content pairs, but mental state vehicles really only become live representations when they explicitly hold content with referential targets fit to cause bio-functions that convey selective fitness to individuals or groups of them. How we experience these representations in language or thought already goes well beyond the problem of intentionality and the evolutionary origins of the mind-body problem and is closer to invoking the symbol grounding and Frege's problem. This is in part why Brentano, the philosopher who defined intentionality as "the hallmark of the mental"¹⁷ talks of a double reflexive character owed to all conscious human mental states (his mental states of first priority in explicative concern, but not mine in this work). A human mental state might have a non-existent or non-occurrent target particularly as a referent, hence his notion of "intentional in-existence"¹⁷, possibly meaning that the targeted object only first "exists" *in* the representation due the human mind's more general and special facility to exhibit about-ness in this doubly reflexive mode, so not in these cases *closely* caused by any real target's "pr/essence". Or were he an informational-semantic theorist, he might say such mental states are never "re-caused" by intimate or "live" data, only by however and whatever some narrow or wider sources of personal and therefore always virtual data get "re-activated" due their previous encoding in the non-indexed background of memory, or just *as if* memory.

The causes invoked here, either arising as imaginative first causes walled off from experience or triggered by mixed experience and imagination serve more *accidentally* (contingently) to "re-create" such states of "in-existence" as always embedded within a meta-intentional or "self-aboutness" object/state (but the more trivial 'non' reading for 'in-' also seem plausible and more parsimonious). So, when there is not—or more problematically—could never be a live target for perception even here the general character of the mental state's aboutness is still non-trivial and auto-defining, *generally auto-manifesting even*. Even if its target doesn't exist the mental state in question still insists in bearing this capacity of aboutness essentially, with both self-and-other-referentiality (on Brentano's, but not all accounts). I will not directly address either this second-order aboutness, nor any cases of intentionality in regards to non-existent things but for showing an entire set of norms and practices we deem are used rationally I will argue aren't, not so much because these intentional states are about non-existent objects or false propositions (although endorsing false sentences as true representations should always be the main concern of any just use of reason) but because the way many norms and practices are currently constructed (have always been constructed) is so as to never have to re-justify themselves, and so to never ask why this isn't always the most important or equally important ongoing concern of insuring use of reason against the pernicious creep of irrationality.

To my thinking perpetual re-verification of why certain means are more rational than others need be made the centre equally and not just the pushed away circumference of the binary of rational means *and* ends (so to avoid just the irrational furthering of ends as oughts over sacralised means). What is risked and I think widely evident in much of the so-called use of too rationally instrumental methods is the need for ongoing justification of the conventionally favoured means hardly ever arises once some ideology has taken deep conventional root as "true" in spite of the oft-agnostic evidence and arguments

typically on offer for the most intractable ontological, existential, metaphysical or ethical questions; any and all ideology must assume it already has *all* the answers or certain future access to them in perpetuity to even begin constructing wide and deep normative forms of power, so no ideology ever takes root without the inherent risk of asserting past its own epistemic burdens (and then endlessly stonewalling, dissembling and equivocating when confronted with equally rational, but oppositely aimed arguments and evidence meant to highlight the avoidable negative effects of constructing any normative forms of power too dogmatically). So, in turn will any “normal” doubt fail to ever arise about the quality of the contents produced by the now only trivially valid means that turn out least justified but most widely endorsed and practised; by this we irrationally and endlessly risk furthering ultimately unsound or not cogent models towards ethically empty ends.

Truth’s Proof Pudding: Norms, Veridicality and Satisfaction Conditions

I will start with the notion of satisfaction conditions, which is not, I believe, owed to any one philosopher. The notion of satisfaction only starts in logic with the notion of truth.

The implicit intuition is that any randomly chosen but grammatically well-formed sentence (‘sentence’ is taken to mean in the most informal sense to start) is only logically satisfiable (as true or false) if:

All its terms and other inferential parts of speech can first be disambiguated, parsed away of non-truth-functional content, and/or otherwise grammatically or referentially “fixed up” so to be made referentially transparent and unequivocal about all its targets; by this the sentence may be reduced to a singularly “quantified” proposition in some appropriate system of logic (typically, classical 1st or 2nd order logic) or in the case of proof the same accomplished for a set of propositions where some concluding sentence may be shown an inferentially necessary consequence of all the others.

So, only those parts or wholes of sentences reducible to assessment as strictly true or false are differentiated as propositions, and not all people say is “logical” in this way. Many apt meanings are borne by sentences superficially seeming literally false, e.g. ‘The moon is a ghostly galleon’ or disingenuously meant only in playful spirit, ‘Hello, I love you, let me tell you my name’, but both these sentences mean something well said! Full satisfaction of *deductive* arguments as “proved” requires determining, first, the argument’s validity, and second its soundness (strength and cogency for inductions . . . coherence, consistency and correctness for abductions). But I think many who leverage statements of proof only rhetorically fail to understand this and promote assertive force as if that amounts to making an argument in all too many popular “debates”. The reality is assertion is often the last refuge of those unable or unwilling to argue rationally at all; they take these exhortations as somehow intrinsically knock-down and impervious to rebuttal and by this, entire arguments are made

straw men of the most irrational kind (the road to epistemic hell is well travelled by Kripkean Dogmatists).

This definition of PROPOSITION made above is not really precise enough as there are further and very important technical differences between what we formally call formulas, which have variables bound by the quantifiers ‘for all . . .’ or ‘there exists . . .’ and *formally logical* sentences, which have free variables, i.e., those not bound by either ‘there exists’ or ‘for all’. From here it gets more complicated very quickly. I am glossing over 100+ (if not 2000+) years of the evolution of logical methods and intuitions here.

Calling this logical “quantification” seems a quasi-misnomer to me. Yes, part of the translation of natural language into some formal *truth-preserving* logic involves quantifying objects unequivocally in the sense of determining their absolute or relative (all, some, more, less than, more than, count, i.e., *cardinal* number enumeration, etc.), but just as much involves “quantifying” by binding properties, relations or orderings to objects (predication), so existential **qualification** occurs as well. Again, the *supposed and seemingly rational enough* motivating idea behind logicism is that no literal sentence taken on its own can ever succeed (except by luck or foundational simplicity or obviousness, i.e., *prima facie*) at being pure rational content, rather it must first be converted into a specialized language to clean it up semantically. Currently there is no entirely complete and consistent single or plural set of such methods on offer, at least once any logical system becomes second order (typically when relations are quantified over as well as individuals) with many complex and often incommensurate metaphysical or methodological interdependencies showing up between logics. The logical kitchen is very well stocked and equipped but without any obvious all-encompassing foundation but for the place classical logic holds historically as derived in large part by Frege’s singular work to rectify and extend Aristotle’s logical system as canonized by Scholasticism (so any arbitrary choice of utensils and ingredients makes some meals favoured and others impossible to start, let alone finish; a ‘you can’t always deduce there from here’ problem).

Being impeccably logical implies using the circumscribed tools of whatever form of logic best fits the structure (another word with an informal sense that blends into a technical one) of the sentences involved in terms of things like the presence or absence of predication, quantification/qualification of reference, or modality—where variables are bound by ‘it is possible that . . .’ or ‘it is necessary that . . .’—among other more esoteric logics, some of which inevitably move away from tacit endorsement of classical forms of logicism. In one of its most developed forms, Model Theory, one defines and talks about formal *logical structures* meant to take the abstract symbols and functions/functors (and other linguistic objects as required) and map them to their targeted real concrete or abstract objects and/or their causes and effects or other dynamisms, by this both leveraging and providing an account of how maths (themselves variously reducible to some logic(s)) are used to do science through the cleaned-up languages that result in certain well delineated objective-observational and always thus, empirically truth-satisfiable domains. Only by starting with disambiguated, non-equivocal and non-polysemous terms, sentences, formulas, etc. can we in turn produce equally disambiguated, non-equivocal and non-

polysemous sets of propositions where each can then be singularly verified as true or false in a one-to-one and exclusive fashion as a material consequence of their target's real natures by *isomorphic representational proxy* on the way to evaluating the "truth" of some theory or model as having been "proved", or when going the other way, when predicting rightly. Only deductive arguments constructed out of sets of propositions can have the satisfaction condition of being proved sound but must first be shown valid.

But the too lazy reification of DEDUCTION anticipates yet another naive structural conflation many people (even most academics) exhibit in their butchery of the word 'proof'. This conflation occurs when the satisfaction condition *means* of determining the truth of propositions, which for all but non-binary logics falls directly to one and only one pole of the simple binary *end* of either SATISFIED TRUE or SATISFIED FALSE gets semantically over applied, i.e., when we speak much more loosely of true or false theories or models. And we should never forget it is only by non-logical means at the wide experiential bottom of it all that contingent empirical propositions are made true or false, and only by this can the soundness or cogency of some theory or model been deemed "proved". But this both semantically overreaches and glosses much more needed understanding, as what really gets proved in some model or theory is *the entailed truth of every conclusion, of every novel proposition the theory or model generates by logical means from the minimally necessary set of true propositions either assumed as premises or demonstrated as probably or necessarily true because of the properties of the real concrete or abstract entities they target*. So, my worry is this loose talk causes many to completely miss the point of why and *how* proof matters *only relative* to non-logical meta-method and meta-interpretative means, which is always meat to proof's potato, but I think many assume the opposite. Again, proofs are, at their own level most critically deemed sound or cogent not "proved". What is really being referred to is just some "hero" conclusion has been made the avatar for all other conclusions lying around within the model, disposed to be necessary or probable truths, but not known as such, yet.

But here is where the second conflation is forwarded in lying so close to the first made between deduction and induction. Besides hiding the real guts of what a model or theory is or does, and skimming over how it is really warranted, the further informal or lay tendency is also to think any model or theory "proved" must always be a deduction (hence the confused insistence from many, including Sherlock Holmes himself, that he "deduces", when what he means is that he abducts, but that word had yet to be invented when Sir Arthur Conan Doyle wrote, so what we really have is an anachronistic meaning, not a mistaken one). So, all induction collapses into deduction, all cogency collapses to soundness, and the inferential means become reified even as the role of non-logical means are denigrated and so rarely addressed in lay debate, the proof's "hero" content is just produced for consumption as a very thin and shallow meme. But memes, with their a-rationally self-warranting and self-replicating nature often appear as truths exactly when they are not, so *caveat emptor*. There is an endless circle of irrationality promoted in the naive endorsement of memes that seem true but turn out false, or more typically turn out not ever well-formable as unequivocal propositions. Those rational and expert enough to do so strip away all the ambiguities of informal or folk claims—they deconstruct

memes more than forward them—and by this produce an impressive array of theories and models, but somehow in the process of communicating scientific content and method (or failing to do that better) what widely gets consumed and leveraged in other so-called rational forums (most terrifyingly, in governance) is just more lying ambiguity and failure to value the much wider and deeper non-logical means of warrant more than the ends of it.^{NOTE}

NOTE: Interestingly and to wave at even more of the complexity and semantic ambiguity entailed by PROOF, there are in meta-logic proofs made about proofs and in these methods proofs themselves appear as propositions of a kind, it gets brain-numbingly and esteem-distressingly complicated by this point, *caveat emptor indeed*.

So, proofs are not really things that are ever shown purely true or false at all in any ideal or endlessly lasting fashion as the single sentences contained by them might otherwise be deemed, they just offer a relative means of wider and deeper epistemic verification made up of webs of well delineated and tractable sets of “cleaned-up” propositions that are variously true or false in relative ways, but where no single sentence’s satisfaction condition alone says anything necessary about the quality of the proof all on its own. Only in relation to the whole set of propositions and by assuming the boundary conditions of the domain of observation or imagination can we be said to know ideally. As, lately, the meaning of words is only assumed definable in terms of the sentences they embed in (semantic holism) so the meaning and epistemic value of a theory or model resides in how its proofs and purely propositional sentences are embedded in it, but only in regards to some toy system, never (yet) in regards to all the objects making up the entire universe taken across all scales of space-time, and so typically only comprehensively within some finite domain for systems that may be represented as first-order or linear, and where progress into modelling non-linear systems becomes increasingly prohibitive and falls more and more to suspect use of induction and regressive (iterative and/or recursive) forms of computation (successive approximation, perturbation theory, etc.) where many extra forms of epistemic method and inference-making risk being begged in without providing much if any metaphysical or epistemic justification.

A sound proof is built just as well on a set of false or mixed true and false propositions. Again, what matters first is that a (deductive) proof is valid, and single propositions are never valid or sound on their own, only sets of them and it takes at least two sentences combined by a further inference leading to a conclusion (another sentence or proposition) to make a proof. What makes a *deductive* proof sound (which is what matters most to *deduced* forms of KNOWLEDGE) is all the propositions that need be true are true exactly when the proof is also valid in a non-trivial fashion. An argument whose conclusion is only true when not all its propositions are true is valid, *but throw in one proposition with an always false*

*material condition and the argument is **always** valid, better yet make your argument smuggling in a contradiction and you can “prove” anything you want.*

However, as engineers often prefer to quantify over imaginary positively charged holes, rather than negatively charged electrons to simplify the math, logicians prefer to justify proofs over sentences always expressed as true in terms of their inferential entailments, so would prefer to use the premise ‘God does not exist’ (true), rather than ‘God exists’ (false) in a proof even though both “mean” the same for use in any proof. Critically and inescapably deduction and induction have separate satisfaction conditions that define them as essentially incommensurate methods in epistemic terms (tracking with, respectively, rationalism versus empiricism, analytic versus synthetic, *a priori* versus *a posteriori*, as another 3+1 metaphorical analogy) in spite of the tight structural morphism between their two-stage methods of satisfaction. Deductions, if satisfied yield certain conclusions from premises for being valid **and** sound. Inductions, if satisfied *well enough* yield only relatively probable conclusions, here for being both cogent and strong to some interdependent degree. I will not go deeper into the fine details of PROOF but would be remiss if I didn’t rail against the use of the word ‘proof’ being most empty for those who fail to understand that most generally PROOF (in the looser sense of “proving” a theory or model) represents not a duality finally, but a trinity of further complexifying and interleaving uses of the two more basic two-stage methods of deduction and induction embedded within the so-called “scientific method” to provide *abductions* or “best explanations”. Looking from the level defining just the differences between deduction and (typically, statistically syllogistic) induction, theory or model building is itself a much more methodologically complex, multi-stage meta-process with its own well delineated intermediate stages and endless methodological reciprocations (on some account only yielding to falsification positively, never absolute confirmation). By the time we combine many deductions and inductions *with unbridled use of the imagination*, i.e. practising philosophy most naively, spontaneously and freely to build the final theories and models we have already internalized a possibly very broad complex of reciprocating sub-methods ordered within a now ever-expanding epistemic trinity with two-stage Deduction the Father, two-stage Induction the Son, and three-staged, i.e. coherent, consistent, and complete Abduction making the Holy Spirit of PROOF (and perhaps inhabiting yet another instance of a 3+1 epistemic para-structure).

And only if some theory or model in question encapsulates and anticipates all that existed/exists/will exist across all scales of Being (:= *all dated* existences) would we ever have anything we could call a *Theory of Everything* (a TOE) but for **assuming Physicalism and Reductionism are already true**. I would be remiss in terms of self-promotion if I fail to point out again the non-logical means by which best explanations are generated is nothing other than the original practice of philosophy, so while many scientists do not see themselves as doing philosophy at all this is simply not right; all scientific method is embedded, and only particularly demarcated from philosophy within a more general philosophic method that is akin to all self-reflective, language or thought bearing consciousnesses; to try to be rational or mean at all is to be philosophical even if good (or bad) philosophy and good science always stand outside each other. Bad science is just bad philosophy in the final analysis, but “bad” philosophy is

also often just normal, if not possibly naive or deluded philosophy, at least until it becomes a new science, or goes out of epistemic fashion.

In other words, the only way to ultimately confirm a proposition true is by providing more purely objective evidence or justification of some kind from outside the assumed logical framework (channelling Carnap) so the collective same is true with proving an argument, or furthering one theory or model over others competing to explain and predict the same phenomena; only independent and “external” evidence or verification provides satisfaction, either of truth or the absence of it, or at the next level of being proved or disproved, or at the highest level of yielding broadly applicable abductive knowledge as theory or model. In an important recapitulation, even though a false proposition can never be satisfied as an objective fact, a deductive argument can still be partially satisfied as valid if some of its propositions are always false, but can never be shown sound if valid only for this reason.

For a cheesy example:

‘If the moon is made of green cheese, I am the bald King of France’ turns out a valid *inference*, if only because if P, ‘that the moon is made of cheese of any kind, let alone green cheese’ is always likely to be found *empirically* false, then $P \rightarrow Q$ is always true *by definition* even if Q is also false, but many forget this is a normative assessment of material implication made by fiat, not discovered as a necessary or universal fact, so *caveat emptor* here as well. Many philosophers and non-philosophers alike, both at first and then persistently find the standard interpretation of material implication (as given by its truth table) perverse and until ones sees how this need arises in some concert with how an argument may be shown valid in a way it could never made sound is hard to swallow. However, the strange negative way validity is defined dovetails with this strangeness of the inference we call implication (which gets very close to a logical representation of physical cause, hence it being called *material*). The first quoted proposition above is, inductively speaking, deductively valid and is in this strange sense still *logically satisfiable even if neither the antecedent nor consequent could ever be empirically true*, but also because of this could never be made sound. Thus, the strangeness of this inference when P is always false never gets forwarded to shore up the soundness of any further proof it would need be an essential part of. So, the structure of any proof harbours endless indeterminacy unless all its minimally sufficient propositions are certain truths, and if and when a *probably false* proposition has been smuggled in as *probably true* unknowingly the risk is that any model we assume cogent now may turn out not to be (and so this era of endless revision of facts has already ensued).

This is because to assess validity we assume all the propositions but the conclusion are true first to see if the conclusion might still be found consistently false *beyond inferential reality* (here meaning that the inferential structure at hand does not insist the conclusion be true, it remains consistent overall with the conclusion being false, so actually entails nothing for the conclusion’s truth status) which is to say simply and directly either it is clearly empirically false *in the experience of reality given to perception*, or perhaps by showing a logical counter example:

Argument:

1. If the moon is made of green cheese, Brian is the bald King of France.

2. Assumption: 'The moon is made of green cheese' is true.

Inductive counter-evidence: 'Brian, If you are the "bald" King of France necessarily by inference, why do you have such a nice head of hair?'.

If the conclusion can be shown false when all other propositions are assumed true it is immediately a bad argument for being invalid, and so is "disproved" in this initial step alone (and now it is often the hidden premises, or "clear and distinct ideas", and evidence that must be reconsidered, but the more these are tacitly held rather than explicitly expressed the more one risks promoting a dogmatism by refusing to look at one's deepest metaphysical assumptions as the real problem).

Also, subsequently necessary, otherwise valid arguments must be further assessed for soundness, and in this step we directly move from assessing inferential quality to assessing the properties or states of the objects referred to by each and every sentence. The purified methods of classical logic do much less of the work of justifying some belief or set of beliefs as knowledge than it appears in the way many go around asserting some pet fact has been "proved" (usually some black and white sweeping generalization ultimately motivated by hidden tribal allegiances and propped up by some problematic form of psychological positivity³¹). The correct response to any such claim, assuming one is truly rational in the way required is 'So, what kind of proof are you talking about, and exactly how was that proof justified?' Here a deafening *logical* silence typically ensues as some fallacious appeal to convention, popularity, or authority is made. So much the worse for best use of reason. A valid argument is sound (and "proved") only when all its propositions are, according to relatively incontrovertible and non-logical means, shown true and then only in that particular case may we say the argument's conclusion can't be false (is necessarily true, at least in the theory, or model the proof is part of). However, in most observational sciences, meaning anywhere measurements are taken or data collected, there is no such thing as pure deduction in terms of soundness, unless the data fit mathematical models that themselves can be derived from first principles, which typically means the models involve only primary properties. This means all models involving intentional terms, i.e., all models making any claims about biological (or cultural) behaviour are doubly (or triply) suspect, first for never amounting to certain verification, but second for the relative lack of clarity in choosing between the various models, each of which typically have very limited ranges (codomains) in terms of predictive power and are endlessly subject to counterexamples, as is always risked fatally in the case of pure inductions.^{NOTE}

NOTE: And, I am not certain there are any truly deductive arguments made in physics at all, or even in mathematics (given the equivocal status of the parallel postulate, just for starters, and never mind the Derridean

Concern applied to the treatment of quantity as representing abstract sets built over the Dedekind-Peano Axioms) or at least some deductions are typically less pure than people might assume. The problem is as far as I remember physics and mathematics in university there always seemed to be at least one point in many empirically motivated derivations where some algebraic, geometrical, or symmetry assumption is necessary to further the proof. This is typically motivated by considering the boundary conditions determining only the idealized or linear function of the system, not its full practical range of possible behaviour (where new unaccounted-for objects/events often enter the field of existence and cause and effect, and old ones disappear, *as if by magic*).

Consider the equation describing the motion of a pendulum³². I believe to derive it at one point one needs to assume that $\sin(\theta) = \theta$ (which is only “true” in terms of limited precision for “small” angles) and this I remember is a very popular assumption to make in mechanics in many different sub-domains. This is akin to creating an open premise line in a logical deduction, which is fine, but unless this premise line is closed we do not end up with a universally sound deduction, only a conditionally sound one (i.e. this proof is sound but only if this added premise that was not part of the original argument is also itself first shown *deductively and universally* true, but we already know that it is **not** universally true; we are just assuming it is “true enough” in all the cases we hope to apply the final model to). However, for some extreme case or if requiring some extreme precision in measurement it might be false that $\sin(\theta) = \theta$, or it might only be true for a narrow set of boundary conditions that would make negative *ceteris paribus* cases seem positive, or positive ones negative, or it might be randomly true or false without determination at some fractalized boundary of very high or low scale . . . by now Occam is rolling over in his grave. So, if these assumptions break down outside the boundary conditions of the toy model then they are incomplete models at best, just “certain” first order approximations as quasi-deductions. I have no idea how many deductions in physics are littered with open premise lines, but it would be interesting to take a survey.

In addition, even if the overall argument (the deductive skeleton of some purely physical model) is valid showing the truth of many of its propositions typically falls back on the always less than certain results of some statistically derived inductive result, so this makes the soundness of these models also contingent on probability or statistical analysis, which is why only deductions in pure mathematics can be assumed to provide proof in the most ideal sense, but then: what are numbers (or sets **and** classes), exactly? At best we can say all the propositions that must be true to confer soundness on some otherwise empirically justified deduction are probably true (due to all the familiar limitations of idealizing measurement precision and accuracy described by statistics; due to human beings because of their psychologies, their inevitable fallibility even in the face of best intentions and otherwise impeccable standards; and due to their many hidden biases and often opaque, i.e. “**unconscious**” denied or repressed motives). Most models are only as good as their least probably true premises or weakest observationally satisfied propositions. If the moon were made of green cheese, I would be the well-coiffed bald King of France and a green cheese Baron of some renown.

The pointed question for our current use of instrumental reason is to ask how many of its current motivating propositions have been deemed satisfied as true that more properly, given all extant arguments and evidence defining the widest and properly vetted scope of owed application (where so many epistemic and normative paradoxes define so many dichotomies) demand a more skeptical stance, or epistemic agnosticism or even irrealism in regards to the very possibility of satisfying them at all? Here I am not concerned to seek wholesale inversion of the satisfaction state of any of the conventionally endorsed propositions in this moment as the primary goal, but to consider how we might better build our models keeping the possibility of indeterminable satisfaction conditions as the more just and wiser interpretative path to tread by always first taking in all the evidence available to both sides of any philosophical debate, especially when we otherwise risk begging in only one side by blindly assuming the most metaphysically lop-sided or otherwise epistemically suspect and self-serving premises. This proposed aim begins akin to how Kant used his antinomies to shore up his transcendental claims but stops short of promoting his implicit idealism (because Kant takes himself as doing ontological work where I see myself as doing pre-ontological work).

So PHILOSOPHICAL TRUTH largely and more precisely starts just about the ends of certain very technically rarefied kinds of singular propositional satisfaction (and *not*, as I recount on the state of the art next, propositional *attitude* satisfaction, at least not apparently in any similarly direct way) and so is not and could not ever serve as any knowledge's entire means of justification and so TRUTH is only part of the means of PROOF not its *simple* end; but is a complex one such that as any proof or interpretation of any theory or model gets more and more complex so to take in more and more of the furniture of the world it starts to look more and more like the problem of universals in the sense no one really understands how proof is materially grounded in truth *but in the representational vehicles for which we have no coherent fall-through ontology* (i.e. what are numbers as material targets, exactly?), just as no one can explain how the particular primary properties of many water molecules heaped together in the right context come to exhibit, cause and explain all the secondary properties which we experience and "know" bulk water by and as, naively and so directly. It is exactly secondary properties that give irrealists their own rationally countering epistemic traction, after all.

But, even I do not doubt there is a deeply substantive connection between the properties of atoms and molecules and their instantiation in the heaps or functional complexes that emerge intrinsically *and locally* from them across lower to higher (and, differently, i.e. *extrinsically and non-locally* from higher to lower) scale and that this is evidenced directly and incontrovertibly by all the most easy to understand best explanations that only the discovery (invention?) and wide dissemination of atomic (particle) theory at even the high school level provides, but it seems to me we have barely begun saying exactly how this happens in any mind-independent way at all, and are simply still asserting this in a mind-cart before the body-horse way. Before we ever intuited and came with some succour of reason to *logically* know with (according to Kripke) *a posteriori* necessity that water *is* H₂O it seems to me our experience and direct knowledge of those universalizable but always unique set of properties by which we first mutely perceive and then representationally conceive of bulk water remains the only "real" (under the

assumption of a direct or naive realism of some limited kind at least) solid ground we have for confirming the equally “real” existence of atoms and molecules (which we can never see or touch in isolation at their own scale but through inferential reconstructions taken from indirectly accessed forms of always computationally derived data that are by now very adulterated by **Life** and **Mind**’s biased functional interactions with all the naturally non-derived data first arising from the BBS, at least on Earth).

So, to infer without a full “cashing out” in the other direction from atoms and molecules to the bulk properties of their heaps or functional complexes as both first cause and as a total explanation of the heap-only-owed properties remains to date nothing but the promise to fulfill a subtle form of, albeit only prohibitively seeming circular reasoning and promised cart made back behind the horse filling in of the rest of the story of how bulk properties emerge from fundamental ones. As such the possibility always looms that what is promised rests too much of its epistemic status on what is still potentially an unsound, not cogent or at least incomplete warranting by too naively taken givens that have already been abstracted too far away from the real essences of their targets only by asserting their reductive status as proper epistemic cause by some perverse trick of *by fiat* use of reason because as far as things stand the entire web of cross-entailments might still turn out the naive epistemic *effect* of a false belief in atomism, if realism turns out false (or of a false belief in realism, if atomism turns out false, and *Solar System Atomism* has already turned out radically false, so . . .?). But we simply don’t know either way, except for the “fact” that below the level of atoms is exactly where new doubt enters coming out when it was a very hard and reductive faith about what the real must be like that we held, and must have held, were we to ever first conceive of going in this way; so much for realist science if it can never break out of this bi-entangled circle of thinking and experiencing, and of hoping to represent all of being only by first assuming logicism.

The “Normal” Fly in the Logical Belief Ointment

But much worse for logicism not all that can be originally or lately satisfied of, or as the contents of most intentional states obviously reduces directly to TRUTH alone, or seemingly at all. For purely bio-functional representational states (first only passive and non-intentional sensory registrations of data, only later active proto-ego or content-mute perspective-taking perception of natural information) and propositional attitudes (‘believes that X’, ‘hopes that X’, ‘desires that X’, but not ‘knows that X’) neither of which obviously or ever reduces to just assessment as facts due to—respectively—the appearance-reality gap and the problem of reference to non-existent objects, the imagined satisfaction conditions invoked along the way fall or tip or emerge over what I think ends up very, very complex and often deeply contingent and irreducibly paradoxical fractal boundaries (in a literally material or existential sense, if we are to take language to be able to represent most naively and unproblematically at all).

These boundaries, for which we can only retrodict their abstract existences as many “first” or “original” evolutionary and spontaneously occurring material events in some tremendous and what I can’t help but see as unjustifiably wide and deep evidential gloss, describe when taken together an always paradoxically interrelated evolutionary spectrum of emergent kinds of norms, likely of many more kinds than I will consider here. But perhaps this is only in categorical appearance so belying a deeper shared and incontrovertible essence (one that PERCEPTUAL BELIEF and PHILOSOPHICAL TRUTH both share if logicism is to be true and naturalistically derived). The first *natural* norms that appear serve to tie function to useful data morphisms that are only very reliably and generally determinable (non-locally disposed *as structuring causes*) and singularly (locally) very reliably re-determinable (*as triggering causes*) with probabilities at or very near to 1. On the foundations of these many proto-intentional “representations” nature then builds norms of relative perceptual accuracy as the first true intentional states yielding to, so as to be born(e) as/(by) the first minds, and only lately has built onto perception what often amounts to the most arbitrary and often irrationally promoted ethical or moral valuing encompassed in IDEOLOGY (including the assumed to be more unproblematic norms required for fiction, and the same ones taken problematically for lying, etc.). It belies a crooked suspension of disbelief not to assume that all mental states, conscious or otherwise, always involve the willy-nilly and not at all unambiguously determinable or easily disentangleable application of each and every type of norm to all arising propositionally in the moment-to-moment and naively given stream of consciousness that is the birthright of all awake and well enough developed human adults. Every mental state token, but for those purely determined by the will as an act of pure use of reason (so very rare, maybe nothing but unicorns?) would *always* seem to involve mixtures of all three general types (norms of function, accuracy, and value), yet I fear the all too human conceit is they are all felt as, so naively determined as norms of rational truth.

In reality most mental states are likely constructed relative to implicit functional norms or meta-normative satisfaction conditions that are:

1. Not ever purely logically determinable (at least as things stand)
2. Not ever, but for the $P=1$ data morphisms, definable in mind-independent terms (like TRUTH is supposed to be, at least Platonic notions of TRUTH), only mind-dependent ones (again, at least as things stand)
3. Very unlikely to be fully analyzable and epistemically disentangleable (on the account now unfolding) as independent types without risking a regression to negative epistemic results, rather than what the hoped for naturalistic, i.e., positive project assumes.

The Endless Conflation of Truthfulness with Truth

Let's start with the kind of normative satisfaction at the forward end of the normative satisfaction spectrum/spiral many people dangerously (so irrationally) conflate with TRUTH, that being TRUTHFULNESS. What makes the satisfaction conditions of truthfulness radically different from truth begins with the recognition facts are always meant to be mind independent, but beliefs never can be. Beliefs are defined in relation to a mind and can be entirely subjective in origin (facts are about/belong to their objects first and foremost; beliefs are first derived from subjects, only falling back to their objects after passing through perception and carried by a properly purified language and method of justification). I think many people are currently very confused about this (the same crowd thinking reality *is* appearance I'd wager). When you 'tell the truth' in an ambiguous and informal sense you are not at all necessarily thereby propounding objective facts, but for in the sense a stuffed effigy of a horse is still loosely considered a horse; the unstable effigy of a "fact" is a belief you only think true but have no means to justify why it is true.

So, respectively, effigies of horses (mental representations of purported objective truths) and unicorns (mental representations of purported subjective "truthfulness") serve here as analogues for the orthogonally opposed kinds of satisfaction vehicles/conditions involved—remembering that statements and beliefs are intensionally interdependent, so not pure opposites—only appearing together at the most manifestly complex levels of representational agency, those demonstrated by self-conscious language bearers. When the fact we must naively experience (in the act of self or other reporting) true and false belief *and* truth and truthfulness the same, or *as if of the same category* (the first in "feeling", the second in "meta-conceptual-conflation" but through similar "feeling") leads us to often conflate what we believe with what we know. In such cases these "feelings" overlap so tightly in experience as to be indistinguishable in a fashion going a long way towards defining irrationality in the first place, i.e., believing false propositions in spite of the evidence, or worse without the need to start with evidence at all, just with some "clear and distinct *feeling*" typically underwritten by some tacit, but denied form of social power.

The underlying mental state vehicles can respectively—as a reasonable hypothesis, not as an obvious material fact—bear either facts or just false beliefs equally (one supposes, due to ontological parsimony) but as unicorns are never "really" real so too are truthfulness's never real facts falling through directly to the world; they always appear first as unicorn effigies in this analogy (as false or unjustified beliefs, they only "feel" like horse effigies, but may always turn out unicorn effigies). Beliefs without explicit argumentative, trivial direct observational, or indirect technical and always *material* evidential warrant widely and deeply "underwriting" them are never really facts, but for the meta-, the *pseudo*-fact of stating (under quotation) you believe so in truth or truthfulness, and what it is *that* you believe. But in cases where you can't (or worse, don't even see the need to) be transparent about why any belief you hold must be "true" then this represents, at best, *only* a preparatory stage for seeking not providing

warrant, so all you have produced is some truth-neutral *content*, i.e., ‘*Truth can’t touch this (oh-oh oh oh oh-oh-oh)*’. And what you always risk in this no matter your credentials, relative intelligence, developed capacities or social power is being endlessly deluded about the facts, both in regard to your own mind or person, and in regard to the world at large.

Given most children in the West easily believe Santa Clause is real, or later preteens easily believe ridiculous myths like you can’t get pregnant the first time you have intercourse (or worse when teens, believe anal “sex” is not intercourse, or that homosexuality can be cured), *and most adults hardly fair much better even after dispelling these childhood and young adult conceptions*, then I’d have to think were we to collate every belief we even momentarily held over our entire lives with some Holy Fact Checker’s spreadsheet (right, right, wrong, wrong, wrong, right, . . .) I suspect most if not all of us have been wrong about things way more than we’ve ever been right, *let alone ending up in a better epistemic position at all!!!* So, while superficially in feeling there is often no obvious distinction made between “horse” and “unicorn” mental states (as warranted facts **or** unwarranted beliefs of either supposed facts or truthfulnesses) in ideally rational practice the deep difference in status and epistemic worth of any face-value proposition is only lastingly and deeply shown by first carefully disentangling and differently applying the very different satisfaction kinds actually broadly in play:

1. Beliefs of purported **objective** facts that are lastingly and *materially* justified as true-*the epistemic gold standard*.
2. Beliefs of purported **objective** facts that are, or turn out justifiable as false-*the negative epistemic background condition of misrepresentation* (often informed by types 3 and 4). We should note that this category is a chimera of possibly endless intensional ambiguities. We have false beliefs we wrongly think true but don’t yet know they are false, we have false beliefs we should know aren’t true but *implicitly, tacitly, opaquely, explicitly, etc.* . . . deny is the case, we have false beliefs we may accidentally pass off as true due various innocent or possibly malicious or deluded intentions, etc. This fractal sub-category defines **the** epistemic **and** moral minefield of the human psyche. Logic balks hard going into this category.
3. **Subjective** truthfulnesses that are sincere and accurate-*the gold standard of ethical behaviour on subjective self-report* (often dependent on types 1 or 2). Sometimes via this category, *ceteris paribus*, objective truths are warranted, *but that does not collapse one into the other, rather they orbit each other in perpetuity across the mind-(world)body gap*.
4. **Subjective** truthfulnesses that are insincere or otherwise inaccurate—*the ethical negative background condition or deluded inner “facts” case—the case of psychological pathology, of the bullshit realm of “the-unconscious”, of all forms of LYING, ignorance, denial, repression, or other kinds of representational malice* (think: advertising and all the clearly irrational meme-leveraging forms of social intelligence determined by that wolf in sheep’s clothing we call “normal”, always fed by and feeding various cults of

personality). But even here we see a problem, one possibly intrinsically inherent to all sharp hierarchical categorizations, so a problem inherent to logicism too: both justified truths and sincere truthfulnesses may be endlessly entangled with the other 3 categories as a universally negative and fatally regressive case (if realism is false it may be falsity and insincerity all the way through and down, but for in the epistemic fashion of it all). It may even be possible, but for the fact warrant of empirical facts must always pass through the world directly, while for warrant of truthfulnesses this only happens, typically, indirectly (and if physicalism is false, maybe in many cases, not at all), that category 2 and 4 are identical.

The often deeply missed implication is nothing we report of our inner world could ever amount to a fact of the sort science promotes, at least until the mind-body problem is solved, and regardless as to whether we are being honest or not but for the trivial “fact” we did indeed make such and such a claim about our inner world at such and such a time and place, and that we really meant it, weren’t lying, and don’t turn out deluded about that.

Big Fucking Trivial Epistemic Deal.

The facts mattering most to right ideology and claims to knowledge are never to be found in anyone’s head alone, but must fall through to the real objects the model or theory in play soundly or cogently proposes in a way ultimately having nothing to do with the contents of any mind.

What goes deeply missing here is any concrete account of how we can misrepresent at all.

Being truthful—at best—starts by telling a beautiful and internally consistent story about what you often take as horse effigies, but are not really about real horses necessarily, only contingently. At worst, being truthful is nothing but a stroll through a forest of suspect unicorn effigies, with only an occasional horse effigy or cogent unicorn wandering about. Yes, it is an objective fact that if someone records what you say truthfully there is some matter of fact to be objectively reified here (i.e., it is a factual claim whether you said this or that, or a fact you didn’t say that or this, but notice—especially—the need to use the word ‘that’, this alone is a clue we are warded off from jumping to truth from truthfulness directly). If you say Santa Claus is real (and it is a fact you said and meant it) that alone goes no way to saying ‘Santa Claus is real’ is satisfied by being true. That we can reify a subjective report “up” to an objective meta-and/or-pseudo-fact does not justify the claim that we can go orthogonally from subjective “truth” or truthfulnesses to objective truth. Falseness of all kinds, intentional or just epistemic, is always supposed naturalistically parasitic on objective truth (as much in having emerged from matter, and matter alone, right?); the arrow of the mind’s intentions (like that of time, of *entropy*?) always runs forward to negative or positive satisfaction over a gaping, but always virtual—so never literal minefield of error cases, but can never—in having probably already set off so many mines invisibly to even get started—step so easily backwards over this field to whence it first arose. The mind often burns truth-functional bridges like an army in retreat for reasons having little to do with the non-local

promotion of rational outcome, but is always informed by the need to survive (be that of bulk material categorical essence, genes as vital essence or memes as thought essence). The analysis of your subjective thought content made literal content does not instantly collapse to the same level of mind-independent satisfaction as LOGICAL TRUTH or FACT at all.

What makes any subjective report truthful, what satisfies that intentional report is you are not a lying piece of manipulative shit (or more interestingly, not innocently deluded or otherwise pathologically fallible in knowing the contents of your own mind) not the entailed truth of the bare content taken as propositions having nothing to do with your mind (and its endless epistemic fallibility). In technical speech the contents of truthfully made propositions (propositional attitudes reports) are opaque to any immediate satisfaction as truths, at least until the contents of your beliefs are verified in some reliable mind-independent way after first properly separating the facts and truthfulnesses, and laying any and all *naturalistically causal* interdependencies the truthfulnesses owe to the truths transparent and complete, and no one, I repeat, no one is close to starting this project well, let alone having made any significant progress; we are talking about solving the mind-body problem, symbol grounding and hard problem in one fell swoop at the level of (human) experience after all!^{NOTE}

NOTE: Practitioners and defenders of *The Secret* (or any other magic bullet “spiritual” technologies) owe me a metaphysics -> ontology -> a cogent theory of mind *as a theory of everything* particularly and **at least** if their claims are to be taken seriously as objectively true (no matter how truthful they might otherwise think they are being, and accurate they are about this). While I agree there is tremendous affective value in trying to cultivate a positive attitude (and a real mind-body connection in terms of being healthy as opposed to just w-healthy) if only to allow one to move on and forward from loss, lack and hardship with less obviously causally counter-productive wallowing, this is not at all the same as proving a real material (or spiritual, so idealistic) effect is in play, just more well-intentioned delusion masquerading for sale as false hope. Believing there is some supernatural access to divine wish-fulfillment as proof of spiritual fitness ultimately buries the real causes of poverty and other forms of suffering, those due the inescapably finite lack of opportunity, resources, and aptitude that being born or getting trapped in poverty or innate lack or contingent dysfunction not only creates, but that the rich and powerful need to endlessly perpetuate even as they convince the unwashed masses to otherwise attribute their personal failures solely to things like not having the right attitude or microscopic “chemical imbalances”; what self-serving tripe. When did confirmation of the universe’s (or God’s) love for its creatures become so dependent on being wealthy so inequitably, unsustainably and beyond any proportional need, or so based on arbitrary and all too-idealistic forms of value? God’s message and the perennial spiritual message has always largely been nothing of lasting value is ever to be found in the accumulation of wealth, yet this dialectic has been inverted, largely by first passing invisibly through Nietzschean inspired forms of nihilism, but lately largely by the Scientism and Logicism. What I see in *The Secret* is the irrationality inherent in psychological positivity^{see below} being leveraged as a self-fulfilling form of self-selecting tribal prophecy, so claims to truth here are made by reifying the exceptions to some rule as its entire proof (only those who actually practice the secret as described **and** actually get what they (think) they want show up as “evidence”, those for whom the secret does not work rarely get counted—who amongst us ever likes to admit we’ve been conned?).

Below : We are always more likely to believe a person we like, and like a person who believes like us, evidence be damned. Difficult, sad or epistemically marginalized people are always clearly wrong, as their epistemic or affective non-normalness and bad attitudes “prove”.

What I find particularly irritating about this recent brain-eating-zombie meme of “speaking one’s truth” is the tacitly (and so very fallaciously) made inference that by knowing my own truths, by simply being honest about what I believe I am somehow justifying an objective ought from a subjective is as a “fact” (or at least as a speech act whose fulfillment is the way to particular or universal salvation). It is certainly of great ethical and existential value to be honest, but there is no value in expecting honesty to ever be evidence of any LOGICALLY SATISFIED, i.e., purely objective fact. Telling your truth might say more about your lack of rationality than being a rational means of shoring up the contents of your beliefs as if they are made facts in the process. This is like making the argument unicorns are real by pointing to unicorn effigies. This is yet another empty and unhealthy sort of meme it would be best not to promote or defend lately being widely promoted and defended, but it is a lived naturalistic fallacy typical of teenagers and young adults and is virally fuelled by the endless obfuscations of social media, although I lately see as many older people, who really should know better, aping the same kind of nonsense.

Polemic sub-rant over.

I will soon say more about how many prohibitive levels and kinds of variously independent or interdependent satisfaction conditions may exist and how they are minimally and relatively structured, at least in order to relatively and uncontentionally (I hope) localize and order them taking the mind-body tipping point in evolutionary terms the very emergence of original intentionality.^{NOTE}

NOTE: I will really only define a vaguely sub-categorizable and “un-sharply” bounded spectrum (but for the inherited purity owed any conceptually made boundary and with the whole spectrum being open-ended in evolutionary terms) from original intentionality to original ____? Here I find we have no ready at hand word, first “semantics”, first thought-word, first non-ostensive symbol grounding, original self-thought, original experience of I-ness? I am concerned to prohibitively define some cluster of archetypically first or “original” evolutionary events beyond original intentionality in evolution underwriting many loci as part of some broader solution basis to all the associated problems.

The first act of perception and of particular mind serves as the zero point or graphical origin (data morphisms to the left or intentionality-negative side of the “line”, accuracy and value norms to the right or intentionality-positive side of the “line”, but a line quickly becoming a “surface” or “volume”). Then I can get right to Searle’s notions and show how they help differentiate speech acts from propositional

acts in terms of an asymmetry between *direction-of-fit of intentionality* versus *direction-of-fit of causation*, both relative to their very different satisfaction conditions.

A Prohibitive Structural Ordering and Evolutionary Indexing of Intentionality Mediating Satisfaction Conditions (otherwise called norms)

(0. Life)

Certain Data Morphisms

1. Original Intentionality or First Mind.

Relative Norms of Perceptual Accuracy (non or vanishingly phenomenal, bare attention as general intentionality with vanishing content)

2. First Phenomenology Involved (affective or “felt”) as if Perceptual Belief, First “Mute” Experiencing

Relative Norms of Perceptual Accuracy (as if “belief” as “desire-need” complexes yielding “looks” with non-vanishing phenomenal content)

3 a). Where and How the “Sign” Grounding Problem is solved in terms of facilitating Original Communicative “Pointing” Behaviour (Ostension), human or otherwise

Relative (minimally arbitrary) Norms of proto-Cognitive Value (implicit, or unexpressed content, concrete targets, only behaviourally expressed, proto-conceptual)

3 b). Where and How the Symbol Grounding Problem is solved in terms of facilitating Original Recursively Symbolic Language, human or otherwise

Relative (variously arbitrary) Norms of Cognitive Value (explicit or expressed content, concrete and abstract targets, conceptual)

4. The point of emergence of Original Intentional-In-Existence, or the First Self-Reflective Experience due to Explicit Mental Representation in Symbolic Language of Purely Abstract Concepts, Original and Reciprocating Self-Consciousness

Relative and Absolute Norms of Cognitive Value (explicit or expressed content, concrete and abstract targets, first creation of empty concepts)

This cluster of “original” events represents at least, and probably many more than four (genotypic) tipping points; “radically functional (phenotypic) emergences” of mind that may have occurred very close together along single lineages or more spread out over evolutionary time across many “breeds” or inter-breeding species in fits and starts. Clearly the evident increases in behavioural, systemic and organ

complexity we see while imposing an evolutionary temporal order as we survey the Linnaean hierarchy tracks somewhat with the categories above. We may also be looking at cases of homology due to direct genetic connection between closely branching lineages or cases of spontaneous parallel evolution. Bees are a case in point as some believe they have a symbolic language, and they are often offered up as the exemplar for first minds, yet they clearly have not, as insects, evolved in more complex physiological ways as other lineages have (nor have they attempted to communicate with us, as far as we can tell, but our mammalian pets and test subjects certainly do). Assuming mind does begin with arthropods from there questions about sentience, ability to feel pain, and claims for self-awareness and complex language are endlessly contentious, but for *homo sapiens* (so it is safer to assume the conceptual satisfaction game is rigged and so show a form of epistemic/ethical charity erring on the side of compassion and promoting forms of environmental stewardship and ethics assuming deeply shared experience between many complex enough species, it is **just** one deeply shared gene pool after all, so maybe all living things, *even all material things* are dipped into the pool of experience, even if not as deeply, but just as profoundly, so, *just as ethics-concerning!!!*).

It is also possible we are looking at a single underlying change or event with multiple downstream consequences that only appear as new aspects of the same one implicit change, with the more complex functions still needing further content from sensory and perceptive input, or allele dispersion, or further environmental feedback to fully activate them across wide social groups. At some point in our species' history close to, with, or after we (or our closest biological predecessors) developed ostensive or proto-symbolic forms of communication going beyond the basic calls, passively communicative behaviours and other non-symbolic forms of animal communication (so after basic but otherwise linguistically mute semiotic or sign-based forms emerge, which likely require only perception and maybe not even conscious experience, so possibly only non-conscious perception) we see the origins of our current and extremely complex forms of post-modern culture first sown. The emergence of complex culture, which I and I'd think many others associate with the first general prototypical experience of self-consciousness that marks at least in part the supposed cognitive superiority of our kind, is definitively evidenced by the sorts of cave paintings found in France from 30,000 years ago but may also simply reflect further progression of modern human language in just some behavioural but not semantic leap. Some have pegged a change in our experience of consciousness to have emerged around ~150,000 years ago (as the mean of a range of hypotheses).

All humans born from this point forward are assumed "modern" in the sense they would be fully able to function in the most technologically advanced societies, were they born into them). Keep in mind even at the near end of this range we are still more than 25,000 years before the advent of written language (but only 5000 from agriculture), so I am also assuming a second symbol grounding sub-problem, that of assigning arbitrary symbols as marks ordered by a previously expressed but only now explicitly codified orthography is in play (the "sonic" orthography of speaking is expressed but only in acquiring the phonemes and morphemes, not yet in tying them to abstract symbols as marks made outside the body) and this is the "easier" version of the more general symbol grounding problem to solve. The symbol

grounding solution mattering first and most only concerns spoken language, but also marks the start of oral history, so perhaps should be considered the more appropriate conventional start of history as culture, not the advent of written languages. ^{NOTE}

NOTE: Ultimately I hope you can intuit that I am likely to argue starting history with the dated advent of some preserved texts or oral tradition or other human-specific artifacts is just another irrational conceit; culture begins *informationally-speaking* in the Big Bang, or it doesn't begin at all. This is the real burden that Epistemic Naturalism owes, whether most see it that way or not. In my masters research paper, I argued while Burge has pushed the casual-empirical origins of mind appropriately back in evolutionary time he has not yet moved it back nearly enough. The residual problem (the Derridean error of last, but evolutionary speaking **first** concern, the final peripheralization basis for all poles of all rational dichotomies) **always** is in explaining the source of the background information any naturalistic (typically physicalist) theory of either sensory registration, perception, or cognition must assume (as well as assuming some material instantiation of the laws of nature as the "alphabet" to ward off cries of Platonism but still solve the problem of universals, all this due to invoking Shannon's Theory, which always leaves these possibly *a priori* sources of intentionality out, but assumed to already exist). To explain the conditions of the background is always to explain how the universe evolved into the substance and form we find it manifest as now (or then for earlier tipping points) but this explanation is ultimately parasitic on the one meant to explain the intrinsic nature of the Big Bang singularity; its implied and vanishingly intrinsic and unfathomably improbable original data/phase space configuration. If there is an empirical mystery in physics to "bind them and rule them all" it concerns knowing both the nature and source of a real nothing, a literal point, one both outside space-time, and situated where all the known laws of physics break down—at least in the mathematizations. No one has a clue how to proceed here, how could they, ***it's a point without any form or substance outside of space-time where there are no apparent laws in play as we know them!!!*** Yet the singularity "really" exists and has this nature, or our current version of Big Bang Cosmology is just a beautiful but empty logical fiction (but are we not mistaking the vehicle and its content for the wrong target here?).

So, even though doing mathematical science was impossible before written language (it would seem) this doesn't change how facts and norms already differently existed but makes the quality and range of their possible forms of expression less sophisticated, fewer in number, and less reliably replicable or codified. I assume that written language does not in principle represent a new form of meaning-bearing intentionality, but simply a "better" or more resolved and resolving vehicularization. In my critiques of rationality, I will, as a side-effect of achieving my main aims deal only peripherally with how the vehicle of speech differently owes the charge of being irrationally used more often than writing does, but do not think this difference derails my overall argument (but am open to evidence that it does). If some insect is our first perceiver then the time range covered by my prohibitive spectrum begins from 400,000 (being generous as shrimp and bees appear less than 200,000 years ago) to 30,000 years ago, but is most critically concerned with the even more complex set of value norms that follow, those which are "felt" to be essentially infused within our species as implicitly rational ones. In the final analysis it will not matter where in the spectrum you might believe the mind and its various meta-functions

emerge, but for placement of first mind, as it will fall more to what all the satisfaction conditions over this spectrum both have in common and differ by, not where the tipping points lie in time that matters most to my downstream arguments.

Searle's *Directions of Fit*

Searle differentiates facts and beliefs differently than I have on the surface, but I think equivalently or at least with tremendous overlap to how I have done so far. He talks about statements versus beliefs, where statements are immediately subject to satisfaction as truth, but beliefs might not be, and speech acts certainly aren't in the same immediate fashion as both beliefs and statements otherwise are. We can largely re-contextualize his analyses just in regard to perception, so I am deeming Searle is also first concerned with reports of mental states in which the objects of reference are given to us directly through the senses, both leading to and falling back out of a naive and unreflective endorsement of realism. We are also assuming, in cases of reporting beliefs, all subjects are being truthful (and don't believe such nonsense as "speaking their truths" amounts to anything helpful for TRUTH).

Suppose one sees a cat sitting on a mat and reports '(I believe that:) there is a cat sitting on *that* mat'. Here we are first in some kind of live and relatively passively generated perceptual state followed by another mental state (or is it the same one simply developing?) in which we then initially internally-think and finally externally-state what we've perceived (so, the count is now two mental states, or is it three, or still that same first one developing further, or a dual-aspect pair embedded in, or embedding the original percept?). These three supposedly/possibly ontically (so not just conceptually) separable mental event kinds (unconscious perception, conscious perception, cognition/conception) when taken as a unity define the direct and very *close* instantiation of the least problematic kind of expressed, so explicit perceptual belief (the empirical kind *closest* to falling to satisfaction as LOGICALLY TRUE). These sub-states often occur so close together we tend to see, *to cross-experience* them as one seamless state, but that is likely an illusion, perhaps the same one allowing the felt unity of experience to directly motivate seeking a monistic and totalizing ontology without much other evidence (think: persistence of sensation, and the 0.2 s lag between new or different sensory input and the subsequent experiential unity of those "then" causes as due to some conceived "now" (later) effect; it seems we "live" in both the past and the present at once; what overflows from this "echo chamber" tacitly serves as rational hope for some certainty in the imagined nature of the future).

Some might argue we can speak without thinking first, but I suspect here our thinking is simply unconscious exactly in the way perception can also be, so beyond self-observation as things stand. In these most uncontentious cases of ideal perception and self-justifying (true)belief formation ('Here is one hand, here is another') there is a very close (in the sense of propinquitous, not in my more abstract

and novel sense of ‘close’) *mind-to-world* direction-of-fit of an occurrent mental state to some concrete object(s) of perception. Non-perceptual beliefs have the same *direction-of-fit*, but do not show or require the same sort of intimacy with their objects to occur or re-occur. In between we have recalled perceptual beliefs, where the character of the mental state content is assumed still distally caused in part or whole by some once *closely* perceived object or event, often ingrained over many exposures, but as said object or event is in these cases not present for re-perceiving memory recall is to some significant degree always a mixed “re-con/perceiving”.

So, the question arises: Is an uninterpreted or base percept the sort of thing that should be considered propositionally satisfiable under any semantic account involving TRUTH at all (as all expressed non-perceptual beliefs are by necessity) or do all percepts first need to be parsed by cognition or conception prior to any possible satisfaction as veridical by other kinds of satisfaction having little to nothing to do with logical forms of truth? In other words, is the notion of ‘perceptual belief’ coherent at all except in a minimally descriptive and gap-begging sense?^{NOTE}

NOTE: Here is when my exegeses might become notoriously and unavoidably vague and contentious. Chalmers defends what I see as a tightly related notion of *phenomenal belief* in *The Character of Consciousness*³³. The spectrum of explanandum and explanans defining the perception-cognition boundary demarcates, I believe, yet another parties on all sides of the ontological divide would equally endorse as marking the coarser range over which some non-conscious mind first tips to be a conscious mind. I suspect this is true even if one endorses the sort of Individualist views Burge argues against, which in extreme forms amount to the empirically inconsistent claim (self)-consciousness:= bearing a fully developed recursive language already working over fully arbitrary symbol selection. However, as I am only concerned with how the spectrum of novelly emerging satisfaction conditions kinds are used rationally or not it does not matter, when I turn to using psychological terms, whether they are reducible to non-psychological ones, or even when and where real materially instantiated concepts emerge. We are all realists about the contents of ideal results in experimental psychology at least (blind sight is real, even in otherwise normal patients as change blindness). I’m not sure either way, but will grant when an occurrent and expressed belief’s cause is direct physical interaction mediated primarily by the senses in ideal conditions under the guiding finger of focal attention that something of the contents of these beliefs, if anything ever can, must always fall directly to some immediate and unmediated satisfaction as at least contingently necessary general/particular truths (perhaps only: ‘there is some thing there/here, but I can’t say what’, oh and the thinking, always the thinking). Even if we turn out wrong in part or whole about what we say we perceive particularly we can’t be wrong about the entailed belief we are perceiving something in some way from some place at some time to some ineliminable if not vague degree of precision and accuracy, but failing not for any sort of fatal flaw in the essence of the perceived or the quality of any percept, just for some innocent conceptual misadventure (“true” percepts without the right concepts are endlessly confusable, but never mute, concepts without any apparent and more “*closely*” reproducible originating percepts are too given to flights of fancy).

Suppose—next—it is very dark, and one can't make out exactly what is on the mat. One might say 'I think (believe) there is a cat on that mat, but I can't be sure'. In cases such as this furthering knowledge about the intimate nature of such ambiguous experiences by *closer* exploration can almost always grant more sufficient or necessary evidence to reduce (integrate?) such otherwise unsatisfiable perceptual reports to (delimited sets of) true or false propositions. So, when we can perceive but not unambiguously conceive of an otherwise publicly shared event we are in no position to judge the logical truth of anything. However, if the event or object can be further explored it seems for normal perceptual events (non life-threatening, stable and ideally normal mental and corporeal affect, no prior consumption of consciousness altering substances or other "pathological" limitations, etc.) resolving these sorts of ambiguity is simply a matter of achieving the minimally necessary or sufficient resolution of the perceptual mental state first in lieu of additional conceiving or cognizing or thinking or speaking, although sometimes the feedback effects of thinking or speaking clearly aid in resolving perception (and remember earlier I argued that there is no in principle distinction between direct and indirect observation, only relative "*closeness*" or "*farness*". So, I am implying in some important epistemic sense *Science* is just a rational form of disambiguating perceptions made across space-scale-times vaster than naive perception passively and spontaneously grants, so indirect observations are effectively *far* perceptions unfolding in super-slow motion in the **Big Mind**. Ideal *close* observation is about presence to the bare (if not vanishing) contents of optimal perception under ideal conditions without too much (if any) preconception, but also requires the right minimal post-conception if anything quantitatively or qualitatively just is to be said or recorded (or even pointed at, perhaps?). It would seem only those concepts or forms of proto conception which minimally colour the perceptual beliefs at hand could ever lead to propositions falling directly to satisfaction as logical truths.

But, in the background we have this worry: Bees (many pollinating insects and birds?) see colours we can't at all or can more finely resolve very fine colour-differences for the same objects we can't. Think of human colour blindness. I had a friend who professed he was colour blind and who "understood" the scientific cause and contexts in which he would mis-perceive but would then argue about what the "real" colour of something was exactly when and where his colour-blindness was admittedly perverting "normal" sight. I also experienced a debate with a naive colour irrealist who without irony agreed we saw and named the same colour on a bar mat *by touching it*, even as he maintained this experience as an irreal one, go figure). Bats may experience visual images structurally ***and possibly to some significant degree*** (granting more evidence to hard-core realists) also phenomenally isomorphic to those produced by seeing with light, but "see" with sound, invoking multiple realizability (I am convinced it is by vibration and sound we more deeply "see" space than by vision. Any audiophile already knows this, tacitly at least). I read that visual acuity in humans peaks at age 10, well before a more mature and sophisticated conceptual toolkit could maximize the ideality of any and all seeing's by sayings.

So, is the notion of ideal perception of reality, granting realism, something intrinsic to reality itself, i.e., does reality impose necessary limits (in the sense of the gap being irreducible) or delimits (in the sense that the gap is always capable of being at least partially closed or crossed, as we assume science

achieves) because those things in it can perceive naively and so veridically as they in fact do more by necessity or contingency? Considering arguments like Nagel's 'what it's like to be bat'³⁴ what it appears to me is ideal perception is some kind of scale-dependent subject-object strange attractor at best, plurally relativized in its objects and idealizations as semantic holism entails; a non-linear fractally resonant tuning of sorts (of entanglement?), but where both subject and object are sender *and* receiver, if only asymmetrically in terms of general intentionality always being the first cause of any and all perceiving's (so always in this sense, subject, not object initiated). Even though perception first emerges and evolves as much over particular fallibility due to contingency yet it may end defined essentially by some universal core of infallibility out of necessity. But, if this isn't the case then there is no such thing as an ideal percept (and worse, maybe nothing of the ideal in reality to perceive at all *except for the unity of an always dualized form of experience*). If reality is actually a totalizable and casually closed and logically commensurate monism, real perception can't be all wrong about what is real, even if there is no absolute access to essence simply because the material mechanisms of perception are functional and only added later as a layer piling up on the very thing we ask all these questions about in terms of a gap; the gap is not just a positive conceptual absence, it is a negative material presence as well because to "see" matter is also to "be" matter (how could the literal matter of some perceiving not get in the way of its own perceiving's, how does a non-conscious perceiving system "know" what matter is its and what is the targets? How do we know, but by touch and normalized forms of imagination?).

So, perception just as likely **both** over-determines **and** under-determines at least some aspects of "reality" *at each and every very same mental event* due to the fact the sensory registration mechanisms it functions over are not obviously implemented in anything close to the way computer operating systems or programs are, where the physical logical-syntactic layer (think "logic gates" as first cell-membrane-embedded data morphism indicators, and only after first minds emerge in animals, as sub-systems made up of neurons) and the symbolic-semantic layer (think "graphical user interface" as perception) are purely separable and only held informationally and semantically together by the derived intentionality of human minds. However (and this is, I believe, a big and largely ignored "however") for the most basic forms of cell-level sensory registration the brute matter of any signal, of some sensory vehicle (typically, a membrane embedded protein and co-factors) and its non-intentional contents (expressed as some kind of lawfully determined, transitory and endlessly recoverable conformal chemical or physical change) are when, respectively, concurrently functioning and set to causing further function equally a seamless part of the same locally totalized and supposedly ontologically monistic stuff, but one already abiding when occurrent in a "special", if ineffable **differance** (meaning there is both a "difference and an endless deferral of meaning"). There is something—*here well before Burge's original intentionality so not a mental state*—that must already materially "pop out" *specially and quantum mechanically* when some successful detection occurs then leading directly to the very fit function it has been (repeatedly) selected for.

In a very real causal-essential sense any occurrently activated *living-body-embedded* channel is more meta-intimately, both causally and materially, entangled **as a sub-microscopic, so quantum system** with

the very matter of its target(s) than it is with any other aspect of its very closely abutting material environment in that moment or event (including all its own remaining “*un-popped-out*” body-matter as determined by the cell wall or membrane). Also, let’s not forget the subsequent “*popping out*” of the material mechanisms causally and lawfully underwriting the passive fit behaviour any indication/sensory registration/detection works to cause against a background of many more possible and relatively independent popping’s out, appearing in metaphor like so many fireflies randomly lighting up in a meadow on a tepidly fecund July night. The forms of matter at hand for achieving bare sensory registration *let alone for full blown perception*, i.e. both the cell’s involved targeting/functional system(s) and its proper target(s) are at any moment of certain indication not ever two wholly discontinuous matter-based systems simply docking like some target/“capsule” to an indicator/“space-station dock”, but realize one intimately *meta-or-supra*-coupled object-event as some singularly telic if not transitory, yet as hard science has so soundly and cogently exposed and described in often stupendous micro-detail, *prototypically real and purely physical, non-intentionality mediated quantum dynamism!*^{NOTE}

NOTE: And these many too mechanistic, too computative-functional metaphors applied at the level of biochemistry are as tainted by a Newtonian view of the cell as *just* a container for functions in some perverse epistemic sympathy with Newtonian models conceiving of the mind as *just* a container for a stream of thoughts or ideas; too mechanistic views of life and mind still abound, despite the endless calls to debunk this impoverished metaphor of reality as *just* a determined but ultimately soulless matter machine.

This kind of barest possible popping out might not yet be analysed out as intentionality-mediated in the technically pure philosophical sense on any local account, but certainly evidences a unique hallmark of vital agency regardless. These original functions of vitality also, then, appear minimally as the categorical base case for an *inductive absurdio reductio of some ethical kind* against Burge’s locus (bees or shrimp) for original intentionality. The question no one seems to ask is how could any phase of life not be also a phase of manifest intentionality, except for the motivating hubris hiding behind the tacit anthropocranialcentrism?.

So, if downstream (and also for this, much more complex) expressed mental representations do somehow (???) achieve a purer ontic distance from their targets in how some fully arbitrary shape is interpreted to mean about that object, and yet the first true representations could only work over data morphisms that are entirely and **only** materially rendered in the same persistent local matter, but by now involving and made over vast collections of cells arranged in a hierarchy of complexifying functional orders (cell, tissue, organ, system, organisms . . .) then this separation must abide in spite of, and not because of the entire and *purely matter-based* system achieving this. Further, these highest level possible, lived mental events, the many rarified *conscious experiences of meaning*, are (but for the scale-

variant meta-structure)^{NOTE} analogously popped out (when occurrent) as their own ontically seamless supra-material object-event trans-scale complexes.

These scale crossing supra poppings out must be **non-arbitrarily** tied to some minimally sufficient set of cellular level functionings, possibly reducing to a single neuron, or even a single functional event in some singular cell. Thus, all we ever have when we consciously or nonconsciously experience meaning through perception is some integrated set of vast numbers of popped out **but seamlessly and specially material** hyper-complex object-events (a supra-material monism of hierarchically collated functional onticity, if you will, but by now counting ontologies as a Derridean would). Yet, if still endorsing physicalism, this, now a full-fledged and fully conscious mental event, is still assumed reducible in final explanation, but for the stupefying complexity involved in doing so, to some singular *originating* functional event, i.e., the one that in fact triggers the “synthesis of perception/conception” to hand (where, one assumes, the concepts have already in the downstream processing been inserted orthogonally from other cellular and biofunctional sources, perhaps arising top down from the mind-brain and by this colliding with the sense data always flooding in bottom up, all so to be sifted out by the right concepts, as the data cascades up in functional level from the cellular to the whole brain and body level, where the experience is finally made wholly manifest; “perception without concepts is blind, conception without perception is empty”, Kant remember who first said that ;).

So, where is the assumed pure separation between sign and signified ever to be found or explained in all of this if mind is just matter? We either assume the concepts are first built on the exact same mechanisms, but then the arbitrariness between sign and signified must enter at the level of sensory registration, or that conception somehow emerges at or even beyond the highest level of consciousness itself. On the first assumption there can be little that is arbitrary in how function maps inputs to outputs and it seems to require an essential core of extremely non-arbitrary “symbol” to meaning mapping to even bootstrap the reliable indications, let alone full-blown conscious experience of representation. On materialist terms assuming this separation as the place to start for materialist semantic theories must either beg this particular gap coming in (which it clearly has in *both* analytical philosophy and cognitive science), or what I have described otherwise begs for the very ontological dualism it professes to deny *on it's own material, but by now: Derridean-counting terms!*

NOTE: A door to warranting Neutral Monism, where matter *differences* lead to mind *differences* over one (one-ness/two-ness) onto-essence as their Janus-faced aspects? Perhaps, but I have deeper reasons for suggesting neutral monism will wrack on the rocks of the same fine point QM has mis-targeted; seeing *without* (in two senses) this point is where we need look next. A door to Panpsychism then? No, because I am arguing that subjectivity does emerge from objectivity, if only in my pre-ontological sense. Instead, I think I've made a case to claim the phenomenal is all in both the special substance and form of things again, but then how this form fills up matter as experience is from **within** not just from *inside*. It is as much due to the “sub-matter” and “trans-matter” of the stuff that gets around, not through the channels. What I am basically and profoundly suggesting here is that more of Being as all dated existences is always leaking in from the degraded infinite of pure quantity into finite quality.

Qualia overflows information channels: it does not flow through them, nor does any sort of computation integrate data and (true)information into experience. Only when something yet to be described tips and open up the space I call **within**, which many would conflate with what ‘inside’ means, do we finally conceive of what we perceive as both walled-off (solipsistic) self-consciousnesses and equally as the unity of *universally shared* and always conceptually borne qualitative experience of this one turn we call *the universe*.

The worse problem for ontological physicalism (but, maybe not for pre-ontological physicalism), if one assumes neurons computing over non-arbitrary neural structure, and not cell membrane detectors account for the required separation between sign and signified that the arbitrariness defining the heart of the symbol grounding problem owes, is premising CTM is then equally *ad hoc* and not justifiable on the same much more empirically close and transparent material terms I have described above. Even if neurons do achieve the necessary separation for realizing original intentionality they can not help but do this in any but an equivalently, if not more meta-complex, non-vanishingly intimate and “popped out” material way, with only the added rider of doing so only up in material scale (so the intentionality is always in the non-local scale-variance as well, not just in some local matter-form variance). Perhaps there is some regression in the sustained intimacy of the material poppings out required due to inevitably going up in material scale from the quantum to the classical scale *and beyond*, but this would seem counter-indicated, as even as perception evolves to cognition so does the phenomenal quality of experience seem to endlessly enrich and expand, especially if one endorses human rationality and self-consciousness as evolution’s greatest products to date.

Debunking Linguistic Arbitrariness

How something can evolve only materially to become both poorer and better at intuiting and discovering hidden causes and effects all the while by losing complete causal and material touch with its objects in their symbolic conceptions is beyond me.

I can’t help but think the very premise of complete arbitrariness in symbol to target relation is overwrought and likely just plain wrong (and so goes hope of defending any conceptually pure **ontological casual closure** of the physical world with this claim; an extreme irony, arguments not included here, but there are a few philosophers already making them). The only causes we will ever find if physicalism is true are just bundles and bundles of complexly arranged and scaled-up functional interactions of—in the final analysis—the same kind of intimately “popped out” material object-events, so simply invoking the problem that now the system of material effect and cause popping out is composed over many and much more complexly ordered levels of cells, tissues, organs, etc., and that as a consequence such systems, as the organisms bearing these novel functions, may access much more

complicated and phenomenally sophisticated material targets in fractal steps of continuous discontinuity in turn (yet psyche was always running through it all in lock-step), but in this never addressing the gaps at all, *just smoothing over them*.

The real problems do not ever seem likely to be solved at one ontological or metaphysical level at all, rather it appears more to me like the problem of universals mixed with the measurement problem in QM, i.e. how can universally shared predication of percepts, those grounding just endorsements of naive perceptual realism, built only by computationally integrating over one, a few, or many certain data morphisms ever arise from the functional popping out of what at their most basic level of material instantiation always start as quantum systems, yet appear to us only naively as middle-scale, i.e. as classical phenomena due to some directly given reality by the very purely separated representations it is only to date an assumption that they've become?

Well, I don't think it works this way at all, of course.

I am arguing this approaches floating a logical impossibility and the reason we still largely believe it is because we are wrong about the proper epistemic target of QM in the quasi-sense I previously argued for. The general natures and endless possibilities of these proposed "poppings out" invoke nothing less than the mystery of what makes any change in essence, let alone just physical change at some fixed or bounded scale, universally possible. Here, in seeing reductionism is flailing, the staunchest of woke physicalists now float a new shameless metaphor: "emergence". But all that term could possibly do is more begging. If in each of the steps, first from non-mind to mind, so from data morphisms to natural information, no pure material separation ever occurs in the systems functioning to realize said states (worse, it seems the matter of system and target become more intimately a seamless material one exactly when functioning occurrently and ideally!) then the proposal of one between sign and signified as fully arbitrary and purely separable seem inconsistent with what naturalism will/should find in the microscopic case of it; the subject-object distinction is at best a regressive negativity not the conceptual positivity so many of our semantic models otherwise assume. At least, it seems very epistemically perverse indeed to be a physicalist and not take to heart the relatively transparent way in which these same metaphysics build a pure conceptual gap in from the start, yet are always surprised they are because of this endlessly re-confronted with dualisms.

Debunking CTM

I think a small step towards an effective argument against the mind in any way being a computer in the way some popularized interpretations of CTM have it (assuming I have failed to take that step yet) concerns the possibility of discerning latency accruing over the evolution of brains, for which I suspect

we might find the latency of perceptive systems either stays relatively fixed over time or improves, and were it to increase would lead to the extinction of those very species in which it had. So, while a mind might lag (and it does with purpose when it makes *far perceptions*, otherwise wrongly named *indirect observations*) I do not think a mind is ever subject to latency in the same way linear computers are. Adding a layer of logic to an otherwise analog device may improve functionality but just as equally introduces latency and other unintended function. Think of the difference in using a remote versus a physical dial to turn up the volume on your TV. Which form depends more on the other, and which has more points of behavioural, physical or logical failure? Worse, this latency can never be re-incorporated into the system as purposeful function; it can only grow without bound (and I have experienced a tremendous increase in perceived effects of adding more and more interrupt calls to operating systems via controls, all in the name of endlessly improving function. As I have experienced it operating systems have gotten worse not better in terms of reliable, stable and predictable function since the high-water mark of Windows XP, SP3).

Much differently in evolution unintended function often serves as fodder for even better meta-function. Consider feathers, first selected for thermal regulation, their suitability for flight is here a spandrel or exaptation. One, however, assumes their more ideal suitability for flight is not just a lucky accident, and feathers would find their way to the sky regardless. Computers never “evolve” like this, they improve only in the annealing of more complex but always radically separate layers, only held together by the derived intentionality of human minds alone. Does evolution ever seem to work like this? No, so why so much faith in CTM as a model of the mind? If the structure of consciousness (assuming it has one) is normally associated only with one-subject-per-one-body objects (or, in the case of multiple personalities or split brains, only one subject at a time) this also assumes a singular nature for what is perceived be taken as an equal but also fully independent totality, but is this not just a lazy inference stopping us from seeing past a psychological need, an original epistemic sin? Is there one reality or many? Maybe the question is not well formed? Is there a layer between matter-as-body and matter-as-(mind-body) (dualism) or none at all (physicalism)? Is it not possible the answer is ‘both’ (and more!) and that it is our belief that we have been doing any deep enough ontological work at all, yet, what is false?

Returning to where truth first meets perception . . .

Once some object or event is fully resolved perceptually under some ideal environmental conditions our perceptual beliefs do seem to fall directly to satisfaction as truth (should we bother to express them all like some child gone mad with naming and sentence games we could experience directly how many there really are) but only if at least one other similarly placed and composed subject confirms the truth of the propositions derived from the different but necessarily perspectively overlapping “other” percept are consistent, so cohere rationally with her own, and are further vetted by the right epistemic and conceptual background conditions as and if required (there is always at least an assumed alphabet and much background “information” in play). What I am explicating on very widely and naively here is actually folk perceptual realism, not a philosophical realism at all. Regardless as to what skepticism

generally or particularly proposes this sort of realism is *prima facie* cogent for being the very basis from which to imagine the skeptical problem in the first place if only because to be a skeptic is to also be a very pessimistic kind of realist about the gap first, but then we could never construct any sound arguments either way as none of this is ever experienced as a deduction, even if CTM is correct; it always remains a direct and naive induction from all the shared aspects of lived experience every person would minimally co-endorse as real (but do we have a useful and incontestable list of these at all, I think not, remembering critically that for most of human history this would include certain knowledge of God's existence through direct "perception" of *his* love).

So, both Skepticism and Realism, naively at least, inherit all the problems of induction, such as never yielding certainty, but that is the only crack a skeptic ever needs, but also the one science needs too. To my thinking the fact that skepticism is a live philosophical concern is just more evidence for naive realism, even if further explication is owed by some specialized method, such as science supposes it achieves best to dispel rather than widen the real gap.

The best naive explanation for the existence of our naive talk of perceptual regularities is realism, but it is still a realism constructed over an appearance-reality gap exactly for the very trivial and general reason that while the epistemic quality of perception in terms of its intimately present intentional targets ("*closest*" possible perceivings in outer scale, time, and space) falls unproblematically to satisfaction by TRUTH in the default cases from whence we begin, this view is not tenable once we are at some obscuring "distance" from some intrinsically and ideally tangible confirmation of the same objects of reference, and here the notion of "tangibility" I am proposing can be direct or indirect thus saving science from concerns that indirect observation is always suspect to over-imaginative metaphysical or inferential abuses. I think indirect observation (when done rationally, i.e., logically) is always direct enough in some way that the very idea of an indirect observation is relatively empty. Rather all this shows is the inferential (and reconstructively casual) pathways connecting the indirectly observable to the directly observable are simply an implicit physical reconstruction of the otherwise possibly-lost-to-specific-epistemic-determination of all the reliable but more contingent causes and intermediate steps evolution (material, biological, and cultural) actually took over time, scale, and space *always still according to its laws.*^{NOTE}

NOTE: So, it may turn out that the reason we can't ever see sub-microscopic things "tangibly" at their own scale (the one right below the scale of first perception) is precisely because at that scale perception simply doesn't (and couldn't ever lawfully or contingently) exist, revisiting an earlier Easter Egg. We can always "tangibly" perceive things too-big-to-take-in-all-at-once-were-they-literally-right-in-front-of-us (such as the moon) because perception already exists up and across the physical scales involved (but for needing more distance between perceiver and object for taking in wholes as the scales increase without bound, or instruments to reduce the effects of these distances, which become unimaginable very quickly in the way Descartes leveraged the chiliagon) but maybe this capability to more effortlessly see up or across scale rather than down it is much more due to the effects of cognition and conception than we suppose? When I look at an LCD computer screen and see my friend *right in front on me* on Skype I am, of course, completely deluded but for the preconception, pre-experience and

remembering I bring to bare; all I am “really” seeing *closely* is a continuous and dynamic field of discrete surface colour patches integrated to the limits of my naive visual ability to resolve the proximal source back through its interloping distal bits, somewhat improbably but with fully derived intentionality made isomorphic to what my friend’s facing camera surface captures (with many computational and purely physically caused steps in between, of course, always constrained by what Shannon first described). Perhaps the lowest scales of a more fully non-cognitive perceiving are the only thing the real is ever directly seen by and as, but then reality’s very own reduction basis is “un-real” simply because perception can not exist at that scale at all to make it appear as the “real” in the first place. Then in some existential bookending, at the *farthest* reaches up in universal space-time-scale reality becomes the “un-real” again in some obverse mixed asymmetry/symmetry (perhaps over some kind of complex and paradoxical wrapping around of the abstract back to the concrete *in some self-interfering materio-absentia*) as what we can only conceive of at a very *far* or near-infinite “distance” and so could never be perceived tangibly and positively at some *close* or finite “distance”. Object-events like unicorns, lies, and sociopath detectives and all other cases of *missed*-representation (never ***misrepresentations***) are actually “perceived” beyond any finite tangibility by “seeing” them through the borrowed and finitely *closer* things by which we may conceive of them by their material effigies but will never touch them as real substance by their own matter.

In analogy to how historians mark the start of history with written texts, I suggest—in a very profound way for which the deepest entailments are likely to be missed for most—the only useful philosophical notion of “reality” is “all that only begins with and is given to tangible perception with some finite *closeness* or *farness* that is physically caused and bounded by scale-space-time both over and as gap, where tangible perception now consists of both direct and indirect perception as the same phenomena but for the *closeness* or *farness* of the objects perceived (and where “distance” is differently realized over time, space, or most importantly, scale, but ultimately according to the dictates of GR as some transcendently meta-real configuration space, some block universe). The *proper* ontological question immediately arising with this conception of “reality” is dual: what comes *pre-ontologically* before reality, and what comes *post-ontologically* after it? The second question is really a “pre-ontological” question too, of course, but meaning “after” material reality, not “before” it, but as my metaphysic is open ended each post-reality is always *pre* the next one up the spiral. This view also entails unreal things still might “exist”, but could only exist at infinite “distances”, so can never be “touched”, at least not from *inside* this version of reality, but maybe still from ***within*** it (the case of virtual images caused by convex images, then, is a literal case of seeing into the real infinite as the intangibly finite, as are all dreams, illusions, delusions and hallucinations or other “false” visions).

That there are deeper skeptical and rational reasons from the contents of science or philosophy to push this gap open wider, even to the point reality is torn apart into an insurmountably pure epistemic rending of Yin and Yang over which the very possibility of perception is warded off, seems moot. Isn’t atomic theory not the confirmation there is at least a scale-variant solution of some great if not ultimately limited utility to the appearance-reality gap, so also showing the means of its material instantiation and causes, and that we are continuing to and have already done much to lay both its

material and psychological nature bare? Aren't competent and well vetted scientists of all kinds exposing the gap's very structure every single new day? The foundational warrant of skeptics does not seem to me to be what makes the gap, but only puts a crowbar in it and starts prying, but aren't scientists just doing the same thing, only with more gentle epistemic optimism for finding hidden structure and being? And finally, isn't the solid core of negative results from science, in lately motivating further hope for a renewed and expanded revolution in science, in a sense, also the data for the proposed "final" solution to come and, **if and when such a revolution occurs**, would this outcome *not also offer further* proof of this gap, if only by finally closing, or better: **unwinding** it with radically different kinds of yet to be determined in character knowings?

If so, shouldn't the *practical skepticism* required to promote something more substantively knock-down against what experience already trivially "proves", i.e., by illusions, hallucinations, peak experiences, drug induced states. lying, etc. be skeptical about science and the rationality of those practising or (sadly at many instances, unreflectively) endorsing its claims most of all? Of course, that is simply the right epistemic attitude to have about all the contents of science as they endlessly risk disconfirmation or revision (and on the surface at least these seem very revisionist times, especially in any inductive or social science making "certain" claims about anything deemed to have a mind or be alive) or corruption by irrationality such as clear cases of implicit bias, or worse, malicious forging of bias-confirming data show, historically seen all too frequently. Or perhaps we simply lack an evolved enough conceptual sophistication, or ability to ever access the required observational methods (The problem of Maslow's Hammer).

It follows that rational science, not realism *ought* to be the proper target of skepticism. If anyone were actually rational in the way science works at it ideally this should also compel everyone practising it or leveraging its facts to be most skeptical of one's own beliefs more so than any others, especially given all the evidence of how deeply biases are ingrained in everyone as shown very widely and deeply lately by empirical science and I'd have to think naive experience has always shown equally. No one should feel the value of the referential thrust of skepticism more than when it is aimed at one's own contents, but this leads to a psyche-antagonizing form of "self"-denial by the immediate and inevitably regressive loss of "self"-esteem likely to follow (think of semantic webs—personal or generationally conventionalized—always at best half horse effigies, half unicorn effigies, but always "felt" as only about horses) and so is largely a psyche-"logical" non-starter. Doubting oneself too justly in the sense reason shows it is actually **most logically** owed destabilizes the core bio-cultural function of the ego; to provide a damped down unity of experience for any accidentally occurring "conscious-body-ness" as a ward against the over-knowing chaos of the unrequited Logos. That way lies "individual" madness by depthless epistemic self-persecution, better to be a realist who is right about realism, but otherwise gets all the facts wrong (and not just because there turns out to be no facts, but somehow in spite of this). Maybe only a naive realist can truly plumb the depths of the irrational without loss of identity?

More Irreal Flies in the Realism Ointment: Illusions and Hallucinations

The problems barely addressed above in regard to perceptual belief start in terrifying earnest in cases of illusion or hallucination. We are realists, so illusions and hallucinations are real things, we trust reports of those bearing such percepts if they are otherwise in control of their rationality, if not their lucidity. They are real gap indicators at the most compelling skeptical level, that of brains in vats³⁵. Perhaps you had taken LSD and are simply hallucinating a cat (but maybe not the mat, although it pulses in distorted shapes and flashes colours like no mat ever “really” does, yet it is still true you are really seeing a mat, just far from ideally, or if some are correct, more ideally for revealing its truer not-ever-static-but-still-circumscribable fractal essence). Here many aspects of your otherwise cogent belief ‘something is wrong with that mat’ can never be satisfied as facts, yet in all three cases (direct sensation, belief, and non-veridical but otherwise stable “perception”) the direction of intentional fit is mind-to-world. What differs in these cases is the even finer nature and source of causation. When you really see a cat it is the cat that causes you to see it—on the general and popular causal-semantic accounts I am endorsing as part of the project of naturalism. Here the *direction of causal fit* is almost all world-to-mind. In the case where you are wrong about there being a cat there is still something real and outside of you causing you to misrepresent a cat, but while the mental state representing what you see is still caused by what you only thought was a cat, the error, the failure to satisfy the propositional claim as true occurs due to a false interpreting of your raw perceptual (possibly phenomenal) data, so while you saw and reported what you saw truthfully, in generating the mental state you used to report what you saw, unbeknownst to you, you have invisibly slipped from making statements about what you perceive to beliefs about what you’ve conceived, although still justly taken from your direct and *close* perception, but now with both outer and inner sources intractably mixed. Still, the root cause of these satisfied and unsatisfiable perceptual truths is the same fact there is *something* on the mat.

However, in the third set of cases it is completely unclear as to what the cause of hallucinating a cat, perhaps with one’s eyes closed, actually is, although memory must play a role, and some sort of conceptual or physiological error as well, but not one caused primarily by any real object fully outside of you. Here the direction of causation is very mixed, a bit from the perceptual data as there is always some perceptual data getting through even when hallucinating, but more is coming from the conceptual data being corrupted by the effects of the LSD (or Schizophrenia or *psychosis*, if you believe this is just due to pathology) so these cases can not be treated as simply or wholly world-to-mind as Searle marks the sharp distinction as it really matters here whether physicalism is true if we are to say. So, it may be in these mixed (mind & world)-to-mind cases they reduce to just world-to-mind causes because the mind is just a part of the world at the same ontological level, but equally it might not be so. If not, to make any assumptions opaquely for the special case of hallucination is to flout Occam’s razor invisibly. Mark this point, we will return to it with great import for defending the main thesis.

Thankfully I will not have to address cases of illusion or hallucination at all beyond this, but to help define the fuller scope of differing demands on SATISFACTION CONDITIONS. The only points you need to take away from this as we move forward are:

In cases of direct (*close*, in my special sense) live perception involving more than one reliable and sincere subject perceptual mental states made into propositions under ideal perceptual circumstances (with minimal conceptual pre-or-post conditioning) fall unproblematically to *naïve* truth satisfaction if they are self-conscious. I call such mental states “*closest*”, in the sense that they are as close to their “true” targets as seems possible.

In cases of indirect or inner “perception”, which always involves memory and interpretive conception, because there is no direct way to confirm truth by *close* and near-identical perspectival social fiat (due to the purer subjective origins of the “truth” claims now invoked differently, or limitations in accessing the measuring equipment or background knowledge required to understand what is being observed and measured) we can not assume the same collapse of satisfaction conditions ever apply as naively, and perhaps are not ever “rationally” applicable in this way at all (so there is a kind of logical truth very close to first perception, and another on the other side of first conscious conception, but never the twain shall meet). The fully negative case has not been made yet, but we’ve been introduced to Frege’s problem as the general base case, which if no solution to it is ever found supports the negative case should epistemically serve as a generally positive but countering meta-induction, if only—as *always*—in the probably true sense (when you have eliminated the *logically* possible all that remains is the *non-physical* “truth” of unmediated experience).

When I attempt to demarcate science analogically as an ideal form of communication made from (nature to minds (back to nature (to minds (back to nature (to minds . . . I will only need deal with the analysis of belief in intensional and indirect cases otherwise having clear and reliable *original* perceptual causes, so just “indirect perceptual beliefs” or “indirect phenomenal beliefs” if you will. Cases where intensionality blocks logical analysis will all be resolved as a matter of normal course by methodological design, except for those informal cases involving reports for which the methods of science and honesty are not currently sufficient, and where matters of trustworthiness and interpretive competency feature more prominently (think: the legal process and testimony, where lying is always in play, and so truth is often more a matter of superficial fashion than just(ice’s) form). Again, in more strictly formal epistemic situations I am equally including scientifically verified reports of unobservables by indirect observation as belonging to the same prohibitively novel class as indirect percepts. It is assumed here lying is less of a concern as the method in play, the scientific one, is meant to weed out lying as part of its methods in much the same way it goes about weeding out falsehoods, yet . . . ? What both cases invoke are situations where we can, especially if we assume relative ethical and psychological infallibility *always* attribute the originating cause as unproblematically due to some *close* enough experience involving the real physical objects believed about as the *original* distal cause, but where the renewing *proximal* cause is willed recall or inference (likely some combination of both). If we assume all involved memories and

concepts used were themselves once veridically caused and they then owe their contents to something of the essence of the things so represented, but are now only “re-perceived” at some inner “distance” the naive view is we can always retrieve this content veridically *as if the very targets of the representations were still in front of us* (or for indirect observation over scale in science *as if they were in front of us indirectly for the first time, or again*) except for the dated space-time or scale differences, these many different indexings (yet another *difference?*).

So, I am also assuming infallible memory recall in what is to come. This is not a problem as the fact memory is actually fallible and often constructed over biases actually helps the “garbage-in” side of my widest polemic “argument”, so by only assuming cases where the propositional contents of memory retrieval are always satisfiable as true I have made my and your job easier. However, if I can win the neat case, I’ve won the messy case too. Besides all non-veridical cases, insincere, and other pathologically caused cases can be similarly excluded as well (as more obvious “garbage-outs”). I am simply circumscribing a narrow sort of simple cases that may not be cases of ideal *closely* derived and live mental states at all but owe their subsequent reiteration in representation only and tractably to being caused, both diachronically and synchronically by what these now relatively *farther* but once very *closely* caused states identically refer to. I suppose I am describing some kind of naive empiricism of basic ideas here, but not to further any sort of logical positivism or epistemic foundationalism, although I may be carving out the same entailments in kind (my larger and more diffused point *lying about all over this work* is if there are any epistemic bases at all they are paradoxical at their many inner and outer fractal edges, and that no logic may cover them all; but they cover all logics). I am largely concerned only with the cases (‘Here is one hand, here is another’³⁶) most resistant to skeptical claims involved in variously acquiring, confirming, storing, and then retrieving the sorts of objective facts that science produces in the ideal, but am now also treating many cases of indirect observation (scale-variant) as equivalent to those involving just recall (space-time variant). Each are equivalently not *close*, but *far* mental states in the same way that is critical to arguments to come.^{NOTE}

NOTE: So, perhaps I am meaning to argue memory is also a form of indirect re-observation (which I think is right), but one made inside (and **within**), not outside. This is especially true if time and scale are as ontically entangled as scale-time/time-scale as space and time have also been shown to be (so space-time-scale is a Derridean numbered objective trinity, a 3 one-ness and/or a one 3-ness), like mind-body (a 2 one-ness and/or a one 2-ness), which I believe but will not argue for in this work, except peripherally. What will ultimately set belief recall apart from perception and scale-variant indirect observation will turn precisely on what facilitates science in achieving the generally superior form of rationality it claims for its methods and contents; one I intend to show is very far from ideally realized due to it lately being motivated more by irrational ends in many of its current projects, despite its very many rational means (instrumental reason). If I can show even the most rational and properly vetted and competent scientist may inevitably be collapsing type two (unicorn) mental states to the satisfaction conditions of type one (horse) mental states in essentially the same way as the more obviously ignorant do (such as those that, somewhat correctly, believe $E=mc^2$ is true, but can’t at all say why, so are at best aping a meme and certainly not communicating any fact they understand *deeply*) then the contingent, but possibly necessary impossibility of

purely separating the rational from the irrational is shown, at least inductively in terms of current normalized use of instrumental reason, as more wishful thinking called reason but still just misplaced faith. By this I can define the scope of the garbage-in/garbage-out problem quite broadly, so also worsening the *demarcation problem* in philosophy of science (even though in other guises I mean to sharpen the very line of demarcation as a uniquely rational, if not fully realized in the ideal, yet, form of communication).

And Now . . . Back to Searle

We can now look at how Searle's asymmetric notion of causal direction-of-fit versus intentional direction-of-fit inverts when one considers speech acts.

Unlike making a statement, for which it falls to the world as it is in itself right now (or then, being realists about the past, epistemically speaking) as to whether allow the statement's content deemed true or false, and remembering at the lower level of perceptual/phenomenal belief that although we may reasonably allow (at least some if not many of) the entailed propositional claims caused by direct experience to be directly satisfied as truths, we must keep in mind the uncertainty as to whether the methods by which such truths are satisfied are epistemo-*logical* at all, so they may not be truths at all, maybe just *proto-truths*, or something not to be called true at all. When we perform a speech act we are asking more of the world than it just confirm the truth we have represented passively. We are "asking", "hoping", "demanding", "commanding", "judging", "desiring" or as in the most culturally rarefied speech acts directly "pronouncing" (as Captain Picard often exhorts, we '*Make it so!*') that the world become something in exactly the way the propositions represent it, where we are motivated concomitantly by sometimes very opaque biological and/or psychological need (so already possibly embodying psychological terms in a circular way as physical terms, or otherwise being irrational).

None-the-less, while the satisfaction of many speech acts necessarily lags their production other more rarefied kinds of satisfaction occur precisely when their most finely made and specifically "activating" pronouncements are made in the right finely specific context, such as for marriage, knighting or convocation (forms of wishful magic all of them, but with less profuse bloodlettings than those otherwise making non-kin into kin). I will often focus on the term desire as a placeholder for all other kinds of speech acts, but we should remember there is a minimally bio-*logical* sense in play when it comes to causal-semantic theories whereby desires need not be speech acts at all. DESIRE is most often forwarded in naturalistic semantic theories, typically as part of some kind of belief-desire or *proto*-belief-desire complex, as more basic than other intentional states, i.e., those entailing further and more sophisticated goal-directed action as part of their satisfaction conditions other than just representing essential need as ends for some function that has evolved around it *like a pearl built up in layers around the irritant's absence instead of its presence*. The more rarefied the speech act the less the regard for

impossibility, let alone plausibility or *sustainability*; this is not so for the most basic or *original* biological desire. If I desire X in the barest biological sense, first: I really *need* it, not just *want* it, it is natural to assume X already exists, and I will find it as a matter of course (and so, I do not require creating it or some collective means of production of it from scratch using imagination and social power). This is especially true of externalist theories that are more purely causal-semantic on the way to couching original intentionality in evolutionary terms. In these theories something other than a human being is the more likely prototype or archetype of the first biologically situated or embodied mind; it is the first organism to perceive an other by that other's real properties and substance, or by realizing some minimal "intentional" orientation towards it by some fitness conferring function in a fashion that goes beyond mechanical "sensation" (where the less equivocal and preferred coining is 'sensory registration', always "just" a data encoding).

First perception is also parsimoniously supposed in some non-trivial way causally underwritten by such *as-if* complexes already operating at a non-intentional level, where here literal beliefs and desires are not represented as such, but simply that certain bio-functional satisfaction conditions begin to look something like what the downstream satisfaction of explicitly represented belief-desire complexes accomplish more explicitly, if not more consciously, only much later in evolution. The bridging from non-intentional to intentional is accomplished by recasting desires first in terms of bio-material need, but where the need is never mentally represented first, so is purely *as-if* functional need, except maybe in the required vanishing psychological sense by equating an empty input with "needing", an empty output with "desiring" and the associated function as "believing" *in name only*. The grounding/bridging idea is then first warranted in *prima facie* and *sin quo non* terms so not in this step explaining how the function came to be at all as actual material structure. How does nature cause biological functions to be?

Answering this question suggests there are always at least two epistemic aspects of causation in play when dealing with functions. The first aspect of causation is called the function's *triggering cause* (which may be equated with what "fits" the input trigger as the most proximal cause of "need-fulfillment") the second the function's *structuring cause* (which may be equated with the "desire" the function embodies, where the causes here are all those in the story of how the function evolved to take the material form it did, and also to account for how that form is what makes it function so). In a function evolving into material being around some found need, so fulfilling that need as a materially structured analog of desire, the two causes in play could only be brought together if there is some further analogical ascribing, perhaps only to nature as a whole due to what its laws allow but do not necessarily require, i.e. an implicit form of material *proto*-believing driving the whole process; from synchronic need to diachronic material encapsulation of desire, with proto-belief as biological telos covering the orthogonal gap between structuring and triggering causes ("believing" works to take organisms from selective causes structured diachronically to the existence by discovery or creation of what is desired at some future time synchronically, but only when the right data and information is made available and encoded in some non-trivial, if not intentionality-mediated way first, *in the genome and developmental machinery at hand!*).

So, the chain of materialist/functionalist/naturalist inference largely first passes through BIOLOGICAL NEED (which already assumes conceptual realism about LIFE, i.e. that LIFE represents an ontically distinct but profound sub-category of existence, one for which an unequivocal intension is still owed unless you are satisfied by my or other accounts) to implicit representation of goals as a form of agency that could only be facilitated by first exhibiting a behaviourally “willed attention” to (hopefully the right) mind-independent objects in the environment in terms of these objects serving as affordances correlating very reliably ($P \sim 1$) with either promoting needs or avoiding “anti-needs”, with the bulk of the sensible environment being largely neutrally attended to (if it weren’t how could percepts based on need ever pop out at all as every signal would end up in harried agency offering little possibility of any rest or regeneration).^{NOTE}

NOTE: Simple organisms surely do not choose their resting places largely for positive reasons to start, only negative ones when *as-if* needs are momentarily assuaged bio-mechanically, as are *as-if* desires; in these interstitial moments living things simply abide as life, as the Dude in *The Big Lebowski* always aims to, but is also largely thwarted at achieving (the pure abiding, that is).

If this is not yet another fine localizing and *close* structural description of a currently favoured prohibitive solution to the mind-body interaction problem, it is nothing at all.

To return to the main sub-topic: I will also, very thankfully, largely not have to deal in much detail with the most rarefied forms of speech acts in terms of all the material pre-or-post-causal requirements owed to their basic possibility of being satisfied or satisfiable, exactly those most like marriage or any other normatively and administratively ordained pronouncement of some new “fact” belonging to the world. Here the facts and norms invoked are almost purely cultural, so as for money are more sustained by abstract absences than concrete presences. In practice, unlike how horse effigies fall only to horses, these many unicorn-like effigies also fall, somewhat magically, to triggering further material consequences that deliberately resist any by fiat dissolution of the effected outcomes through lying-in-wait extrinsic and often negative social consequences, for example, exactly when one’s desire in regard to “being married” is it now not be the case.^{NOTE}

NOTE: What I am getting at here is in spite of the fact that when one gets married nothing essential seems to change materially inside a person making their being married materially “proved”, other than by them voluntarily participating in (and so “re-proving” in turn, the very virtual legitimacy of) all the institutional, administrative, and social pre-requirements and built-in consequences only triggered by BEING MARRIED that must minimally supervene on GETTING MARRIED, *that the state of being married is materially meaningless* unless the state of being naturally “single” is not first assumed as the ground facilitating the very possibility (so the problem of

identity and of persons bites hard here as well). Yet, no one can declare themselves unmarried as easily as another special agent has been licensed to declare them married in the “right” context, i.e., you can’t become single again by such easy fiat in spite of the fact that other than aging one is assumed materially equivalent or numerically self-identical as that original “singularity” throughout, so is in this sense always materially “single” even when married. So, of course (and because marriage depends as much on the possibility of DIVORCE -> BEING SINGLE AGAIN) becoming unmarried requires the removal of all the legal, social, and administrative entailments by some—ultimately equally virtual but different—outside fiat once again; the debt owed is a debt to the failed lasting *faith* in the assumed ideal purpose of the institutions involved, not reason at all. There are, of course, many reasons to think marriage is a big lie derived from the notion women are property (or worse, an economic burden), with the disavowed but maybe well motivated intention of marriage aiming to put a damper on the natural unchained promiscuity of pre-cultural human beings as primates first, which may not be a bad thing to aim to do, but I think would be better to do without the need to leverage such one-sided myths, just accepting hard truths of the core ugly aspects of our biological natures, which if they are irreducible are none-the-less able to be transcended by promoting more honest forms of value, such as one hopes the #metoo/explicit-consent-movement is about, but I seriously doubt is the case, or will ever achieve without input from the wisdom of elders (whom seem largely shut out of these debates, one assumes for being assumed sexually decrepit).

Money as Real Absence – The “Marriage” of Value to Everything as Nothing at All

The situation is very similar with money, which few appreciate only bears an ontic positivity (besides the trivial material basis of its many arbitrary types and tokens and less trivially constructed institutions) as a debt mitigator that can only really be used to “cancel” another debt due to a third party (exactly as subtracting a negative number from itself always does, returning it to zero, to a real “nothing”). So “real” money, like marriage, has always been an absence, a negativity, more a representation of abstract faith than of concrete reason, although one mitigating against other absences of its own kind positively in its most fundamental agency (which is not what most people take as the essence of money’s agency, which is otherwise believed in only as a “green lie”). The holding of any paper, metal, or digital type of money is only a holding on to tokens of representation, not what is represented. The real target is just some non-local general equivalent of EXCHANGE VALUE. Money only creates the naive illusion it literally buys things exactly because its intrinsic value is deemed identical to the things it buys *by some wide and inclusive enough mental fiat*, with this illusion only sustained due to the tacit and largely superficial faith that endless reliable satisfaction of all the present and historical speech acts (and supporting material institutions) by which this illusion was first made “real” may continue to persist.

So, while many believe the economy and money needs to persist in its current forms as some kind of concrete necessity, this is just an irrationally disguised want, so a value masquerading as fact. In a quick look ahead I would be remiss in not pointing out while the real *objectively factual* “costs” of any object’s production belongs first to the evolution of the entire universe and then to literal animal or machine

power, time, and energy consumption, we often—in determining value—treat many of the riches of nature as if they have no cost of production at all (who pays for all the oxygen?) as if anything lying around is just there for us to transform and consume *naturally* (where here ‘naturally’ means with some causal necessity, ‘man is the measure of all things’ is true, right?) without needing any justification at all; human desire often has no reasons of its own but that ‘desire is, and must always be satisfiable and satisfied’.

The many people who lately rail with deep concern against mounting global debt load seem very confused to me. How else, given money is something owed and negative at its heart, do we expect people to get wealthier but by growing the debt in proportion to the number of people we expect to be enriched with unbounded stuffs through the economic system’s current means in furthering superficial wants as if they were deep needs? What we metaphorically seek to avoid in our concerns about our share of the debt load, even though most can’t express this at all, is that those at the bottom (top?) with the most at hand (and defensible) material and virtual combined wealth not itself built on debt directly owed to other people don’t rise up and demand full payment of the remaining debts all at once, as this would expose the rotten negative core of the whole enterprise and like pulling on a rope tied with a series of false knots, the whole chain of entitlements simply vanishes as does all the virtual wealth representation. Worse still, in this case the “rope” regressively disappears as well (as inflation drives paper money towards valuelessness, and food and water—and at some point access to untainted atmospheric oxygen—take over again as the real commodities of irreducible material value in whatever culture survives as the “truest” general equivalents for VALUE life will ever know).

This problem has been only very recently exacerbated as at one time all this debt was tied up (as an intentional form of material insurance against all debt) in a material general equivalent, i.e. the gold standard, but as the amount of gold is finite so too is our ability to shore up global debt anymore on any material basis as inevitably what all the gold was shown to amount to in relative worth in terms of concrete utility could no longer cover all the absolute debt it represented, so it became rational—in that moment at least—to throw away one irrationality at least, i.e. the idea such debt could ever be so “insured” materially at all. Bitcoin, which in some minds is meant to solve this problem, as well as minimizing corruption due to “hiding the real books” and minimizing the imposition of unjust costs on wealth transfer is by some deemed the most fit virtual general equivalent to replace gold (one can argue it took off only because the gold standard had already been abandoned before bitcoin was created, leaving a material vacuum that amounted to creating an unsustainable economic idealism less stable than the still unstable one we now have). This hope for bitcoin unfortunately is not likely to be fulfilled as its actual intrinsic material value is ultimately tied to the (troubling amounts of otherwise purposeless use of) energy required to mine new coins, at least until all coins are mined (then back to the ‘if wealth is too increase so must the hidden *material* debt problem’). Suitable candidates for general equivalents always have both wide (normalized) intrinsic and extrinsic value, which is what makes them suitable for becoming more *generally equivalent* to all other things at their level of imagined agency by ensuring

exchange value is held relatively constant across all exchanges, states and currencies, but for allowing the necessary margins for endless profit taking.

In other words, without a monetary general equivalent of VALUE it is impossible to say what a pig is worth in any consistent way such that anyone would be willing to accept an intrinsically much less valuable placeholder for it, let alone be willing to blindly exchange it for just an inedible debt-cancelling-token, which is what really happens when one buys things with bits or cash. Once all the bitcoin is mined and assuming bitcoin becomes the actual or *de facto* general equivalent of money, sooner or later (no, I think just sooner actually) new debt-based “revenue” streams will likely still have to be endlessly created to keep the economy going firm in its assumption that infinite growth is possible (cough). But, sooner or later (so, also sooner) these methods all “bank” on being able to extract more energy and substance from the natural world in ways I fear have already gone well beyond the carrying capacity of the Earth, driven, I think, by our increasingly narrow notion of value as only that which is quantifiable (can you see the sub-metaphorical metaphysical justifications that could only be due to a false promotion, or at least a wildly premature and unwarranted promotion of physicalism and logicism yet??? No, OK, then can you see the problem of trying to render an idealistic end by only physicalist means?). ***Caveat emptor***, more literally than ever, but now in the general, not particular sense.

Wrapping Up Things with Searle Ribbons and Austen Bows

Searle talks about both *word-to-world* and *mind-to-world* fit, but I will argue these can be reduced to identity, if only in the switch from particular/simple to general/complex cases. With marriage the way the words ‘I pronounce you married’ are used entail a word-to-world direction of fit with the satisfaction conditions simultaneously realized entailing one is materially, or “in fact” married exactly as these words are spoken in the right contexts (and with the prior ‘I do’s’, completed paper traces, and the absences of ‘I object’ already in place, of course—see—marriage is very complicated for such a simple final act of satisfaction, it is very historically back-loaded in its structuring causes). This (minimally) worded act falls through as part of one larger properly vetted and licensed mind-to-world direction-of-fit as a triggering cause, but only over and assuming the existence of many other institutions invoking a web of further mixed world-to-mind, world-to-world and mind-to-world relations (again, with many of theses future-looking in a negative sort of consequence sense; the endless reactivity of systems is always very good for business) as parts of the proper structuring cause. So, we might say in the cases where institutions are involved to “back up” speech acts we have a ***mixed minds-to-world and subworld-to-world directions of fit***. In cases of speech acts involving only one subject this is still nomologically speaking (to keep things as simple as possible but recognizing under the hood it is much more complicated) just mainly a mind-to-world direction of fit, but one incurring both the intentionality of many other mental ***and*** physical

states. One also hopes most (if not all) of the involved speech acts are truthfully made, and where the facts really matter, that the statements made are all true as well.^{NOTE}

NOTE: It is important to note here there may always be, actually—must be—a non-vanishing intention to bring about the satisfaction conditions in action, but not necessarily in a way actually matching one's truthful (*not* true) desires at all; this is of course a form of being of insincere about one's real motivations, just another instance of the unbounded ways in which people lie without calling what they do lying (and often the starting point of "white-lying"). There is an analogous but own-level meta-similarity between propositional attitudes and culturally embedded speech acts in terms of speech acts bearing their own level of intensionality-like meaning opaqueness. It seems were Lois Lane to marry Superman not only might she believe *that* she is not married to Clark Kent but she may not even be able to be right about why Superman has married her and only quasi right in believing *that* "he" wanted to. It also seems she at best only loves $\frac{1}{2}$ the man she married and possibly in only " $\frac{1}{2}$ " the way she thought for the "half" she does love "rationally", although which parts she loves rationally and which parts she loves irrationally, and of what she believes she does so authentically is very hard to say *unless we allow paradoxically chained forms of Derridean counting of whole same-different objects or persons instead*.

Because I do not need to deal with these kinds of very complex and instantaneously satisfied speech acts directly again and granted but for the switch from particularly local to generally plural and non-local cases *that word-to-mind direction of fit be taken as identical to mind-to-word direction of fit*, if only as an open premise line. Only now our borrowed tool kit is full and ready for further use but for restating the key differences between statements, unproblematically sensory/perception-derived beliefs owed naive truth-based satisfaction conditions, and most (all?) speech acts.

That is the *prima facie* fact that:

1. "Leaving out the various qualifications we might summarize this brief preliminary account of intentionality by saying that the key to understanding representation is conditions of satisfaction. Every intentional state with a direction of fit is a representation of its conditions of satisfaction."²⁹, p. 13
2. For statements and beliefs the required fit in terms of the satisfaction of intentional states is from the world to the mind, where, in Searle's own words,

'Intuitively we might say the idea of direction of fit is that of responsibility for fitting'.²⁹, p. 7

In terms of what causes the statements and the veridical intentional states bearing them, we assume an intuitively prior responsibility going from the world to mind first. So, for statements and beliefs causes are (mostly for my central concern) world-to-mind, while the satisfaction of them requires the world fit these proposition, hence the causal fit is inverse to the intentional fit. The situation is intuitively

reversed for speech acts. Consider the basic sort of needs and derived desires that will be our subsequent focus. Here for the content of a desire to be satisfied the direction of intentional fit is reversed. If the desire is to be satisfied the world must come to fit the mind, so the intentional direction of fit is from the mind to the world. But the causal fit is then reversed as well. The intentional states by which desires are proposed must also be the source of further and often wider intentional agency such that the represented desire is caused to effect the intention's represented satisfaction conditions (by instantiating all the material targets of the contents in the right relations) be made real in the world. The causal direction of fit is then, for satisfaction of speech acts, from the world to the mind, as it is the world itself that must change to cause satisfaction of these intentional states, facts be damned.

"If the statement is not true, it is the statement which is at fault, not the world; if the order is disobeyed or the promise broken it is not the order or promise which is at fault, but the world in the person of the disobeyer of the order or the breaker of the promise. If the statement is false, it is the fault of the statement (word-to-world direction of fit). If the promise is broken, it is the fault of the promiser (world-to-word direction of fit)." ²⁹, p. 7

3. There is often (always?) an inverse relation between the direct of causation and the direction of fit.

"In each case, cause and effect are related as intentional presentation and conditions of satisfaction. Direction of fit and direction of causation are asymmetrical. Where the direction of causation is world-to-mind, as in the case of perception, the direction of fit is mind-to-world; and where the direction of causation is mind-to-world, as in the case of action, the direction of fit is world-to-mind." ²⁹, p. 122

So, we could just as easily take Searle's conceptions and use them to define an essential difference between propositions and speech acts, which is what I will do to make the case if economic theory is a science it is not one essentially identical to any other well-enough demarcated physical science at all.

A final bit of sage advice from Searle before we move on:

"If my beliefs turn out to be wrong, it is my beliefs and not the world which is at fault, as is shown by the fact that I can correct the situation simply by changing my beliefs." ²⁹, p. 8

I doubt Searle could have easily defended the naked value of this epistemically idealized practice in the age of social media; once again we should rue not only the way Socrates died, but why he died (is the current core of Western epistemic malaise not owed to this event in perpetuity?).

Chapter 6 - Baby Steps Forward: Applying And Extending The Tool Kit

A Final Structural Account of Norms: Gender and Sex

To complete the minimal conceptual tool kit required to narrow in on some more purely analytic version in defence of my main thesis, to grant some fine logical and evidential specificity to rationality's wide and perhaps very deep garbage-in-garbage-out problem as I hope to communicate it to you (even if only by opening just one of the required channels) I must also provide a prohibitive structural account of cultural "norms". I use scare quotes here only to indicate that I will still be speaking mainly about satisfaction conditions, so working in a domain of objects and relations both less than and greater than norms or 'normal' understood in the most basic informal sense. I begin with the sorts of irreducible *original* norms Burge invokes in his theory of perception, and end at stereotypes and other normative webs or other more complex structures (like theories and models, and finally, entire ideologies). I suppose I am likely to step on the toes of many social scientists as well as normative ethics philosophers; this is not only not my area of "expertise" (self-derision) it is an area of philosophy I typically avoided exactly because it is too messy and difficult; I picked philosophy of mind because at least the harder problems are relatively easy to define, and it is harder to be deemed insane in one's pronouncements as no one really knows what they are talking about when they speak of consciousness and the mind. Yet, every boob thinks they know what norms we all should be following, which entails they must also know what those "fact-norms" are (I hope to dissuade some philosophers, but as boobs, louts, ignoramuses et. al. are defined by their recalcitrance most of all, I mostly defer to their nonsense if only to back away less slowly).

I did some minimal research as well as taking the requisite course in my undergrad studies, so here I may be too much on the superficial mark to mean much very well analytically, but as that is not the only satisfaction condition I have proposed for understanding *my* meanings I hope for some fair non-divide-and-conquer use of charity here. One important thing my cursory reading did show me there is an opposed starting point between how social scientists and philosophers ontically preconceive norms. The social scientists assume they are exogenous, the philosophers think they are endogenous, which explains why ridiculous claims like 'gender is "just" a social construct' can even get started and perpetuated as a meme amongst the otherwise most biologically ignorant but "socially affluent" ideologues^{NOTE}. I guess it sometimes helps to be completely ignorant of biological science (and math,

NOTE: Also, to my thinking, but for the fancy replacement of the words 'internal' and 'external' (cat calling the dog a sociopath) this difference between social scientists and philosophers appears as some in place cross-discipline recapitulation to the Internalism/Externalism debate, but that is probably wrong too.

so many mathematical illiterates out there still using logic well . . . somehow?) to even become such a vapid social “scientist” or philosopher in the first place. I’m pretty sure SEX, all forms of actual or possible material sexuality, and abstract GENDER are very naturalistically and so very causally related—even if often only paradoxically in the locus where they first meet: when and where and how **sexual bodies** first tip to **gendered minds**, as a sub-emergence of the entire body to mind tipping point! Even if some aspects of *all otherwise possible and always imagined forms of gender* get over-simplified and denigrated by naive use of reason within the real biological-material spectrum that marginal, intermediate **and even intrinsically inter-convertible** sex types give profound evidence of, to propose there is no deep causal connection between gender and sex is just more of the worst kinds of Cartesian, religious or tribally derived nonsense. What we’ve done is to divide one bio-material thing—*sexuality*—into two pure concepts: CULTURAL MALE versus CULTURAL FEMALE by glossing all the underlying and messy biology as if there are only ever, or only ever *should be* just male and female bodies (God’s plan or Platonism often get invoked here too). Sexuality is a chthonic functional pluralism; the vastly improved genetic outcomes of sexual reproduction are due its two-fold asymmetry in allele sourcing, but likely arose as just another sprandrellic accident, breaking the rules of asexual reproduction’s prior emergence even as it aims for the same necessity: lasting reproductive and behavioural fitness. Academic views forwarding a necessary causal relation between SEX and GENDER are actually very well evidenced and are only tipped to endorse this ridiculously marginal position by media and politics. In this step the informal memes (and political rallying cries) are conflated by two very different underlying theoretical views.

The epistemic, so theoretical difference lies between *Social Constructionism* and *Social Constructivism*. One theory makes the almost trivial claim things like money (and marriage and gender norms, and the list goes on to describe everything in culture going beyond the living-matter of things) are made up largely by fiat in exactly the ways I have already described for money and marriage, and then goes on to try and build general models about how such cultural artifacts are all created. To this theory taken only as one general claim/meme I say mainly, ‘duh, you think?’ (so endorsing to some degree the general claim and specific methods and results to follow, assuming the warrant is just). However, in response to any work of science meant to expose the general mechanisms by which this happens I say, ‘Declare your metaphysics first!’ so to show better whether your warrant is constructing facts, or just more constructions (the ‘gender is a social construct’ meme taken to the ridiculous extreme to follow is itself such a specious construct). The other theory (you look up which name goes to which theory to find the *difference* yourself) claims there is no necessary **or** contingent connection between SEX and GENDER at all. This is a form of ideology and idealism that belies all rational and empirical credulity; a monster born of political correctness I doubt could ever have good epistemic intentions behind it at all, but to pave the way for new-fashion tyrants and tyrannies and to *somehow* make amends for all the historical crimes of punishing differences constructed purely as false evils by arbitrary use of violence (and so marking the

worst forms of real evil!). To these theorists I say, 'Clearly, you have never raised a child you weren't otherwise able to perfectly "construct" '. What rubbish, the emperor has no clothes, sex or gender apparently.

All this aside, I suspect my claims to come will raise more not less eyebrows and probably often for good lack of reason or evidence from my objectors, but also because like Ken Wilber does in his book *Sex, Ecology, Spirituality* we are at a tipping point to where my "arguments" will become most trans-logical yet still sub-metaphorical. When Wilber switches from explicating the scientific background evidence from the objective domain to speaking about meditative states in the purely subjective domain of "inner" experience (of *within*, not inside the brain) his style and oratorical method changes deliberately to match. The kind of "subjective" talk (be careful of the sense entailed here) the second part of his book *Sex, Ecology, Spirituality* displays is what he calls 'Mandelic Speech'. Here, I see his kind of metaphorical use goes well beyond even the kind licensed in pure art. However, mine is intended to target something more than logic but still less than art or metaphors of spiritual transcendence. I have been using the term sub-metaphorical, but will now switch to the term I use in my pre-ontological work, that being 'eMetaphorical'^{NOTE}

NOTE: The inspiration comes from the reverse 'Me' which begins as a nod to the fact (norm?) my full name is Michael Brian Palmer, yet my given name has always been Brian (yet another story, not told here). So, to avoid all the pains due to the failure of even the most modern customer databases to respect the idea of a given name I tend to use 'M. Brian Palmer' in the hopes people will figure it out and not just rely on some dead bits of silicon to tell them *wrongly* my name is Michael (even after I always make a point of this as well). They rarely seem to listen or even try to, and I end up being called the wrong name all the time (typically by now by both brain-eating zombies and silicon-based robots, like the "friendly" bank machines I use), but if I leave the 'Michael' out in my hope to be treated like a human being (Yes this is "shouting": 'MY NAME IS BRIAN, I COME HERE OFTEN, YOU SHOULD KNOW ME BY NOW!') One of the most impressive capacities of the human socio-linguistic brain is remembering faces and names for Christ's sake) I get in trouble for not using my legal name, sigh. So, the letter 'M' figures in my polemic mythology as a side-example of exactly what I am railing against in this work, the claim we are collectively '*lost in representations*'. It is also as close to the middle of the alphabet as you can get, and I am also aiming for a metaphorical middle ground. Then there is the fact I don't see the world as most do (my open mic stage name is also eM, emulating David Bowie's excellent use of personas in his art, in part) and once I realized my metaphysics are pre-ontological and involve a complex material inversion of, I'll admit, what must appear very mysterious and opaque to you, that also resonated. It became obvious the best way to append something to 'metaphor' to canonize a sub-class of meaning "above" logic, but still "below" artistic use of metaphor would be by letting all these contingencies lead the way; so, the idea of an "eMetaphor" was born.

So, as I am only trying to bookend an open-ended range and expose the mysteriously entangled structural guts over which norms feature centrally in determining satisfaction conditions on the way to the discovery/creation of *a priori* logical (conceptual) truth, not delineate all the paradoxes or missing

naturalistic evidence in between the least and most rarefied types of norms and their related complexified ilk, it (I hope) should not matter if I am wrong in specific fine places, only consistent or coherent (but never complete) in a minimally general and encompassing way we can agree serves the purposes to come. Here, too much logical analysis of my “arguments” (now a non-pejorative use of scare quotes indicating the possibly irreducible ambiguities and absences I must work over) will only get in the way of my attempt to communicate the most substantive parts of my thesis; much is begged, but without the begging there can be no possibility of a meta-abductive *reductio*. In pointing to the existence of apt forms of evolved knowing lying beyond logic but before the most scandalous uses of metaphor I hope along the way to create in you the epiphanic experiences going halfway (along *only* the opening, not closing channel of meaning-conveyance) to “proving” you have actually taken my meaning none-the-less.

With the appeal for charity in place, we can move on to Tyler Burge’s account of perception.

Tyler Burge’s *Origins of Objectivity*: The Neo-Empiricist Cognitive Science Centred Revolution

I will be necessarily inflicting a grave injustice on both you and Burge as I attempt a compression of his brilliant work and series of inferential mazes in a minimal number of bare steps (and one quote). The first half of *Origins of Objectivity*³⁷ takes a negative stance against certain *a priori* views that—largely due to Burge one supposes—are now passing from fashion, then presents the positive stance centred in scientific evidence from cognitive science, particularly vision science. I am paring away most of the inference and evidence leaving only the signposts of Burge’s prohibitive mapping of the random walk from biology to first psychology. As always, that Burge be shown correct is moot; I am simply following the neo-empiricist epistemic impulse. Further: that Burge’s view appears tacitly dualist I think goes too far. My take is his analysis is agnostic as to ontology when considered in the context of Chalmers’ review of types of materialism³⁸. Specifically, Burge’s model of perception may be commensurate with all but the type-A reductive kind, and if we assume irreducible is not the same as eliminable then likely not type-B either (remembering we are realists about the mind and mental states). The fine evolutionary point of Burge’s account poses yet another view of the problem the mind’s intensional characterization poses for physicalism but is only prohibitively knock-down (in the probably true way) against the reductive or eliminativist kinds. But, assuming the case for determining a much finer and farther past evolutionary origin of particular mind has been cogently made—mind realized as *original intentionality*—this already demarcates the second emergent kind of norm/veridicality/satisfaction-condition type evident for living things^{NOTE} with the first kind being the much more reductively tractable case of sensory registration (the encoding of environmentally derived data morphisms with P=1, but not yet mentally representing (true)information, natural or non-natural).

NOTE: Burge and other authors in the field often use the word ‘veridicality’. This word means something both more and less than logical truth. Basically, in lieu of some reductive account of the physical basis determining all the how’s and why’s of the instantiation of some satisfaction condition at some level of abstraction—and especially where the representations involved are not explicitly assessed over propositions—‘veridical’ serves as a placeholder for ‘quasi-true’, and the word ‘falsidical’ for ‘quasi-false’, but in a way less vague than in typical informal use (again, where the norms of truthfulness often get problematically conflated with those of objective truth, for one key example) but not entailing logical evaluation as the *de facto* method of satisfaction invoked, but still honouring intuitions about THE TRUE and deeper ones about RTM. VERIDICALITY represents a general positive form of satisfaction covering all functions invoking norms, be they objective or subjective, FALSICALITY the general negative form.

Burge’s positive story starts with biological needs and primitive agency/behaviour as is now favoured in many naturalistic theories. We already have sensory registration of non-derived data as a trivial and non-psychological kind of “representation”. These purely bio-mechanical cases leverage the outside-to-inside mutualization of some aspect of the environment’s informational phase space in passing through the organism’s membrane embedded molecular channels fit to cause other changes such as gene expression (or repression) or more direct triggering of extant (ossified?) structuring causes leading to passive kinds of fit microscopic agency of subsystems but without any need to invoke intentionality or subjectivity as either an effect or cause. For Burge this means the agency is neither directed by nor arising from the whole cell or whole multi-cellular organism as either a whole body or as a mind. Somewhere along the way as functions complexify, multiply and so become more sophisticated or integrated they inevitably fall to working at the for-the-whole-organism level, such as we see in the widely invoked magnetosome, yielding taxes et. al. As we move from bacteria to simple pre-Cambrian forms of animals at some point—yet another mystery glossed for which a deep account is owed—we move to shrek and other kinds of neural reflexes, but still no perception, no true agency, just life as many locally indexed 2nd law denying machines. But at some tipping point, one grounded in an appeal to perceptual constancies as the objective *a priori* material necessity by which general (but **not** platonic universal) properties can come to be bound to particular objects for the very first time, some organism, likely an arthropod, finally evolves the sufficient neural and bio-functional complexity to facilitate a meta-novel kind of agency that is whole-body as a form of attention to an other as a perspective-taking “self”.

This “self” or *proto-ego* exists only in the perspectival sense granted by the “proof” of said attention being irreducibly emergent, so *originally* psychological. What differentiates this original perception, *a posteriori*, as bare (empty of content) attention subsequently entails an *a priori* collective character for the entire category of meta-norms coined and collated at and beyond this point as necessarily only ever predicable of mind-bearers. The entire body of intentional terms already well vetted in experimental and folk psychology serve as the cogent epistemic foundation of the science of perceptual psychology

and show profoundly minds are something beyond just determined matter, epistemically at least. The normative and collective endorsement of this set of norms in *prima facie* terms poses a single cultural burden against any and all reductive forms of physicalism on Burge's view of things. The entailed discontinuous tipping in the essential character of norms involved in going from just a living body to a living (whole-body)-mind follows a single inference, one which describes a bridging of the vehicularization of satisfaction conditions from unrepresented (but trivially and non-intentionally in the data morphisms) to their vehicularization as that particular attention to that particular object, but only to start in lieu of any concomitant presence of the phenomenal or any instance of a singular and expressed property-bearing "look", at best some anticipation of this, of some *proto-experience*. Rather, some object is simply "located" in some direction, or at some distance, "intentionally" aimed at only as placeholder, as a popped-out instance of an *as if* ' "look (and likely act in regard to)"', a *this*' or a ' "look (and likely act in regards to)"' a *that*', where the meta-embedded satisfaction condition is as much the entire act of perception (means) as the event of attending (ends); so an undifferentiated means-end complex.

Original representation is satisfied as veridical (more specifically: accurate) exactly when the first act of perception happens even as its satisfaction conditions "escape" or "fall back over" ***literally and materially*** (or insert your favourite shameless body-mind tipping point metaphors here, and do not doubt that they are all ***glossing metaphors***, especially EMERGE) from a diffuse internal to very fine external locus of satisfaction (so, is this not also the bare evidential point where internalism becomes less tenable and externalism more so?). The first act of perception, it seems, self-confirms as long as the something or anything externally causing it is in some relative accuracy attended to at all in any minimal sort of way contingently possible and useful for the organism (and that it already or soon will owe its material persistence to some unique gene or set of them, assuring its phenotypic persistence). Although Burge does not argue this way I have hypothesized first perception is widely (wildly, even) general in the sense that anything—and in a non-paradoxical sense *almost everything* at the right intrinsic (nomologically constrained) "scale" the perceptive system is aimed at will set it off. So, only through many further generations of genetic improvement do these functions narrow in by largely negative parings away (not ***this*** that, but that other ***that***) on the way to our sort of much more finely discriminable and/or grossly integrable representations, finally giving their contents to perceiver's like us as direct experiences of the target's nature given by the specific properties and embodied spatial-material-causal essences typing said object or event reliably and accurately (in some novelly emergent personal "theatre of sentience" one supposes).

So, the mind is less, or even not at all built up from basic single target registrations/percepts, and instead is more the result of strippings down starting from there actually being too much morphic inclusiveness in the background data to begin, yet with this wide, this *wild* inclusiveness still naturally constrained by the bandwidth and data capacity limits inherent to the scale and limited neural and systemic complexity of the first perceivers. Sensory registration, then, is actually bootstrapped up over too many positive detections, none even deemable as false to start, not from too many negative or

mis(sed)representations. Only by cutting through this noise first could a downstream and much better targeted indicator better resolve its discriminations, as some equally noisy fit function finally finds itself accidentally or otherwise able to piggyback onto only those signals that yield up free energy and matter towards survival reliably and accurately.

But, a very hard objection to the claim original perception starts “of everything and anything” is this entails a viscous negative epistemic regress in terms of explaining downstream representation of absolutes by their real properties. Pointedly, the perception of wholes as absolutes falling under names or concepts seems logically and otherwise unlikely to follow from this at all as there seems nothing here for leveraging but more empty turtle differences of content-empty intentional attending (by now ‘intentional attending’ has become a redundancy) all the way up and down. So, this poses not the information-based bottom-up cognitive binding problem *per se*, but a similar if not diametrically opposed retro-downstream problem forecasting slim hope for any materially grounded instantiation of either particular phenomenology, or its general unification.

If perception starts more generally rather than particularly this entails an even-tougher-to-account-for downstream-mind-to-target “symbol” independence exists; one made worse than what most semantic theories already assume but now not for being holistic in terms of how word meanings only emerge relative to their embedding in sentences, instead prefacing a holism of molecular value only emerging relative to their embedding in membraned bags! If, as I’ve argued, particular percepts are only ever reducible down to more differences, never absolutes, where the functional fitness becomes the placeholder for essence always over a *difference*, it seems no singular epistemic ground could ever be found here for the perceiving any absolute property directly by its brute matter, just a general one always yielding percepts empty of content, yet always signifying “everything” (for being locally general) rather than “nothing” (for being locally empty of content to start).

All that seems on offer here is just increasingly complex “zombie” perception over an ever-expanding local domain of possible further resolvings of always residually negative discriminations. Perception would just be endlessly ruling more non/never “seeable” things out as ‘not *this* that, or *that* that, or *that other* that, or . . . yes *that* that, whatever the hell **that** is’, so it becomes harder to see how any phenomenal reality could ever get in from the molecular/cellular level up, leaving us instead to explain percept’s qualitative feel as caused by some top-down integration (over what?, neurons of course, so we are back where we started) rather than by integration of minimal *absolutes* made over differences bottom up. Now the microscopic veil I seem to have put in place has been refined down to a gap that instead of being built up from some specific and always content-empty *data* differences to absolutes (itself a monumental problem for any reductive materialism assuming information based semantic theories) is proposed instead as due a paring down from an “everything and anything” that is never a “something” for being a difference tied to all functionally fit “blind seeings” in perpetuity, so never by some *final* data difference necessarily (so non-arbitrarily) tied to the essence of any particular environmental object or event. This molecular “idealistic” gap seems even more troubling than the

physicalist appearance-reality gap, one over which no object and no subject could never meet but for some *Deus Ex Machina*. So, I've basically re-expressed dualism in functional-informational terms not as the causal interaction problem but as the phenomena instantiation problem. A new kind of skeptical idealism risks being forwarded here, not of some infinite God but of the infinitely non-phenomenal yet (now even more mysteriously) always finite representation of things only ever *as if* phenomenally given (by this blending dualism into epiphenomenalism).

Correcting and Extending Burge like a Derridean Would – O.I. as the Detection of “Everything”

But: this is not what I mean at all. The “everything” I've invoked is very *closely* and dynamically bounded in the sense of original perception only being able to detect “anything” at some *naturally contingent and finite, but always delimitable (and so effectively unbounded) scale* in starting only as a content-less attending to “something” as an “ego-like-perspective”.

So, what I am really proposing is a wide form of perception “as if” there really were an outside to the body in a sense no monistic ontology could never allow (so with nothing particular either “seen” or “felt” or “conceived” as outside yet, but where the extension of OUTSIDE now really exists *universally*, but in a way already going “beyond” matter as a trans-ontological embedding, yet only the matter has shown the way *how*).

The possibility of wide original *general* perception is, also, plausibly grounded by inevitable overlappings in the data-morphic character of the shared and minimally sufficient chemical environment in which such perception first emerges in terms of SHARED PRIOR MATERIAL NEEDS FOR ALL AND ANY LIFE TO SPONTANEOUSLY ARISE. When life *originally* exists, there is now non-trivially a real, wholly material and in a “same-other” (Derridean) sense wholly ontically isolated and empty “self-vehicle”, if only *inside* a functionally defined but still wholly physically realized (and so completely physically explicated) boundary **and** at least one general catch-all form of an equally empty but more ephemeral “other-vehicle” *outside* the same boundary. What binds this ontology crossing duality in materially totalizable onticity is all the near and quasi-identically detectable mutual data morphisms by which general life first pops out. This also effectively and *naturalistically* demarcates the real and original extensional bearing of INSIDE and OUTSIDE as the first concretely realized real abstraction (but for EXISTENCE/NON-EXISTENCE at the Big Bang) but where realizing perception proper at this fine point of emergence first needs closing the material-functional loops involved in a special, a *psyche-logical* way.

For non-trivial “seeing” the fitness conferring targeted data morphisms are first—as non-intentional sensory registration—already tied to passive bio-function, causally relayed from *outside* to *inside*, but

then find their way—finally—back to *outside* the cell not just in some passive or sub-systemic, but bootstrapped active whole-(self/body) agency. By this some free-living cell first “knows” itself (and other) in the integration of many of the causes and effects of sensory registration transcending just the independent but representationally mute encodings of many otherwise generally local but *otherwise unlocalizable* othernesses. What must happen for a life to first “see” is the random, sprandrelic or exaptative but (clearly) not impossible integration at a slightly higher scale of webs of such functions becoming *radically* redirected *focally* back outside to some fine and persistent enough particular object or property instantiation such that it has now been attentionally carved out of the background of otherwise mutely detectable general other-nesses as some content-less intention materially expressed *as an entangled quantum system*, what I coined a “popping out”. This popped out intention, as both a literal closing of a material circle and the virtual opening of the first causal quasi-material/quasi-psychological spiral of intentionality is materially made by **and** over an already quasi-concrete/quasi-abstract but vitally demarcated **volume** in space-time to some **point** in space-time outside that same volume along some attentional **line** *at the very least*, but one ineluctably serving downstream as **the** master basis for all subsequent universal or non-local object or property predication, at some point overflowing with qualia by some further means to become the most florid percepts currently experienceable.

But, in achieving this first attentional carving out of some non-trivially represented but qualitatively mute datum against the background of general detectability, in first closing the causal-functional loop from a general outside to inside and back to a particular outside ***something pre-ontologically novel also pops out even as it all also first comes to seem made of the same identical stuff but never was or could be (i.e., only in “perception-as-reality”)***! This last sentence describes nothing more or less than a quantum-mechanical mode-locking of generally delimited detectability being mapped over a functional barrier back to particular object or property localization (*proto-conception?*) and it marks the first real emergence of a kind of Derridean meta-objectivity whereby in any act of true perception there also emerges with/by it a seamless materio-psychic whole, a transient but profound self-other complex as one transcendent “thing”, but equally *beyond, not within paradox* yielding to a real separation of self and other as a two-ness, one now “1/2” grounded in original subjectivity, yet still “wholly”, i.e. “1” grounded in matter by no separation at all, rather by a “hyper” or “popped out” but still empirically real form of materiality (the one philosopher's of physics wish analytical philosophers bring with them to their armchairs, rather than the blindly insistent expectation to find a final epistemic-regress-blocking substantive mereology).

The only real paradox I see is a consequence of insisting on a non-Derridean, a too logistic form of counting; here of the functionally emergent (one/(two)) psyche-material object/s as a separate (one)self and yet (two)same-other in both one wider ontic, *and only much later*: one experiential breath. The real paradox, the real source of confusion about the material relationship between the body and mind comes from always insisting in ***one universal kind of materiality always conceived of as two definitionally walled-off kinds of perspective-taking, one looking purely from a too abstract (so never***

explicatively concretizeable) “inside” the other looking purely from a too abstract (so never explicatively concretizeable) “outside”.

This is like trying to eat your ontic-conceptual two-cake *fundamentally* and have it *in substance* one-ontologically too; this seems the deepest perversion of reason motivated by seeking ontological monism, and when we go too far to reifying the other pole of this glossed Derridean object(s)-event(s) is it any surprise that our dualism's fail logically as well in still counting in a non-Derridean fashion. *Counting like a Derridean*, I've argued, makes much more sense, trans-logically speaking, in explaining the “real” and fine naturalistic “emergence” of a local mind from **only** matter (but, only on my special sense of ‘reality’).

Life as *only* matter becomes a quasi-material and quasi-psychological whole in a quasi-abstract(onto-virtual?)/concrete mode **only** when percepts first naturally occur as material poppings out due to their satisfaction conditions first being manifest and concomitantly satisfied as *the found possibly of all living thing's not impossible disposition for first closing the intentional circle in winding over one loop of the spiral*: world-to-(mind-to-world-fit) causation to mind-to-(world-to-mind fit) satisfaction (where data morphisms are just: world-to-(mind-to-world-fit) causation tied to fit function).

The key to see the way around any epistemic regress (for the idealism) or gap (for the physicalism) is in remembering in going from encoding data morphisms to natural information representation the associated norms also fall from absolute (probabilistic) certainty to (relative) accuracy, so even as the possibility of both specific and general perception has now been grounded in biological meta-function, so has the appearance-reality gap in the sense many might sagely claim that SEPARATENESS always reifies an illusion, but now only if purely particular physicalist terms and conditions are (somehow?) combined with general idealist terms and conditions. How do we bridge these in our models? Well, we may also be forgetting *once again* the intuition behind naive realism here and should look for a still literally material means for the essence owned by any arbitrarily bounded matter to somehow leak through “a-intentionally” to other similarly bound matter (i.e., perhaps some residual material effect still passes from the outside to the inside that isn't data or (true)information but *really* serves as the vanishing origins of experience, but might also be evidence of the existence of UNREPRESENTABLY REAL things?). This non-channel mediated but still *extra-or-supra-disposed* physical effect might, then, either fill the finest instantiation of the gap from the bottom up, or the broadest instantiation of real regress from the delimited background (the rest of the universe) top down (or both?), but what seems plausibly evident is all the matter making up the (always fractally) bounded system of subject-object in any act of perception, but that doesn't itself pop out in that act *is still from the perspective of the ontological and ontic totalization* just **very close** matter seamlessly abutted to itself as perceiver and perceived as both a local and non-local (universal) whole, but *finally in the naturalistic sense* only on Einsteinian general relativistic terms (once we put every real object and event back together as the universal configuration space of the block universe operating over all quantum systems).

So, something of any independent object or event's essence might (must?) always pass through from outside to inside the body (and back outside) but now over an unrepresentable material *difference* and a (much later) representable psyche-material *difference*, if being subjectively "in(side)-formed" could ever lead to being objectively "ex(outside)-formed" as/by perception unmediated by function exactly because there is some truth behind the intuition motivating the ontological reduction **and** totalization in the first place, but not by this representing any absolute or final epistemic truth, but a trans-logical and paradox unwinding one. This, literally a materially rendered paradox, is representationally (in hypothesized error) made over the same hidden Derridean binary promoting both physicalism and idealism (it's always one God **or Theory** only lately, but we forget it started as many gods **or theories** in history)! So, we also risk forgetting while a mind is always supposed more than matter in its abstract nature (and I have tried to show *how* it is that) it is yet **always just matter** so—in a favoured analogy—as at least one ray of light passing through a lens is undisturbed by it refractively, so something of the essence of the matter of some perceived object, which is always physically causing thus at two levels in combined (asymmetrically) intentional and (reflexively) non-intentional micro-physical interaction, something of essence always simply leaks through in non-channel mediated ways and forms the missing ground for explaining our naive experience of perception as always of wholes given by their properties (if only as the reality-modelling capacities of mind evolve sufficiently for the evident spectrum of naively taken types and tokens of consciousnesses on natural offer to start to appear).

What are Concepts and Conception Really? – The “Post-Ontological” Glue of *Reality-As-Perception*

Finally, on what negative basis could we ever describe a more appropriate set of background conditions for concepts and cognition to emerge **inevitably, if not necessarily** than if perception (also) begins as the content-empty general capacity to perceive “everything and anything” as possible +/-need, and not just as a content-empty specific capacity to perceive “some thing” as actual +/-need. Having gone meta (from concretely to abstractly real) once to get to first mind do we not expect to have to go meta-meta (from concrete to abstract and back to concrete in conception, but now built upon a more general form of ABSTRACTION grounded by original perception in first going from a *general* outside to a *particular* inside to *particulars* outside as perception . . .) to keep moving up the normative (satisfaction condition quality) spiral? The etymological origin of ‘conceive’ is exactly ‘to bring together’ after all, now meaning to bring the entirety of the concrete back to itself as the finite and particularly pluralized concrete, but only after passing through a complexifying kaleidoscope of quasi-trans-ontological (i.e., pre-ontological) abstracting function.

In the most technical sense ‘conceive’ may mean to bring together all the represented functional differences **and** the insuperable material onticity—the local and passively intimate and always perceptually over-determining and under-determinable **causal totality of any sufficiently bounded, coherent, and repeatable local event** in some stitching together of essences—both over and as the mind-body paradox—forwarded to their proper representations, and from there only then falling back to their objects at a meta-meta-functional or **meta-abstractly, so only quasi-reconcretizable** level. Weaved implicitly within this unapologetically dense last sentence is the claim that things which become perceivers also become—in transitory part—of one shared essence with what they perceive, and at the limit (perfect accuracy) become the very things they perceive, but only over the vast hidden orders of evolutionary scale-time contingency that become ossified genetically as encodings of their now indirectly related causal-informational structuring cause essences, which always plays out over expanding scales of increased local 2nd law denying complexity. CONCEPTION is a clear and distinctly self-meta-referencing idea indeed, the general equivalent of Russellian classes binding all the logico-computational sets of proper triggering causes to the long since in the past and possibly empirically unrecoverable origins of their structuring causes. The general causal line of the past (of all pasts) runs minimally and inescapably straight through all the objects coming and going materially unaffected; the past (and future) makes the perception of objects absolute by providing the very context in which things objectively and absolutely *seem to* come and go; everything here **now** had its originating cause(s) **then**, but these are brought forward as dangling causal traces and in some way encoded generally in the genome (so nature “learns” in virtue of something even before personal learning exists), which I think some are rightfully arguing is a form of (true)information, so is also an intentional system (which is also a claim inconsistent with Burge’s theory, importantly and tellingly). This, however, is not exactly what I believe, but what the angel physicalist (and devil idealist) version of myself must, logically and evidentially. Instead of (just) having essence fill in the gaps of phenomenal experience (as some God of the gaps) from the material ground up in my pre-ontological metaphysics phenomena are (also) filled in “down” from **within** (again **NOT** meaning ‘inside’) but over a complex and materially paradoxical inversion (of some, here, unoffered kind). This entire analysis, however, would also end up in contradiction to Burge’s larger account, and is not pursued further in this work, just dangled.

There certainly need be a generally “special” form assigned to the essentially vital character of all living things, but this “definition” should never ascribe more than matter to that special general form, but for accounting for the non-trivial appearance of VITALITY, but I think not as some fine *difference*, only as a quasi-ontological *differance*. It seems to me I have defined LIFE (if you stitch together the pieces strewn across this work) in realistic, near reductive and in the most basic general and functional material terms possible, but only locally as life’s local triggering cause, not as its universal structuring cause. The structuring cause we can access is the rest of the story of how the universe came to be contingently as guided by lawful necessity, but the irritant at the centre of this many layered epistemic pearl—a wet-dream version of totalized empirical knowledge—is that part of the story unlikely to ever be told in the logical framework by which it is supposed real. That epistemic irritant is nothing less than determining the source of the intrinsic nature of the Big Bang singularity (. . . turtle, turtle . . .).

And Now . . . Back to Burge

Metaphorically speaking, after *original perception* satisfaction conditions are no longer just determined and leveraged inside the organism alone; they have been, literally, *quasi-materially abstracted away as function* to be borne outside of the organism, or at least spread along the sensory and wider physical channels back and forth in relation to some object or event, somehow. **This still seems very consistent with a further key claim Burge makes—the most important one for us to carry forward—that once a function is non-trivially representational it may be selected for in cases where the content represented is not veridical, as long as the resulting behaviours still lead to survival for that organism and flourishing of the offspring also carrying the trait, thus shoring up the species as a both a synchronic and diachronic population.**

Regardless, we end up with a new emergent category of norm, that of *Perceptual Accuracy*.

“The function of sensation” [*sensory registration*] “is explained as the perfectly reliable leveraging of causation through production of causal-informational sensory states, and psychological function is explained in terms of accuracy. These are fundamentally different types of explanation. If explanations of accuracy are not reducible to explanations of success in indication then neither are their objects, perception is not reducible to sensation.”³⁶, p. 317

Importantly these categorically new norms are not ever wholly arbitrary norms (in the sense that what choice is made does not really matter, just that some choice **must** be) although they are possibly paradoxically relativized; they can be completely wrong (inaccurate) about what they represent but perfectly functional in doing so in the perpetuating-the-life/species/genome sense. Arbitrary norms in the cultural sense often originate in the breaking of an inherent but function-blocking symmetry, such as which hand to shake with, who sits at the head of a table, etc. Such cultural norms often meet needs only emerging at other levels of material concretion or psychological abstraction where there is some closed, albeit complex series of causal and intentional entailments comprising some system of behaviour either concerned with issues of politics (including here the notion of manners, or ‘polit’e-ness) or with promoting the avoidance of or attraction to some object or event furthering the likelihood of certain “best” physical outcomes. In these cases, the norm’s origins may be due to either transparent or somewhat historically opaque causal relations, but they are certainly more arbitrary than those they emerge out of, first the certain data morphic “truths” and then, the relatively accurate and functionally-fit “successful” perceptive ones.

Consider—looking ahead—driving on the right-hand side of the road. It is a norm, and it is necessary such a norm exist by forcing a choice—if avoiding head-on collisions is the right *value* outcome to start from—but as DRIVING is an artifact the arbitrariness of the choice for establishing norms like this is not natural in the sense perceptive accuracy norms must always be, assuming it is perception first taking

non-derived forms of data to natural information. These administrative sorts of cultural norms are superficially derived from other goals (derived data) in minds, not from primitive natural function, while the first perceptual norms can only come from non-derived norms (hence their superficial allegiance to objective facts, as I will continue to argue in deeper ways). This suggests a very complex and very opaque series of possible categories exists between the original sensorily registered and cultural norms indeed, where relatively arbitrary cultural norms and scientific facts often get blended to determine formal normative agency (as legal or other administrative standards, etc.). Overall, this spectrum of certain data, relative accuracy and arbitrary value norms is built over and so tracks with non-derived data (natural data) evolving to mixed, and finally more pure forms of derived data and their associated forms of information: natural information, (true)information, and non-natural meaning.

There are natural fact-like norms to be “mined” by evolution from non-derived data by perception falling closer to being satisfied as objective truths, but cultural norms are mined largely from derived data and the more rarefied the norms the more rarefied the derivation of the data and information; everything in between *close* perceptual proto-belief and the actual use of logic involves possibly intractably opaque mixing of data and information beginning from a non-intentional form of certainty (so not epistemic) first “intentionalized” only to relative accuracy, then potentially to complete arbitrariness, so now combining many sources and antagonistic and synergistic counter-causes and counter-effects where any hope for explicating a clear and simply *linear* story of cause and effect in the conceptual fell swoops by which we currently define the naturalistic project seems very premature (but I think such a linear narrative so neglectful of the possibly un-modellable morass of empirical contingencies at hand is widely and tacitly endorsed without much argument or evidence, this *all too Newtonian model of the mind as a box in which to align thoughts in time in step with the world machine*). Yes, all this is based upon certain data morphisms, but we can’t forget these morphisms bear no intentionality (supposedly, but perhaps just no *particular* instances of intentionality) they are not only persistently non-consciously held, but they are also always before (so always “beyond”) representation (or they would already be percepts) so nothing of them gets through as phenomenal even though everything we feel in consciousness is/must be “informed” by them.^{NOTE}

NOTE: The gap only starts as a step from certainty about the morphic structure of some dynamic set of differences to relative accuracy (the fine point when a body first tips to mind, stare at this point and you also see the fine locus of the interaction problem for dualism). That perceptive accuracy is relative to a kind of certainty itself only defining the lee side of the gap as an attentional point means perception causes the gap to relativize even as it opens it, so seems very unlikely to ever be able to close it (something else must, then). This quasi-material gap starts as a literal fine point (in two senses) of emergence or tipping but moves on to a space with the character of *Cantor’s Dust*. Beyond this, as conception easily goes beyond both the present and what exists this fractal line is made into a fractal surface, but here our “gap-points” and “gap-lines” always risk further combinations as completely arbitrary “gap-volumes”; we can’t even say anymore what is gap, what is source, and what is real, perhaps.

So, it seems likely rather than each new type of norm and its application achieving some pure independence in form and function, that as the brain has evolved in fits and starts with new systems kludged on top of old systems, also in both antagonistic and synergistic ways, there is never any pure separation between the different effects of sensory registration, perception and conception/cognition and the final phenomenal or representational qualities of any given experience circumscribed as a single mental state. So, in parallel, the cause of the phenomenal and representational content of any unified mental event is not likely to ever be due to just one lower or higher level function in isolation, although any given mental state might be invocable more purely at just one level, but again, the process by which unified mental states “crystallize” seems more akin to how Belousov–Zhabotinsky reactions go, with sporadic patterns momentarily stabilizing and thus popping out impurely like the tip of some psychedelic iceberg (so only ontically pure in representation, never in material fact) only to be as a matter (ha!) of course washed over and away by the endless streams of new or renewed unintentional data, derived data, and various forms and sources of information constantly flooding through the brain and for which ego consciousness is maintained more in relation to as a filtering out than as any possible focus of discriminate and user-privileged computing in. Yet, there is likely always some certainty from the data morphisms shining through; these “proto-facts” when layered with intentionality yielding to the relative accuracies of percepts both conscious and unconscious, as some by then seamless (so possibly causally disentangleable) whole, even as this process for language bearers (thinkers) continues unabated most of the time we are awake and is finally and even more intractably mixed with the arbitrary as given by the conceptual/cognitive, **and where by now reality has been as much constructed and projected onto matter (now as “ex-formation”) as purely informed by that same matter as “in-formation”**. We sleep and wake in a material bed of perceptively localized and intentionality reified data morphisms and “dream” (by projection) the rest of absolute reality back into the cracks between all the real differences as the phenomena they target in pseudo-or-back representation as ultimate *source*. My God is an all infinite and forever unrepresentable background and only the illusion of a finite foreground (my God is INFINITE QUANTITY and FINITE QUALITY blending from quantity bottom up, as degraded or infinitesimal being, to quality top down as finite phenomenal experience, but over three, not one, not two, pre-to-post-ontological leaps).

The fine point where I intend to argue is if Burge is right and while sensory registration, consistent with Fred Dretske’s view^{39, 40, 41, 19} (their metaphysics and explanations are often radically opposed, but not all of them, I am only putting together cross-endorsed content here) need be certainly satisfied ($P = 1$) to serve function towards positive selection that right from the get-go this is not necessarily true of perception. The universal appearance-reality gap then reduces in particular origin to any and all particularly contingent body-mind gaps (at this point we are not sure if the gap is necessary in any *a priori* way). But as these, now second order gaps arise by the natural relativization of perceptual accuracy at its origins, and because encoded and *never intentionality-mediated* data are never “felt” or “seen”, absolute *inaccuracy* may also be selected for positively as the limit case (and where ‘absolute accuracy’ becomes the red herring or regressive epistemic delimit by which skepticism takes root in contingency and by which realism appears as the missing absolute-maker by necessity). This may be true

even granting selection for positive accuracy is more likely to dominate over time, which seems the preferred intuition. But, as the very notion of a real appearance-reality gap is supported by the objective facts of science, which I am now arguing is also deeply constructed over both norms of inaccuracy and arbitrariness in the evolutionary and materially intrinsic historical sense, we can't rule out the parsimonious "normal" statistical case that the relativization of accuracy fits something like a bell curve centred on $P=0.5$, i.e. the default case is perception is on average only accurate half the time, or that most percepts, when finally taking on a phenomenological form start at best 50% accurate about what they represent (but, because they have an underlying form of certainty to work from something is still really being perceived rightly by its *data* essence, even if by this level of emergence there is simply too much essence available to ever possibly render it all!). To really say we need hard empirical evidence and to first accept the burden of the contingent possibility of fit norms of perception being selectable over radical inaccuracy, as we must first rule those more extremely inaccurate cases out ($P \sim 0$, such as for otherwise very convincing illusions, for a less problematic example. In the end it is the illusions we perceive that we don't know are illusory that I worry about the most!) as the deluding epistemic free-riders they most certainly are (and you may be perceiving such an error case with felt certainty, i.e., assuming $P = 1$, when it is not, and still be 100% wrong about that, even right now!). Perhaps I am now describing the very basis for MISREPRESENTATION (and so in turn begin to construct a model of illusion, dreaming, and hallucination around what allows this free-riding to occur in spite of the negative selective pressures in play, even imagination might turn out mostly an absolute free-rider!!!). At this point how could we know, as we are not even looking for systems functioning over absolute inaccuracy in cognitive science **at all** as far as I can tell, and it might be impossible to detect them, they are after all working in us as perfectly accurate representations naively, so we have in some relatively complete arbitrariness already deemed their targets real, and likely on deeply logical terms (but, we sure see the superficial signs when we look at the many documented inconsistencies in people's verbal versus agentive ethical behaviour, and the concept PERCEPTION OF GOD or LIFE AFTER DEATH or ALIEN ANAL PROBING may be likely instances, but then again maybe our perception/conception of God and an after-life is perfectly accurate and real, and that is the real problem).^{NOTE}

NOTE: If this view is taken seriously then there is no such a finely determined or determinable thing as *perceptual misrepresentation* at all as these may just be evidence of positive cases of near or complete inaccuracy (or past $P > 0.5$ forms of accuracy) having since been relatively shorn off from their once paradoxically fit functions, perhaps the true originating functions have been walled off, made dormant, or have lost genotypic (and so phenotypic) representation at all (or maybe their dependent functions and proper norms are hidden, where now just the superficially attached free-rider norms acting are parasitic and so making the functions epiphenomenal). The traces of many once ascendant functions must "lie" around in the genotype and phenotype like so many representational spandrels, just as "junk" DNA acts as a honeypot for retro-virus DNA, thus burying the effects of infection, if not the cause.

The implication for rationality is it is built unavoidably just as much over perceptual “guesses and lies” in moving over evolutionary time from general behavioural competency to particular use of the idealized forms of epistemic infallibility we lately build all notions of rationality around, i.e., all the methods and norms of philosophy, logic and science. Of course, it is exactly the scientific method (one hopes) reliably allowing us to parse out the inherent relativized and contingently necessary claim percepts can be satisfied just as well when they are inaccurate (and so expose at least some contingent aspects of the appearance-reality gap due to those slippery or fully inverted norms, at least) but I am not so sure this is possible without addressing the more problematic way norms guide human agency historically and more tellingly right now. One only need consider the current crises undermining rational discourse due to social media, and the return of fundamentalism and other regressive politics to at least serve as a very general base case for the *eMetaphorical* arguments here and yet to come.

So, we start from norms (or equally, satisfaction or veridicality conditions) due to data morphisms tied to fit function yielding passive behaviour, then pass through and over very many psychological norm sub-instances of relative accuracy with their prohibitively possible “paradoxical” leveraging of fitness—*and further miracles occur here*—head towards cognition proper. Only much later in the story do we get to first conception as the *psychological* object facilitating higher cognition, now more purely phenomenally granted, perhaps even “full-stop” consciously (at least involving whole-body meta-awareness) on the way to a self-reflective form of consciousness certainly very tightly, both causally and historically concomitant with the emergence of complex symbolic and recursive forms of language. But even here we have glossed too much as prior to the emergence of culture we also pass through a semiotic era of non-grammatical ostensive (pointing or gesturing) communicative behaviours that would be impossible without predicative forms of perception, so which already seem to require perception of absolutes and therefore likely (proto-?) concepts as well. Yet another intractable epistemic knot enters the stage, bows, and leaves, with a knowing nod and wink (where *do* we place conception?). And even with complex language in place—spoken and written—we are still not guaranteed to yet have a proper notion of logical truth but have passed over, now, our fourth rough category (bio-functional data norms, non-predicative general-or-non-general psychological norms, predicative but non-conceptual non-linguistic norms to concept/language-borne cultural norms prior to written language).

Of course, it is in the leveraging of *a priori* rational norms in written language the ‘man is the measure of all things’ meme finally takes deep root in the West over 3000 years ago. So, our prohibitive fifth category of norm only covers those externally and explicitly encoded by publicly shareable syntaxes and symbols tangibly materialized beyond sound, so less transient and much more stable (perhaps infinitely so). So, our final gloss is over the written language form of the symbol grounding problem, possibly invoking even more veridicality inverting and randomly arbitrating selective pressures as I will argue using following examples.

The Norms of Culture – Off the Deep End, into the Clouds

To finish my *eMetaphorical* account of the emergence (and rough structural description) of categorically distinct and coarsely independent kinds of norms I offer three examples as an even rougher sub-categorization of the sorts of cultural norms only possible with the advent of written language. As always I do not need to be right about all the details, or even about the order of complexity I intend to impose on this sub-spectrum. I am well out of my area of expertise, but for being someone who pays attention to the many ways in which norms appear used both rationally (to serve knowledge and further civil society) and irrationally (to serve deluded, abusive or epistemically pathological forms of power). My aim here is to *eMetaphorically* justify if there is a problem for rationality in terms of the relativization of accuracy by perception there is then in “*eMetanalogy*” a much bigger problem for rationality in terms of how human beings use often totally arbitrary value norms to shore up ideology and brings into question all the administrative practices of the institutions meant to promote the best outcomes for all who espouse them over such often paradoxical and empty differences, such as the worst forms of racism, sexism, and all other negative values isms already suppose and appear to leverage, often *as if by direct perception as “obvious” appearances* (“clear and distinct ideas”).

Of course, these very complex and epistemically ineffable kinds of metaphysical norms (*The True, The Good, The Just and The Beautiful*, or RIGHTS, FREEDOMS and RESPONSIBILITIES) like the entire body of extant and still codified laws, practices and supporting and concretely manifest institutions, guiding idealized stereotypes (good and bad, what is inductive science but the seeking of stereotypical regularities of particulars as indicating general Natural Law???) historical and extant forms of political, familial, tribal and military codes, epistemic ideology-complexes (including all tribal, religious, scientific and philosophical isms and ologies), etc. still have their roots deeply entwined in *close* mammalian and *far* bacterial biological essence and necessity (and even *farther material essence*, of course) and at the *homo sapiens* tipping found in those unreflectively evidenced hunter-gatherer notions and behaviours encapsulated by whatever human cultural universals turn out undebunkable.

For just one visceral example: it is relatively easy to casually (in both material and psychological terms) account for and see the value of many of the body taboos we all inherit once the scientific evidence is deemed appropriately vetted as lastingly cogent, such as those revolving around body wastes, birth, death, violence and sex acts, so these are combatable through education (however, I am not so sure we’ve made the kinds of progress we should have hoped for here, given the anti-vax movement and the anal-sex promoting chastity movement as just two examples of *back-sliding-in* rationality, pun partially in-tended). It also not hard to see how the tension between selfish individual and group needs promotes norms of revenge and altruism in ways appearing inconsistent but only really show—and show it very clearly—biological life is not, nor can it ever be a zero-sum game (until all life is gone, at least). Yet I fear many believe the myth science and technology’s best aim is to make it one by force, lately in the guise of Ray Kurzweil’s *technological singularity*. This is often normatively promoted as a utopic version of the future. Given I would argue the worst of our environmental and social crises are exactly caused by the unwise use of largely unneeded technologies (all shored up by hidden irrational idealisms,

metaphysically speaking) all meant to further our unhinged economic system in its insane efforts to perpetuate infinite growth on a finite planet by endlessly creating new virtual revenue streams over hidden and disavowed but *always finitely real* material bases, this vision—as things stand—seems to be furthering only dystopic outcomes. Even if it turns out possible to upload one’s consciousness as data for some silicon-brain-in-a-vat kind of immortally simulated life I for one would rather take the Logan’s Run option and would willingly enter the suicide machine.^{NOTE}

NOTE: Here, I think, reactions to Robert Nozick’s *Experience Machine* are telling.⁴² Have you read it, it’s very short and very lay-person accessible for a philosophy paper, and in ways it flouts many of the rules of good academic philosophy writing, you know like all the other seminal (the class of deep-meaning exemplifying) papers seem to, yet are often held up as anti-exemplars stylistically? Is this more inappropriate mixing of accuracy and value or the unwinding of it? I simply can’t tell.

Three (wildly) Prohibitive Categories of Cultural Norms

I have been unavoidably providing examples out of order in terms of otherwise furthering a purely naturalistic account, as the found narrative often seems to require. The proposed naturalistic order in which cultural norms are most closely grounded (in complex enough animal society) after data norms of certainty falling close to determining “truths” and those of perception falling away from relative accuracy to *original* value is:

1 (or 1a?). uncoded perceptual-behavioural norms of individuals (with their inherent condition of relative accuracy and possible inversion in ties to fitness) and concomitantly and somewhat incommensurately . . .

2 (or 1b?). uncoded perceptual-behavioural group norms (which must often, like administrative norms such as driving on the right side of the road minimize the occurrence of some negative but all too possible objective outcome—in the cultural case of DRIVING avoiding collisions while facilitating bidirectional use of a single rather than dual installation of roadways; in turn replacing norms such as “Marco-Polo” or other informal norms of right of way based on size of vehicle or status of occupants) and finally . . .

(In the interim we also follow the development of minimally verbal semiotic forms of communication, ones strictly pre-or-*proto-cultural*, and with associated bridging norms likely to appear, but these remain essentially perceptual-behavioural until a clear tip to the final category is evident, but one now falling

away from the earlier kinds essentially even as these earlier kinds still ground them. This leads to cultural norms that require a more sophisticated and self-conscious form of semiosis or proto-symbolic language. At this level I could offer further sub-categorization, for example: the individual-group norm distinction is still in play but subsumed for ease of explication.)

. . . 3 (or 2?). Norms codified in simple to complex verbal (or signed) language informally and orally or by concrete or artifactual semiosis (think of the deep origins of art and music) . . .

(These harbinger norms accelerate in complexifying as language spreads and shifts from just verbal (or signed) to verbal and proto-writing and then represents a still flaring Cambrian-like explosion of value representation in various heuristic, algorithmic, and administrative forms shading from the trivial to the sublime, and ossified in ever-evolving formalizations by both *ad hoc* and rationally engineered forms of encoding as various “texts”, by which time we are dealing with the last category alone. . .).

4 (or (3b or 2b) or 3 or . . .). Norms codified in complex language informally but universally (myth making and story telling) and then all the remaining codified formal norms of technocracy and modernism are summarily lumped in.

These divisions are not meant to represent any lastingly useful extensional purity, just as a means to shine different lights on the very idea of how “normal” is constructed by nature. As we climb this spiral I suspect the intermingling worsens, not resolves, yet somehow the value of logic shines through all of this??? This inevitable inter-mixing of norm sub-types into unified mental and physical experience might go a long way to explain some of the obsessive and conflicted behaviour we exhibit in terms of still defending naive cultural norms for which science reveals mixed if not wholly negative, but sometimes even hard to accept positive value claims (think: slavery, rape as a reproductive strategy, cannibalism, war, human sacrifice **and** the once contextually rational practice of abandoning unwanted or clearly developmentally impaired babies rather than simply euthanizing them, *let alone what we favour now, which is to keep them all alive regardless as to the cultural, biological, and physical costs, perhaps unsustainably and unwisely if not compassionately only in regards to parents, but maybe not in regards to the people who would otherwise not be alive at all had they a choice*).

Using these divisions also helps to explain why ongoing debunking of some implied values of some very longstanding quasi-rational norms, such as the late confronting of homosexuality and gender taboos demonstrates (as for most other movements of secular humanism) are so often met with fierce resistance and even back-sliding within converted groups; the more deeply the source of some only later rarefied and linguistically expressed norms rests, the more likely it will resist any attempt to dig it out at the roots, so culture has necessarily acquiesced as much to affecting change only superficially by just fixing the representations and rarely, if ever, deeply subverting the targets as consistently, but for

over generational churn and as if turning a super tanker full of oil into a pristine and very narrow, shallow, and rocky harbour . . .

The first kind of norms after the non-consciously derived biological ones, those which likely motivate taboos as a prohibitive first kind of non-naturally expressed social or cultural norm (think: holding one's nose after someone farts, but not just to not smell—probably willingly smelling, so largely to make a point about the smell's source—not to avoid it *even while seeming to want to*, or think of the proto-norms of humour, where deception in meaning is already subtly in play^{43, 44}). These lead in steps to the first sorts of quasi-administrative (mythology as history) norms involving oral traditions, or creation of meanings assigned to explicit talismans or other simple means of ostensive or artifactual representation (so, first much more concretely semiotic than abstractly symbolic). Then we get the administrative norms associated with the emerging concepts of ownership, social status, death and the afterlife, and trade and war, all of which track closely with the creation of written language and its *original* wide use in accounting and actuarial mathematics (probably first used as an extension of magic and other forms of oracular divination, such as precisising the best breed, age and quality of chicken or sheep to bleed to death as some sacrifice to some God or gods for some kind of certainty and control over nature, see how little we really change psychologically but in our many all-too-rational means for irrational ends yet?). These minimally or at best quasi-rational norms likely then fall inexorably to more sound (if not often cruelly dispassionate) uses of institutional norms imposed at increasing scales of social order: families, tribes, villages, towns, cities, city-states, political states, countries, trans-national unions, etc. Peripherally we see the wider and less deliberate concomitant emergence/expansion of in-group/out-group stereotyping, fashion, art, ritual, and ideology in general. However, for this work we are mainly focused on paring away the endlessly “trans-orthogonal” complexifying of norms in the much wider structural sense (like the ray of light passing through the lens unrefracted so does the arrow of my meaning intend) but for brief side examples, like the one following here.

Marriage Norms – A Whimsical Analysis

The current norms of marriage, while presenting as one of the most rarefied, long-lasting and universal forms of strongly codified human norms (with deep ties to human notions of realizing meaning and purpose in life beyond death) are still deeply embedded in both the prior emergence of much crasser legal/administrative norms and in much, much deeper biological norms such as statistically irreducible body differences due to sex type motivate the need for. But, as we are (I am) only meaning to follow the straightened thread from sensory to perceptive to cognitive/conceptual while tracing out the emergence of the logically *a priori* and intuitively grasped norms of science, mathematics and philosophy from the naively empirical and observationally grasped *a posteriori* norms of *close* perception, this path must be dredged out of many dusty plumes of crazily interleaving normative

“weather systems”. This normative space describes the expanding belly of the black box of the contingent story of causes and explanations of mind as the most important project for naturalism.

So, a kludge of a normative “ugly Christmas sweater” is being knit, and we should not forget this. It is very interesting to note while naturalism would have us explain how norms of logic emerged in some absolute and close sense from perceptual belief this priority gets inverted by Logicism, which would have the cart somehow explain how it pulls the horse without accounting for how the norms of relativized perceptual accuracy need not obviously ever follow the sort of non-paradoxical outcomes as logic does, and the arbitrariness of value norms would only seem to make this worse (but that we still pull logic out of this background of normative noise does by this point lend some credence to the case for *a prioricity*). This strange (to me) inversion of epistemic cause and effect, of course, rests on deep intuitions behind the very conception of *a prioricity*, rationalism, and the ‘man is the measure of all things’ meme explicitly, but I must stress as things stand this is nothing but assumption by Western fashionable fiat, and if we take the logically constructed denial of the analytic/synthetic distinction to heart⁴⁵ this only makes the problem potentially worse for Logicism. Behind this, again in analogy to how at least one ray passes through a lens unrefracted, even here the idea of something more than what is represented over the gap getting through unmediated returns to our purview; somehow the irreducibly non-contingent facts of the world have their causal and material say as non-local (read: universal) messages from the past and present (about the future) in ways not transcending the gap necessarily, but certainly run through the gap unmediated by interpretations otherwise endlessly constructed over changing kinds of satisfaction, again particularly in regards to the case of possible and likely selection over inaccuracy and arbitrariness, even to the point of complete inversion and finally allowing the conception of non-existent targets (sometimes even being able to make these unicorn effigies into actual horses using science and technology!).

I will provide one final sub-division for purely methodological and not categorical use in a very question-begging and so artificial way (so I am in this both endorsing the possibility of ideal rationality even as I mock the very idea). I do this so I can make some final set of very special norms into the proper test case for determining and testing for some ideal or at least near-ideal practice of rationality and communication of meaning.

5. Norms (satisfaction or veridicality conditions) with a clear rational basis.

These sorts of norms hardly ever cause lasting ideological battles and prove their worth daily. The recapped example is that of which side of the road one drives on.^{NOTE}

NOTE: The case of where knives and forks goes is structurally similar, but with less avoidance of disaster entailed in the failure to follow the norms as they emerge, but for the arbitrary social perjury flouting such norms invites in

more rigidly circumscribed “formal” social contexts, which also problematically assumes maintaining unjustly stratified social class systems is valuable over a different set of what turn out much less rational norms (those by which the history of wealth and power is told largely by norms of violence and theft).

It is Not a Fact that in North America We Drive on the Right Side of the Road

As mentioned earlier this is a norm we derive in an outside-in way as opposed to, say, body or object taboos, which arise inside-out and often without being explicitly pre-represented as such in any way. Consider the anecdotal story of a friend of mine with OCD. When he was about 6 years old he started spontaneously taking guest’s shoes and depositing them in the garbage while proclaiming them ‘dirt’. This is not how we came to ride mostly on the right side of the road: because riding on the left side was intrinsically “bad” as my friend found strangers’ shoes to be without any prior guidance of extrinsic norms in any obvious way (why would stories like this have such an impact if they were easily explained as learned?). Importantly, a few countries ended up choosing the left side. This track wells with other biological facts such as the tendency for right-handedness to be more common than left-handedness, and likely evidence in kind resonating all the way down to the “favoured” chirality of biomolecules, which is necessarily materially invoked in the sense of it being a contingently passive causal choice necessarily made if life is to have one shared genetic or metabolic base at all, so a passive “choice” of “normal” determined by (one supposes) an accidental form of natural parsimony; nature is as lazy in a least-sufficient sense as the organisms it creates also often turn out. These sorts of natural path of least resistance “choices” are negatively selected—filtered in by the lost effects of a very wide non-local context only understood as the entire contingent history of the universe to that point, rather than selected in by some clear and distinct local intention (or world-mind). In the case of biochemical classes, the choice must fall to only one of the left or right forms, with amino acids being almost entirely left-handed, but sugars right-handed (this being only one of 4 equally likely paired outcomes, but perhaps one that speaks to a higher form of parsimony, of post-choice re-symmetricization, a law of large material effect taken *species sub aeternitatis*).

In all these cases conceiving and determining handedness by observation or function (direct or otherwise) evinces an objective, proto-propositional, and so near-logical and purely materially embodied norm (so also a possible satisfaction condition for other sensory or perceptive, but NOT cultural functions prior to the advent of modern science). Here the relative choice to be made seems logically arbitrary but there is always a materially contingent causal story to tell in so many missing but more purely objective material facts (and those which I think determine the final form the project of naturalism for the science of mind must take, explain it all to explain the mind or explain nothing of the mind at all). But when one says it is normal to drive on the right side of the road, while this is often

painted as an objectively natural (but contingent) fact we—I think—often forget it was originally a forced choice, so the result *now* of a function that only subsequently got codified *then*, with DRIVING belonging to a fit cultural selection process more Lamarckian than Darwinian (and the case of bio-molecular chirality would seem more Lamarckian to start too, but perhaps it was Darwinian selection turning it to one rather than the other “hand” over an early advantage *or disadvantage*, so just as likely against whatever version of handedness nature slightly favoured at the emergence of first life).

It may be a fact that ‘In North America we drive on the right-hand side of the road’ is true but this is just a *facons de parler*. It is only a norm being proposed, never a logically necessary fact, so it is only part of a larger embedding within the prior set of all the other kinds of satisfaction conditions pre-determining the most basic objective requirements for DRIVING being selected as a fit cultural function in the first place; the most proximal one being to avoid head on collisions as the wholly negative and fully non-arbitrary **value-based** end of driving, with the positive goal directed and value means only being the rational ends made widely possible if this norm is widely endorsed and reinforced first (or chaos, not order ensues, and no one ever promotes chaotic imposition of norms for very long).^{NOTE} In the end there is no objective fact of the matter as to which side of the road is the “right” side (although it turns out the

NOTE: So this suggests those value norms collapsing to truth, like the logical ones are supposed to (TRUE is in many guises, but for the inverting and always contextual effect of prefixing ‘not’ the “better” value than FALSE) must be shown both non-arbitrary and accurate by laying bear all the data morphisms and functional structuring and triggering causes in their essential physicality, but as logical deductions made only from those *a priori* intuitions science endorses as cogently as possible in perpetuity. Is this a circle or a spiral? If it is a circle logicism is begging directly. If it is a spiral then experience is what it really starts from, not logic. Like viruses logic could only “live” after “*meaning already is*”, so could never explain the experience of meaning; experience thus “explains” logic more than logic will ever explain experience.

universe is shown ineliminably if not vanishingly asymmetrical within certain higher order symmetries, i.e., within CPT symmetry)⁴⁶ so this is akin to the naive collapsing of belief to knowledge but differently, an error of treating the propositional endorsement of a norm’s preferred but symmetrically arbitrary valence as an epistemic necessity.

The conflation made here is more subtle and less egoistic; the real target is some behavioural endorsement, so the “fact” of it is really a disguised speech act: ‘Thou shalt always drive and pass oncoming traffic on the right side of the roadway, *ceteris paribus*’ and so is not really a statement at all. The choice behind it is just one necessarily made in furthering means, yet only contingently as end, i.e. one while the need for a means casually necessitates determining some choice as a fact does not because of this determine the factual content of the choice objectively at all, just that some subjective choice, individually promoted but necessarily collectively endorsed in some deeper embedding in other

institutions and norms has been made because it must've been made to move culture forward in some presupposed and non-arbitrarily *valuable* way. The unfolding and evolving story of all of culture's value norms is the very abstract backbone of the entire shebang we call (written) history.

If *naturalism* is true the deeper objective truth of all historical causes can only be recovered from the entire *Big History* of the universe if we are to have a non-trivial physicalist explanation of why these choices were, in true objective fact, the ones so contingently made (or, is this not a quantum-mechanical phenomena too?). Here we can see cultural norms unlike perceptual norms, where perception's satisfaction conditions are a seamless and concomitantly emergent part of their inherent functional telos of being fit for positive or negative selection (better: filtration) require choice not for what is positively/negatively achieved in the act distally in the context of some long evolved structuring cause but often for what is to be avoided/approached proximally (as *freedoms-from/freedoms-to*) given all the demands these many fit structuring causes already seek to mitigate for or against in terms of supposed needs, and already with some impressive use of natural reason, impose on their hosts.

So here is how and where in prototype the norms called values enter but always supervene on norms of accuracy. Here things get really paradoxical and very messy as the norms become more and more abstract and ultimately more a matter of arbitrary "fashion", not proper function, perhaps as shown by the endless (and also, at times, quasi-rational) perpetuation of superstitions having no evidential basis, yet that still tend to memetic replication as urban myths endlessly changing in setting, but not in essential morale. I have no wide enough argument or evidence all or most cultural functions require creation of norms in this way, but there is certainly something to the claim cultural norms go beyond their objects in abstract and "**constructed**" ways perceptual ones never do; they go outside abstractly and often universally, which perceptive ones only do concretely at first and only abstractly in the relativization of accuracy (so anticipating the phenomena of imagining and remembering) but cultural norms also involve forms of abstraction ending up so arbitrary as to be empty of content but for the choosing (as the right "fashion") or go well beyond what actually exists purposively (norms of art, especially fiction) or problematically (lying and other forms of delusion, intentional or not, malicious or not). And, as I will argue next, if these norms invoke the inescapable problem of always being entangled with norms of relative perceptual accuracy in so far as the real facts in terms of causes require we untangle the hidden mass of leaps in normative complexity perception must first undergo over possible veridicality inversion to even provide the background conditions allowing conception and cognition to emerge, even more intractable and endlessly a-logical forms of strange and unstable meaning inversion seem on offer, if they are only waved at here.

The Image of the Skull – A Study in Diachronic Meaning Paradox

One need only consider the sexual mores of the Victorian Era, for which death, especially in childbirth (for both mother and child) was a constant, unavoidable and chaotic fact of life.⁴⁷ Somewhat accountably the image of a skull takes on a very dark and dreary form and meaning as an artistic artifact in this era, and sexuality becomes (at least was superficially) repressed. This seems somewhat paradoxical (or just accidental?) as the more likely species level biological outcome might seem to increase the pressure for more procreation under such constant mortal threat being so directly applied at the re-creative pinch-point, not less, as a form of *rational* compensation. There is also surely a correlation between the relative hyper-sexuality of *homo sapiens* and their relatively diminished birth rates and brood size, also negatively correlated to selective pressures due to nature seeing fit in increasing the size of human babies' heads in ways very dangerous for both mothers and babies (less so for babies' *naturally deformable* heads and over-wired and under-developed brains directly in *normal if not very painful for the mother* passage). These effects in turn are also entangled with the physically contingent and necessary limitations of hip structure making upright walking possible, another of the set of changes defining the tip in the life of primates from the trees to the ground heralding the emergence of the self-anointed most rational animal.

Yet, in the internet era of porn we have, in a relatively short order and without significant social protest (why exactly has religion failed to marshal social media as secular society has, is the question here?) and over an easily "rememberable" time frame (less than ~120 years) swung to the other normative value pole and lately in very extreme terms. So, even as we now face the negative consequences of global over-population we have normalized an even worse (and I think ultimately regressively valueless) kind of unhealthy hyper-sexuality clearly going well beyond the biological norms, taboos and pre-cultural realities that would otherwise naturally constrain it (famine, tribal warfare, drought, all the exhausting hunting and gathering, and the absence of birth control and antibiotics) and tribal sexual identity politics and delimiting of sexual taboos and categories that seem disproportionate in regard to the clear negative effects; loss of the valuing of intimacy and long-term commitment, recent alarming increases in STI's, the ongoing #metoo movement as a reaction to "rape culture" and other avoidable and all too obvious negative consequences of making non-procreative sex too easily accessible.

Of course, much of this behaviour is forwarded as a normalized form of identity conference for shoring up self-worth and "normality", but is one also clearly and in some pathological/ethical excess driven further by exploitative forms of media and manipulative advertising operating over the most chthonic impulses of sexuality. Currently in our culture (and I witnessed this form of art explode into culture only a decade or so ago) the image of the skull appears as a harmless cartoon and excuse to "party", not the constant reminder of the inherent dangers of a more natural *human* procreation un-remediated by science and technology. So, we have—possibly—two interleaving, inverting and entangled tipping points in norms here, the relative repression of extreme forms of sexuality cross-linked asymmetrically to the relative meaning of the skull image. Of course, these two extreme swings in normal value-meaning might simply co-occur at random, which while making the account above more spurious only lends justificatory weight to my main thesis, because if certain norms only invert relative to each other in

some paradoxically contingent fashion talking about their causes independently risks the making of many *post hoc ergo propter hoc* fallacies, but now in an anti sense; sometimes correlation is just un-analyzable and indemonstrable “cause and effect” seen from the viewpoint of everywhere and nowhere all at once.

For the more informally and arbitrarily constructed norms I think make-up/invisibly-direct the mass of human passive/non-conscious cultural agency (in the sense of the explanatory reasons we might give for many of these “normal” actions being largely after-the-fact-rationalizing and not due to clearly articulated and evidenced free use of authentic will or reason) it seems the more arbitrary the norm and the more it is already deeply informed by causes otherwise hidden in deeper or wider biological universals the more likely these are exactly the norms humans end up most willing to kill themselves and each other over, or at least use to make snap moral, ethical or aesthetic in-and-out group assessments in very superficial and ultimately unjustified sorts of ways (such that a Liberal can instantly abuse anyone wearing a MAGA hat as racist, sexist, and otherwise ignorant and lacking in liberal education, without needing to vet their actual epistemic credentials or values at all). Strangely, these often most ideologically divisive norms continue to dominate human conflict even though the rational view is that existence confers more than enough space for them to be differently conceived and tolerated (if not celebrated) so they might be obviated in their most perjurious and injurious forms and replaced with norms of greater rational value and warrant transparently and completely, except in very clear cases where the prohibitions are non-egoistically universal (so hopefully only starting out as vengeful but ending compassionately motivated) as for premeditated murder, incest, kidnapping, or grievous theft (sadly, not rape in many cultures where the victim is often more demonized than the perpetrator, or equally amplified in similarly motivated honour killings involving adultery) and only very lately, slavery.

A Rational Pre-Scientific Conception?: *Original Sin* as Naive Cognitive Science

And here, I think, is where the original conceivers of *Original Sin* meant their deepest concerns to be targeted by the coinage. If norms of perception start as norms of relative accuracy, and if the norms of culture at some point become norms of value constructed over these prior and possibly paradoxical forms of accuracy (and where value starts with need but more often ends with unhinged wants) once we see how all this entails the existence of something deeply problematic and seemingly a-rational or more purely and essentially irrational lying behind our need to always judge value over poles of opposition (i.e. naive reason as original divide and conquer epistemic agency, a blind and uninformed endorsement of the law of non-contradiction, so more simply the “naive” but mostly illusory use of reason) we should immediately see the harm we do in promoting ANY arbitrary norm’s single pole over its opposite *tout court*, no matter the “good reasons” we might find and give for doing so. It seems we

have a deep and I think largely unacknowledged and unhealthy tendency to fall to normative forms of certainty much more probably in those cases where the very possibility of verifying the supreme value of said pole as an objective fact is most difficult, i.e. exactly when the objective evidence shows agnosticism and existential tolerance is more warranted, or at least an indexical assessment that is always transient and discretionary, so never universally chosen even for that or any other individual rightly exhorting that pole of the norm at that singular event, or for some future one otherwise morphically of the same background context forcing the same kind of choice.

The wise course here is to always return to agnosticism about such norms (think: reproductive right to choose) if only not to prejudice ourselves against contrary evidence in the transparently dogmatic, irrational, and far too “normal” ways all of us are guilty of more than most of us are able to admit to (or even see!) and especially when we hold power over those who would deny the one-sided value of our choice of the pole of some otherwise arbitrary norm with similarly empty but oppositely aimed dogmatic warrant. Our need for absolutism in epistemic self-and-other control is no more evident than in our need to attach and identify often with the most arbitrary endorsements of our tribe without much reflection on hard objective evidence at all. Worse, in cases where our choice of norms is turning out the most harmful to the sustainability of a global technocratic culture based in rights and freedoms (again, rarely do the responsibilities figure as prominently) is exactly where you will find even the most otherwise rational people in widest and deepest denial of the evidence. We appear addicted to having popular ideologies constructed (often over the rallying cry of a wolf in sheep’s clothing sort of false positivity, the current norm of favouring the aping of psychological optimism over psychological pessimism as the proof of being mentally healthy and so worthy of wider social inclusion as a “truth-speaker”) over certain choices of arbitrary norms much more than we seem attached to the ideal of disseminating a more transparent and skeptical form of appropriately vetted method(s) for the realization of an idealized rationality.

Worse still, scientists and philosophers can be just, if not more fallible in this regard, and often in ways with much worse consequences than endorsing whether or not one should wear white pants after September, or red with pink as the “right” choice (as if that is some lasting objective fact we no longer need to debate or challenge, or ever need give a moment’s worth of one’s best rational thought to). At least I hope you can see where we are headed; passing over more meaning inversions on the way to logical truth, but in a way where any hope to uncover some linear series of causes seems very prohibitive, or at least any hope for realizing this in anything but millennia seems very contraindicated to me, especially—pragmatically speaking—if we stay the course on our clearly irrational collective over-consumption of nature beyond its *finite* ability to regenerate its found abundances and climate stabilizing forms of complex biological and geochemical interdependencies or to continue to carry billions of humans and their billions and billions more of domesticated animals for more than a handful of generations in our current modes of economically motivated hyper-productivity and clearly unhealthy and destructive (degenerate) forms of industrialization, maybe as few as one more.

Where Lies the Essence of the Gap?

Here is a second example, one I think demonstrates the kind of perverse “rational” forms our often unreflectively slavish insistence takes—metaphorized as *original sin*—in making what are ultimately very arbitrary value choices over relative and even “paradoxical” perceptive accuracy as if one is propounding objective truth directly. Yes, there is an on-or-off kind of certainty in play about the registered presence of fit environmental (likely both internal and external) morphisms over which perception is first integrated to further serve *radically novel whole-body* behaviour, but as this data is not mentally represented it is never, *and it can’t be without begging in naive phenomenal realism* what we perceive or conceive of *most* directly. It seems the fine point at which body tips to mind in the fine materio-functional realization of original intentionality (of first mind) is also that piece of irritating sand serving as the empty seed around which the phenomenal pearl is built *as the gap-maker*. If essence is in the form of things alone, and the form is fully capturable in data morphisms then no further account should be required to say what the real is. However, it seems—channelling more Aristotle, if something of the matter of the thing perceived (something of the absolute sub-stance) is to be conveyed it can only reside by being recreated in effigy in the matter of the perceiving mind if the absolute and tangible qualities of any object are ever to be more fully “seen”. This works because at the bottom all (particular) matter is equally supposed the same matter in universal onticity and ontological essence. I have argued that something of the matter not only “gets through” but also literally becomes of one shared matter-mind-thing, at least when the various morphisms, percepts, and concepts are made to pop out in the presence of their objects as facilitated by all the live channels in play.

I have further surmised we may be, in imposing too pure conceptual divisions, missing the very *close* source of the phenomenal as literally due to that matter, that *Aristotelian but undifferentiated form-substance*, getting through in some non-vanishing (but here-to-fore unnamed) way due to the passive and asymmetric causes and effects intimately passing between subject and object not/never channel mediated and for this not needing or having any sort of channel mediation possible. Of course, this solution only works directly for perceptual belief and *close* perception (direct observation). Soon I will argue and try to show how so-called indirect observation, what I’ve renamed as *far perception*, if done in the ideally rational way scientists, philosophers, and logicians suppose, cogently, is best, is the very means by which the certainty of data morphisms by the guiding beam of universal lawfulness yield to objective logical truth as that sub-metaphorical ray of light passing through the centre of a lens that both encompasses and is encompassed as the entire causal-material history and evolution of the entire universe (so finally bringing together all laws and contingencies). This may prove true even accounting for (so correcting) the hidden and rationality corrupting aspects of perception that are inaccurate, and those of conception treating value assessments, often completely arbitrarily made, as statements naively (so conflating arbitrary value with non-arbitrary truth). What will remain to account for is all the remaining a-rationality, which I think equally requires us to first disentangle and mark (so to obviate as ever being “factual”) all those empty or corrupted conceptual values and perceptual inaccuracies

impeding this process in the first place; those being the values that given the true essence of reality, reality could never produce, and in part those percepts we call obscured, illusions, or hallucinations.

The final residual problem here, which risks throwing the baby out with the bathwater, is then owed to what makes the material difference between those speech acts always plausibly and possibly satisfied and those which can never be. In the wider field of those imaginings always writing intentional checks nature could never cash (and so defining the very culturally wide and biologically deep field of positive irrationality) we must leave another path forward beyond truth to those speech acts which best represent the truest, and one supposes best outcomes (if the value of sustaining human life and culture for as long as possible towards some actually obtainable ideal is a value not arbitrary and which is fully positive, accurate, and licensed by those morphisms determining the widest and deepest warrant of our in-fact most apt theories and models of reality) for the transcendent possibility of creativity, both human and universal. This leaves us with a prohibitive expansion for the definition of irrationality.

Irrationality is not just the holding of false propositions as if they were true, or of inconsistent propositions as if they were consistent. That is the trivial and obvious base case, i.e., believing—if only by the representations—what could never exist exists or will come to exist with certainty; or at least having no means by which to warrant the claim if the propositions made are about the future or are made so indirectly as to be beyond all but the *farthest* perception (so, of the most tenuous indirect observation) and so already looking more like speech acts than statements. Deeper irrationality lies in the imposition of arbitrary value based upon the inaccurate perception, *close* or *far*, of things that do otherwise have some relatively unproblematic warrant to ground their real or just highly probable existence as *intrinsically valuable*, yet would place demands on their function (or future function) that equally sound or cogent warrant clearly indicate imposes a destructive or “self-denying” telos on said object’s ends unilaterally (or the same for other object’s continued *means*) without factoring these objects’ existence into the value conversation first with some substantial charity. This assessment of irrationality must be made as much in terms of the ends **and** means by which such imagined value is meant to be satisfied by human agency codified in institutionally backed-up speech acts webs underwritten by either THE GOOD, or THE CONTINGENTLY-NECESSARY (I am here assuming that most take EVIL to represent the sort of self-or-other destroying agency defining the most malicious and intentional kind of irrationality, but I have already offered signs life cares not one whit for good or bad, so the possibility immediately arises the most inaccurate and arbitrary value in play here might actually be the GOOD-EVIL complex itself, but I think it is safe to endorse this value as furthering biological fitness if taken as a concern in regards to all life **and all other matter**, and not just human life and thriving).

The problem is not so much in adding accuracy and value to certain morphic “truth” to get better meaning and experience, but in allowing too arbitrary value to be declared due to accurate perception when it is not, or to allow inaccurate perception to be declared due to certain morphic essence when it is not, so both separately or in some combined case falling through to endorsing anything a fact which

could never properly be named one (such as appeals to truthfulness as a means of getting at the truth naively suppose). What this entails for any human agency resting in some or large part on the maintenance of values largely instantiated in abstraction as absences, like MONEY, DEATH, REPUTATION, THE FUTURE. etc., over speech acts that, unlike for statements about what exists (for which even the extinction of the real objects targeted does not undo the truths, just dates them) that the products of speech acts do not by existing as the satisfied effects of these acts ever equate to proof of their lasting or necessary **non-arbitrary** value just by their being made to exist. This is akin to an ethical naturalistic fallacy: that something may be made to exist means it is necessarily good it exists, that it must exist, or that it ought to exist more and in endlessly “improvable” forms. This kind of self-serving rationalization (a premise of all hyperbolic marketing and advertising) is often combined with some related downstream bullshit corollary (once the predictably negative consequence ensue at some tipping point) such as pleading for innocence over ignorance (somehow this still flies in the era of all information at ones finger tips) or for exculpation of moral, legal or financial responsibility when some new product declared an obvious boon for the good of all of humanity then turns out harmful (think: the productive, evidential and economic causes of the opioid crises—nothing of any lasting value has been gained by “improving” on the efficacy of opium as far as I can tell, but I doubt we will stop trying).

It appears to me these endless crimes of wilfully blind neglect of reason’s best skeptical thrust (which would slow down where irrationality would speed up) of **anti-wisdom**, are almost always facilitated by the blind optimism of popular zealots and demagogues, always forgetting the wisdom all poisons are cures, and all cures poisons often in paradoxical ways across differing contexts (where the context of increasing scale, such as in economies of scale, currently drives the tendency to excessive consumption as the needed norm). Everywhere you find a magic bullet solution easily and cheaply produced for curing some newly defined human pathology or meeting some unfulfilled need expect to find the rate of diagnosis and consumption to follow in kind; what is the horse and cart logic of cause and effect in play here exactly?

Something has clearly gone wrong and if ideal pursuit of rationality is the cause then RATIONALITY is a self-denying value, at best. As I still have faith in reason I’ll lay this one at irrationality’s feet and declare all who defend such nonsense beyond reasonable *ceteris paribus* clauses out of their fucking minds in terrifying ways and for this invisibly dearest against the hopes of furthering rational society.

That the mind can perpetuate the existence of, for example, money in so many concrete *effigies* does not make the targets of these effigies any more concretely real. This entails for all institutions in part or whole resting their agency and intentions on such effigies, by this passing off speech acts as statements, that once these effigies are widely enough distributed and believed in *for further claims some institution might make of being a deeply rationally constructed enterprise sufficient warrant can never be found in any of the oughts by which said institutions necessarily function alone*. Instead, deeper and ideally rational warrant is only to be found in those non-arbitrary values intuited from the most accurate

perceptions that fall through to certain data morphism as truths, i.e., in the supposedly expert use of philosophical, scientific and logical methods.

I don't think I really need to make much pointed argument to the effect we are very far away from achieving this goal collectively. Even if some or most institutions, problematically often within both epistemic, ethical and metaphysical silos, are consistently using what are supposed the same rational background information and instrumental means each may still not have done enough separate work to warrant their own proposed ends as equally rational in terms of their assumed, often tacit and all-too sacred values. Our one-sided naively rational and current reification of individuality over collectivism as an unquestionable telic value embedded within the ethical assumptions of capitalism seems an obvious part and driving cause of our looming problems of over-consumption and slide back into tribalism, fascist thinking, and incivility. However, this is not necessarily evidence of widespread individual irrationality *per se*, but of a warded off and denied form of *collective repression of an otherwise deeply and widely felt human value to promote collective responsibility through personal sacrifice and growth*, and so exhibits a form of collective, not individual madness.

No Such Thing as Mental Illness

In another even more hyperbolic and naïve work I argue for a radical re-interpretation of the causes of psychological “dis-ease” as not due to intrinsic pathology, but (equally, when counting as a Derridean) due to extrinsic and ultimately unwarranted intolerance of innate and otherwise originally purposeful affective differences only arising as “pathological” as the default human social group emerges (and as I am arguing gets ethically and rationally lost) into representationally administrated hierarchy. One of the consequence of us breaking out of our original flat social groups (as the animals we still biologically are) was the summary and invisible filtering out of some narrower or marginal, but otherwise purposively functional and fit psychological types for any access to power and other more problematically narrower ones in to dominate access to power. This, I would argue caused an unbalancing of the natural and intrinsic range of human values celebrated by the global collective towards just a sub-set of our fuller healthy and natural affective potential. In this a-rational process as the modern forms of mental illness first become institutionally warranted (See: Foucault's *History of Madness* and *The Order of Things*) the mixed genetic and environment-caused “losers” in this accidental re-sorting are deemed “ill” rather than seen as being marginalized unjustly by circumstances having little to do with what reason might otherwise ask of us and itself (which is to always construct human communities over the values of compassion, charity and cooperation, as much over dispassion, competition, and wealth accumulation).

This thesis is motivated by taking the paradoxically pushed away pole of the assumption that human-type (complex language borne) self-consciousness is an obvious boon, as captured in the ‘man is the

measure of all things' meme. Instead, I argue our particular kind of consciousness is a spandrel (at best, an exaptation!) and as such did not appear originally as a boon to our furthered existence, but as a curse that just as likely might have lead directly to our extinction. I then propose the ego, as a purely biological object, emerges to solve this "problem" (of being a harried animal still embedded and contained by its natural environment in flat social groups, but now experiencing a literal "God-consciousness") where the ego's primary goal is to maintain all the lies necessary for "self"-esteem in the face of the otherwise overwhelming angst of first grasping the concept of our mortality and recognizing the endless chaos by which the future becomes the present, and in this always both recapitulating and denying the character of the past. This is of course a perversely one-side argument, but as with this work it is simply meant to stand against the tide of current forms of thinking that have gone too far to their own endlessly denied paradoxical pole by assuming themselves the ethical and rational centre of all value in their and all other epistemic domains.

This, I will try and argue soon is no more evident than in our continued endorsement of the current metaphysics and material agency of our global economic system means in terms of the clearly irrational ends some otherwise non-vested and not so easily psychologically corruptible individual or group would see it as otherwise "intentionally" aiming for, i.e. the probable if not inevitable collapse of large chunks of post-modern civilization, and so the near end of the hope of pursuing all the, what I can argue for only on somewhat vacuously given *prima facie* terms, empty values by which we seem driven to such collectively self-destructive ends in the first place. But before I can begin that argument I must first articulate as clearly as possible the fine conceptual-philosophical problem as it arises in the context of the tipping point we call first mind as situated within the spectrum of norms by which life and mind spreads itself on the world, sometimes well and sometimes in spite of our best intentions with horrible unintended consequences requiring no help from any evil--big or small--to unfold, just lack of epistemic humility (and maybe more deeply because of our need to construct so many of them so far beyond sufficient or necessary need, all to perpetuate the illusion of lasting certainty and control over nature).

The road to hell is paved with inaccurate perceptions and too arbitrary values, intentionality is just impelled towards messaging, don't shoot it, but always be endlessly skeptical of its *interpreted* meta-contents.

Even if the data morphisms informing VALUE or some particular values do owe there "value-certainty" or non-arbitrariness to some intrinsically lasting essence of ethical and epistemic goodness this is often only contextually determinable, so possibly only evidencing a local value for those objects in lieu of more intractable assessments meant to ensure some infinite and universal (non-finite and non-local) value is in play. This seems especially true of many of our most lauded historical values as once the truly objective evidence from science and philosophy is first deeply considered this often makes agnosticism the saner epistemic position to take on many, if not most past and current values (let alone past and current facts!!!). Instead, I fear we continue to promote more use of naive divide and conquer reason, which typically simply reifies one pole of some value over the other wholesale, and for all time.

Particularly, I suspect the ‘man is the measure of all things’ value and percept will have to be recast unless we intend to continue to “measure” nature into unrecoverable decline even as we promote the best hopes for perfecting the human condition by bringing an end to all suffering by the same “measurings”.

These failures to warrant values and percepts more deeply is often particularly true in regard to those “facts” our tribe, or any tribe has otherwise non-consciously chosen as “normal”, so imposing a value on a behaviour as if there is some necessary fact of the matter, when the opposite is usually true, i.e., there is very little of necessity or deep warrant in many tribal values at all. VALUE is a deeply and likely intractably intentional term, so nothing epistemically objective in the mind-independent sense could ever come from such subjectivity directly without begging the ontological questions. For starters, the universally biological could care less for promoting any specific value for any individual, only general fitness for the entire genome (and this is only *as if* caring, not ever *felt* as such), so as death and violence are as central to life as are peace and thriving the general case is “good” only if the genome persists with sufficient living particulars situated in the right environments to sustain it, and perhaps, if new more complex and resilient forms emerge over the hard choices a value perspective might summarily block as one not best for all involved, but which otherwise is best; nature eats her young and even vegans must kill to live; only chemotrophs can ever be ethically pure as physicalists.

I also think the (value) norms of fashion are consistent with this case, as well as my recent whimsical account of the extreme inversion of sexual mores and meanings owed the skull image; there is always much Yin-Yang in this. My next case will be more telling for the violent reactions between tribes this particularly problematic norm creates in spite of its already relatively rare deviation from the default case: that being the human universal taboo against homosexuality. This deviation will be explained on a needs-based account of how taboos may differently arise, even when they are identically and more immediately informed by the chthonic well-spring of the general forms of primate sexuality as it falls to the more extreme particular case for human sexuality, so not from derived wants at all. Much of our ethical choice is simply rationalization of what we’ve non-consciously decided as wants in appearance, but not what we necessarily want at all, but due to problems nature creates for living things only culture needs to decide about, in turn because of our deep and unexplained need to decide irrationally over allowing the matter to simply remain in perpetuity (because that is its truth!) an open rational question (too many open questions tempts epistemic chaos and destabilizes our thoughts about our identities, and if the references are chaotic at some point the referrer and all referents must be as well). This is anathema to our near pathological need for certainty and control and is what “justifies” knee-jerk use of naive reason most of all.

A Final “Perversely” Funny Example, or: How Even Marginalized Haters Gotta Hate

Let us, then, consider the practice of homosexuality. To begin, homosexual behaviour is not uncommon in the larger animal kingdom and given the extreme hedonistic reinforcement inherent to human sexual behaviour in its very tight linking to the dopamine system the default positive-value selection of many of the messy or shocking forms of sexuality going well beyond procreation are easy to anticipate. It is just as easy to see the problems in allowing these behaviours to expand without check, even without the need to apply any cultural value to the helpful and/or harmful acts that might be selected as sexual at all (think: balloon fetish and the role clowns play in this). Evolution has leveraged the dopamine system to keep animals behaving in ways that once they can speak they are immediately conflicted about (also for good reason, defecation is healthy, interacting with fresh familial feces is relatively low risk and may even confer immune system benefits, but leaving around and interacting with rotting piles of stranger's shit is clearly problematic). Once animals become sufficiently enervated for receiving phenomenal pleasure from touch and are otherwise well fed the demands of filling one's time once some values are represented by aiming for acts that may be freely chosen and accessed without clear limit the possibility of sexual behaviour not strictly procreative seems inevitable, as do to a compensating degree the emergence of taboos against them becoming necessary as a hedge against the behaviours becoming too dysfunctional; *lest a homosexuality revolution doom the species to otherwise pleasurable extinction*, but there are clearly positive selective pressures involved as well.

Human sexuality is of a more hyper kind due to the negative pressures leading us to become self-consciously cultural, and in this we risk harm from excesses other species avoid for being hypo-sexual in comparison. Homosexual and other non-procreative forms of sexuality provide a relief to the chaotic nature of the often-relentless demands of the human sex drive (especially in recently sexually matured individuals lacking the experience to see the downsides of unchained sexual expression but who are often overwhelmed by their new desires and by the all too easy to access opportunities for fulfilling them in a life of relative leisure and *ennui*) as well as serving as a further form of social bonding and grooming. But, rape (and this will be politically denied and anyone making this rationally evidenced claims demonized as a "bad" person, as if our abhorrence of the act is the objective proof the act is wrong in materially logical *a priori* terms too, when in factual biological terms all we need ask is whether it works to bring about the right biological norm, which in the final analysis is impregnation as opposed to not being so, values be damned before values can be spoken of and their negative effects prohibited by institutions) while a marginal practice is also positively selected for as a reproductive strategy *simply and cruelly* because it works whether we like that or not (Nature not only eats her young, she often rapes, abandons, and bullies them too, these are hard truths to accept. Again, vegans who think they are sparing living things optimally by not eating any meat are similarly deluded: Nature eats life to live!, except for those bacteria that can extract energy from purely non-living chemical difference. Are these bacteria the ethically excused and morally pure or are they the sole cause of all ethical malaise, so many microscopic angels leading us inexorably to the fall from grace?).

Suffering as much belongs, in *functional-fitness* terms, to the essence of life as anything, but if we believe the Buddha not necessarily to the essence of minds. We must always work hard to remind ourselves as philosophers and scientist that biological norms, even the most complex and accurate perceptual ones do not give a crap about GOOD and BAD to start, at least until after these values may be felt and signed or symbolized to other like feelers first. So much of the selective pressure directed at choosing over poles or spectrums of cultural norms is due to our arbitrary imposition of *a posteriori* negative value on otherwise relatively “good” and positively selected sets of behavioural norms deeply entangled with and intended to reinforce those behaviours regardless as to some further value they might be deemed to have in abstract representation according to only one out of millions of possibly otherwise perfectly serviceable, sustainable and fit forms of life. And, even if only at the margins or the long tail of behavioural possibility (think: nose-picking and booger eating, which turn out behavioural goods in pre-cultural terms, but ones lately culturally demonized in spite of the good purposes these behaviours were both selected and *reinforced* for!).

In small but otherwise very socially entangled groups with the right sorts of shared sensory experience these extremes are more easily tolerated and/or mitigated, but once group structure fragments into hierarchies as it only has for us very lately, these behaviours can more easily be hidden or denigrated and their natural sources and insinuations denied; in practice demonized by all in speech, but also in practice subtly reinforced in allowing for endless hidden opportunity for re-occurrence, especially within families and tribes, sadly, and only pushed away as a problem of evil largely due to the failings of others in what turns out to often be displaced and false myths, be they about criminal cabals and global conspiracies or isolated serial-killing or raping monsters. So, we, in these informally practised ethical inconsistencies tacitly endorse the inevitable lack of control we have over ever achieving some total obviation of the worst of the “bad” behaviours exactly in proportion to how certain we come to be about their wrongness, yielding norms of superficial and paradoxical complicity in promoting a hidden tolerance combined with a representational universal denial, not really evidencing norms of rationality at all, *just seeming to*.

Consider the following two hunter-gatherer tribes’ documented taboos around homosexuality⁴⁸. We have a relatively rare set of *close* cases where instead of a complete prohibition against homosexuality, likely the default norm of most cultures, especially tribal and religious ones, there is whole-tribe endorsement (superficially at least) of homosexual acts. However, and this is where things get instantly absurd in an all too human way, one of the tribes only endorses male-to-male anal sex, while the other only endorses male-to-male oral sex. In each case these acts are much more strictly constrained in terms of appropriate contexts than the more immediately necessary practice of heterosexuality, which in these cases is sometimes practised more begrudgingly. Not surprisingly these tribes are very paternal, but here is the twist: these two tribes were also at war with each other over their different norms of sexual practice in much the same way we now see homophobic tribes set against homo-tolerant tribes today, yet if any of this were driven by *transparent* rational consideration one would expect these tribes to be by this already more normatively aligned and therefore more likely to extend, not so strangely

counter-restrict, the range of practices within their already rarely tolerant and shared deviance from the, *ceteris paribus*, universal taboo.

I hope at least you find this entire situation tragically funny (“fragic”?) but also supportive of where I am headed. The mystery to solve is why we always seem most upset and thereby come to derive the most social power or tribal cache exactly in terms of what often turns out the more arbitrary value choices, even in cases where we may have already gone off the rails of normalcy more deeply determined by biological and cultural universals or defaults. Here we are often collectively most in denial about the oft-missed need and deeper value of choosing and defending all of our norms more rationally and transparently as well. Yes, at the tribal level it is easy to explain the lack of rationality from these cultures’ failure to have developed science and formal logic, but clearly use of naive reason motivated by some deep need for epistemic certainty (and the control this yields) is already in play and this looks to be the same sort of cause at play even when more rational looking forms of epistemic norms are chosen, especially in cases where it turns out we have got the science or philosophy wrong. Historically speaking this seems true of much of the bulk of historical claims for knowledge, as lasting pursuit of knowledge is always more a weeding out than keeping in—and finally—is often a *leaping over*, as captured by Popper and Kuhn’s respective claims, i.e., most of our shared and only superficially justified beliefs often turn out lastingly false “facts”, yet who amongst us works from this basis in our day to day agency? The ethical and epistemic impulse entailed from history requires being most skeptical about our own culturally derived knowledge first, and only justly of other’s after we’ve sorted all the inevitable falsehoods out of our own always unsound semantic webs, but is this the “normal” practice at all?

Not ever, it seems to me.

Chapter 7 – The Epistemic Character Of Norms And The Mind-Body Problem

The 2 Fine Points of Rational Concern about Norms and the Body-To-Mind Tipping Point (*Original Intentionality*)

So . . . here we are at the fine point of concern, and as I mentioned I now (*then*) feel (*felt*) the results I have worked so far to justify as pointing the way to some sorely needed and much larger project of epistemic reform will appear underwhelming (and it’s just as likely I’ll have sowed seeds to further our collective forms of denial, not confront them). That is in part because these fine points as expressed will *accurately* appear underwhelming in the *being-justified* sense. Where I expected to have laid arguments bare to get to this point even as I expanded the domain and depth of analysis all I fear I’ve done is

produced a very large abstract defining a scandalously prohibitive and sure to be mocked research project; one requiring years of hard research and data compilation to start, let alone finish (not to mention the hard to face epistemic contrition). All I find myself really able to do is make the bare claims as finely as possible, not even close to comprehensively—let alone completely, consistently or correctly—in some suggestive and generally descriptive fits and starts and then proffer further examples of what I see as suggestively evident “proof-pointing” to such irrationalities being opaquely, subtly or even transparently practised, *as otherwise fully rationally justified means and ends*. However, as many of these are based on pet peeves they are possibly much more inferentially useful at showing my hidden biases than furthering my thesis (in the end if the psyche of the world is irreducibly mad we all are, but we might need to get better at negotiating that madness, even by leveraging it with clear but warranted a-rational intent at times). There are no clear or perfectly well-formed deductions or inductions on offer here, so nothing by which to best explain anything as “proved” either. That is OK. The harder work is left for you and with some good reason.

If what follows were instead produced in many volumes as some philosophical magnum opus it would be, I now think (perhaps revealing in me some compensatory effort to maintain some epistemically ironic form of “self-esteem”) even more likely to fall as an epistemic still birth than this work is also likely to. Worse, in those people I most wish to wake up to their own invisible irrational practices otherwise deemed normatively rational all this would do is cause more reaction, more perjury, and less communication in the way I’ve hoped for by modelling this book’s arguments somewhat like the implicit model of communication I have weaved throughout and would preferentially defend (soon more explicitly) as a definition of the ideal practice of observationally informed material science (taking a stab at the demarcation problem in the process). So rather than with a ribbon and a bow I tie up loose ends as a barely constructed *lens*, hopefully and all too prohibitively shining a light on the rotten core of those images currently produced by the methods of philosophy, logic (math) and science that may turn out the most deeply irrational in directing our collective agency (explicitly or invisibly). I am not meaning to claim all, many, or even some current knowing-ends or hypothesizing-means be deemed perniciously irrational in some absolute or comprehensive sense, or just meaning the more trivial claim some current “facts” are just plain wrong or some research programs are “crazy” in an uninteresting but still rationally appropriate sense (think: perpetual motion machines, or internal combustion engines running “only” on water).

These sorts of epistemic dead ends are an inescapable part of the overall process of improving knowledge and are not my main target. I am though deeply concerned with those value and accuracy norms confused with facts too naively, particularly in cases where I have proposed up-front but largely missing and *transparent* definitional and inferential work is required to trace the normative dependencies back down to the essential matter of things in naturalistic terms to the certain data morphisms. This, I have proposed, requires one to first show sufficient non-arbitrariness in the values in play and how they in turn are tied to observations of sufficient accuracy, and only then determine them right down to leveraging the well-vetted data morphisms required to fulfill the concomitant speech acts

by which minds cause novel material (or other seemingly immaterial, but always materially supervenient) things to be created. I believe only then can any transition from is' to ought or ought to is' be made in the sense some ideally rational ethical system assumes is best, so possibly and probably capable of facilitating universal and lasting benefit to wide and deep, collective and individual thriving. Only by such a protracted and transparent means could the warrant for norms being logically analyzable ever be rationally shown in the most ideal sense required. This supposedly ideal ethical system, by taking the reigns of oughts from is' out of nature's randomly evolving contingent hand and leveraging her only lately very impressively represented set of necessary but still incomplete laws^{NOTE} also honours

NOTE: And I must ask the question: Is it at all ethical to go about trying to remake creation according to our values and relatively accurate perceptions with the economic, technological and productive zeal we do given the current state of affairs in physics? *But for all we know now we didn't before* (and the hope, always the hope for it) we seem farther from sussing out any sort of unification of fundamental natural law than what we expected going in. We seem as far or farther away than we've ever been, but for perhaps not seeing all this as the trans-paradoxical structural "fact" from which we need to start the pre-ontological work.

the rationalist thrust as part of naturalism, by ensuring LOGIC itself is not the most arbitrary, so ultimately most valueless and least accurate method of warranting of all.

If logicism is to win the day it is only by having the cart both back behind the horse (peering out but not yet seen as the data morphisms) and only then back in front of it by perfecting the use of rationality as is already supposed required, by whatever method(s) and final epistemic solution some all-encompassing "uber-logic" covers. To achieve this is as much to promote keeping the fact-norm distinction clearer and to expose its current relative neglect. Not honouring this distinction more transparently is a problem not very well seen to date in either lay or academic practice. To solve it we must work much harder to better mark those most problematic norms which are conventionally leveraged as facts, but whose real explanation depends critically on the ontological presuppositions and normative quality (arbitrariness and relative accuracy) already opaquely in play, especially where the practitioners furthering these norms as facts are not aware they are even doing so, or in cases where they are aware of the problem but might still be assuming others are too, but aren't, so where the risk of much talking past summarily and widely ensues. By this alone the illusion easy access to meanings is equally shared and communicated otherwise persists invisibly.

I am also very concerned with those roads already deemed dead ends that might be revisited in the special *pre-ontological* sense I have proposed we are actually working in. But my greatest concern is for exposing those roads of inquiry and practice power does not want us to pursue at all. As those ruling are rarely scientists or philosophers the best work from philosophy and science is often twisted by rulers to serve popular and uninformed values, most often by disingenuously treating the metaphysics as settled

when it most clearly is not. Again, I am concerned to show the irrationality of certain currently favoured metaphysical means more than ends in terms of those negative ethical consequences we risk bringing about by promoting rational values that turn out nothing but precipitously arbitrary unicorn effigies based on inaccurate percepts whose falseness is not to be shown by logic at all. This implied end, if constructed over means seemingly justified but actually invalid or otherwise due to “false” theorizing or modelling will only be found in the cold and hard experience of future *unrepresented-until-they-happen* consequences, not in the satisfaction of some favoured speech acts or propositions. When the wrong models are being forwarded the ends produced could never be consistent with what was otherwise hoped for, but in these cases must still have been what we were aiming for all along (think: random collapse).

If that unintended—but always by humans—intentionality laden end is not ever itself defensible as ethically rational it could not ever have been rationally motivated. It is then actually a case of the worst kind of irrationality possible; that masquerading as good use of “reason” by fulfilling oughts but only by degrading and ultimately devaluing all the *is’* by which such oughts must be materially constructed—and so much for the proof of human reason and its most laudable values, its human rights and responsibilities and project to perfect the human condition. It seems to me currently we are more intent on “perfecting” and extending avoidable and pointless suffering for all life on earth, including ourselves. The possibility of instead *first* embracing being and life as it is before value ever existed and so *first* honouring that as *the* core ethical value without needing *first* to so recklessly undermine its nurturing furtherance never occurs to humanity anymore (because we’ve constructed so many of our hopes on forms of false epistemic certainty and rapaciously neglectful forms of technological control, and all this in spite of the very wide and deep logical incompletenesses and inconsistencies in and between our current best models of reality) but we will find our way home to this value none-the-less, just more bereft of real need being lastingly met and so less able to “suffer well” at all.

Problem 1 for Rationality as Practised: The Body-to-Mind Tipping Point

I have outlined a skeletal quasi-physicalist model built from current favoured takes in more scientifically aligned approaches to philosophy of mind. I have defined my Big-3 problems (Mind-Body Interaction, Original Intentionality, Symbol Grounding) and laid out the ontological playing field in terms of tensions between materialism/dualism and materialist-realism/idealism (idealists believe only in the reality of the idea of sub-stance, but not in the matter of it at all) but there are many forms of dualism and materialism (and other onto-isms) in play and the disputes between different kinds of materialists are not necessarily less charged (especially between the naive realists and the eliminativists) than those between materialists and dualists (lately, between 20th century analytical philosophy of language philosophers and 21st century neo-empiricists). In the end it does not matter for MATTER (nor does

MIND mind) where body first *tips* to more or (here an **XOR**) first *meets* a mind (on some “occasionalism”). All that really matters, all we should mind in terms of solving the epistemic problems (positively by science, negatively by philosophy) is that body-functionality and mind-intentionality are defined in conceptually non-identical terms by all plural sides, yet at some fine locus of *still universally-closed* causation must interact *lawfully* (somehow).

So, as the empirical evidence (or epistemic fashion) lately suggests—regardless as to ontology—we can today rationally believe the emergence of perception in arthropods **does** best mark the origin of mind by some first materially instantiated act of original representation or first mental state in, variously, a minimally unproblematic correlative, and/or supervenient, and/or interactive sense (where the reductive sense is now assumed epistemically problematic).

This harbinger mind-archetype is also, then, the best and *necessarily real* starting point for unambiguously defining and justifying one’s ontological stand in terms of real functions fully instantiated as equally real microscopic and sub-microscopic matter-structure dynamisms (over some kind of gap).

To do ontology in this neo-empiricist sense means couching any or all models of *intentionality as bio-function* directly in terms of some actual organism and its biophysical and biochemical totalization as a pre-requirement for meaning well, perhaps for meaning rationally at all.^{NOTE}

NOTE: My initial academic training was in physical chemistry, but I ended up diverging more to the biological and polymer chemistry side of things (differential equations and adiabatic heat curves haunt me still). This has left me with an imaginative toolkit based around “stick and ball” models (aimed closely to the nanometer scale of the atom) and other isomorphizing “geometrical” representations (stoichiometric equations, protein folding models, periodic electron shell configurations and orbital “shapes”, standard model particle “graphs” both visual and abstractly algebraic, etc.). These always supposed real chemical, atomic, and sub-atomic structures are not only very well represented *qualitatively and quantitatively* by such models, if any representations fit tighter in resemblance to their targets in a purely material epistemic sense than these I do not know what they are (a map is not the territory, and the moon is certainly NOT a ghostly galleon, but an electron orbit, no matter how abstractly given is still an orbit even if not a classically elliptical one). I believe philosophers and scientists, particularly rationalist-trained or closet rationalist ones too given to hypothetical-deductive uses of imagination starting only from too rarefied forms of conceptual purity and abstract logical structure might particularly benefit from thinking more in terms of the real and unproblematically evidenced actuality of these structures as the starting, not end point of theorizing (but for them being mostly just out of reach of direct observation, so the *closest* possible of the past’s *farthest* perceptions, “memories” of the universe before it had any minds at all). There is more of my concern we continue to invoke a too-Newtonian view of the mind in this; the view on offer here is ultimately quantum-relativistic and only mereologically substantive in a fractal sense inside of *reality-as-perception*. There is a deep and under-appreciated connection between scale and time (scale-time?) and fractal space (scale-time-space?) hiding here. To my thinking integration of the fractal, the quantum and the generally relativistic are the riddle perception solves as the unity of experience, not the thing into which perception is embedded as a supposed

emergence out of some *a priori* matter-only “one”-reality at all; perception on my view of things is simply the pre-ontological to post-ontological Derridean chef of the dish we, with some naive *and* critical confusion call all of reality, but is really only the finite part of it.

This does not change if one instead promotes a dualism at this locus of radical existential change; one still owes a causal account at this same fine point, but the burden and scope of proof certainly appears much bigger for dualists, now one of *original intentionality though original trans-ontological interaction*. We are in either case (all cases of?) “onto-ism” always dealing with two categorically pure and qualitatively non-overlapping aspects of some otherwise sufficiently formed material stuff—both in-formed by data, and ex-formed by function—now bearing the novel onticity of mind-stuff in lawful ways, but only for dualisms as a coming together of one-nesses, not a falling away from a one-ness, i.e., where the idea rubber first hits the matter road. The epistemic project needs at this point put down the naturalistic project and switch to shoring up the orthogonal account of where and how the “ideas” now borne by this matter enter the existential field (having otherwise run in parallel auto-lawfully anticipating but not yet fit to touch or interact with matter, but always waiting for/anticipating it, one supposes).

Now an entirely supra-independent second source of universal essence need be proposed and while there is still assumed a form of totalized casual closure (now in two “ortho-linear” directions, one for matter-to-matter causation alone, the other for idea-to-idea causation alone, and the third for the sub/supra paired orthogonal interactive accounts, i.e. matter-to-idea and idea-to-matter causation) it seems an entire account of ortho-lawfulness must enter the epistemic field only at this time yet each substance still have some “at-a-lawful-distance” sort of onticity of its own. As the matter first reaches up and meets the mind-stuff there is still an “emergence” of mind out of matter *from the perspective of the totalized matter* but not, inevitably, in the very problematic and I think ineliminably metaphorical way ‘emergence’ is used to shore up non-reductive forms of materialism.

EMERGENCE: The Most Shamelessly Used Empty Physicalist Metaphor Ever Proposed

In fact, I hope in reading these last few sentences you intuit the problem that the word ‘emergence’ properly belongs semantically to (and so might be used soundly or cogently for) both materialist and dualist accounts.

When mind “emerges” from matter on non-reductive accounts of materialism/physicalism the term ‘emerge’ also semantically/epistemically targets the essence and lawful dynamism of the matter-mind-interaction emergence within its default conceptual intensionality and extensionality in one real step as well. However, for dualisms only an account of the “emergence” of matter-mind interaction is needed

to start, so here the semantic grounding of the concept ‘emergence’ at the mind-body tipping (meeting?) point is **without**—as the diametric senses paired with ‘**within**’—both the matter and mind stuff (if only in abstract post-representation) in regard to the intension (~definition) and extension (things picked out by the definition) of the concept EMERGENCE. In other words, in the case of explicating non-reductive materialism mind emerges strictly “out of” matter (and so does the matter-idea interaction in *necessary, but here epistemically trivial* onto-orthogonal lockstep) while in the case of dualism mind does not really “emerge” out of matter in the same strict sense. More precisely only mind’s interaction with matter emerges “in to” the here-to-fore *only material world, but only in reference to some now God-like epistemic frame of reference*. Perhaps this is more a “mergence” than an emergence (feel free to explore the linked etymologies of ‘merge’ and ‘emerge’, ‘e’ simply means ‘out of’, while merge simply means ‘to dip or plunge’ but the root meaning is always shared, even equally given logicism, so possibly invoking a Derridean form of counting for the root term’s various modifiable senses instead?) but then where did all the ideas themselves emerge and/or merge from, surely NOT the Big Bang?

So, positing an emergence/mergence of ideas for dualism *just in regard to the finitely totalized matter* glosses the missing account of the original source of ideas. Where do all the ideas, the thoughts, the feels, the qualia, etc. come from *originally*, and why is this not **the** central problem for defending dualism *as it surely is for defending physicalism*, but different only for differently leveraging the same root metaphor. In the dual case we propose a “melding” of two mysteriously given sources of diametrically opposed kinds of standing-under/standing-over. In the mono case, we describe instead a “dipping into and pulling out” of the second out of the first, where now the first one is always the “one” ground of the second. Surely no rational person who wants to be taken empirically **and** logically serious in any epistemic sense is still positing a personal God for this?. However, I doubt this linked-meaning pair of notions if used in either isolated or mixed senses could ever be interpreted without damning metaphorical residue as both need be subsumed under a wider *and always metaphysical* account of saying what beyond solving the interaction problem grounds the very possibility of the totalized and fundamental as the deepest possible source(s) of universal, but always mixed lawful and contingent change. The *prima facie* semantic problem (the one only starting with the etymologically entailed *cross-entangled intensionality*) is that both ‘emergence’ and ‘mergence’ might (must?) always have their semantic entailments substantially overlap; each is a dark (logic defying) star orbiting the other *all at once in some seamless a priori bi-coining* more so than one meaning “evolving” in prefixing or anti-prefixing reaction to the exultantly prior meaning (i.e., where instead ‘emergence’ simply “e+merges” from ‘mergence’).^{NOTE}

NOTE: Here is more mixed Derridean and non-Derridean counting. The naive etymological entailment is if ‘emergence’ is derived from ‘mergence’ then what emergence is and means must be, respectively, materially and semantically derived from mergence intensionally and extensionally speaking, or we may just be changing

meanings after the fact to suit epistemic fashion and not at all honouring the semantic intuitions leading to the coining of “emergent physicalism” in the first place; heralding a semantic bait and switch.

Again, does this metaphysically inconsistent “self-pair” as an epistemic trans-logical structure invoke Derridean or non-Derridean forms of counting in either logical isolation or when taken together? I think it invokes both for both (in diverging ways) if only over the same assumed Western binary identifying fundament with substance, and vice versa. For dualism an essential once-two-ness of otherwise isolated forms of fundament-substance/fundament-insubstance somehow now become counted as a oneness as the unity of experience because as Descartes only really may be claimed to have empirically “proved” with the *cogito*: ‘there is thinking’, so prioritizing the pure subjectivity aesthetically by a material skepticism (reifying one form’s substantive role as the fundament of experience over the other, so putting pressure on the fundament-substance identity as the interaction problem, i.e. dualism largely presents as a one problem at the body-mind meeting point, not a two problem). Differently in the monist case an otherwise ontologically incontrovertible one-ness somehow bootstraps itself into a conceptual two-ness to explain the unity of experience as arising back down into the matter, thus prioritizing the objectivity aesthetically by a realism of both matter and ideas (reifying the prioritization of the fundament over any of the forms of substance, so putting pressure on the fundament-substance identity as the reduction or (XOR) emergence problem, i.e. monism largely now presents as a dual, a Janus-faced problem, one that if Jaegwon Kim is right⁴⁹ pushes some emergentists to deny universal casual closure for mental causation, so promotes causal overdetermination of the mental over the physical).

Both views, I think, have failed to see there are also Derridean forms of the unity of experience possible and actual right now; while we always start with this supposed “higher” conscious perception as of a unity for us now, this higher experiencing was, naturalistically-speaking, only made possible much later in evolution and representation (it was developing into existence back then, and surely can keep developing beyond this now). Let’s not forget there has already been at least three very big—and maybe many more—so, not just one tipping made towards higher forms of consciousness. First there is *originally intentionality*, and only then higher forms of differently walled-off kinds of minded-ness, i.e., intentionality, original experience, and original “semantsis” (original self-conscious awareness, or “God-consciousness”). Yet shouldn’t we also say, in a retro-diachronic sense treating all these emergences as one ongoing event-process, there is only one archetypal original emergence of first mind still unfolding?

So, don’t our minds still contain and function over that same original mind in some very tangible if not placeholder sense, if only at our mind’s lowest levels of functioning and so still in that sense via these many causally past-locked and future-looking effigies? Original mind still embodies, as does the entirety of the past and present all-species genome, the operating system kernel built over to realize our current forms of experience, even if it never experienced a damn thing back then. If it was (and so still is) the

first mind in any factual sense at all, it remains the basis for all further developing of minds, multiple realizability and perpetuity be damned!. But, and we simply have no current way of confirming this or not, we by this act as if there is no ongoing concern of what it might be like to be a mind at its own lower proper scale, even as we are at the bottom made of hundreds, thousands or even billions of those same possible minds and so, maybe only walled-off from all of them and each other at the top, not the bottom. But, as at the bottom minds also start walled-off more trivially because there is no possibility of content yet, it is only at the middle this question really aims, at the meso-scale. So, are there many discontinuous experiences of minded-ness possible, lying along some Cantor's Dust-like line, so to be ordered as some finite evolutionary para-spectrum now only made up across scale, or is all experience due only one still emerging and evolving mind only disposed to, or occurrently experiencing, only as a genomic whole, but for what the more sophisticated material or functional complexity allows to manifest only at certain scales (i.e., mo' neurons = mo' consciousness)? Or is it both of these things all at once (that all minds at any manifest level experience but always experience minds at different levels as incapable of such, or is it just that possible channels remain to be opened, *or already lie open to us to finally start using better?*) in spite of what logicism says and maybe the real problem is partially one of relative neglect of scale concerns, and ultimately due some accidental and vainglorious impoverishment owed human-type consciousness alone?

Let's not forget in our favoured info-semantic model it takes a dual level functional actuality (tertiary, if we included sensory registration) melding (sensory registration and) perceiving with conceiving to first make the unity of experience consciously felt and represented as such in language, but then it is already by this expressed as a unity that has already slid existentially fully from the concrete to the abstract, from the real to the virtual, then to the irreal, and on to the impossibly real (so, always as much over than through the gap, but here it is not the appearance-reality gap, but a further one "going out" from "real" existence to "real" non-existence). All we ever have tractably given to us as the universe is already a reduction of some delimited (by the bounds of the observable but not actual universe) and regressively fractalized pre-ontological, but otherwise near-infinite GR totality. This Uber Block of block universes also presents as a plurally Derridean, as a trans-real and potentially uncountably infinite sink, but is always one still trans-paradoxically defined in relation to just one BBS as source (so a real nothing coming in and a real everything going out). We assume only one means to grok all of this, starting only with purely separable *differences* expressed in conception, pulling them off and by this degrading experience over the *differances* of these always dual objective forms of ossified consciousness, i.e., those by which an ego first naively reasons in its divide and conquer mode, but one always grounded in the possible re-experience of subjective forms of non-dual, i.e., ego-less or "God" consciousness, just as well.

The Para-Relational Metaphysic of CHANGE

So, for the continued divide and conquer use of reason both sides still favour each opposed ideological group may need abandon use of both terms (emerge and merge, *monism and dualism!*) or risk worse than “talking past”, instead talking about the same damn thing and yet in gross epistemic perversion not believing they are. I expect to see papers along these lines in the literature soon enough.

I believe the *prima facie* problem is ‘emergence’/‘mergence’ is/are only terms consistently usable in an essentially and intractably cross-semantic referential sense as part of an irreducibly meta-transitive/trans-logical 3-place relation; the one falling out of my following rough sketch of a deeper account for CHANGE. Both A, imagined here as some local thing from which some differently imagined C emerges (and so also by this some or all aspects of A-ness end up given away into the form and matter of C things, but never matter-energy non-conservatively, nor in this over-determining causes) and this same C, again, the thing that emerges, must bi-obversely in a pre-and-post sense both “be” **within/without** some further B* if the idea that an A could ever become a C is to make any sense for either monisms or dualisms. I am here already describing a structural phase space for CHANGE akin to the one proposed for the wave equation’s *unobserved* evolution, with the relata appearing as *cross-dated* moments of finite amounts of *entangled* matter-energy transduction, where in some fine moment this perhaps vanishingly small parcel of matter-energy—at the very, very least—is not really being or existing in that moment as either A or C anymore, but instead being or existing as some non-(A and C) only in the fatally unobservable quantum sense. To understand change at all I see no way around proposing some finite para-moment of being where despite the final perceived changes described soundly at a much higher level, what is only at the much lower-level always supervening on matter-energy losses from A yielding to balanced gains for C; a “space” where change always goes to hide exactly so it can really be itself, the illogic of it all notwithstanding! Otherwise, A and C could never stand *beside* one another at any one time as the laws of conservation demand, yet somehow they still must even if only when passing through B*, but now in some analogy as a *quantum tunneling* (so perhaps, then, B* is simply the “wall” tunnelled through, or better yet in that moment becomes more than the wall, first on one side and only in that same final moment of matter-energy transduction that is “the real change maker”, finally on the other). But then, change is never a fit target for being perceived or conceived of finally, largely because perception is always a paradox reducer in the first place, and because conception simply goes along for the paradox denying ride as perception’s developmentally anticipated other aspect, the “mind” of perception’s “body”.

All emergent enough change still seems to me to reduce to saying when sitting becomes standing even as it is impossible to do both at the same time, right? Here B* is the always non-locally, but only abstractly delimited background of some datum of/as whatever finite local change is really taking place. B* is defined as that same-different (so, Derridean) *all-fundament-all-substance and most importantly all-change* embedding “thing” (that “one turned” thing, we call the universe) only supposed by first reifying the realist pole of the Western binary as uber-ground (self-impugning as an incoherent logical definition coming out, if not going in). B* is supposed what allows the “real” possibility of:

1.

Any and all categorical change in type or cardinality of tokens in terms of minimally coherent and finite stuffness ever manifesting at all; entailing some kind of novel change in quality or quantity that is also always locally and finitely indexed to some range of scale. Thus, what “becomes” is always somewhat “taken” from the background stuff too (and remembering entanglement, this may also be a non-local “taking”) without *necessarily* deleting any other kind or essence but for what some natural law need work over as its proper objects (matter and energy inputs), but equally, always contingently invoking some *necessarily* prior *contingent* loss of extant matter-form in, at least, the diminished cardinality of some non-vanishing kind at some proper scale of reduction or supervenience, while at some different scale the “opposite” happens and CAUSATION is behind all of this, never “miracle”.

2.

The visible and experienceable universe always remaining that same totalizing fundament within the much later emerging unity of experience (always walled-off, *don't forget*) in spite of all the novel forms of material comings and goings, and ever shifting and logically entailed cardinalities of all its “real” types and tokens, be they natural or not, or concrete or abstract.

So, what we end up with above is a recapitulation of both mind-independent and mind-dependent forms of being under one logical seeming “roof”, i.e., B*. So, B*, it also seems, both particularly changes and generally stays the same as A becomes C (infinite epistemic regress beckons here too!), by this ensuring causal closure and conservative matter-energy finitude; there is always both a local particular event and a non-local matter/energy-compensating universal reaction co-occurring with any finite real change *over time*, but the time-indexed asymmetries marking the “change” can never co-occur *in one moment, only over a minimal chain of them*. The * is simply meant to remind us, then, this realm of “pure change” is always and forever by this made unobservable and intangible in any direct way, yet is none the less real for this, i.e., supposed no less fundamental and/or substantial. In fact, B* is most real exactly because of this need for it to “exist” to explain the paradox of change most of all. This describes any and all particular “emergings” as necessarily passing through a specially transient but always *paradoxically (Derridean) inter-mixed series of spectrally/fractally existential shadings of real A&~C to ~A&C matter-energy complexes*. These complexes must “pre-exist” in some essential and lawful disposition always as/in B* in some “real” sense (either as Aristotle’s or some other dispositional form of realism) before any particular A or many A’s (and many D’s, E’s as and if required) could ever become a C at all in some essential actuality, especially as A *is* (or A’s, D’s, etc. are) *literally becoming C in particular*, but also in universal or general terms before any and all change were possible at all. This is where Aristotle floundered and proposed the prime mover at the same ontological level as *Being* (or as my B*), when what he needed, what he was so close to was seeing the need for a pre-ontological account as I have conceived it, but instead he got stuck in the naive use of reason: ‘matter is more fundamental’, ‘no form is’, ‘no matter is’, . . . do you see the problem with too much naive use of reason yet?

As a trans-logical 3-place relation ‘emergence’ can never be used soundly to equivalently represent both 1-place events (mind “out of matter” as still one thing) and/or 2-place trans-ontological events (mind “dipping into matter” as two separate things then becoming one) without simply begging the question (yet again) or endorsing an invisible semantic bait and switch, conflation, or equivocation. The only logical and semantically non-begging use of the term ‘emergence’ I see is pre-ontological: if change is possible and real, if one thing or set of things may become another one or many thing in novel onticity or ontology then these one/many event/things must abide in a third *paradoxical* pre-and-post source of Being/non-Being (*neti, neti*) and this ____? ____ will ultimately be both infinitely regressive *and* anti-regressive, but for in how perception first reduces it to the unity of experience, but I re-digress. Those lately proposing casual over-determination, another entailment of my pre-ontological metaphysic, are already evident and also anticipate this outcome. All this also recapitulates the pre-ontological problem I keep waving it; can you *feel* the real epistemic need yet?

To recapitulate:

In the final analysis I can see no technical and non-begging form of emergence being proposed unless the original Parmenidean paradox of change is solved by its conception as well. It seems to me the notion something can emerge out of some extant one-or-many-thing-event-nesses to become—but not in the exact same space (volume), and at later consecutive but never overlapping times—a two-thing-ness (so, taken in *species sub aeternitatis*) yet the whole shebang stays that same universal one-thing-ness, regardless as to whether that finally entails just ontic or both ontic and ontological novelty seems a self-contradiction in terms of how both material monism and dualism are defined (like the idea of a “real nothing”). Rather ‘emergence’ or just ‘mergence’ seems a more suitable label for what occurs when mind stuff is first fit to *e/merge* its causal ontic nature to matter’s correlatively, i.e., any logically consistent use of emergence can only be meant well across pre-ontological levels in the first place. Dualism, then, seems a more *not less* parsimonious account on this onto-relative basis, and the generally negative empirical meta-inductions of the kind Burge forwards are points in case.

But dualism really fails no better here as the only way we can then epistemically totalize the whole two-shebang is by trans-embedding the evolution of matter and ideas in a third quasi-ontological one-remaking framework. In other words, to really say how change over finite and fundamental substance (matter remains the fundament in this myth, is totalizable, but not does ever totalize what emerges out of, or merges with it) to possibly delimited and endlessly interacting mind-form also requires bringing any such proposed ontological/ontic differences back together into a singular existential story (a model of everything) as the unity of experience suggests. But for Dualism this requires the immediate proposal of an even more unstable ontological trinity, a third kind of sub-stance (more a holding-stance) which “meta-contains” and so allows the bringing of all together in a further but always pre-ontologically given realm of one being (but, soon a fourth, then a fifth kind of holding “stuff” or ontological realm will be needed to keep all the interaction gaps bound as some logical whole over each new kind of meta-intensionality that arises). Here yet another vicious epistemic regress ensues (over something more like

what one sees standing between two facing mirrors, not a delimited regress, but a regressing regress) but one never to be logically totalized as otherwise supposed (see: Gödel's Theorems and other death knells for achieving both logical completeness and soundness for any model of the Real numbers).

However, if there is matter and ideas and a further matter-idea essence-annealing "workshop" then there is no paradox as to how new things come into being at all, but there is also then no necessary limits placed on levels of ontology either, even as Occam's razor cuts more deeply with each added ontology. What is new of the essence of some originally extant object is then always trans-borrowed out of and cis-returned to this pre-ontological/pre-ontic "container", not of God, but of everything that might become real *but could only ever "exist" in space-time-scale* (think: possible but "real" non-ontic worlds not un-full of non-things disposed to not thing-ness as background). Space-time-scale *is* God's way of spreading out the infinite, but infinity is not ever a way of being any thing at all, any where, any how, any when, any way, nor any no where, any no when, and no how, or any no way either . . .

So, again, this too imprecise, too metaphorical side-exegesis, I think, still might show a possibly bigger boon and lesser burden for dualism than many seem to think, perhaps because they still think God has been smuggled back in, but that is not true, only *meta*-(mind-independent)-independent **and** non-space-time-scale forms of (not) existing have, but then again, what are numbers exactly? The real problem with dualism might not be in accounting for interaction *per se* (even epiphenomenalism still owes us a set of laws of appearance, i.e., how does it appear my thought I am thirsty is what causes me to go to the fridge, but isn't actually the cause, and separately laws of how thoughts may non-logically cause each other), but in accounting for the source both of ideas *and* their possible mergence to matter. The problem for mergence is it seems to always need propose two *full-stop* fundamental sources, never one. At least with emergent monism we are certain there is only one source out of which two things *emerge* rather than two *merging* as one; can you see the obverse but intractably linked semantic structure of emergence versus mergence in regard to the mind-body, *the original intentionality* tipping point yet?

The original felt/folk intuition was always given as a naive and often explicit form of "spiritual" dualism (this seems truer as I get older and my body has fallen behind my mind in terms of function, painfully so at times) but then naive reason could not abide with this, so according to the ego's insistence in seeking certainty and control as simply as possible, monism then ruled. Not too surprisingly, in the philosophical West the ground was always dualism to start as well (matter-form, Judea-Christian, then Cartesian ones, as a sweeping gloss) but in the casting off of the religious dogma of the soul, with this no longer infecting the practice of science, our most rationally enlightened ism, MONISM, first took hard root as reductionism. We swung ontologically backwards from these older dualisms to a hard monism, even as our count of Gods worshipped fell from many to one to none.

But reductionism now seems a red herring, so this makes the entire dynamic of onto-ideological fashion unstable (and to my thinking unfolding like an avoidable car crash in very slow motion as long as only non-Derridean counting is reified over Derridean counting). Lately there has been a bounce-back from

hard monism to either (non-Cartesian forms of) dualism or non-reductive monisms, but either way you look at it this situation is less tenable than what we started with, if only for the multiplying of ontologies, not beyond necessity, but where every on-offer ontology suffers from the same not-well-formed-ness in terms of the hidden substance-foundation binary. But worse from here, the near entire set of these current isms all seem to need invoke a version of mergence/emergence that is logically incoherent and epistemically regressive, but still the naive use of reason—the logicism—is not brought under suspicion (if logic is fallible then what grounds our continued hopes for certainty and control, what shores up the ‘man is the measure of all things’ meme?). This blinds us to the problem of being *lost in representations*, it blinds us from all the real paradox and the fact *natural* language over-determines logicism intrinsically, essentially and transparently. The only solution here, failing to address the hidden Derridean binary of Substantiality and Fundamentality, is to further the hope for epistemic totalization by a pluralism, but not an ontological one, *just* an epistemic one to start.

Of course, I am trying to point out a new way (back, then) forward, one requiring transcending, not rejecting logicism (naive reason has only been able to construct ism and ology to date in relative logical antagonism to each other *by design* after all!) but also shifting to seek—not ontological pluralism, but asking for, begging for, dying for ***an integration beyond all isms and ologies first***. Only then can the need for a pre-ontological account be embraced, one that requires a going back and “re-putting” together (body-mind/mind-body not ever BODY and MIND) the results of millennia of conceptual analysis and invention *first*, rather than endlessly furthering more of academia’s fine conceptual pullings apart; the universal existential fly, I fear, is running out of wings to pull off to understand how flight is possible without making the experience of it lost from the world.

The Shape of Para-Knowledge

The key is in the incommensurate *metaphysical* relationship between QM and SR/GR as much as anything. Until we stop thinking of all scientific knowledge as purely objective at some flat and seamless level of epistemic access and come to see all knowledge below the level of function is still pragmatically warded off and QM is really a theory of how pre-or-degraded matter as quantity comes into *reality-as-perception/perception-as-reality*—so is more a model of how reality is constructed over an intrinsically indefatigable gap than how reality is either directly or indirectly grasped—we will wrongly continue to treat the incommensurate puzzle of the quantum and the relativistic not as the meta-clue to the real problem but as a “flat” sham of a non-problem; one not ever solvable at any reductively logical level.

Further: GR, then, is as much a theory about the delimited nature of the mind out of which conception first binds this pre-matter/perceived-matter to/as experience (concepts—*in metaphor*—are ultimately unbounded hyperspheres circumscribing (empty) point identities centred on endless recapitulations to

the Big Bang Singularity; all volume-sounds signifying no-things along the fractal lines of all possible space-time-scales). There is no *flat* TOE to be found in physics to rule them all (worse, there is no hard or more fundamental science at all, just very small *and scale-relatively-speaking far*, then middle-scale *close* and finally very big *and scale-relatively far* sciences). But there is a hard and literally paradoxical material twist occurring first as the Big Bang and then recapitulated and re-twisted (secondly as unconscious mind, then thirdly as expressed self-conscious mind). The always evolving “pluriverse” is both a *many*-turns away from and a *many*-anti turns towards the original source as 2 interweaving circle/spirals, if only in both an ever-expanding, yet always infinitesimal falling away from the same point; on each re-turn passing close to the source once again, but now at a different scale, so only materially recapitulating the same original point (the BBS) at some difference and *differance*. Providing the epistemic untwisting only teasingly waved at here will solve the problem as to what and *how* numbers really are and show the way to Derridean as well as non-Derridean forms of “logic” and counting, but only a science of subjectivity aimed at developing the *within* of the self, which shows the ego as the Big Mind’s most essential non-thing, can do this; but only after or in concert with first idealizing the practice of rationality of all extant egos in more non-egoistic ways; always inevitably from both an ever-expanding and ethically centred personal and trans-egoic perspective (until the final leaping off the top rung of the spiral, always a leap of non-faith).

The source of LOGIC is, of course, assumed in equal and proportional part of the essence of the matter (or of the ideas) so when thought is most appropriately logical it is also most seamlessly borne in some lawful correlation to the wholly determined material (or ideal) world as well as leaping off *representationally-speaking* only after its non-representational material and living expression has been made manifest (assuming CTM) so logic can’t ever be the final resting place for ideas if emergence is a real thing; emergence entails a real possibility of both existential infinite regress *and* progress. Moving beyond just use of logic for knowing best simply becomes *at some point I believe we are very close to* the new basis for the “trans-emergence” of, at least, better conceiving of possible forms of future trans-reality, as well as facilitating the hoped-for leap to the next better epistemic measuring of reality, i.e. as much by integrating over the falsehoods, fictions, and other forms of lying by representation, so as much by integrating with the gap in place, and not ever in representation alone ever dispelling it.^{NOTE}

NOTE: Otherwise, we will simply become more *lost in representations* as only gap, at least until we finally and finitely get the false forms of certainty and control we currently all-too-rapaciously seek. i.e., by getting and becoming nothing at all. Humanities epithet, some time after 2200: ‘wasted a beautiful opportunity for “nothing” ’.

But these from-the-future-back-to-now-looking meta-fictions may be as much waiting to merge-with/merge-from the real world (:= *perception as reality/reality as perception*) as the ideas were first set to merge with or emerge from the matter, but only by first passing through embedded and

materially over-determining general and particular forms of life; showing the worst blind gloss of CTM and of scientism in general: all things we find in reality with minds are living things, so to become a mind might first necessarily require becoming alive! The question we should really be asking is whether or not in becoming a non-egoistic form of collective Mind we need take the matter with us at all anymore, or can finally leave it behind?

Without a clear winner to the ontological wars, we have only a quasi-literal/quasi-figurative glossing point, either of “emergence” (assumed change to greater complexity and real novel conception) or “interaction” (with assumed lawful causal closure) but regardless we have ended up stuffing most of the mysteries of mind into this very ontically opaque, ontologically ambiguous, and very tiny and *very contingent* place in evolutionary time (and only here on Earth to boot). That being the case anyone claiming to produce facts, or epistemically leveraging philosophy or science of any institutionally well-vetted kind around or over this archetypal difference can not begin to bring their results to the world in useful ways without first declaring their own background beliefs about these tipping/interacting points, their ontological allegiances, and any other metaphysical presuppositions, many implicit, tacit, or ~~unconscious~~ *nonconscious* as part of what otherwise risks being nothing but more proselytizing. The problem here, of course, is many scientists (and most epistemically unwashed lay people) not only don’t see the need for this, many reject it out of hand (having assured themselves by clear and distinct ideas, tacit naivety or dogmatic anti-intellectual convention metaphysics is bunk or moot), and worse, most simply have no idea they hold such deeply hidden assumptions either individually or as part of whatever beliefs the epistemic tribe they belong to stitches together from possibly (and very likely) rationally inconsistent sources.

Problem 1: ‘Physical Information’ is a Wicked Misnomer

This is the first fine point of concern:

If you don’t say explicitly from which side of which view of things you are constructing your conceptual frameworks, but you are otherwise making hidden assumptions about ontology then I suggest you endlessly risk playing empty language games more than even the most whimsical and in fact out-of-their mind Hegelian or Meinongian or Kantian philosopher (spreading my hard-core materialist-aping pot-shots wide so as not to alienate any particular continental content or approach and reminding you gently in this work in I am doing nothing less than attempting a reintegration of the continental and analytical schools. Did you notice? Did you balk? If you balked at least you experienced the exact kind of meaning-conferring experience I am trying to put back at the centre of MEANING, even if only negatively). The most patently troubling instance of the failure to own one’s ontology I see in both

informal lay contexts and in the most technically complex and hard-core primary-property physical science talk lies in the many conflated or equivocal uses of the terms ‘data’ and ‘information’. I think theories motivated by catchphrases like ‘it from bit’ and related new school quantum ontologies often start (or end, or maybe they equivocate and/or conflate over the whole morass, dulling the listener into excited submission and endorsement by the stupefying inconsistencies of it all) by variously conflating DATA and INFORMATION, combined with mistaking what represents (the bits!) with what is represented, i.e. targeted material differences always entailing a hidden background of immaterial/ideal dedomena as denied *differances*. If nature as an *IT* is just built over immaterial *BITS* then this misses the fact that bits are just numbers in another guise (so it seems to me inconsistent to endorse any sort of ‘it from bit’ ontology if one is also a physicalist, especially if the bits invoke immaterial targets as quantities). So, was Wheeler really saying, like the Pythagoreans, ‘all is number’?⁵⁰

What are numbers again materially speaking, *exactly*?

Shannon’s theory only really **represents** the syntactical transformations tracking with some message’s conveyance *as if* playing a delimited YES/NO question game, but that is a shameless metaphor. The only thing currently linking the quantitative formalism to the **assumed** alphabet and background conditions required to even begin to track the differences that matter in the matter (*at complete distance from the intentionality*) back to the original *and also always assumed* intention to mean behind the message is **the derived intentionality of human minds**. Thus, to my thinking building any ontology by prioritizing quantity as **the** totalizing “sub-stance” is a form of anti-occasionalism, in which we are the God-minds breathing life (literally) into immaterial quantity even as we deny our intentionality is fully derived—**we somehow bootstrap ourselves into reality even as we vanish while explaining it!**

Instead, this must be explained in non-derived terms exactly before we have slipped from talking about data to information. It is exactly when we use ‘data’ or ‘information’ inconsistently in interpreting the metaphysical weight of some computational outputtings modelled by use of Shannon’s Theory as if it were already a theory of meaning we most muddy the semantic waters. That we can, after assuming an alphabet (as laws, or just found habits of nature) and background conditions (all the local products of universal contingency fit for the allowance and conveyance of meaning non-locally) explain *HOW* (not *WHY*) certain symbols from a source might be made isomorphic to binary stand-ins in passing back to their duplicates, all in the right order at some sink, does not explain *HOW* or *WHY* anything means at all.

So, to peel the vehicular layer off, as only those barest material differences dynamically realizing a live encoding/decoding of some meaning now made bereft of all intentionality, leaving the inter-mediating matter-based channel vehicles “in-formed” but not “ex-formable” all on their own—only lately in all these logic gates made by layers of doped silicon—and then to say *equivocally* this layer *as it only exists in this very materially thin and intentionality-mute sort of “representation”* be taken as *concrete* model of all there is “at the bottom” is more like calling the cart a horse, than putting the cart before it. Yes, we

can pull this or any other *pre-conventionalized* layer of encoded matter-differences off its material base (what the transistors are only vehicularizing the meanings as, but in complete lieu of either their ontological or semantic essence, so effectively at “infinite” distance from both), but by this we also push away the semantics of the outputs of the program to some placeholder mind invisibly; the one always needed to put the intentionality and symbol grounding back in. All that is left at the bottom is materially engineered generality as Turing Machine, *but only because that is how we made them to be, not because that is how we are necessarily made in order to do that.*

So finally, to assume some engineered and by design causally-tractable ontic difference machine made empty of any of the differences only we can logically fill it with is pointing to an apt model of the mind as Turing machine, and also deems meanings reducible only to syntactical encodings, seems perverse. The second error takes the channel “representation” as a “meaning” and the first errors smuggles in intentionality in a particularly pernicious and thin way, as it massively begs the question to assume all minds are computers simply because computers may be programmed to multiply realize syntax and so relay meanings, but then to ignore as they are currently designed they could never hold, let alone feel meaning at all!^{NOTE}

NOTE: Of course, only those interpreting the memes superficially will endorse these sort of ontologies. Those theorists really serious about reducing ontology to deeper and more “pure differences” over which first matter as data, and only much later meaning as (true)information is first realized by *original intentionality* are also immaterialists, idealists or even transcendental idealists of some kind, but few probably see that clearly or see the conflict with the materialist views at the heart of CTM in its most question-begging metaphysical form.

Thinking the brain a binary computer or *just a computer of any kind* is the same mistake made at a higher level. Yes, there may be modelling going on in the brain in some kind of binary way, as nerve firings are (only sometimes, in turns out) of a clear *On* and *Off* nature to some significant epistemic degree (if only in abstraction) and perhaps even an embedded binary (or trinary: i.e. <, 0, > or +, 0, -, etc.) activity is also evidenced by many if not all cell membrane detectors also suggesting information processing as *integration* is only being done at and across neural meta-structure, and the data processing is only done by the intentionally mute bio-functionally disposed detectors et. al., but . . .

Nature may have evolved things to model with bits (at or across various levels of scale-time), but that is no justification for saying all of reality is sourced as what bits *really only target*, at least until you’ve said what the natural, non-vanishing and actual material bio-structure of some prototype and minimally sufficient mind adds as that original intentionality first making the *Dataverse* into an *Infoverse* (and along the way, also say what numbers “really” are ontologically, better hope these two proofs don’t fall apart into some ontological regression or incommensurateness as well).

Again, I am not trying to say any or all currently favoured theory or knowledge is completely wrong—I am not a skeptic in necessary terms, just contingent and pre-ontological ones—I am trying to say while there may be a kernel of truth in even the most whimsical and otherwise un-evidenced thinking (that idea is crazy, but not crazy enough) unless we are sure in our most philosophical-looking pronouncements we have first properly disambiguated the intentional entailments of all terms as we speak at or across the mind-body tipping point, or gloss some fact-norm distinction we endlessly risk passing off metaphors too literally, begging in what we claim we are explaining and furthering possible forms of invisible but wholly fallacious starting points as ends. If no one notices, well the emperor may be further decked out in the most resplendent verbal finery but is epistemically-speaking, still naked none-the-less.

Here is the problem of conflating DATA and INFORMATION shown in more precise particular rather than general description. Maybe one is just plain confused when talking about information in Shannon's sense in already taking his theory as one about how semantic information is communicated (I know I suffered from this confusion for years in many ways, as my errors in interpretation became more subtle). Maybe instead (and more optimistically) one knows the difference soundly but has not taken care to differentiate for their audience when the sense used in speaking of information is meant transparently to mean data and otherwise to mean semantic information. We largely assume, especially when presenting for our tribe, our natural audience knows the difference from context, but maybe they don't really to a significant enough degree for best or any ideal communication of meaning. This problem can only get worse when we speak outside our epistemic tribes.

Maybe we are *in fact* using the same name for the two different things (or think we are using two different names for the same one thing) in absolutely consistent ways, but then the question is **how would we or anyone else really know** without doing exactly the sort of communicative pre-disambiguations I've deemed necessary. What we otherwise risk, and in so many places, is furthering irrational word salads masquerading as sage knowledge, thus only ever furthering "joke" theories, where the joke is on everyone and no one knows it. I (and Voltaire) have implied these sort of definitional disambiguations are the essential starting point for any ideal form of communicating meaning and I will soon use this starting point to define how the practice of science is so radically different from economic theory the very idea someone can ask whether economics is a science without bursting into laughter never occurs, but really should. Of course, economics it is not a science, no practice pinning its hopes largely on purely idealized and empirically unwarrantable metaphysical premises—and with so many speech acts that when satisfied are meant as not only proofs of value but of accuracy and deductive certainty, so endlessly mistaking our ability to create certain oughts as justifying is' as a form of epistemic justification—could ever usefully be called anything but a religion.

Again, no lasting perjury or the furthering of economic anarchism is implied, we need an economic system, just one better than at hand. We still need keep and use most of the in place values and institutions too, for both efficiency's and expediency's sake, but perhaps (no not perhaps, the opposite of that) start by weeding out the more arbitrary values and re-grounding of all economic norms (as we

move “sideways” to a new model that at some tipping point will emerge of its own accord from grass roots more than by “expert” fiat) in some new less arbitrary ones, but *only after determining the deeper and better norms from the most accurate percepts about what furthering this current set of values and economic means and ends really asks of this planet in terms of the data morphisms science owns and interprets suggesting not only is sustainability impossible given our current economic values, that near-term collapse of chunks of civilized society has already started.*

In this always risked epistemic corruption of glossing over the supposed sources of intentionality invisibly, easily allowing a blind switching of one’s metaphysical feet from one (white) square to the next (black one) like some anarchic and always rule flouting bishop on a chess board, the irrational side-effect is to allow one to avoid any claim their epistemic ground is unstable at all. White square, black, as you need, just don’t step on the excluded-middle ontological crack *while someone is really paying attention*, or you’ll break mother-truth’s back. These sorts of crouching-tiger-hidden-dragon theorists variously largely talk about how data is turned into more complex forms of data, not how data is made into (true)information at all, *until a miracle occurs*, and they are suddenly talking about semantic information (the hidden dragon) in appearance but still only data (crouching tiger) underneath. In these instances, theorists may naively and superficially respect the gap the body-mind tipping point represents in the aims of their models, but often fail completely to honour the problem of original intentionality at all.

Here’s an ugly-step-sister of my “favoured” meme of nightmare teen-aged boy thinking; the popular *we live in a computer simulation* meme. OK, as I’ve said before I think there is a nut of truth in every ism and ology thinking about mind has ever produced and even this perverse end to drinking the CTM purple Kool-Aid has merit as a talking point (just as imagining going faster than the speed of light in thought experiments works—yielding always valid inference, but unsound conclusions as things stand empirically, *if I were the bald King of France . . .*). However, while I think it is true in a very profound sense, again, that something may be modelling the universe or just modelling sub-domains of it by computation over bits I do not think that entails the whole thing is therefore likely to be in kind simulated (simulations are defined as appearances, so this is just another lazy and fallacious application of the appearance-is-reality meme). It seems way more likely to me (and this is how it goes in my model of the mind) the brain realizes a digital model of the universe as a spandrel of its otherwise purely analog instantiation towards improving perception only “~~unconsciously~~” non-consciously, so is one which ends up only accidentally (meaning: contingently but with a tone that mocks the ‘man is the measure of all things’ meme) as the ontic opening to a richer and more seamless unity of self-reflective experience, not to some reduction of experience to simulacra.

By making the world ontologically instantiated both *by and as* bits one is begging the question not only over the body-mind tipping point, but right back to the Big Bang singularity and also invoking the same smuggling in of data as if it were already semantic information. All a computer can ever do in lieu of some mind to interpret its results is make more data, no computer we have ever realized or logically conceived has ever or ever will communicate or experience a damn thing even if everyone agrees it

seems to (again, aren't all the things we reasonably intuit as having minds not also things that are alive? If so, why have we so easily disposed of the inference that to become a mind first requires the thing in question is *necessarily* alive, which I've argued is to realize orders of function that lead to the persistence of 2nd law denying behaviour *inside the universe as a trans-logical embedding!*).

That something computes is no proof it reduces to a computer but is only evidence its matter has been formed (and so was always formable) to model one. This the-world-is-a computer-simulation meme posits a kind of zombie world (of the Chalmersian kind, phenomenal zombies⁵¹) that is not only empty of experience, but also of vitality; call this *Robo-Idealism* if you will. Either way it is nothing but nonsense in the way it flouts epistemic and metaphysical responsibility to both the matter-(living-body) and the (living-body)-mind tipping points; only the invisibly irrational could take the idea seriously on both physicalist and realist terms at once and yet not think the question as to what life is and what irreducible role it might play in realizing mind isn't also of central, nay epistemically prior concern?

Problem 2 - The Black Box Spectrum of Norm Emergence: Certainty to Relative Accuracy to Absolute Arbitrariness

The second fine problem will be even easier to state, but much harder to cash out in fine detail by logically analyzed example. This is as much because the second finely stated problem is inevitably entwined with the first, although it need not always invoke the first problem as an epistemic burden. There are situations in which being explicitly agnostic or implicitly ignorant of the inferential entailments in carelessly using norms as facts carries no *de facto* taint of irrationality. Sometimes providing no resolution or transparent demarcation of the metaphysical perspective borrowed is warranted; I have done this on many occasions and will continue to do so. But the likelihood such transparency is critical to justifying the means (and so ends) of some otherwise neglected metaphysic must vary in some significant degree either directly or inversely with any absolute or relative denial of the deep epistemic need for metaphysical analysis as central in honouring the ideal and deepest demands of rationality. Rather, I suspect those most seeing the need may least need be transparent in some discursive settings but never in all of them all the time.

Conversely, those most denying the probable (and when we get to the ontological nuts and bolts of it, necessary) need to declare their metaphysics (which should include one's ethical grounding as well) are the most likely to really need to; often exactly when they are being the most irrational in glossing, conflating, or equivocating over terms and isms and ologies, at best only being consistent with their opaquely held metaphysics by accident. Ideally one should always declare both one's terms (with some sufficient logical precision, so they are always free to use any of the otherwise favoured formal or

informal senses as long as their semantic web doesn't snap apart for doing so) and their metaphysical groundings and allegiances if we are even to judge the value of the proposed need in the first place. Assuming otherwise anyone may flout, or worse *flog* rational norms summarily and not so innocently, even if such floggings don't directly amount to irrationalities for being logical inconsistencies, but only the sorts of conceptual misadventure we found Lois Lane exhibited in her beliefs about Clark Kent and Superman. But let's not forget what matters about Lois' epistemically perverse situation: she remains very confused about the ontic entailments of her most intimate meaning-world none-the-less, and I can't believe anyone *psychologically healthy in some ideal sense* would rationally chose to remain in such a state were it made reasonably clear to them they were in it, especially scientists, mathematicians and philosophers! The pragmatic question is whether or not scientists are all always more like Lois Lane to some significant degree or more like those so imaginatively given access to her mind in such an all-knowing way and so always capable of judging which are the real "facts"?

So, I am implying there are very, very many cases where even for our narrowest and consistent enough *if not transparently given* conceptual frameworks at hand it is already likely we are dealing with many reified "facts". Largely these appear as "pseudo-facts", innocent-enough semantic rephrasings making disguised speech acts such as 'in North America we drive on the right-hand side of the road' look like mind-independent facts when they are not. These sorts of miscast "facts" may be forever warded off *as things epistemically stand* in being potentially fatally derived; only due to the original symmetry breaking choice and wide habitual re-choice of minds needed to continue re-warranting them in wide and consistent intention and agency, but never *a priori or even contingently a priori* as purely objective and universal *scientific* facts must otherwise and are assumed to be (such as: Water *is* H₂O).

Of course, there are also many seemingly less compromised and analogously bifurcating *found* perceptual facts to get from direct, widely shared and endlessly repeatable experiences such as let us cogently say 'a stick in water only *appears* bent, but *is not actually* bent' that I am proposing do present as inductive facts much better grounded in certain morphic data and so serve as a positive contrast to those more fatally grounded in the inaccuracies or arbitrarinesses of intentionality (to really understand how intentionality causes in purely physical terms is to say how any arbitrary choice of norm occurred as a very wide "fact", but never reduces only to *that* that was the choice, nor its content; that all might just be due the luck of the contingent draw, so opening an epistemic gap, not closing one).

But, please make careful note: in the bent-stick example while the grounding of the relativization of accuracy in perception of illusions is certainly much more directly explicable by the certain data morphisms of science (from basic atomic, optical and electromagnetic theory) and so involves no obvious intentionality-mediated choice from a mind to first break a symmetry (no mind decides under which circumstances a straight stick appears bent, or that it does, the symmetry breaking involved here—going from an *a priori* conceptual/universal default of 'essentially straight things always *are* straight' to the more contingent and context-dependent *a posteriori* perceptual/particular 'sticks may *appear*-straight or *appear*-bent submerged in water'—is assumed a more completely non-derived step;

it is an instance of “proof” of the existence of the gap, after all) and so may be explained in almost purely physical and reductive terms *but for the assumed biological locus of phenomenal and conceptual perspective-taking involved* (where to fully cash out the reduction is also to explain all the mechanisms for perception, experience and conception, also in the promised non-intentional terms).

There is still a very telling residual difference between these contrasting cases, the first, the driving case, as things stand is only grounded as a cause in some otherwise arbitrary, if not unavoidable need for making a “first” choice via intentionality (so appearing first and only as a norm, and only as a “fact” by some glossed re-interpretation made over an equivocation of the content of the decision’s real target in sliding invisibly from *satisfaction condition vehicularization* to a logically unwarranted *content meta-vehicularization*, i.e. the one summarily blocked by Frege’s problem). Differently, and placing very diverging demands on claims for rationality and TRUTH the cause in the second case could only ever be understood as lawfully determined, or ever be warranted directly and immediately by physical science alone. The lasting difference is between found and created content, i.e., between those cases of fact for which the mostly non-derived data morphisms make the fact *all the way back to the BBS*, versus when the “fact” of some choice makes the data morphisms *only from the (not yet physically explained) emergence of original intentionality forward*.

This fine point at which here-to-fore *always physical* causes finally bifurcate from making only figurative “choices” to making literal and explicit, but always seemingly arbitrary binary choice, falls away from those only being non-intentionally made (so, only previous to this could we always extract the data to ground our explanations more purely right down into only the certain morphic matter of things) towards those more fully mindfully made. The very first pip of this point, of course, “hallmarks” the body-mind tipping point of *original intentionality*. Even as the first mind realizes the first knowing it already starts mixing in as much, and so more and more of the possibly derived than of the non-derived, or of the perceptually inaccurate as accurate. How could it not as its mandate is only to figuratively know how to biologically survive, not necessarily to survive to come to know with any literal certainty or perfect perceiving of the real.

I think a very metaphorical way of restating the difference here, *as a difference*, lies in always remembering the wiser epistemic course as things stand: norms as cultural values always start much closer to unicorn-beliefs than horse-facts than even the most relative or inverted perceptual accuracies do, so until value-norms in particular are shown non-arbitrary enough and based on accurate enough precepts grounded in the right morphisms of logic or inductive science are best assumed at this juncture just necessarily useful fictions, but certainly not facts of the kind science promotes, although without them even science could never imagine nor create the experimental means by which it assumes it more impressively knows, which is a big part of the problem owed to irrationality (how is it science is always rational in imposing norms, but non-science isn’t?).

Particularly, economic theory is *more accurately* a model first wholly constructed from values and speech acts taken top down and always asking for the morphisms to follow suit, for science the case is converse. Science only asks and sets out to construct certain material pre-circumstance by speech acts to control for the widely interfering morphic variability inherent in all matter, so to allow for the observational faith we place in measurement to shine through from the certain and essential data (especially for the indirect observations, those I've re-coined and re-classed as '*far* perceptions'), i.e., so to tease out the knowings one variable at a time. After this science simply waits for nature to speak to us and be interpreted, and does not at all impose any kind of telos on the intended and laudable epistemic ends (but for the hypotheses, for which it is always value-ambiguous going in to coming out whether confirmation or refutation is the most valuable end, but regardless: furthers knowledge, *if only in the ideal*).

Economic theory seems to not care to listen to or communicate with nature as its primary goal at all, but instead to make it endlessly cash out its idealistic value-cheques (always deeply furthering arbitrary wants as accurately perceived needs in the manipulative process of this) with not much apparent regard for what the real matter of it all might sustainably bare. Here is the same residual difference as the contrasting stick and driving cases, respectively, between perceptual belief and value norms, the first mapping out knowledge taking atoms to heaps and functional complexes as science describes things (confirmed *satisfied as true* by mind-to-world fit), while with economic theory only a mapping from preconceived, and so always suspect forms of value derived from minds back to matter (confirmed *satisfied as "made-so"* by world-to-mind fit). How such asymmetrically different forms of agency are to be equated as equally rational pursuits without more obvious and much deeper forms of logical and evidential warrant (all currently missing in any sort of knock-down way) is way beyond me; economic theory is a best an anti-science—all opaque imposition of unicorn idealisms, no transparent grounding in horse realisms).

Equating economic theory with the practice of science is as logically perverse as equating speech acts and norms. Rather, if we take Searle and Austen to heart they are defined in opposition (so if economic theory is a science it can only be seen that way if we count as Derrideans, i.e., trans-logically, not cis-logically). Light is dark's logical "opposite" so can never be part of its extensional identity but as infinite background to its finite datum-expression as foreground, so just the negative part of its intension.

The "Level" Playing Field

But as long as our inferential pathways stay within or without at the same, respectively, flat or cross-levels of analysis (not-too-arbitrary value claims in to not-too-arbitrary value claims out, or relatively accurate enough perceptive claims in to relatively accurate enough perceptive claims out, or some

mixture with non-problematic glossing of ontological commitments in terms of sources of intentionality) we are fine. Hell, in many cases it may be the default we may naively dip up or down the normative spiral and not ever invoke logical or empirical wrath, but now Occam informs us beyond the grave of a new possibly problematic kind of multiplying of hypotheses risked by ignoring cases where intensional or extensional conflation of intentional and non-intentional categories occurs without the associated data morphisms also provided (those which, if given, might show the inferential melding at hand invoking a metaphysical or other kind of impossibility).

I fear there is a ubiquitous, but denied practice in both lay and expert discourse of all-too-often inappropriately treating norms as facts in the sense oughts are being invisibly used to warrant is', and/or is' warranted as rationally demanding the forwarding of certain oughts over others (with nearly everyone acting as most of all the other philosophical or scientific questions on the books are irrelevant). One wonders, if we performed a thorough review of the various categories of norms to reveal their transparent groundings, to tie their real need to certain data morphisms, would these abuses stick out as the sorest our inescapably irrational thumbings; those owed us of the irreducibly universal and always half-mad psyche. If we move up to value norms from accuracy norms our meanings must refer back to accuracy in a way analogous to how we must close open premise lines for deductions to be complete instead of conditional. If we conclude "up" from where we started we may have crossed another tipping point, so we may owe some deeper epistemic work, but may not have glossed original intentionality (this only happens in the move from data to (true)information or vice versa) but we have probably already endorsed substantial rhetoric or metaphor as literal in doing so. Even here we are OK as long as we include the rider that certain of our lynch-pin metaphors have or are being forwarded to where we have more, but clearly delineated logical or evidential work to do to "cash them out", so where any talk of inference to further fact-ness at this point is very premature.

What is often happening in these slides up is new or improved epistemic norms are being proposed as categorically insistent placeholders, often for entailed reductions and/or bridgings, or to further experimental forms of confirmation of the pre-supposed real references of these newly created meanings. This entails we need the morphic certainty of some more complete and comprehensive model more deductively warranted to complete the is to ought (or ought to is) transition to ensure we are not making a new value too arbitrarily or seeing something as accurate that is actually only given in relative or even absolute inaccuracy (the moon always *appears* bigger against the horizon, but *never is* bigger). If we dip down from value to accuracy and back then this is also not a move from the intentional to the non-intentional, so no mind-body solution is obviously required (although it may be entailed, but in a moot way for either being epistemically alright or *all wrong*). But the epistemic moving-downs at some point anticipate and drag back in the need to invoke the certain morphisms as foundation as we inevitably move from conceiving about wholes to the many simples over which physicalism always assumes all real things are made (so reductions are still baby, only universal reductionism is bathwater).

As long as those percepts in play are accurate enough in the inductive/statistical sense required the borrowings we make for new values will be accurately non-arbitrary as well, i.e., while the arbitrary owes little to accuracy the non-arbitrary always owes much more (and so too in kind do accurate percepts owe more to certain data morphisms than uncertain ones). The problem is too arbitrary valuing allows us to conceive what we otherwise might inaccurately perceive exactly with the sorts of “clear and distinct” ideas that are laughable, but only when no tying of anything at the higher normative level has been grounded in anything with any morphic certainty.

When we do invoke the first with the second problem is when our model invokes any terms crossing the mind-body tipping point for which the ontological answers really matter, such as those that might rationally licence “spooky action at a distance”, but warrant no local possibility of finding (ethe)*real* ghosts by this. The risk is not only in mixing our uses of intentional and non-intentional terms but in combining idealist value with materialist morphic truths that were we to trace out the ontological entailments might be shown as belonging to fully incommensurate conceptual frameworks, i.e. we must not promote value cheques in material terms only ideas could ever cash out but matter never could (like perpetual motion machines, the non-arbitrary value of constructing them is clear, but they can never be perceived at all, and so no data morphism could ever “prove” their existence).

For further example, I think any folk notion of the large-scale *instantaneous* teleportation of bulk matter being pragmatically possible is exactly motivated by this sort of mistake. Assuming some finitely determinable macroscopic-scale matter could spontaneously appear in some otherwise empty enough space by some technological means ignores the demands of the uncertainty principle (not to mention these fantasies largely assume a Newtonian space-time). For any short enough uncertainty in the amount of entailed infinitesimal time over which such matter manifests itself out of nowhere the uncertainty in the real (and by implication from universal causal closure, the non-local and) local energy change entailed becomes so large that were such matter to so spontaneously manifest much of the local environment of both the space and “borrowed” matter it first supervenes on and the space it near-spontaneously enters would be rent by such subsequently and lawfully destructive and immense conserving of energy from source to sink (and back) that the fact of its radical dislocation in space-time would be short-lived. Any *real material* teleportation of the kind science fiction such as Star Trek invokes would concomitantly (at best, subsequently) be made moot by the explosive space-time and matter-energy rending actually physically involved in finite terms. As the time for teleportation is stretched out to overcome the locally destructive consequences of a successful teleportation and as the object so transported becomes more and more functionally complex at some point the time required for teleportation collapses into one re-invoking and so requiring the literal re-iteration (so, where is this to be made to happen exactly???) of the entire causal-material history of the original object’s first creation being first unwound informationally and then re-capitulated by rerunning the entire history of the universe (again: where, exactly, in some actual possible world or in all of them???, Occam is now thrashing in his grave!!!) but for making whatever contingent adjustments are necessary for placing this

teleported object (and its non-local or universally energy-conserving balancing of local to local matter-energy change) at this new location. This is pure conjecture, of course.

Going Up and Coming Back Down Do Not Commute

If I treat the analytical, ethical or ontological layers in reverse order to how they appear in nature I can state the fine point in some generalization, perhaps without much but *prima facie* warrant (so as for naturalism to really warrant my claims here I need both the entire missing story of all nature's contingent tipping-points and to determine the very, very *close* and *far* causes of the source and nature of the BBS's information configuration space). The bed I've made is for all of us, myself no less, which is why on writing to this point my hope for convincing anyone of anything was summarily deflated; even I continue to be too logical and to assume logicism will see me through even as I claim it can't for anyone in all epistemic circumstances in any final or totalizing way. If in any theory or model or statement of supposed fact it turns out the thrust of our persuasive concern is more or primarily aimed at the level of value interpretation, creation, defence, or denial then we must first show in terms of deep and non-intentional data morphisms where and how our sources of justification are more purely objective, but also inevitably and unavoidably expose where and how we always risk them being more problematically of the too-subjective *by fiat or fashionable* kind exactly when we are clearly inferring or argumentatively speaking across the categorical divide of mind to body. It seems likely to me on the basis of this sketch of a prohibitive analysis much if not all justification invoking the body to mind tipping point therefore rationally demands we first show our metaphysical and ontological cards and delineate our intentional and non-intentional terms in non-begging ways if we are to have something more than faith behind our sayings why these values or some other values are non-arbitrary enough and so would be fit for achieving the best outcomes for The Good, The True, etc. Of course, we may often find in these cases our default clear and distinct ideas about THE GOOD are already inherently problematic, but that is a separate concern (or is it?).

However, to represent the needed morphisms deeply, taking data to (true)information in a fashion already plurally removed from how perception first achieves this we are always relying on some kind of filtering/pre-conditioning by perception, be that direct observation and measurement or indirect (*far* perception). This mean we must show why all those percepts critically involved are accurate in the same sense making the strongest and most cogent inductions strong, i.e., in strict analogy to how we can not base non-arbitrary and fit value on any conception about bent sticks made by treating sticks looked at partially submerged in water as actually bent, so as if they are being accurately perceived as really bent in these cases as the factual morphic ground. If we are going in any way from data to (true)information or back then of course all the deeper, *the more fundamental and substantial* morphisms invoked must be sufficiently certain as well.^{NOTE}

NOTE: And I have this far idealized and glossed the likely fact any certain internalized or encoded morphism might only model a sub-set of essence of the largest coherent system it ends up modelling, so the certainty in play is more about certainty to regards to mutualization of enough data essence, rarely most and likely never all of it. If morphic essence is fully mutualized between subject and object one supposes but for multiple realizability the subject has fully become the object and we now have another two-ness that is also as radically as possible seamlessly a oneness too, but this I think only occurs in Thuraya states, and even here only in reference to some body-ego as a space-time-scale anchor *in absentia*.

In going up from certain enough sub-mutualizations of essence by some subject taking in some object but then also (at some structural-functional-material point of minimal sufficiency) adding in the intentionality (so only achieving this at some level of minimally sufficient neural form, function and cardinality embedded as only part of a whole-living-body or embodied mind-system)^{NOTE} we must do an independent assessment of the degree and relative valences of all percepts involved as shown by the morphisms ***before making any factual claims*** (otherwise we risk just seeming rational, invoking pushed away self-contradictions if the seemings we start from are not, it turns out, directly indicative of real being or existing as we so often naively assume, i.e., if there is a real physically instantiated source of the conceptual appearance-reality gap as both science and philosophy assumes and we have already gone some significant way in dispelling it; remembering I have argued we are way off about this).

NOTE: recent empirical evidence suggests as few as 20 neurons may be required.⁵²

We simply can't assume all functional finesses and the by-evolution-leveraged (naturally law-infused) morphisms they are built upon all subsequently become part of systems only ever yielding accurate percepts even if we have otherwise on the extant evidence, arguments and intuitions concluded to date we have been right in doing so (hence the persistence of and need for universal forms of skepticism to guard against all claims of rationality owed to the methods of science). In cases where we are uncertain or turn out, in spite of the evidence, wrong about the levels/states of accuracy/inaccuracy of what perception has allowed us to rationally conceive over the morphisms (so only now talking about absolutes and their properties in a possible Gaussian distribution in terms of perceptive accuracy as we conceive from one object to the next, with those tied to our deepest biological concerns more likely to be seen more accurately, but also more likely infected by evolved forms of bias) we need be very careful about adding value assessments to norms of perception as the more inaccurate the percept turns out despite its usefulness the more likely relatively unavoidable arbitrariness in value assessments will follow in concert (because of the cognitive biases). For example, even if we are never wrong about the bulk material risks of colliding with large, dense or high enough velocity masses *in general*, we still might fail completely to be able to accurately identify the offending objects or real risks in name or real

essence in all data morphic fields; a cloud no matter how big its volume never proposes any mortal collision risk no matter how solid it might seem from a distance, but nature clearly hedges to at least one kind of fit inaccuracy here at least as flying into a cloud visibly and head-on for the first time is never a comfortable feeling no matter how irrational we might brand it.

That's about it: The arrow of logic passing through the lens of natural creativity as its rational centre can only do so, thereby allowing retro-diction of fully non-arbitrary value back to ideally accurate percepts and finally to modelling by certain data morphisms, as if it is all factual and therefore logically accessible/analyzable content. Those percepts and values proving less accurate and more arbitrary should not get such a by fiat pass. Much more work must be done to shore up such claims against ever collapsing to facts at all; they may already have become irreparably tipped to being nothing but beautiful fictions (as *all* beautiful and literal fictions already are *intentionally!*). The path to explicitly expressed forms of representative rationality are always made through a black box of possibly irrational pre-valuation of the partially or even completely inaccurate perception of things daisy chained to the promotion of what turns out irrational value for being all too arbitrary (particularly as and when we tip to complex language-borne forms of culture and escape the nurturing if not more cruel bounds of our originally constrained hunter-gatherer environments).

The naive warrant of logic, it seems to me, also passes from the past to the future and back to the past in some naturalistic sympathy as if perception and conception never exist in the imperfect forms they do, and intentionality is only realizable in the closing of the circle of cause and effect from outside to inside and back outside via the first "tangible" norms (so while each step is just data morphic, the completion of the journey is still the cause of original intentionality, of the mind). So too does a full account of what is rightly logical need first pass from past to present through many potentially obscuring perceptive inaccuracies we may have to date failed to see (like the still common idea that the sun rises and falls each day where were you to ask people to speak more accurately they would likely be mute) and thus also through hidden and too arbitrary or ideal forms of value, including possibly its own self-valuation (as I have argued elsewhere).

The real laying bear of facts requires much more than sound or cogent use of logic. It also requires showing by the morphisms the facts of concern have been determined in perfect non-arbitrariness and perfect accuracy first at their own level (within their always orthogonally situated semantic webs) and only then back down to the widest and deepest morphisms of all, those determining the most fundamental and comprehensive laws of nature. The side-effect of this will also lay out all those contingencies making the differences that really matter (including most tellingly how the body tips or dips, and first anneals to mind, of course). We can see another tracking analogy here: data morphism to deductions, relative accuracy to inductions, and non-arbitrary value to abductions (they are "best" in

being “good” explanations, after all). Any further arguing serving as convincing warrant for you I might make I can only leave around for you to discover on your own recognition of like cases where you see rational means being proposed for irrational ends (or other *normalized* failures of use of reason). What I can do is propose examples of these newly defined kinds of irrationality, those currently passed off as rational only in normative and not factual terms, and then show how these particular norms-as-facts could never collapse directly to logical truths by showing where the values or percepts in play are, respectively, far more arbitrary or inaccurate than they have otherwise been deemed.

A Bonus Third Problem: Facts rely more on Right Ontology than Right Ontology relies on Facts

The final but related problem with failing to honour the body-mind tipping point and the accuracy relativization and arbitrariness of norms beyond certain data morphism has less to do with the requirement for inferential consistency and transparency for theory or model building and has more to do with the way the various ontological models available are themselves compatible or incompatible at their own higher level of conception (where what is conceived as a non-local totality is in a sense always concerned with something real and irreducible explaining all essences in time, space or scale as the basis by which although the form and function of things may come and go something remains the same by which such changes are also made possible).

That minimal, empirically determined and simplified collected universal onticity, roughly the 10^{80} protons the *visible* universe is manifest as, when the CMB is emitted is all that material being (fermionic, at least) ever has from which to make all other concretely tangible things that can be said to have existed, exist, or possibly exist in the future *in the same, just older visible universe*. This problem first asks us whether we are best to work from a monist, dualist, or even pluralist perspective. If one assumes both an epistemic and ontological monism one may be, at the well-defined poles of the historical debate, either an idealist or a physicalist. What differs in terms of one’s beliefs about fundamentality concerns what this fundamentality is grounded in, which is to say by what one-or-many-kind of substance, but where “standing under” is a metaphorical placeholder already biased towards a physicalist or material view on assuming logicism. This metaphor of standing under is equally applied by all Western forms of ontology to explain both form sub-stance (as only that local matter supervened upon) and matter sub-stance (as that which grounds all matter-form universally). Idealists do not doubt we have the idea of matter right in many empirical and so framework dependent cases, but they go further and explain away the standing under as one not of any matter at all, so they always see the idea of matter, or of anything else that exists as lying closest to the shared, i.e., fundamental essence of all

things. Ideas in bearing tangible objects or properties as targets become tangible but only by those ideas given to a mind, or ultimately *The Big Mind*.

Of course, most idealists have traditionally also been real God-endorsers of some kind. This is required as to plug the holes in the source of all ideas it becomes necessary to propose a Big Mind, or God, or simply a real, an *ideal* infinity. The materialists have no such need (they have a need not to, actually); empirical science has given them a real nothing to be that w(hole) source. This suggests the possibility one may be espousing materialist methodology yet be a theist (or at least not an atheist) so also promoting idealist rhetoric in other guises and practices. While this isn't irrational in the sense logicism promotes, it is ethically inconsistent in so far as the justification for the nature of The Good in terms of means and ends no longer need come from the same source. So, there is a potential kind of mixed epistemic and ethical practice that looks problematic if in one context one promotes idealist values as ends, but then expects to use purely materialist-derived means as the way to determine policy, to cause certain effects on purpose (so always with intentionality) and the same taint of something maybe not irrational but clearly a-rational occurs if idealist means (think: The Secret) are meant to further what turn out more purely materialist (*in both sense*) values as ends.

In other words, I find it very inconsistent to believe in some God or other form of ultimate idealist ends, but then see the same person spending much of their life accumulating only material wealth at the expense of those less fortunate. At the heart of the tension between idealist and materialist monism is the role the notion of the soul plays for furthering the best outcomes for civilization (and all the supposed noble and non-arbitrary values secular society promotes in its representations, but rarely ever achieves for her most vulnerable and least socially powerful, so not necessarily unintelligent or otherwise undeserving citizens as the most hatefully self-serving causes of poverty and tolerated forms of social neglect are often "explained").

One can also simply push these two poles together across the metaphysical incommensurateness and get dualism (as Descartes conceived it) but this is not only the source of the worst kind of interaction problem it is also, with Cartesian dualism's rejection, currently well out of epistemic fashion. I have also tried to show when perception is recast as the origin of mind in purely local *naturalistic* terms but also given by its non-local structuring cause as part of the entirety of Big History (where local intentionality "also/same" arises due to general life emerging as a universal embedding of 2nd law denying function over a real quasi-material/quasi-ideal and equivalently quasi-concrete/quasi-abstract *realization* of INSIDE/OUTSIDE) the epistemic affordances resulting for both dualism and monism are effected in ways where each approach now carries new intractably inter-mixed boons and burdens, but always in non-zero-sum logical directions in terms of any hope of ever untangling or finally, justifiably reifying either from/over the other (so neither ism may now ever be fully right or wrong under the assumed logistic insistence of the definitional, the too-purely assumed categorical independence of each concept's intentionality).

For idealist, or non-Cartesian dualists that are not theists there is still a first idea, but it is not of God or from it, it is simply the first act of a self towards an other made by intentionality, asymmetrically expressed across a real boundary first materially determining a purer, more abstract, yet entirely materially supervenient demarcation of *original* abstraction, that of function aimed from a real physical inside (as that living and locally 2nd law denying body) to a real physical outside (as that same body, plus all of what that particular body is not in its own material identity, which is nothing more or less than the rest of universal creativity as a grand structuring cause at that moment the first idea has merged to some finite matter).

But, even I am shamelessly mixing ontologies here, if only to show the new empirical place where I have supposed they meet and so to never be resolved by evidence parties on all sides might agree to as “factual”. This problem with mixing idealist and materialist ethics will feature in my account of ideal communication, my arguments as to why economic theory could never be a real science, and finally my account of why the real cause of Many Possible Looming Environmental Not Just Climate Crises is not CO2, but being “*lost in representations*” where what I mean by this can only be seen from the perspective of probable outcomes, first by assuming the materialist ethical agenda is the dominant view and possibly only conventional-seeming right epistemic means, but then showing how our actually practised values could never be consistent with that view, so making the entire human collective look particularly irrational in any and all of its unknown leveragings of inaccurate percepts as accurate ones, or too arbitrary values as non-arbitrary. As we look closer the various ends and means on offer instead describe a morass of idealist and materialist ethics and suspect cross-warranting that certainly doesn’t appear rational in any *prima facie* terms at this higher level (unless pursuing certainty and control as means to the end of “self-or-collective” destruction is assumed the most rational end; it might just be the most expedient, if not most unwise). The fine point of the second problem is only to be found in how the following examples convince you there is at least a base case to be made that at the core of human rationality lies an essential and necessary, yet denied form of ineliminable irrationality, so the problem is not so much we are crazy, just not rational enough about the value of irrationality, nor of the impossibility of eliminating it.

Chapter 8 – Some Norm-Level Teased Apart Pet Peeve Examples Of Being *Lost In Representations*

I hardly suppose there is any clear overriding pattern to the examples and anecdotes I provide here, but in treating each case I will try to show something of the various problems I have proposed are evidence of humanity becoming increasingly “*lost in representations*”. That we are *lost in representations* means many things: we promote irrational ends by rational means, rational ends by irrational means, and worst

of all irrational ends by irrational means (although there is still a role for the irrational as part of wisdom so this reading in being non-paradoxical is pejorative). Sadly lately, even as revolution both social and epistemic is sought we instead, I fear, tacitly and widely practice the first case (of too many rational means heading to irrational ends) as “normal”, the second we reduce to “abnormal”, and the third to “criminal”. The rare but ideal fourth case of always promoting rational ends and means (and that this is done by honouring the mind-body tipping point) may appear much less in default human agency than we imagine; it may even be impossible to achieve in principle.

In addition to the potentially problematic mixing of rationality and irrationality over means and ends there is the parallelly problematic and underlying causes and effects of promoting too inaccurate (or even—invisibly—totally inaccurate) percepts as accurate and too arbitrary values as non-arbitrary. This, this work proposes, happens when no or an insufficient effort has been made to ground a norm as a “fact” based on more fully accurate percepts and more fully non-arbitrary values, with the entire causal and inferential (so justificatory) chain summarily grounded logically by best-fit method in the right data morphisms, which means to determine to the limits of reason all the transparent material causes, either those universally or locally extant or conceived as speech acts meant to produce purposeful effects from both the non-derived (natural) and derived (artifactual) means being leveraged or promoted through the practice of some very well vetted science-based technology. The lasting value of aiming for this sort of demanding and deep epistemic transparency rests as much in exposing/preparing for the likely unknown (unknowable going in, but always *generally* anticipatable) but inevitably unintended “costs” of intending (something about paving roads to hell?).

This alone might help to shift our systems from their all too reactive and often blindly optimistic and woefully uninformed modes of engagement to more patient, humble, and proactive (i.e., *wise*) agency. Beyond this, of course, more thoroughly exploring and justifying the entailed structural complexities my analyses gloss would well overrun the current need for brevity as the work to justify the claims about inaccuracy or arbitrariness can not be logically or evidentially completed here but as a rough base case for the proposed epistemic project. Much is simply anecdotally asserted and none of the examples on offer fall directly into my area of expertise but in that some might describe these situations as evident best use of reason, while I won’t. But, because claims of rationality are indirect claims about what the mind is and does, and this is an area I have spent my life working in (to the point I’ve created a model of the mind of my own) the charity I ask for here seems reasonably owed based on my well-vetted and still rare enough academic credentials.

We have, however, fallen well beyond the more well structured and better argued claims bringing us to this point. We are at that point where the grandest and yet hardest to accept epiphanic insight is aimed for, as a leaping off from logical to sub or *eMetaphorical* exchange. That you may come to see and “feel” and finally accept some personal responsibility for the problems I am delineating in some rough but well understandable circumscribing seems very unlikely. That what comes next elicits images in you of your own analogous or resonant experiences with irrationality’s endless and *daily forestalling* of attempts to

mean well by the currently normalized practice of implicitly manipulative tending to anti-communicative use of “reasons” will have to be enough. We are looking for those all-too-normal behaviours opaquely aimed just to *seem* to win an argument, or persuade against reason, and/or tacitly functioning to repel any esteem questioning self-reflection by fiat of the many well-documented forms of all-too-human psychological bias; taken together evidence of some *original sin owed mass human forms of normalized rationality*. These rationality-aping-only behaviours, often parasitically lumped under the oxymoronic category of “social intelligence” rarely rely on use of deeply reasoned and explicit and appropriately vetted justification. Instead, they function more to block efforts made at real communication first by failing to recognize the need to be transparent about the methods and contents of proof in play and secondly in often being perversely resistant to disconfirmation even in the face of knock-down evidence.

This problem with the way human “intelligence” often works and wins in discourse, so appears as a social good—its source the “madness” contingently inherent universally *and so also unavoidably* in the human psyche—starts on the surface as naive conceptual over-purification and over-determination resulting from promoting just one positively selected pole of some Derridean binary (because of how the logicism combines with the tribalism); what I have called *naïve, divide and conquer use of reason*. It ends with the death of epistemic humility, the loss of respect for those with well-vetted and non-vested credentials in the use of reason who have no social power or hold marginal if not well-argued and evidenced views, and—worst of all—further endless cults of celebrity and personality. The problems I am waving at deeply and widely are as much due to human rationality being *shamelessly self-reified* beyond any just warrant. That some small fraction of all humans is capable of developing use of reason in the ways logicism and science supposes is best is certainly no guarantee a typical “normal” person is rational in this same way; most adults can’t add, subtract, divide and multiply fractions even now. Yet every uninformed and under-educated yokel gets to walk around basking in the suspect light of the ‘man is the measure of all things’ meme none-the-less and were they to accrue social and/or economic power in spite of their failures in best use of reason, lacking both the minimum background contents and methods, are still deemed “socially intelligent”. Where is the right proportionality in that?^{NOTE}

NOTE: Where most see human cognition and language arising due to the direct and lawful (if not equally accidentally playful, cruel and meandering) material thrust of biological evolution’s creative power (which is, of course, further reducible to the creative thrust of universal matter-law) expressed over some contingent random walk marking an event of transcendent biologically-derived improvement, I think this assumption is poorly warranted and exhibits nothing but the universal hubris defining the core of our psyche-logical agency, our *widest and deepest source of original sin*. What if, instead, the ego—wholly a dopamine leveraging hi-jacking automaton, a biological “hack” furthering all the illusions of identity, freedom, etc.—evolved as a reaction, as a *compensating means* in reaction to, not as boon *ends* of self-reflective consciousness? The ego might have had to emerge as a desperate bailing out reaction to the very serious and immediate existential problems experiencing an otherwise unmediated self-reflective consciousness might create (a hungry lion cares not a whit for sparing a soul so enlightened by being as to simply abide without any need to intend, and so not caring about living or dying, or even existing at all). That lucky and equally unlucky animal first experiencing this problem of original locally finite

and embodied experience *as a “God-consciousness”* then does so as a meta-ontological spandrel, so in a purely meta-accidental and orthogonal sense to the bio-material ones we suppose were the only ones in play. The selection pressures here were (so are) not ever purely positive as the self-reification of human rationality by itself supposes; instead the pressure was both positive and negative in the same way a women’s hips getting wider undermines upright walking but where narrowing them to improve walking ability makes child birth much more perilous, or in how the severely increased risk of choking in humans due the evolved migration of the larynx was mitigated by the ability to finely vocalize many sememes (have you never met a dog who but for the lack of an ability to finely vocalize is clearly otherwise “saying” something?). There are, I am sure, an entire set of (7?) such selective paradoxes that both anticipate and define the emergence of human-type self-consciousness as so paradoxically counter dualized in positive and negative selective essence. Yes, one needs a healthy ego, but a too powerful ego is always unhealthy in another way, so we have yet another paradox; the thing we define ourselves by may ultimately be superfluous to where evolution is really going, and so we deny the very possibility of transforming *within* even as we continue to unravel nature’s 13+ billions years of randomly but creatively piled up cyclings of matter and bio-functions just to finally know what we’ve lost in the process, as it vanishes forever. Yes, it seems the real cost of representing knowledge is one must consume what one wishes to know.

Overwrought Claims For Wide Human Forms of Ideal Rationality

Sure, some people are near ideally rational in their work in the way I’ve suggested is ideal, but how many people do you know who are like that all the time or by default, let alone who seek out their counsel (and I’m *not* referring to Spock, more Captain Picard or Gil Grissom, and certainly not Captain Kirk)? That humanity is generally considered widely populated with “rational animals” due largely to the rare work of some of our supposed best minds does not go one step of the way to ensuring anyone is rational in this way by default as believing ‘man is the measure of all things’ supposes, or is likely to be consistently rational from moment to moment, if at all, but for always having “reasons” and being able to use them in the way social “intelligence” has been lately normalized. I think given a more thorough and fair assessment of all past and well-vetted evidence from history and adding in mounting evidence such as this book and so much other content lately well documented, studied, described, and defined, to continue to assume we have the slightest idea about what we are doing collectively as we impose our suspect values onto nature—with so many possibly invisible inaccuracies possibly informing them over all too arbitrary value—all to realize some perfection of the human condition is very premature.

Instead, it seems we are doomed to not only endlessly replicate the mistakes of the past but continue to invent new ones in the name of progress. And this, I am afraid, literally afraid—not figuratively afraid, is ultimately being forwarded all in the name of shoring up and perpetuating institutions and ideologies of certainty and control largely for what I am proposing are deeply, *even contingently-necessarily* denied psychological reasons (due to the metaphysical nature of the world psyche, not to our psyches *per se*

but for the biological and material contingencies it has to supervene on) and not due at all to the late celebrated ethical and material ends supposed by the current reification of objectivity over subjectivity. Instead, we “knowingly” usurp the passive evolution of matter aiming to fix and fulfill any and all wants of the human subject because we believe the subject is inherently and somewhat problematically immutable (but, because of the rationality, always in a “good” way)—but really fear what this change asks of us, so is just more eating our cake and having it too. Here the blind assumptions and values of the CTM dominated technocracy underwrite the stunting of rationality—not its forwarding, ironically perhaps to the point we have lost, not gained more access to the best epistemic forms of certainty (think: social media) and technological control (think: environmental collapse). With the polemic tone well set I can begin with the examples, these many epic failures in use of reason.

It Won't Happen to Me (Unless I Want it to)

I will start with a joke. When you ask someone why they buy lottery tickets when they only have a 1 in 69 billion chance of winning what do they say in reply? Typically, ‘someone has to win’. And they are right (we seem to be able to intuit the law of large numbers and rally it to our reasoning in very ad hoc ways). Differently, when you ask someone why they risk having unprotected sex when they have a one in ten chance of catching an STI with each unsafe encounter, what do they say? Well, ‘It won't happen to me’. Of course, in isolation for a single event each claim is relatively valid and accurate enough, but clearly different motivating values are in place in terms of the luck one supposes, and whether or not we are reifying a particular or general claim. One value expresses a deep biological need or impulse (sex) the other a cultural value (wealth). Ironically, assuming the same person believes both these claims, while each reasoning step taking in isolation is valid it is rationally inconsistent to argue in the diametric directions entailed overall for more than one event (and this irrationality gets worse as the number of events increases). To win the lottery the number of times you need to play to ensure a win is so astronomic as to be almost a certain impossibility for most who play and a certain marginal loss for those who can, but winning the STI lottery, even using protection, is almost assured and very possibly in only a few interactions, typically much less than ten as the naively “rational” might wrongly suppose “intuitively”.

Here the problem is that in different and structurally opposed contexts we exploit an opposed and so inconsistent value-interpretation of the law of large numbers conflating the particular with the general. In one case we expect the law to work for us as if we bought most of the tickets (but didn't) when it isn't likely to, and in the other we expect it to keep us safe risking more and more particular infection events when it probably won't, but that is just what we want to believe not what we've reasoned out at all. Do you know more people who reason across such cases *in behaviour* inconsistently or as the data morphisms show they should in the context at hand, i.e., to **not buy** so **not use** the lottery ticket, but

definitely *buy* and *use* the condom? If not, this describes an irrationality as a form of pseudo-rationality in using rational means inappropriately, probably because of a relative misconceiving of the value of the ends sought for, so failing to distinguish between them as differently due to biological need (where reason is often overrun in meeting needs in both the short and long run) as opposed to cultural want. One in this case has simply fit the risk assessments to match our unconscious wishes ass-backwards, all to allow us to seem rational in our choice, yet not really choosing at all, just *rationalizing*. It is certainly true most lay people *and* academics are often shown terrible at intuitive statistical analysis; our bodies may leverage proper Bayesian notions of probability, but our conscious cultural minds often fail at this completely in naive terms. Where is the ideal use of rationality in any of this?

Is Water Hardness an Objective or Subjective Measure?

Here is a case of confusing indirect (what I call '*far*') perceptive accuracy with a value assessment within a hard science, again not to perjure scientists, as one hopes—at least—those who leverage these scientific notions are careful not to treat the somewhat arbitrary norms in plays as facts when, for example, expressing these technical terms in the context of furthering some technological solution to a “problem” (see, ‘problem’ represents a value too, but when needs and wants, and norms and facts get confused, “problems” might be red herrings or straw men more than calls to necessary action).

Consider first the constructed notion of pH. While there is always some of the conventional in any scientific scale or qualitative heuristic there is always enough clarity in the warrant of the accurate percepts and well-vetted and very abductively sound data morphisms and motivating inferences over which such conventions are constructed as values within culture (both in science and society at large). pH is a convention of convenience to start. As water is contingently the basis of life (and this always matters, the contingent nature of certain norm and value *representations* correlate with but never reduce to the necessary and essential nature of the *targets* of said norms and values) understanding its chemistry is key to promoting certain other values, and to “seeing” the world more accurately. Water reacts in the presence of dissolved acidic or basic salts (and down the causal hierarchy our explanations fall to the atomic identities and structures making something an acid or base) facilitating larger and larger quantities of dissolved ions, respectively either H^+ or OH^- (ignoring the other respective and relatively more inert halves of the salts so dissolved). I will skip the math, but as the range of scale over which some bulk amount of otherwise pure H_2O may support H^+ or OH^- turns out symmetric, anti-reflexive and exponentially expressible (over many orders of relative effect and concentrations) taking the logarithm of the measured amount of H^+ or OH^- not only makes the direct perceiving and conceiving of acidity or basicity possible as if lying along a line but this formulation then shows itself capable of being embedded within further deductive constructions, i.e. those describing the chemistry of all acids and bases within stoichiometry and other more generally rational methods of chemistry.

However, while our values here are fully non-arbitrary—we seek to understand water in terms of the rationally constructed norms of acidity and basicity as they correlate to H^+ or OH^- concentrations in solution—some of this non-arbitrary value is not derivable from data morphisms directly, only biological norms. For example, it is reasonable to describe those single cells that can detect and react appropriately to H^+ or OH^- levels (so not ever to pH, just *as if* pH in functional effigy) in water as intuitive scientists even though they never literally feel *as a conscious experience* the negative effects of too strong acids and bases on their bodies. We might even call those reactions causing them to avoid situations in which too much acidity or basicity might destroy them summarily *as if* rational and equally the deepest archetypal materio-functional source of our similar reactions, yet we always must start in our experiences with acids and bases indirectly and back-infer essence while pH sensitive cells literally channel data essence directly. Either way and over the many expanding scales up of emergent biological complexity what we perceive when we measure this otherwise made-up quantitative convention of pH is deeply and very rationally grounded and motivated in passing down through the most accurate biological norms and only then to the most certain data morphisms. Nothing irrational to see here, so we move along . . .

Now consider the convention of ‘Water Hardness’. While many might naively assume water hardness is equally a fully rational construct it most certainly is not. Water hardness, while it measures what is rationally tied to data morphisms may not be rooted in wide biological norms at all (unless there are cases of single cells needing to detect and react to hardness, but I suspect if they do it is more passively as dissolved minerals are typically well tolerated by all lived forms over orders of magnitude that pH is not). The motivating cause for the creation of water hardness standards is derived from up not down the normative spiral; we value soft water more than hard water for various reasons only well meant in an evolved enough technological culture with central plumbing and municipal water supplies and all those other things we created for realizing other values (such as being clean all the time, or not having our appliances and clothes caked with chalky residue or the taste of our food adulterated, etc.).

So, water hardness is more relatively determined as a contingent cultural value in more arbitrary ways than pH. There is no problem in this as there is always some deep and wide enough quasi-epistemic value in this, but largely in terms of furthering other very reified cultural norms by speech acts, not the biological or data ones directly anymore. While I am OK with saying some bulk water sample always has a pH value essentially, and so this represents a real fact, to say water has hardness as an identical kind of fact is simply wrong. Water hardness is more determined as a norm, even if it is an unproblematic fact we can measure it as rationally as we do pH. The problem for rationality comes in when people (think: salespeople) profess it is a fact water that is too hard is *always* bad (or that there are no negative non-local costs to reducing it that might outweigh the long-term local practice of *always* reducing it locally).

So, WATER HARDNESS does not represent a complete fact to the same degree pH does as the norms grounding the value come more mixed from above and below, so is a significantly more arbitrary value-

relative norm than pH. While if one's water had a pH of 1 that is *always* bad (as a fact) in terms of meeting our biological need to consume it in the way required right down to the morphisms, water hardness is not grounded in the exact same way. Technological as opposed to Pure Science is riddled with such relatively arbitrary value norms. So, another problem for rationality arises when a scientific norm's proximity to real fact grants it the sheen of necessity beyond what it is really owed. This is just another way even the most rational methods fall over to arbitrary norms in ways that need not necessarily be banished, but certainly play a problematic role in arguments in ways I do not think even the experts explicitly see; their faith in the inherent rationality of their disciplines, I think, covers more norms generally than facts in all the fine particulars.

Is All Lying Bad?

Here's a small morsel for you to chew providing another analysis of mixed rationality with deep irrationality in play (perhaps reminiscent of the lottery/STD case). Consider the ethical exception to lying that we call "white lying". What the studies show is most people can rationalize (maybe they are being rational, maybe not) many cases in which lying is the preferred ethical choice (think perversely: Kant's *Murderer at the Door* for a counterexample). Yet, other studies show that—purportedly the same set of people taken generally—when asked in what situations they are OK being lied to often say 'never'. Go figure, yet another inconsistent sort of outcome of assigned and "reasoned" ethical value occurring when posed across asymmetric contexts. If you think lying is OK in some contexts but then never want to be lied to yourself is this a rational place to start ethics from at all? I'll let you answer that question for yourself, I'm off to get a lottery ticket for my bare-backed Tinder date.

Can We Really Have Confidence in Confidence Intervals?⁵³

These are revisionary times for inductive science: fat is bad, fat is good, cholesterol is bad, cholesterol is not that bad, meat is good, meat is bad, flossing reduces cavities, no wait it doesn't . . . sigh.

The next problem is quite technical to understand in fine detail. I once did understand it quite well, now I'm not so sure, and am probably flailing and failing here more than on the mark, but I really only need be in the cogently critical neighbourhood. Real understanding of this emerging concern requires at least mastering university level statistics for those intending to be graduate students in statistical mathematics where one first learns the deeper premises and deductive justifications of the entire method and not just the surface methods—albeit complex enough—of sophisticated by-hand statistical

or probabilistic analyses, i.e. those where understanding how confidence intervals work *in very fine semantic detail* takes centre stage in terms of their central **normative** role in judging/interpreting how strong the use of ‘probably’ is in claiming something is *probably true* or *probably false* (or simply: *undetermined*) based on some statistical sampling and a possibly very indirect series of observational inferences made across scale (statistical results are as much reconstructed over *far* inferences as *percepts* more so than gleaned from direct measurement of properties). Taking a basic softer-science-aimed course in how to use some statistical software packages in research is not nearly enough as by then all the metaphysics and perhaps too arbitrary norms have been silently stuffed into the software.

This emerging suspicion about the epistemic soundness of many traditional uses of confidence intervals—again—concerns how well the relatively arbitrary choice of confidence interval tracks with the required strength of the ‘probably’ in the assessment of some statistically supported claim being *probably true* in attempting some, typically, syllogistic integration of particular cases over some limited sample population or set towards making some general *ceteris paribus* factual claim (think: does smoking cause cancer?). The problem is all such inference-building measurements are intrinsically suspect to random errors, normal variability, and interference from competing causes in measurement even when the observational method is otherwise impeccable. On top of random variability is the problem of sample size. Too small a sample size and those random and variable effects might swamp out the true norms or facts being measured (where here the norms in play are the classic mean, mode and standard deviation).

The telling context in which the choice of confidence interval most invokes suspicion is largely in the psychological and social sciences when one is dealing with objects of study so complex (human beings, quite frequently) the properties being measured are often very far removed from being obviously shored up by the kinds of data morphisms underwriting primary property physical and other non-intentionality laden sciences (not to mention all the possible lying and other hidden biases and dark motives). As we can have little confidence in any single sample or measurement as an apt representative of any and all groups it is a proper member of, we must hope the distribution of deviation from some essential norm or average for many samples otherwise ideally fits the standard and symmetrical Gaussian curve (there are, of course, other kinds of natural distributions, nothing is as simple as it seems or gets talked about here).

So, to make further inferences as inductions from statistical or probabilistic “heat maps”, always of generalities only derivable over combined forms of intrinsic and extrinsic variability, requires some independent assessment of warrant ensuring appropriate sample size, method, required number of iterations of root experiment, etc. or the conclusion made might simply be the product of pure chance as opposed to grasping at some essential general truth owed essentially to the larger population represented by its sample sub-population. The interpretive logic of confidence intervals, like the logic of determining logical validity, works in a hard to grasp “negative” sense, so is more an attempt at filtering out the assumed symmetrical effects of randomness by saying how it has been mathematically

controlled for rather than as a selecting in of some purely positive claim; i.e. it is always impossible to take a perfectly accurate, precise and stable measurement of any property, but for luck (so we have no way of knowing we've hit the "bull's eye" at all but for the throwing of a tipped law-of-large-number's worth of darts).

Typically, and normatively the bulk of inductive work in empirical science assumes a sufficient confidence interval of 0.9 (in hard physical science the norm, due the relative observational tractability of pure material objects and their primary properties is 0.95), representing the value of "confidence in the result" but in what turns out still a relatively arbitrary if not reasoned way, so expressing a norm not, *better*: never a fact. Even if, based on certain Gaussian-apt results extracted out of some sufficient and representative sub-sample administrated out of the larger and more complete group being studied, we rightly claim some probabilistic conclusion is shown true with a certain standard deviation in the data that is itself deduced (by doing the maths) the strength of the conclusion is still *subjectively* dependent on the rational appropriateness of the chosen confidence interval. But as all choice expresses a core of arbitrariness, a "fact" derived from the result of some arbitrary choice is not of the same quality as those first collected and computed to shore up the conclusion. Even though the relative accuracy and value of any conclusion is determined relative to the choice of confidence interval the warrant for the confidence interval never rests on the same certain data morphisms as the computed data and graphical set does. The choice of appropriate confidence interval in the context of the sample size and observational method at hand, given the measured means and deviations is always finally made as a free choice by a mind, so is always suspect due to ineliminable psychological bias and not just "honest mistakes".

This is how it sort of goes: 'We conclude that 35% of people pick their noses, with a 0.9 percent confidence interval.' Now, even assuming the experiment has been designed well enough not to introduce hidden bias by ensuring a representative sample of varied enough people (who are trustworthy enough) have been measured in the right way to ensure the results for the sample can be generalized beyond just that local group (imagine if inductive science only made conclusions of sample groups in isolation, what use would that be to knowledge? Oh wait, I've just described how social media works, trustworthiness be damned). Here's how that general claim gets more fully cashed out. If we were to randomly "measure" another 100 subjects outside the original test group we can assume according to the previously stated conclusion that in 9 out of 10 ten cases of re-sampling a further 100 subjects there is a very good chance, i.e. a very high probability plus or minus some intrinsic deviation (the "bad" extrinsic deviation is assumed controlled for by now) our measurement of this new set of subjects will re-determine that ~35 +/- % of our calculated standard deviation of people also pick their noses, but in 1 out of those same ten times we re-sample it will turn out some random error or natural variability has swamped out the actual measurement and so will either over-determine or under-determine the conclusion well beyond reason (but not dis-confirm it, just expose a case in which all things are *not* equal, but exactly as predicted and already accounted for).

In one out of ten cases (think of the STD risk assessment) the measurement taken and the inference to draw will produce a “lie”, either an accidental confirmation or an accidental disconfirmation in no way reflecting any sort of general truth about the set of particulars at hand, and this is an irreducible fact due to the ineliminable problem of error in measurement and natural variability tied to the pragmatic problem only small samples taken out of much larger populations are typically and pragmatically measurable. Importantly what gets observed in the “tenth” case is not what you are trying to show or prove probably true by the induction but a failure of one or more of the assumed *ceteris paribus* clauses; a recognition of the fact exceptions are often paradoxically the “proof” of their inductions if only for being the statistical outliers exploiting the space beyond whatever arbitrary confidence interval has been determined as “normally sufficient” *and that—again—has already been rationally anticipated and accounted for.*

The growing worry here is too many studies are making conclusions only from within the warrant of the 1 out of 10 case, and not the 9 out of 10 case, so they are tacitly and possibly invisibly (or there is epistemic malice in play) “cherry-picking” negative or null data to shore up presupposed beliefs and not warranting novel facts at all. The problems of induction run in parallel with their relative probabilistic or statistical accounts of warrant. Of course, to reduce the confidence error is to increase the confidence interval without limit. A confidence interval of 1.0 could only be achieved by measuring every proper object belonging to the entire group (and in perpetuity) about which the generalization is being made and this is of course pragmatically and economically infeasible if not impossible, but the reality is were error in measurement effectively eliminated (so the standard deviation is made as close to its intrinsic value and Gaussian form as possible) by measuring every possible subject at every moment we still wouldn’t be dealing with the possibility of insincerity or affective variability (although this may be the cause of the exception-exception at hand); yet another irreducible problem for making induction over objects with minds.

What Is The Point?

What is my point for rationality? My point is there is growing concern the confidence intervals and experimental and interpretive methods widely promoted as fit for making positive factual claims in nutritional, social and other psychological or mind-involved sciences are often woefully insufficient. Sometimes problems with interpretation leading to false claims being made and widely endorsed (before the *mea culpas* and retractions ensue, think: Cold Fusion) are just due to woefully bad methodology and clear enough bias or mathematical error, but are just as likely and much more problematically due to unjustified faith in the accuracy owed the favoured confidence intervals, or rather that people treat the norms of statistics involving value choices as if they are themselves facts and so often fail to deeply justify either their sampling methods or interpretation of results, yet these

methods and interpretative norms are still promoted widely without concern. What many critics of the current use of statistics are slowly raising alarm bells about is many people are picking confidence intervals, sample sizes and methods, or methods of mathematical “tweaking” of data, etc. tacitly to serve biases about what is to be proved or disproved and not at all honouring other forms of warrant impacting their conclusions, perhaps not considering the need for use of much higher confidence intervals or much larger sample sizes (and with much more effort made toward same-reproducibility before publishing results) especially in cases dealing with language-bearings subjects, and especially when there seems the sort of lack of study-to-study reproducibility increasingly becoming a problem in the popularization of scientific inductive fact in media, conventional lay society and political discourse.

These are clearly times of endless revision of “facts” but the question as to whether it is more norms or facts being overturned increasingly need be asked. In this case what we have is more a cultural value—confidence interval—that could never be made completely non-arbitrary, so one always needing to be reaffirmed as properly entailed from outside the assumed experimental and interpretive framework by some lower scale accurate perception and finally certain data morphisms, rather than just by assuming a Gaussian distribution of the data set as a necessary intrinsic feature (in the background *post hoc ergo propter hoc* concerns loom at a whole other level).

I am made to think of the problem of colour realism here, which I think reflects a meta-analogous problem of how particular subjects could ever be tractably both represented by and/or represent the generalities they are the evidence for, or *vice versa*. Think of politically incorrect stereotypes. There is often an element of truth in them even if most in the target group do not fit the stereotype, and whether the pejorative assessments are unjustly reified or not. The problem is not in social stereotypes existing, the problem is they actually have very little, if any logical value for determining the characteristics of randomly chosen representative particulars at all (doing this is what leads to racism, sexism, etc. directly). This is exactly why for making general inductive claims statistics and probabilities are always required.

If Stereotyping is Bad All Scientists are Natural Racists?

But what is inductive science if not the—*ideally speaking*—non-pejorative stereotyping of nature?

If use of one type of stereotype is epistemically or ethically bad, then on rational terms so is use of the other, but for controlling for the different sources of bias and warding off certain fallacious over or under-determinations from general to particular cases, or particular to general cases as yielding facts *by illogical uses of inference* (i.e., hasty generalizations, fallacy of composition, etc.). Rather, when we make an induction to a particular from a generally contingent *ceteris paribus* law we are invoking possible

worlds, or betting lines, and we fall down rationally-speaking exactly when we impugn a property on some random individual due to the statistically derived properties of the assumed group the individual *obviously belongs to* by some probability as if there is necessity in finding positive confirmation, but only and always error in finding disconfirmation (so cherry picking inconsistent poles of some quasi-Derridean binary oppositely in differing contexts and now able to prove anything we want at all, and so shoring up and not confronting the hidden biases and *deep and normal kinds of all too human irrationality always in play*).

If you deny the value of stereotypes, that they mean something rational if not potentially malicious when abused, but then endorse a *by fiat* faith in some arbitrary use of the 0.9 confidence interval in the making of other kinds of generalizations well I think you are being irrational in this. The problem lying close to these various ones of mathematical induction and inductive science is, of course, the problem of universals and its antagonist *Nominalism*. The moral here is to be very, very careful if any of your statistical assumptions for making probable conclusions about generalities over small but otherwise *just* assumed appropriate and rationally determined representative samples are taken as facts but are “in fact” just manifesting as relatively arbitrary norms (so perhaps already based on inaccurate percepts) if you want to truly be ideally rational.

In the final tipping from probably true to true or probably false to false, often constructed over what many are now arguing is not a sufficiently non-arbitrary choice of statistical norms for which other possible harder and less certain means of warrant might actually be required (so to make the norms involved less arbitrary over the accurate enough percepts, but now all inferentially embedded in the certain data morphisms) well then I have either damned induction further, or simply shown our revisionary times are not due to nature being so precocious as to be unrepresentable in generalization over small samples of particulars determining lawfully natural stereotypes. Instead, we are simply in many cases deluded we have ever been dealing with the facts we supposed, and just false beliefs more purely normatively confirmed by too arbitrary value ultimately driven by hidden biases and other all too common abuses risked in the pursuit of epistemic power instead of epistemic humility. We’ll have to stay tuned on this debate as it is barely a tip-of-an-iceberg controversy at this time.

Revisiting The Sex-Gender Divide

So, returning to the Sex-Gender divide, we can now see much more clearly what is wrong in terms of Problem 1 and 2 with the too strong views of Social Constructivism, which might even have all scientific knowledge literally “made up”. First off *and let me be very clear*: I am also a critic of science and deny it any reified status as a more fundamental or totalizing truth-or-knowledge maker, particularly in terms of aligned claims that would have it the proof of humanity owning an intrinsically superior form of

rationality or intelligence. I certainly do not see science as the *sin quo non* knowledge maker, but would still put it upwards on a spiral of universal and “real” epistemic development (so I endorse EPISTEMIC PROGRESS, but always with a paradoxical rider) entailing not only can we continue to improve upon ideal use of science by correcting the ways I am showing it corrupted by our denied irrationally (always due the madness inherent in psyche of the world) but that we can also transcend it even as we “perfect” it (as much by an integration across the spiral by positing paradox as a new meta-epistemic, if not oxymoronic “trans-grounding”).

In the end, I believe, we must reject any notions of finality in means or ends of knowing; the universe grows beyond our understanding of it even as we understand it differently and “better” *exactly due to the effects of having caused this knowing by interfering with what otherwise would materially self-determine its own outcomes; in imposing the norms of all the needed speech acts on the world both science uniquely, and other epistemic sources similarly favour*. Even as we grasp the world’s epistemic affordances most soundly or cogently we also disturb what we observe *by the very thinking of it*, by analogy as some kind of conceptual/cognitive uncertainty principle.

The material problem with the too literal claim ‘gender is a social construct’ in its most naively social-warrior meant way (all sound and fury . . .) is some seem to take it to entail—and so become zealots set to impose their too arbitrary values in place of other what are now supposed equally made up values—there is no such thing as sex, or sex differences deeply rooted in *mind-independent forms* of the biological, and at some point *there is nothing real in culture at all but what we make up and impose on it using power*.

“There is one kind of sex cell, here is another, therefore SEX is real and begins as a real material but always spectrally inter-tangled dichotomy”

So, unless we *in concert with all free-living cells* have made up the intentional world entirely the idea we fully control how and why such values are constructed from the mind down, not from the matter up ignores too much *prima facie* evidence gender types are deeply informed by and existentially embedded in all sexual types (themselves never purely beginning nor ending with what the hard-line division of MALE and FEMALE supposes due the underlying insistence of a too naive or *divide and conquer* use of reason). Here we have the obverse problem with norms than our previous case showed. Rather than using inaccurate percepts to shore up too arbitrary value we are instead ignoring relatively accurate percepts, i.e. all those by which we observe, classify and explain SEX and SEXUALITY through empirical and folk science, largely in direct (*close*) or unproblematic indirect (*far*) observation, with only the aid of optical instruments working on proximal input as our eyes do—so extending what we can see without corrupting how it might be seen in conception were we tiny microscopic homunculi as in the movie *Inner Space* (this is a stretch of course, the very idea of each of the various forms of seeing disappears as the scale decreases to the atomic, and as it increases what is directly or even indirectly seeable at such

ever increasing distances and scales—as very *far* percepts indeed—slowly vanishes, first to points of visible, or but for our instruments, invisible light, then to the nothingness of unbounded empty space).

The subsequent set of inductions and abductions derived from this observational data leading to the factual, albeit contingent claim sexual life forms exist and evolved out of asexual ones is simply too detailed, immense, epistemically compelling and cogently confirmed to just be made up in society and then somehow projected so arbitrarily onto matter. SEX starts with complex enough but *not* necessarily perceiving animals (by an apparent long shot of billions of years!), so its factual status is wholly grounded in the many certain data morphisms we find lying around (making it very hard to say how we “constructed” the base material divisions on which GENDER supervenes even as we first looked at them, such a smuggling in of equivocation/idealist-begging I have never imagined, ‘construct’ now means ‘see, then conceive; by this act creating the targets *ex nihilo*’).

Categorically, sex at its material base is about two same but conversely telos-functionally identical cells, *otherwise varying in allele content at some common loci but never in cardinal or ordinal number of genes and chromosomes*, combining and mixing only half of their genetic material (always duplicated as paired chromosomes in somatic cells, but first split apart and separately walled off as gametes) to make a new cell (relatively speaking, it is of course more complicated than that). This is instead of just replicating their genetic material asexually in isolation as fissioned off clones with much less subsequent allelic variability possible (or sharing genes by less comprehensive means, such as is supposed why and how viruses originated, for one example). The evolutionary advantages and burdens of sexual reproduction are well understood too.

But as sex becomes more complex and mind-bearing animals emerge and develop we can begin to see where the problem of inaccurate perception and conception enters. Over scales of neural and systemic order the means by which sexual reproduction occurs goes in fits and starts from the cellular to the sex organ to the brain and whole-person level, and it is only at a very late point in this story people first see, accurately, the differences due to male or female body types (yes, the intermediate kinds have always been in play and as purposively as pathologically, here I think is where ideas should be re-constructed *within not beyond* necessity instead). But due to other biological values in play, specifically those that would *naturally* have us see deformity or too rare difference as “bad” (in the being hard to reduce to some existing reification of some other too hard choice of only one pole of some higher embedding or lower embedded norm) we inaccurately by our hunter-gatherer taboos already non-consciously “learn” (and for understandable reasons as my next example will explain) thereby to consciously “see” the conceptually purest poles of sex organ difference as RIGHT and anything else as WRONG, but this is already a step too *far* away from the certain data morphisms (which are what really ground the ineliminable and originally by necessity dominant binary forms of SEX *and* GENDER as real well before the terms ‘human male’ and ‘human female’ are ever culturally normalized and yes, in support of the ideal end of the LGTBQ movement, if not of some of its irrational means).

By the long statistically or probabilistically evidential tail the current rationally constructed confronting of conceptual under-sights (defining what terms people get called and may identify by) and of other denied and unjust institutional slights defining the core message of the LGBTQ movement (the missed rights owed the aggrieved, the failed responsibilities of the aggrieving) certainly are ethically and compassionately well motivated, but not by that is the entire gender binary made a fiction. “Normal” is simply denying and denigrating *as always* the real paradoxical, the Derridean tipping spectrum sexuality always was disposed to be then, and still is now. (Abstract) gender literally emerged *as a difference over scale* out of concrete sexual differences realized by integration over many cell, organ, system and organism types both diachronically and synchronically, much as bulk water does *in analogy* out of many, many molecules of H₂O, so it is hard to see how gender is constructed or is ever constructible as some social warriors so radically imagine it as no minds existed to do so when the most basic forms of sex **and** gender first emerged (even if it was only **as if** gender for originally lacking expressed intentionality).

But this is not a symptom of us constructing false entities so much as it is of our endless need to use divide and conquer forms of reason as we start to first conceive of the world by language as value, but find nothing but chaos around the edges of our stable and almost always dualized forms of naively given linguistic experience (what words **don’t** have opposites?). So, while sex at the cellular level is always accurately perceived, how we think and perceive of sex at the system or organ level *in only cultural human beings* gets corrupted in perception by our need to value too arbitrarily for the illusion of self-identity or for social or ideological control. The hard-core constructivists have it backwards. The nature and spectrum of sex organs is more arbitrary than pure taboo informed naive self-reflection ever sees it as accurately. By this the true character and range of possible forms belonging to SEX and GENDER are less accurately perceived in both lay and often academic interpretation than they should be *as any and all taboo value functions must deny all disconfirming but otherwise accurate perceptions to maintain the aims of these more naive forms of reasoning by reducing the spectral and often paradoxical targets of the knowings to just their black and white, their conceptually pure poles* (so, naive reason is a very slippery eel indeed, sometimes reifying one pole over the other—i.e. patriarchal forms of sexism—otherwise reifying the pure conceptual poles by denying the spectral base explicitly or more subtly—i.e. homonormativity).

The mind may do this because perceptive accuracy is already revitalized and while a person may deny or not “see” this, the mind already knows it and exploits this fact by feeding lies to/as the ego, half innocently by accident, half on purpose. The various gender movements also, I think, have it half right and half wrong too. Gender is fluid (*all unicorn abstractions are!*) and so can always be somewhat freely created, especially in cases of embodied sexual characteristics that do not lie obviously on some MALE versus FEMALE (sex organ) poles. MASCULINE and FEMININE and their assumed isomorphic supervenience onto, respectively, MAN and WOMAN, while perceived accurately enough, are at best empty ideals of (gender-based mind-to-body) “normal” function, not (sex based body-to-mind) “normal” form, all serving to perpetuate the illusion of fixed identity (which is *always* constructed quite a bit by endless forms of lying, that I will agree to).

However anyone who has raised a child accurately perceived by MALE or FEMALE knows ‘boys tend to be boys and girls tend to be girls’, *ceteris paribus*. Here the *ceteris paribus* clauses should cause us to see with more accuracy and so impose less fixed arbitrary value to all MALES necessarily being masculine in some prototypical way and all FEMALES being necessarily feminine (so while a confronting deconstruction is actually required, instead a need for more data-morphic obscuring constructions is forwarded; all this will do is strengthen the dominant binary in ego reactivity; you can’t fight city hall by cutting off its face to somehow not spite its nose). But that we don’t see this is not due to lack of accurate evidence to that effect, rather the problem is the *long-standing non-conscious cultural pre-determination and imposition* of gender from the outside (in scale, from the mind down) in some trans-logical (pre-ontological) *conflation* as if it is arising from the inside (in scale, from the body up) rather than in letting it become what nature has it at its genetic and material core first and then allowing the ego which comes to identify by it to adjust more healthily and less impositionally within whatever cultural constructs it always starts from, but not ever finally or lastingly ends with.

Where the social warriors get it wrong and where Jordan Peterson waded in but I think has been deliberately misunderstood (for denying the hard core view *justly if not problematically largely for the crime of being an entitled and opinionated, but academically well vetted white middle-aged man*, but endorsing a different basis of psychological difference for the MASCULINE and FEMININE, one very consistent with many wisdom traditions, and I doubt most critics of Peterson have bothered to read any of these works or if they have, made any effort to understand them more deeply) is in thinking we need more pronouns. The extreme and unsustainable ideal aimed for is once people are free from the unjust and arbitrary tyranny of these made-up and other-enforced genders as determined by “normal” sexual body defaults—which now has no necessary poles at all—they may then not only make up what they want to be in absolute arbitrariness but to expect the world to instantly create all the further institutional rights and practices for them to do so.

Well, good luck with that.

Controlling reality through the leveraging of right speech and the banning of wrong speech only works (unjustly and cruelly) for Fascism, and expecting the government to police language demonstrates a complete misunderstanding of how language evolves as much in reaction to the imposition, informal or formal, of exactly these sorts of superficial and oppressive forms of power, so even more fucking good luck with that (has no one read *1984*, *Animal Farm*, etc.?)! What I think is actually required is less pronouns, not many more, not seven, not six, not five, not four, not three, not even the two-ness we have been beating all of humanity over the head with as normal since we could speak of them, just one: PERSON (and for me sooner or later even rocks are “people”, as neither we nor they have identities but as a value, so not as something we can ever “see” or reduce to, all we find at the bottom are intentionality-mute morphisms after all).

We are All “Dudes”; Let’s Try Abiding a Bit More, OK?

My nominated (only half) tongue in cheek universal pronoun pair of choice to replace all the gender-based parts of speech is ‘Dude’ and ‘it’. I think this pair already works naturally in many existing English grammatical conventions, allowing the replacement of any and all gender pronouns or other parts of speech directly without much fuss. For example, ‘she’ and ‘he’ are replaced with ‘that Dude’ or ‘this Dude’ with identifying modifications that may still innocently refer to male, female, or other being allowed if there are not too many sticks up the butt or passive-aggressive chip on shoulder type people in play, i.e., ‘Yo, *male-looking* Dude. Oh, you identify as female, my bad Dude’, etc. (at some point we all need to get over how others might innocently or even maliciously misperceive us, some females do look and/or act male and *vice versa*, etc. It is impossible not to offend in many innocent situations, but the need to self-identify only by taking offence is juvenile and counter-productive).

I also like ‘it’ to replace his or her because this also tends to raise up the ethical status of non-human persons and other objects in ways I also think are also desperately required. By de-stigmatizing pejorative uses of ‘it’ we may also start the more deeply required project of deflating the entire mass of unwarranted content entailed by the ‘man is the measure of all things’ meme. And once we are all normally just persons first and last (as Dudes or its, but this is a pipe dream: ‘him’, ‘her’, ‘he’, ‘she’, et. al. aren't going anywhere, and I doubt any legalized form of ‘they’ speech will ever take root, but something more informally might once the perjury and blame motivating the movement has been soothed over by more generational churn, which gets us more used to these new impositions of identity by default; familiarity breeds *complacency* just as much as *contempt*) we may finally belong in our collective entirety to just one shared universal and always *stranger-faced and stranger-facing* neutral gender. Only then may we *informally* allow for further normalizing a universal set of non-polarized and spectrum-honouring sex and gender referring pronouns et. al. across all languages to confront and replace all the deep but innocently enough evolved biases due all the inaccurate percepts and too arbitrary if not functionally fit enough value functions.

In this *Brave New World of Other-Perso, Purposefully-Reinforced Intimate-Identity Mystery* the matter of what goes on between one’s legs sexually and in one’s gendered or gender-less mind, like the possible cross-ranges of many of the all too human perverse sexual and asexual practices, returns to being no one’s business nor responsibility to either pre-legitimize nor pre-demonize but for those universally informed-by-taboo restrictions remaining rationally banned as legal prohibitions. By this we may, by a back-turning but re-fowarding recapitulation, recover a default covering up of the chthonic impulses of sexuality, but now with more self-honesty derived from a more general form of understanding of sexuality and gender first in non-personal terms, even as we re-centre our self’s in the endless not-knowing and not-controlling of sexuality and gender by letting them be cross-personally discovered more intimately according to some more healthily negotiated but always private contract (to start, at

least, ultimately PRIVACY, I think, is a wolf in sheep's clothing too-arbitrary value as well, one that more accurate perception might see as more harmful to human progress than vanguarding it).

It is well-nigh time for us to stop constructing our identities only according to the always slipping, sliding and inverting of values over generations by default conditioning from all the too-arbitrary, always mixed beautiful and puerile stories of either fiction or fashion, nor from the default folk notions of either SEX or GENDER, but according to the best rationally chosen means and ends required in the moment, i.e. promoting those values confronting the human tendency to excess and by that all the inherent risks due that excess risked in all human sexual behaviour coming in, rather than just serve to unleash it too far going out (where all the problematic outcomes will continue to ensue inevitably and unstoppably regardless as to rationality—now shouting—**SEX IS NOT RATIONALIZABLE, NOR IRRATIONALIZABLE, BUT A-RATIONALIZING, I.E., CTHONIC, BUYER BEWARE ALWAYS, RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES AND LOGIC-DEFYING COMPLEXES OF DESIRES, NEEDS AND THEIR OUTCOMES AROUND GOING WAY BEYOND THE THIN ASSURANCES OF CONSENT AND IDENTITY, AND ARE NEVER FAIRLY DISTRIBUTED IN EXPERIENCE AND NEVER WILL BE!!!**).

In a more evolved globally shared culture, we address the undifferentiated cultural person first and primarily, not their tribe to start, not their bodies, not their clothes, not their beauty, not their power and certainly not these endless sexual and mixed tribal power plays meant to temper the too inexperienced lustings of youth. It is time for us to get over the shame of our many forms of “nakedness”. It is time for vulnerability to be the norm, and not the stomping on it, which is all I think adding more pronouns or controlling language to “fix” bad behaviour ever accomplishes. The innate and irrepressible bullies will simply have more ways to mock and slur, not more reason to confront their own inner uncertainties and insecurities of identity, body or mind. The real problem with this asinine form of the “gender is socially constructed” meme (I am perjuring only the zombie uses, and am fine with theorists following the thread until the epistemic ethic proves itself bankrupt or enriched, but I do worry about the politically motivated costs of promoting such theories to the intellectually unwashed who often seek power any way they can, reason be damned) is it invisibly endorses a form of idealism but does not own up to its responsibility to base its theories and metaphysical premises on some resolution of the mind-body and interaction problem in terms of a realist materialism. Yes, having invisibly promoted (yet) an(other) idealism theorists can respond, like Berkeley, by proposing a regressive God of the gaps; whatever new ideas really ground the old ones are themselves constructed, so the whole thing is made up in the hive or collective “God” mind.

Thus, a meta-form of hypocritical rationality appears if the same constructivists are either professed or closet materialists or realists, believing in differing sets of metaphysics that are basically defined in logical opposition (but one supposes since it's all *turtle-ideas* all the time and all the way up and down even inconsistent ideas can be the basis for knowing, and I'd agree, but to different epistemic purposes).

Look, every once extinct, extant, or fit to become extant coherent social group with some likely longstanding and coherent enough ideological framework would claim itself—if only tacitly—involved in furthering an ethical *and* epistemic project. Things once thought and shared and meant well enough on the basis of our pre-linguistic perceptive origins are always immediately expressing a naive and natural and fit enough use of reason, even if often ending up on ossified facts and norms inevitably becoming corrupt and oppressive by the power they accrue. However, the solution I see is not only to go forward and multiply new value beyond necessity, but also to go back to the origins of both sex and gender and untangle the sprandrelic inaccuracies and covering arbitrarinesses, so to unbind the spectrum from all its long-standing hidden choices made by our *original sin* only over too conceptually pure poles and their often-one-sided “normal” reifications. Nowhere but in sexual politics does this need seem more pressing, if only because this entire concern with gender seems yet another moot distraction compared to the more profound collective crises we all face despite what is hanging (or not) between our legs or that we find the wrong thing hanging there, or where we might wish to aim these things.

‘Beauty is truth, truth beauty’ is a Damned Lie?

We see a similar problem with notions of natural beauty (non-cultural; prior to the widespread practice of arts and advertising) explained as arising (at least in large part) from the accurate perception of symmetry combined with adherence to fashionable local cultural preference. Here we have not a case of inaccurate perception (the symmetries and asymmetries are right there to be seen and the morphisms show they are not lies, except for what using makeup meant to be applied and not seen achieves) but a case where the original background context has shifted so much a once accurate percept has now been, otherwise once tipping directly to a more non-arbitrary *biological* value, made relatively inaccurate all because most lack the epistemic training and rational affect (even knowing the facts won’t cause most to stop the now more relatively arbitrary valuing) to understand the original likely biological basis of beauty as indicating the value of HEALTH or FECUNDITY.

This example also suggests a further wide problem for rationality and one I think well defines the deepest sources of psychological malfeasance inherent to our natures, but ones now appearing with mixed rational content from biology and irrational content coming from culture only after some widespread and profound cultural change has mitigated some biological value-percept that only made sense in its original background conditions (hence the Garden of Eden metaphor taken in a negative, or forward, not back-looking sense). When humans naturally lived in the face of unavoidable, sporadic or regular risk of experiencing famine or drought, and a hard relative lack of medicine and access to surgery, this made child birth and development fraught with peril, so those naively perceived as most beautiful for being most symmetrical and superficially unmarred (keeping the other free riders like eye colour out of the story, as they add to the arbitrariness more than the non-arbitrariness) were very likely

to be accurately perceived as more fecund and healthy. Therefore they, as a matter of biologically fit perceptive course were more valued and sought after as sexual and reproductive beings, but even here already at two levels: reproductive and intimate-social.

However, in having constructed modern medicine, a global food industry, and water sterilization, and their combined storage and distribution infrastructure we have also accidentally degraded the value of this form of default perceptive accuracy and non-arbitrary value. This hasn't stopped media from exploiting these sorts of mostly unconsciously triggered valuing, even though in terms of measuring reproductive fitness most of us now appear very symmetrical, but are now not for this obviously determined more healthy or fecund with as much assurance, but we still clearly act as if that is the case (think also about results showing most women still want a taller and wealthier mate even when they are very tall or very wealthy on their own). To redress these widespread problems with how media works (if it didn't work who would pay for it exactly?) to instill often biologically disruptive local and non-local values so effectively (endlessly promoting, at and along the long negative tail many empty or ultimately harmful wants as needs) promoting less not more vacuous or too politicized and power-seeking reforms seems needed (towards the ideal of banning all push advertisement, at least for all children and maybe most young adults).

The way we have completely inverted many of our natural relationships with our environment, going from being controlled and accurately guided by it mostly in unconscious and behavioural terms to controlling it (*superficially, at best*) in the most terrifying non-local terms possible, entails many of these default biological norms, constructed or not, should now be considered suspect (and in perpetuity, as we can not evolve these away in anywhere near the time, but we can contrast the right confronting values instead). This would seem to suggest the use of tools of manipulation and value control practised by the media, advertisers and politicians are not only counter-productive but it is ethically and epistemically unwise to allow their perpetuation unchecked; nothing but blind folly, so the opposite of an eyes-open wisdom (think: obesity crisis and the infinite bowl of soup experiment, or how as the top predator we eat the big and strong when biological nature has mostly thrived eating her young). Yet almost the entire internet runs economically on such hyper-manipulative models, any wonder we are in such a value muddle? As hard as it is to go against those parts of our nature that are now relatively inappropriately rational that once weren't, especially all those unsavoury but all too natural animal behaviours that could never be good or bad at their original level of emergence, we must also confront those we continue to put all our faith into for being so obviously good; the hyper-valuing and exploitations of superficial beauty are just one case in point. Again, the ethical value of promoting a wide and deep personal, and collective normative skepticism seems warranted instead, but most would rather attack those who simply don't believe as they do and seek to trick or oppress them into believing otherwise.

Reputation: A Wolf in Sheep's Clothing, The Most Normalized "Truth-Making" Lie

The final two examples I will not analyze in much detail but I think both exhibit a deep core of the irrational in our treating the too arbitrary as the non-arbitrary, often based on unconsciously held and paradoxically entangled percepts, sometimes accurate, sometimes less so, but clearly based in the morphically determinable nature of our original psychological emergence and its background conditions, when the *original sin* first takes root (because reflective consciousness was first a curse not a blessing as we continue to suppose at, I believe, our lasting collective perils, if only for the possibility of pushing the matter of our possible transcendence forward in the context of suffering less and better than we might otherwise need to). This is most evident in our continuing valuing of REPUTATION as if it confers a non-arbitrary value by knowing it, i.e., its contents may be directly perceived in the person it belongs to accurately. If there ever were a sorer case of us continuing to value something it is clearly irrational to and is clearly tied to the problem of power quite closely, I don't know what it is. Here is where IDENTITY goes to be made opaquer than even its possible non-existence supposes. We must create, or for the least unfortunate *have created for us* avatars we must endlessly defend, deny, extend or retract to even be allowed into any social circles or other certain groups (often falsely promoted in terms of value by their own collective reputation). These avatars of seemings then become what others must see us as at a distance. But this is conflating a value, and one that is always arbitrary, with a percept that could only be inaccurate due to the category mistake invoked (who ever really deserves the reputation they have either way, i.e., who amongst us is what their reputation projects? Not a one! and as much in the sense were we on a dating site we would all profess to 'love the outdoors', or 'not do drugs', etc.).

Once this quasi-administrative practice of encoding value judgments about people is wildly and widely implemented this way the negative costs and burdens of owning a reputation not only increase without limit for those with less power or social or genetic luck, but their control of such is also often ripped right out of their hands. Then add in the internet with its ease of access to anonymity and equal ease of spoofing the positive (or by others, negative) representations it has created towards one's online REPUTATION—here, only of an avatar and not a person at all—and now at some even greater and more unknown sort of perceptive and value distance. The just use of "reputation" has clearly been made as arbitrary as it can be. Now there need not even be one accurate percept on which some avatar or person's reputation is actually warranted (let alone any certain morphisms) but this is because all the accuracy of perception has now been stuffed into virtual representations with little or no felt or normal enough value placed in the prior need to vet the targets of those representations at all.

If there is a single way we are most *lost in representations* in irrational ways clearly causing the hope for civility and ideal rationality great harm it is in the continued valuing of reputation over things like *lived* humility, honesty, contrition, compassion, personal responsibility and growth, etc. The idea REPUTATION offers some non-arbitrary value any more leading us directly to accurate percepts is unsustainable in the continued opaque uses of social media (and as we peel back the occlusions what

we see is ugly and exploitative, our avatars are being bought and sold and by this we give up our oh-so-precious privacy voluntarily and deeply but think we haven't, trusting those who exploit our data most of all, our hen-houses overrun by invisible and virtual foxes) and this concept more than most I see is in great need of confrontation and deconstruction (perhaps necessarily replaced by some new system of more vetted and less corruptible forms of marking people for their freely chosen always mixed divine and shitty behaviours, but with less arbitrary and counter-productive punishment and more gently forced accountability of the sort that actually makes becoming a better person the path of least, not most resistance).

In the end, isn't the idea *to be a good person, not to seem to be one*? I am most confused about this when people defend their reputations at all costs, i.e., especially when they are not deserved.

Think: Lance Armstrong, Bill Cosby, Donald Trump . . . only the recent tip of a very shitty iceberg of abuse arising from undeserved reputation causing predictable and otherwise avoidable harm to others facilitated by the worst sorts of malice and egotistical excess (and who amongst us isn't just as likely to be so corrupted by power, and so never be truly free to throw that first stone righteously? Here is *not* one hand. Here is *not* another . . .).

Waste: A Negative Unicorn with Inconsistent Value Senses across Differing Contexts

If REPUTATION is the biggest normalized "lie" of real personal ethical value, and the cloak of the worst forms of abuse of power then it has a twin in collective agency that is a lie at its own level just as widely promoted as non-arbitrarily and accurately perceived when it is nothing of the sort. In fact, it is something that could never be found in the data morphisms at all, and as such, on physicalist terms does not and could not ever exist at all but in all too arbitrary norms (thus shoring up inaccurate percept-value naively). This is the concept WASTE; it is a negative unicorn (it is the material debt the real negativity of unhinged money growth really "costs"). The way we construct WASTE as a purely conceptual value starts neutral enough, waste is simply what is not wanted in some context post-production or post-event (kind of like WEEDS, but in line, not orthogonal to the intentional processes of production) in which some less valued or relatively or absolutely unvalued material excess appears of its own essential accord as, typically, benignly superfluous due some unavoidable contingency. WASTE here is a cultural-material *value* spandrel. But WASTE does not and *can not* represent a universal natural category (even human "waste" is never "naturally wasted", it first appears in thought more as a shame-object, but we often fail to see the accuracy in the felt unpleasantness having certain morphic data embedded in it aiming towards health and away from disease, but often in paradoxical ways).

The irrationality at the heart of the conception of WASTE is two-fold. Use of the term often supposes both a wholly negative but often culturally arbitrary valuing locally even as it also supposes we can non-locally perceive this same waste accurately as totally or relatively casually benign, so where the supposed downstream value is no longer subjectively negative, but is assumed objectively neutral (WASTE is first conceived within yet another form of naive idealism). An example is the grass cuttings or fall leaves normally cleared and discarded from our lawns (“garden waste”), or uneaten but unwanted or spoiled food, etc., but from here we fall along a spectrum away from assumed benign-ness towards cases due any sort of industrial production that risk polluting, such as the tailing ponds resulting from open pit mining, etc.

We, of course, are not here directly concerned with pejorative senses of waste such as when we say ‘that was a waste of time’ as these senses of the term are derivative, we are largely focusing on bulk material forms of waste, not experiential ones. There are, of course, many formal cases of confronting waste in which it is controlled and converted by infrastructural, administrative and legal process, with wise ethical sources working against these forms of waste being allowed to simply stand in the last place they fall to, largely because of the by now at least very clear negative consequence to the health of persons or the local environment being cogently labelled as “bad”, but there are many more forms of informal wasting that never seem to be met with the same sort of ethical concern and have been normalized as beyond needing any personal or collective attention towards or mitigation of them. In these cases, waste or wasting is not assumed “bad” unless some other local-enough essential need is going unfulfilled by it happening; then we may have an informal kind of waste with a *close* negative ethical value, but a shoulder-shrugging kind of temporary waste, one we often assume nature or some cultural system will take care of as a matter of course. This sort of conceiving of WASTE is very mind-dependent and I am arguing here far too arbitrary, so is ultimately a short-sighted and all-too neglectful, irrational, and only-local-human-relative sense of waste, invoking informal, i.e. *uncodified* norms of behaviour that often intrinsically ward off any need for personal or collective responsibility, largely by tacitly denying the always inevitable and wider (or delayed) negative downstream consequence of throwing any thing away (or even more importantly: failing to maintain what is designed to be maintained by wilful negligence or ignorance). But these sorts of wasting rarely invoke NIMBYisms as their negative consequences are too diffuse and too latent to be “seen” as directly as say, for someone throwing away fresh food in front of a starving person or burning \$100 dollars bills might invoke shock or wrath.

The deep and irrationality caused sources of WASTE and our tendency to directly discard what we determine has negative value, no value, or has lost its value begins well before culture in primate behaviour. In our natural pre-or-minimally cultural state we are well justified in simply dropping what we don’t want *or can’t help but expel* on the ground as “waste” as in this context nothing is every really wasted by nature (so one species’ garbage is always an other’s treasure). In other words: at this juncture there isn’t nor has there ever been a category of a natural kind fit to be called waste but for the biological kind where even though something has been discarded locally no non-local piling up of

casually inert stuff ever arises. There is, then, always a viscous conflation risked in using the same word for deeming the always essentially and intrinsically useful biproducts of metabolism as belonging to the same extension as “spilled milk” or other forms of “garbage”. This is simply where the evolutionarily downstream irrational biconception of WASTE gets its original perceptive, but not cultural value grounding, and this biological sense of WASTE is cogently sub-grounded in the material morphisms given by the naturalistic facts of evolutionary biology and physical causation.

However, as soon as we have created artifacts for which nature has no intrinsic present biological need, well, then the assumption waste is benign as our default behaviours deem it is no longer a defensible, i.e., no longer a rational position to assume. The rational problems with our conception of WASTE begin with the first mind-dependent senses of the term; another all-too-self-serving-to-human-beings category mistake is being floated here, sometimes what is waste is defined only by the wishes of minds in ways that are truly “natural” (and so not only benign, likely beneficial, *ceteris paribus*) but when waste has clear or not so clear but retro and/or predictable negative existential consequences—locally or non-locally—is when the sense of WASTE being a positively conceived artifact with the implication of benign effect starts to subtly disavow real negative consequence and the need for of a global aiming for more wide and deep individual and collective responsibility to mitigate the growing negative affects of many forms of normalized wasting (plastic is currently the poster child of this failing). This pernicious semantic shift at some point of responsibility does at least motivate the creation of systems of “waste management”—here the very idea what we don’t want might need be managed first arises, but this shift only marks a doubling down on the emptiness of the cultural concept.

We are now learning (some of us at least, I desperately hope) nothing we create, process, value, or dis-value is materio-causally benign *simply because of the normal values and behaviours we have typically assigned to it in culture formally or informally*. This, I think, has happened because we have largely failed in the conception of WASTE to justify the most non-arbitrary non-local senses of the many possible quasi percept-value attributions of WASTE by the certain data morphisms that would deem those non-conscious beliefs which motivate our current behaviours around WASTE unsound in “un-natural” culture (even if they were once sound for our natural state). We not only want to eat our cake and have it to, but we also wish to throw it away without any future consequences for which we are deemed responsible as ultimate cause in the sense were we not extant then none of these consequences would have ever naturally arisen.

I worry that we have constructed yet another great lie, another normalized aspect of *original sin*, to “confirm” both the lack of accuracy and arbitrariness in use of the concept WASTE as representing something that is always or mostly lastingly benign but is really only irrationally defined in the conflated sense body “wastes” (scare quotes used here because nothing of this kind is ever really wasted at all, so a locally subjective to non-locally objective inconsistency in definition has been forwarded, a glossing of the unexplained shift in context and explanation from the particular to the general) may be simply and usefully, i.e. *naturally* dropped on the ground. We have simply lumped our ethical values for

artifactual/artificial wastes mostly into a set of seemingly benign biological (human) norms, and once again as if the mind-body tipping point never occurred.^{NOT}.

NOTE: Worse, we make an obverse and equally irrational and problematic set of value assumptions in terms of the novel creation of increasingly pointless and reckless innovations in technology and so continue to foist new products without recourse on people clearly causing us individual and collective harm, yet no technology entrepreneur ever needs to get to the business of it but with the blind optimism underwritten by CTM and the myth of benign effect the demagogic oligo-technocracy currently assumes (but we really should know is driven by the equally irrational means and ends of perpetually shoring up the global economic system *as if it is too big to fail, at least until it does in such spectacular fashion it becomes moot that 'all things must pass'*). What do people think is increasingly consuming most **if not all** the energy we get from burning fossil fuels exactly?

(Information) Technology . . . duh.

We have once again a-rationally failed to honour the mind-body tipping point, here by conflating the natural-unnatural distinction when it suits us in terms of denying ethical and causal responsibility for all the non-local effects of allowing the cultural sense of WASTE to be perpetuated in the minimally but vanishingly (-> extensionally empty, conceptually-speaking) apt biological sense. Worse for good use of reason it is only by the tacit re-conflation of the natural-artifactual/artificial distinction this could ever be “warranted” as this distinction—I argued earlier—is itself irrationally grounded but for in the assumed human-only, so very narrow mind-dependent valuing behind the ‘man is the measure of all things’ meme. Natural waste’s value, as in the case of discarded shells or bones for example, is mostly neutral in the long run (neither good nor bad, benign nor toxic, but for what it does or what happens to it next *by further and often unpredictable natural accident*) but for contexts in which the local value is totally mind-dependent and largely motivated by NIMBY (not in my back yard) thinking. But as waste in the biological sense blends to waste in the cultural sense it takes on more problematic kinds of non-arbitrary value because nothing could ever be as predictably casually inert as some otherwise arbitrary conception might take it in the “unwanted but costing no obvious but nuisance-harm” sense all non-human forms of natural waste do; this nonbiological kind of waste could only exist in a technological culture in the first place and it is Janus-faced in a self-spiting way. This is because mind-independent or non-conscious (i.e., ego-less behavioural) Nature can’t ever waste in the way we’ve supposed is so in terms of certain original body taboos. Yes, while one starts out rational enough by saying biological “waste” is “bad” in both the I-don’t-want-it sense and in the it-might-be-toxic-or-disease-causing sense, the idea conceiving and by this segregating cultural waste the same way as a reactive solution in the same out-of-sight-out-of-mind mode (fingers crossed those drums of toxic waste don’t start leaking) is certainly not. To think otherwise is to flout a malicious sort of conceptual neglect on the world, to polish more too arbitrary and inaccurate human value turds into pyrite.

Again, we not only want to eat our cakes and have them too; we also want to be able to throw them out should we choose to, assured because they no longer have positive value for us they could never be perceived as causing harm for others in all too easily predictable downstream circumstances, many only emerging over scales of production and generations only recently become manifest in nature in “unnatural” ways.

One of the obvious (to me) trans-political changes required is to grandfather in a global zero-waste policy *as soon as possible-today would be good* for all currently allowed forms of productive externalities generated by businesses or other human institutions, or at least to raise corporate taxes to the point that when clearly non-benign effects arise of some new lauded technology and cause inevitable but disavowed harm we can act immediately to mitigate those effects by the public trust for the good of all, not just for the share-holders, and do so much more pro-actively and with less of the foot-dragging inherent in our current high-school-popularity-contest-like politics (with its pointless swings between left and right poles of ideology) and current forms of inefficient governance (now 300+ fucking years old and clearly failing, assuming they ever really worked that well at all!). Better yet is to make every business transparently and **pro-actively** fiscally and ethically responsible for each and every thing it produces (as part of the object’s original price as its real but always unanticipated non-local “cost”) that inevitably becomes “waste” for no longer working or being wanted, either recovering all wastes as part of the life cycle of the product or hedging funds to ameliorate the negative consequences of these products directly against the always likely if not inevitably unintended negative effects.

Furthermore, rational work need be done to show these zero-waste means and ends are deeply represented by non-arbitrary values based on accurate perceptions grounded in the certain data morphisms derived from the widest input from science and non-vested scientists, as well as the ethical guidance of non-scientific institutions endorsing them.

I am calling for nothing more or less than the dismantling of the public waste management system in its current form, and placing all the responsibility for the air, water, and land quality right on the profiteer’s doorsteps. If you can produce your never benign products by building the costs, unintended or not, into your business models up front and make a profit I am on board, but I fear the real unicorn here is the EXPECTATION OF UNHINGED PROFIT BORNE BY NEGLECT OF ANY RESPONSIBILITY FOR EXTERNALITIES. The end of the concept WASTE entails even the most seemingly inoffensive wastes become part of some lasting and real non-arbitrary value for the work we do to reincorporate them into our productive means less regressively and reactively (so more progressively and proactively) and in this emulating how nature never in fact wastes a damn thing, nor could ever work over such wastes walled off from the rest of creation. Such a self-serving irrational concept has not been created by humanity, except for REPUTATION.^{NOTE}

NOTE: And in ranting sympathetic analogy how exactly do people “save” money buying something on sale? Doesn’t the only consistent meaning for ‘save’ entail not spending money at all; such two-faced rationalizations are nothing but self-deluding Newspeak meant to confer unearned forms of self-esteem.

There is simply no **real** thing representable lastingly by WASTE in the cultural or biological sense, nor in the physicalist sense either, but for in some tongue-in-cheek four unicorns of the apocalypse sense.

A Final Pet Peeve Example

I will leave you with a final example, very much a pet peeve of mine, showing a different and more orthogonal concern about not a complete failure of rationality but a relative or close enough one I think we all might be able to offer equally eye-rolling examples. I might call these “close but no cigar” or “small” failures in the use of rationality. These are cases where to start at least the sorts of terminological and functional disambiguations I and Voltaire recommend happen as a matter of rational course. They are also cases where the values in play are pretty clearly non-arbitrary. The problems come in with the accuracy of representation in implementation; like the more trivial case of a stairway built to a wall with no door, or a massive bridge project where the two ends being built fail to meet in proper alignment in the middle, or perhaps the aforementioned case of under-filling an airplane in treating a litre of fuel as if it were a gallon. But the case I will recount is even more unintentional and so is more an opportunity missed than an “epic fail”. However, the morale is even when very rational ends are being forwarded by otherwise very rational means it behooves us to not take our eyes off the prize and to conceive well beyond the prize’s realization, so perhaps the morale is also a little bit about the need to do more prototyping out of representations, to build the “box” first on the smallest possible scale so you can see the walls and get out of it more appropriately in the so hard to take back final step of some much more comprehensive and unrecoverable implementation of an otherwise avoidable failure.

My example of a subtle failure of accuracy in implementation is generally related to a deeply troubling problem and trend I see lately whereby otherwise laudably conceived projects and community-based efforts at improving infrastructure and making quality of life more democratically accessible are well enough started, but then seem to fall immediately to neglect. There seems to me a tendency for many local civil projects to be very well implemented up to the point of ribbon cutting but where no clear longer-term plan for maintenance and revision has been imagined as part of the project’s mandate. I offer up the case of publicly usable bike pumps and tools stations as a tragic and ultimately counter-productive example (in the worst light, simply pandering to minority concerns, at best a sign of how short-sighted political expediency has made ever effort at social progress pointless lately as each new

party ignores, if not dismantles what the previous party put in motion; at great cost to all but the lawyers, consultants and binder-makers). When I first saw these communal bike repair stations popping up I thought what a great and cost-effective way to promote healthier and less energy intensive forms of transportation, and I was also happy to see businesses implementing such projects on their own impetus. But for every such station I have seen erected over the last decade I now find nothing but broken pumps and missing and rusty tools, and often all too soon after implementation with no apparent effort ever seemingly made to maintain the stations, and where the provisioning body clearly has abandoned being responsible for and restoring/promoting the communal service, likely because they had a too pie-in-the-sky view or disingenuous intent, taking their cues from *fiction* as some “build and they will come” sort of pipe dream.

I suspect a lot of these built and then abandoned social gifts are not really motivated by any deeply felt largess, but are simply more thin attempts at fostering “good” public relations as loss leaders meant to promote certain appearances over advocating for real change by the sort of persistence often required to making lasting progress, which is as much defined by how people fight against change even when it is in their best collective and individual interests. Here is another very damaging way, very indicative of our too easy views of what lasting change requires (promote the false positivity in appearance, but neglect the substantial efforts required to keep the thing of value maintained, also indicative of our increasingly short value-attention spans, more concerned with creation as consumption and not with lasting value, more of the promotion of personal rights with little of collective responsibility).

It is a general given everyone (most) could plan well up to executing a murder, but most would also fail to plan for what to do with the body and following investigative situation. The problem here of being very, very *lost in representations* is to mistake the realization of some otherwise non-arbitrary value determined according to otherwise accurate enough perceptions as some static ideal but not at all considering every thing of value getting implemented must due to the relentless march of increasing entropy and *other unintended or disavowed consequences* be not only maintained to have its value more fully realized, but need have the value communicated and protected as part of improving the social contract, not just by pandering to bipolar political expediency or placating special interest groups (a “throw the dog a bone but never really feed it” ethic). These failure of rationality are all too common lately; in the squandered money wasted endlessly debating the need for and forms of now long over due maintenance of key but always controversial infrastructure, in the tendency of businesses to focus all their best representational efforts on collecting revenue and data much more than ensuring quality of service and data security, in the efforts of politicians to race to the bottom of the pointless popularity contest campaigning has become (what exactly do the boorish skills it takes to get elected lately have to do with wise and transparent governance, instead anticipating the maxim of many wise coaches, we should expect those we elect to play like they practice).

This problem of positively envisioning change in representation as if the implementation of the static things imagined is all the work ever needed to be done to prove the lasting value of what has been

created I think exhibits a very short-sighted idealistic and irresponsible sort of all too reactive uses of rationality. What is often required and totally missing lately is more proactive and much longer-term forms of planning for social progress. This also plays out, lately, in our tendency to be too concerned with appearances and not the substance underneath, to favour the having of things and not the quality of our relationships with things, which show and have their real value emerge only if the objects created are committed to beyond their basic static rendering as those original representations as if all we have to do to make the world a better more civil place is to look in our heads and paint the world with all these idealized but all too fragile surfaces, always failing to see the much harder to meet and plan for obligations of long-term maintenance and remediating communication of the required but often missing social norms entailed, both formal and informal.^{NOTE}

NOTE: Here, I believe, lies one source of the deep causes of the backlash against immigration that is called “racism” but isn’t really. What people are upset about is the chaos in informal social norms resulting when too many immigrants are too selectively, often for political and not rational means and ends, summarily dumped willy-nilly across some extant but otherwise stable and more progressive culture (in the further up the spiral sense). While you can take a person out of a culture, you can’t as easily take the culture out of a person. In a sound effort to escape the negative effects of some “worse” culture if one’s solution is only to escape to another “better” one this by itself does not prevent certain features of less heinous but still normatively problematic aspects of the source culture inevitably at some mass of influx and concentration destabilizing existing norms that are in fact more democratic and compassionately rational; one only need see the perverse-seeming problem with gangs of *rich* immigrant’s children emerging in BC, Canada as a telling case; this is the tribal aspect of the originating culture being re-created in the new one, but silently and with no one seeing nor understanding the developmental/cultural-indoctrination context piece and the risks of not confronting these likelihoods going in. Let’s not forget there was as much, if not more conflict between established Americans and post-WWII immigrants; between all the sub-immigrant groups (almost all of them European!!!). These forms of past racism and the often violent local conflict they drove are conceived only at least as bad as the current forms of new school “racism” suppose, but actually they were much worse. We forget how we’ve progressed and by this risk regressing.

This is what conspicuous consumption thrives on most of all: furthering access to the endless dopamine high of getting what you want, if only in the having of it, but then not as much or not at all in the purposeful using and maintaining of it, except as a status symbol. Take the current trade in rare vintage or limited production shoes. I am confused when the value of something with such clear utility as the shoe confers inverts away from the using of them for their proper function to the opposite, i.e., never using them at all, instead preserving them, but now not for any intrinsic value, only some imagined extrinsic value in some system of exchange. There is an ethical risk, especially at the scales of production of global industry, mass-production and ever-increasing normalization of wealth hoarding in allowing this reification of the extrinsic and too-idealistically cultural value of useful things over their intrinsic material

value, their ideal use value. Lately the reification of these delimited havings over more righteously limited usings is driven by the Internet's ability to spread FOMO far, wide, and deep.

Aren't Many Bike Racks Being Installed and Used Incorrectly?

Here, then, is my last particular but subtle case of a missed opportunity to best realize a rational means towards some rational end, but where the final result shows a missed opportunity (and exposes a subtle cause of the irrational, what Daniel Kahneman explains in *Thinking Fast and Slow* as due to the arbitrariness of “value anchoring”) not an epic fail, but a near miss; a failure to optimize a rational outcome ideally. I am, as a life-time competitive cyclist and bike commuter, happy to use most of the plethora of novel bike racks now available in most urban centres large and small. Let's imagine a plausible history for the emergence of the typical form these racks take. In cities it starts accidentally with parking meters, metal fences and sign poles. By this the basic model of the bike rack was set, and certainly not because the objects used were ever designed for this extended function but over a cultural-evolutionary (so Lamarckian) “accident”.

These sorts of affording accidents are called spandrels in evolutionary theory and they often lead to systemic kludges. If instead the final system were designed in isolation by some omnipotent designer in terms of achieving ideal function more directly it might be very differently rendered from entirely independent first design principles. But for nature, as there is no designer *per se*, just selection (environmental filtration) over variation, much of living systems are built over such spandrels as kludges (the human brain in particular). So, there is not much *if any* explicit representational design in this. One of the improvements representation allows for us is to resolve the inevitability of such kludges and to weed out the unanticipated and unintended consequential flaws of some otherwise well valued and imagined new object in small steps before full-scale implementation. This is essential and ideally allows for technological culture to progress much more efficiently than biological evolution, in self-aggrandizing theory at least (man *is* the measure of all things after all, right?).

The naively human intentional design process likely starts in the first arts and “crafts”, but ends in the much more advanced science and engineering of things we find possible today. First we learned by trail and error (engineering arts, psychological arts, alchemical arts, etc., versus those same practices as *mathematized sciences*) and then by generalizing the results of trail and error we come to learn the laws, then by the laws we come to build novel particulars more by streamlined intentional necessity, so relying much less on things just being contingently fit for their intended (so derived) functions but by constructing them as well articulated ends and by ideally circumscribed means of production right from start from representational content articulated largely from pure imagination.

But sometimes in our need to get to ends we fail to consider if one starts with a spandrel function one also summarily risks the creation of less than ideal kludges. The current form of a very common bike rack is a case in point. Anyone who locks their bike to a sign pole or parking meter knows the flaw of this found system, as a secondary concern. Bikes when ridden are remarkably stable, but when still and upright as these accidental locking posts require are remarkably unstable. How many riders have come back to their bike only to find more of it scratched and dinged by either someone locking their own bike too close on the other side of the pole, or it being knocked over by this process or otherwise simply and inexorably drifting away from its anchoring point and summarily crashing to the ground? Take a look at photo 1.



Photo 1: This is the *found* way most bike racks are used. One often comes back to find one's bike has crashed to the ground, either from an intervening bike or just the insistence of gravity. It is not ideal.

The primary value concern with locking a bike is how to best secure it in a way also minimizing vectors of attack on the lock *and* coincidental damage to the bike's proper function or aesthetic value. The best

general solution is the high-end U-lock, but here is where the inaccuracies in perception start to creep in causing less than fully rational ends even though the final means of securing the bike certainly are. In photo 2 we see how a bike is ideally secured by a u-lock in first passing around the pole, then through the spokes of the front wheel **and** the down tube of the frame.



Photo 2: This is the *ideal found* way to use a standard bike rack, but is this the most rational use possible?

What this accomplishes is quite a few things: this fills up the space of the inner loop of the lock minimizing attack from prying or jacks, and by both securing the bike to something immovable and self-immobilizing it (with the front wheel locked to the frame as well as the pole) a fail-safe is in place (and many a pole is easier to remove from the ground than most imagine). One of the things people fail to understand is an immobilized bike in plain sight with a very good lock is actually much safer than one hidden away, even if locked to something, but not immobilized. Often the best use of a lock is to immobilize rather than bind the bike, especially for short stops in high traffic areas in the day (at night

well-loved bikes should be both bound and immobilized in a secure climate controlled but only rarely un-peopled room).

So, what it seems to me many original manufactures and designers of current bike rack styles did was to perceive the use of poles accurately as the best way to first intentionally design bike-locking stations by accepting the default but sprandrellic use of poles as the functional anchor. But here is the problem. Take a look at the other way one might lock one's bike to this particular kind of bike locking station. Of course, you want to lie your bike against the widest surface right? Wrong. Take a look at photo 3.



Photo 3: The most *rational* way to use a typical bike locking station? I think so, but I never see them used this way unless I do. What I wonder is how the designer meant these be used?

If you use the station this way not only does this improve the security but also the spacing and stability of the two bikes in the one stand, a win-win use (but for the use of slightly more space that is worth it

for keeping the bikes from tumbling off their poles into the sidewalk or street in more dangerous or annoying ways). But the problem is that, and I am not sure either way, it seems to me either the designers themselves failed to understand the additional problem, or failed to best communicate or see how their design might best be used, or they did understand what I see as the ideal use but have not well communicated this and so all the bike lock stations of this most basic and accidentally derived kind have summarily been installed at the wrong angle in terms of best orientation to the street and sidewalk (so, in some *apropos* recapitulation to my running-through Derridean trans-logical/pre-ontological approach also in half or “ortho-ontic” error, so only a half-rational outcome at best).

Close but no cigar, indeed!^{NOTE}

NOTE: In a similar vein I once read an article about how Abode was constantly upset by the fact people insisted in using Flash in ways they found valuable Adobe never designed in as intentional function (which I think they then had to support where they did not want to and probably had no easy way to support as they had no prior design representations of how said function emerged). Not all of value that emerges need be represented to best come into being, sometimes instead of paving a path according to some *ideal* theory one should simply wait to see where people wear the grass out first, and only pave there later.

Other Sources Waving The Flag At Endless Forms Of Human Irrationality

The following list is just a sample of works supporting or related to my various general and particular claims in this work about human forms of rationality *and* irrationality.

Thinking Fast and Slow – Daniel Kahneman

Predictably Irrational – Dan Ariely

Everybody Lies, Big Data, New Data – Seth Stephens-Davidowitz

Pandora’s Lab, Seven Stories of Science Gone Wrong – Paul A. Offit

Behave: The Biology of Humans at Our Best and Worst – Robert M. Sapolsky

Talking to Strangers: What We Should Know About the People We Don’t Know—Malcom Gladwell

Chapter 9: Solving The Demarcation Problem Of Science As A Form Of Ideal Natural Communication

There are only two main arguments left to make. The first will take a cursory stab—very *eMetaphorically*, so very prohibitively of course—at the Demarcation Problem in science. The second will attempt to show how the debate around the climate crises has been superficially parsed into representable concern in ways resonating morphically with the same structural features of naive, divide and conquer use of reason I have sprinkled throughout this tome. By looking beneath this pedestal of emerging, and great ethical and existential concern, and dovetailing these results into my least sufficient argument economics is not a (material, natural, or basic) science, I intend to argue while CO₂ is rightly deemed the straw man proximal cause of this existential un-ease and tipping, it is really the bankrupt values and irrational premisings underwriting our current global economic system that are and have always been the distal cause of the various forms of collapse we now risk. Yes, there is some merit in the claim there may be a “science” of almost anything existing to be observed and qualified, or measured and quantified, but at some point what gets studied as the normative weight of the subject matter moves away from the physical, biological and way “up” into the cultural. In this process science becomes more and more sealed off as “special”, so not obviously “fundamental” or “basic”. This means the confirming data morphisms are just as likely to go around in a self-created circle of too derived or even completely derived data, thus never reaching through to the ground of what nature is trying to communicate to us with less supposed epistemic adulteration, with less possibly suspect human value already dictating epistemic ends.

So, if the study of economics is a science it is certainly not in any obvious way a basic or hard one. Importantly, it also seems to work very differently to science in terms of its sought for and most transparent ends—achieving endless and certain profit from the economy versus endless and certain knowledge from science (scientists are not primarily motivated to start with “correcting” the targets of its models but with assessing their representations to uncover lawful inferential relations, but economists, I think, don’t ever have the same pure motives; they may correct their representations, but by this almost always impose more cultural effect, never determine direct natural cause but for all the pre-loaded forms of *tacit intentionality*). Additionally, the science of economics does not at the bottom seem to be concerned with any naturally found objects at all except as convenient levers for applying other norms and values to, so is not a natural science either as its kinds are never found lying around in nature. It seems what is largely studied in economics is how our expectations in terms of what we’ve imposed on nature are being fulfilled or not, but with little regard to honouring the essence of most of what the practice of economics simply takes for granted as reducible in all its value (what its essence is epistemically “worth”, in knowing it concretely and in terms of its intrinsic functionings) to just exchange value (what is it literally worth, by owning it) so it also seems a science unconcerned with the intrinsic structure/nature of things, so could never be a true material science either.

Should a science that is not basic, natural or primarily material and that largely ignores the intrinsic value of essence really be called a science?

The deepest problem I see with thinking the study of economics a science to stand besides physics, biology, or even psychology (where the arts/science distinction first rears its head) is made clearer when we seek to sub-classify sciences in certain terms. Do scientists spend more time “listening to found nature” in some pure open mindedness—wanting what they get more than getting what they want—only imposing speech acts meant to tease apart, with minimal epistemic interference, therefore to expose the right variables for study, or do they instead rely more on dictating to nature by use of speech acts to create things that would otherwise not naturally exist, and so only after the fact of the complete or partial fulfillment of said speech acts ever have its, now very observationally suspect objects appear for science to study. What about economists? Has one ever had some epiphany about GDP sitting in otherwise rapt silence watching, for hours and hours, a colony of ants transforming a rotting log into giant complexly tunnelled mound? Or does an economist instead labour in a more purely abstract realm set to idealize the GDP, rather than just observe and document it? It seems to me an honest science is never concerned with epistemic wish-fulfillment, yet economics is largely implemented as a cultural form of exactly that.

So, if it is a science it is certainly neither an epistemically humble nor observationally honest one.

By this economists and all fevered capitalists must also deny much of the contents of other sciences, philosophy or value ideology seeking to mitigate against its current risks, excesses and wealth and opportunity disparitizations even as it reifies itself by its name-saking itself a much more ideally rational, i.e., more basic, more natural, more clearly material, more humble and more honest science so disingenuously. Rather, I see naked greed and other evils owed to our original sin simply serving to further more and more irrationally motivated forms of industrial excess and over-production (endlessly feeding the unicorn we call waste) going well beyond meeting any real needs or more honest forms of valuing, leveraging the inherent madness of all psyches toward wants not only likely valueless in the long run, but now forwarded as needs falsely just so people can know who they are as a consequence (at least while the dopamine is squirting and one’s affect is positive). This analysis at least shows if economics is a science it is already one lying *farther* along a spectrum both fractal and paradoxical; at some step of method or aims economics may be as demarcable from, for example, astrophysics as astrology is already assumed to be. Yet, as we consider next, even here the task to say what the difference is, as for so many other lauded philosophical problems and core intuitive concepts, turns out much harder to cash out than expected. Let’s see if we can’t, at least, push economics *farther* apart from hard science in ways astrology already is well pushed away from astrology.

The Problem of Demarcation of Science from Pseudo-Science

This is the problem of saying what separates a legitimate practice such as experimental chemistry from astrology, for an archetypal example. The naive epistemic intuition is the first practice, chemistry, in offering reductive insight into the gross contingent behaviour of certain purifiable bulk macroscopic objects in terms of the lawful behaviours of their identifying micro-particles is a canonical science, while astrology in basing the fate or fortune owed a person on their relative place in the solar system and larger universe in terms of celestial bodies at their precise time of birth (largely planets and constellations, the second which turn out quite arbitrary arrangements clearly informed by anthropomorphic interpretations) is often held up as something far less rationally constructed. The problem is practices such as astrology or other forms of divination are assumed to rely as much on general guess work, psychological gullibility and trivial truisms than inference from lawful regularity to particulars and as such their “facts” are not ever confirmable by any sound or cogent enough quantifiable representation in some logically deduced model, nor are their facts always open to falsification or other non-vested forms of rational and mind-independent confirmation or disconfirmation (molecules do not suffer from confirmation bias, delusion or malice--just quantum uncertainty--while psyche’s always do).

Perhaps the contrast is better shown between Darwinian Evolution and Intelligent Design theorists, or perhaps even between String Theory and Standard Model theorists, assuming no coherent logical *and finite* model of string theory is ever produced. Any cases in which practitioners are trying to pass off some otherwise still socially or culturally legitimized practice involving explanation of phenomena from the past or occurrent present, or prediction of said phenomena into the future (or other diagnosis of causes of current boons or malaises) but for which there is missing epistemic depth and logical or evidential warrant, or lack of reliability or reproducibility of results, and so too much relative mind-dependence in interpretation, is often labelled pseudo-science. The problem, as with many other philosophical puzzles making up the core negative results of otherwise very well posed ‘why?’, ‘what?’ or ‘how?’ questions, is that the intuition modern (meaning post 16th century to late 20th) science is essentially different from other human practices in hard to deny in *prima facie* terms.

However the problem—as always—is not that we can ever fail to mean, understand or if versed and vetted in the special practice of science endorse the intuition, but even if all agree science grants special access to knowledge this does not seem to lead to some logical reduction of the problem of saying why, how, or by what it *is* different in the superior epistemic way supposed by using conceptual or other linguistic forms of analyses or definition. It seems no matter how we draw the boundary with words some sciences risk exclusion and some pseudo-sciences inclusion in the club of ideally rational epistemic practice (the spectre of Cantor’s Dust and the intractable nature of all fractal boundaries haunts all of language, but philosophical language most of all apparently).

The Unicorn Of All Unicorns: IDENTITY

So the question arises or should at least always be simmering in the skeptical background as to whether these analyses fail because the objects referenced—e.g. TRUTH, RIGHTS, IDENTITY, DEMARCATION OF SCIENCE—are so basic conceptually they emerge at some non-reducible—so unanalyzable level (begging another part of the semantic theory, but one no longer consistent with higher concepts being composed of lower, more simple ones) or perhaps these analyses fail and demarcation remains elusive due to something like the problem of Maslow’s Hammer (and I’ve proposed my own version of this, of course), or what is a death knell for realism, some kind of hard epiphenomenalism or eliminativism is in play, i.e., no demarcation exists at all but for in some thin and ultimately meaningless way, in some *as if* valuable or *nominal* way. Perhaps the explanations need be inverted.

That we, for example, both believe in JUSTICE and leverage institutions to manifest it (so to make it particularly real via its intrinsic and lawfully general “intentions” towards the equally problematic realization of THE GOOD) might only be “proof” some unicorns are more “rideable” than others, not that they are obviously real, so only real in an immaterial or abstract-functional sense. The risk of not granting the immaterial forms of universal value over which humans construct both civil society and supposed epistemic progress their own ontological basis is to risk making much of what we say and normally endorse in our everyday “communicative” exchanges so much “sound and fury” and in this seeing all our efforts falling away to the irrational or at least collapsing back into some a-rational anarchic whole, but for the emperor’s new clothes seemings of it all.

The root of the problem of this endless failing of fine analysis of too abstract things and events may be that the referential heart of IDENTITY has always been epistemically, logically *and physically* empty and so all we may be doing, all we can do by “seeing” is to pre(in)tend by some guess that some pushed away conceptual circumference is really the thing at the centre because that’s all use of reason can ever access of the deeper sources of the really real; the Ur-real.^{NOTE}

NOTE: As a shameless metaphor: The guessing referred to above is always between a local *this* or *that*, whatever it is or turns out to later be experienced as categorically or predicatively, i.e., seeing is never “well-formed” towards pure objectivity at all, instead it constructs absolutes *only ever* by some forced choice *only ever* over real differences *only ever* absolutely see-able as the qualitatively real in conception, never by perception alone. So, any particular rational choice is always *at bottom* made by/as a randomly bobbing and meaning-inverting Mobius-cork plugging a much deeper sea of a-rational or pre-rational being by pushing the irrationality inherent in this need to start perceiving as a form of contingently necessary or categorically mute random guesswork (as no explicit conception is yet in play but for the *as if* disposition of function to realize it downstream in evolution). Irrationality by this always inescapably denigrates rationality, forcing one part of the foreground or background to become its own pseudo-absolute over both a “real” difference (as some datum in perception) and an *onto-difference* (as the totalized change of the foreground and background re-reconciled in fundamentalized and totalized conception as some TOE), or is this not backwards? Is it not the step from matter to life that is the *difference*, and the distinction between self and other due just the material difference? Yes, it is both put together, not as turtles, but as paired paradoxical difference/differences all the way down and up, but only within *perception-as-reality/gap/reality-as-*

perception, never through or beyond it as we've otherwise quasi-wrongly assumed we've already been granted access by the methods of science alone! But each "seen" datum is then, generally speaking, nothing but a complex and materio-paradoxical opposition made in pure blind local relativity and the (true)information made from it is always suspect by this as well (pre-reality is not substance, it doesn't hold reality it "floats" it, substance only "really" exists in my special sense of reality, but pre-reality only becomes/is this *reality-as-perception* in a single-same/different paired non-Derridean **and** Derridean act of onto-counting; matter to life as self back to other as matter *describing the paradoxical spiral of the always self-bootstrapping implicit and universal wide intentionality defining the essence of the singularity's disposition to cause all forms of universal material, biological and cultural contingency*).

I, of course, if you are following my tacit and wider meanings do not endorse a totally bleak epistemic view (only a humility-damning corrective to the entire project) but think all the problems and current conceptual poles and oppositions over which extant philosophical and scientific problems and analyses are constructed fail for reasons more deeply begging for a pre-ontological approach. Under this approach these many infamous negative results and their associated value claims instead serve as a collective para-structural clue to the pre-ontological arguments and model I have been waving into vague existence.

A Limited, But Quasi-Physicalist, or Pre-Ontological Definition of REALITY

Thus, I will not review, nor follow the thread of any current attempts to say how science is rationally demarcated from pseudo-science, nor am I doubting there is some difference, just that its chained *differance* must reside elsewhere in the metaphysics. Specifically, to demarcate science I believe it is critical to first lay bare an account of all the appropriately owed *a priori* metaphysical entailments of whatever monism, dualism, pluralism, etc., one is endorsing and then within this framework provide an account of what numbers are and by this also say how quantification within deduced (or perhaps *only* conditionally deduced) mathematical models works so well, largely in the domain of the very, very small, i.e. the quantum realm, and then only again in the very, very big, i.e. the cosmic realm, but not so much in between. I offer a prohibitive account of the ontology of quantity as "degraded sub-stance" or more *e*Metaphorically as "pre-real" or "degraded" being, *but where the sense of 'real' in play is:*

... (gap₀) / (sensory registered) reality-as-perception / gap / perception-as-reality (conceived) / (gap_{0/1}) . . .

On page 53 I introduced another version of this definition:

“pre-reality(**irreality**₀)/(gap₀)/**reality** as *middle-to-close perception* (looking back in time)/
appearance-reality gap/
middle to far perception as **reality** (looking forward in time)/(gap_{0/1})/trans_post-reality(**irreality**_{0/1})”

So, which is more precise, which is more correct? Well, neither and both (and the same for all the other definitions I might remake this as, both better in some degree of meaning, but then worse in some other). Here is where my anti-logistic, *my eMetaphorical* approach need be explained in more detail as to how it semantically works. There is no final logically intensional parsing possible here, no *stable meaning ground but for a web re-centred over paradox, rather than simply trying to dispel or get under them*, nor am I looking for, nor should you look for one.

These plural ways of better defining “reality” by a pre-ontological approach are best analogized in the facing mirrors example: each regressive image stands in analogy to another sense or interpretation of this redefining and recontextualizing of “reality”. Logic keeps expecting to hit bottom in pure definition of both sufficiency and necessity but, I think, falls too far “below” the real in this and can only do so over some naive use of reason where the arguments and evidence for the premises assumed should otherwise leads to epistemic agnosticism. My version of **Being/non-Being**, of the real and unreal, so of the *pre-ontological* is in all these definitions (and also not in any one of them) this “definition” is meant to be para-semantically vital, it is meant to morph its senses to best fit interpretations according to the view one takes pre-ontologically; we are carving out views of the totality of being across many paradoxes here, the epistemic “face” of God never sees *species sub aeternitatis* as any finite being, but only over a fractalized progressive and regressive series of perspectival interpretive lookings variously overlapping but at the fine point of it being each to each incommensurate (two close enough lookers may both see the same *this or that* looking to and from some shared space-time scale, but also can’t ever see what the other sees **exactly** at all, perhaps channelling Leibniz and his monads, but paradoxicalizing then).

I am in this, most of all, attempting to define the unbounded but always expanding circumference within which the unrepresentable or never represented becomes the representable and represented, but also where as this representational progress occurs the domain of the unrepresentable or never represented expands another meta-conceptual notch in lockstep. So, what is representable and represented both expands and contracts but always over fractal boundaries and where what is counted is always flirting with the infinite, so the very idea of determining some net change in *finite* cardinality always risks invoking the wrong kind of counting. This is the Hilbert Hotel of the representable and non-representable equally; at least in terms of being unrepresentable in logic, but perhaps not as experience **within**.

The Ideal Practice of Science as a Form of Ideal Communication of Particular with General Nature

I am going to propose science offers up an ideally objective rational form of communication between the environment and the/a mind (more metaphorically: between a self and an other at some ontic distance but still as one supra-object/event as a pre-to-post ontological *popping out*). Current fashion would have me invoking PERCEPTION as Burge localizes it in arthropods, but also keep in mind I have argued to push original perception and mind back to the first free-living cell, at least in terms of my additional proposal of this also hallmarking the original appearance of INSIDE-OUTSIDE as the original quasi-concrete/quasi-abstract but otherwise wholly materially rendered boundary determining life as a universal embedding of all particular forms of intentionality, with the most general source of intentionality always owed to the nature of the BBS.^{NOTE}

NOTE: I tried to show, somewhat elusively and minimally in this work but more explicitly in my master's research paper (but the baby was edited out, leaving only tepid bathwater. . . sigh) Burge has not pushed the origins of intentionality back far enough. I have also asserted the genome is a fully intentional system (even if not a representational one in the way RTM supposes) but do not provide much argument but for some references.^{missing in this draft} I have also asserted the ultimate and universal originating source of intentionality rests in an account of the intrinsic informational (*data-based*, less ambiguously) phase space of the BBS and an answer to the begged metaphysical question as to what its cause is (? . . . turtles, turtles, turtles . . .?). This entails everything the universe ever does is intentional and is always aimed at knowing and experiencing meaning, both in and by encoding and decoding over time what the universe always was, is, and might be necessarily and so might also become contingently, so I am talking about *BIG EVOLUTION*. The naturalistic project's widest aim in my definition of it is it promises, so owes us a story of the whole universe coming to see itself through some complex enough thing emerging in some complex relation back to it such that to explain any part of it is also *at some limit* to explain it all, but not just for some time then, or now, but for all times and non-times (and spaces and non-spaces and scales and non-scales). This suggests the real problem captured as Maslow's Hammer is not that we are fatally limited in understanding reality intrinsically but in a very real sense we are equally creating (or what is more likely: are just the latest universal tool by which the universe creates) the very things by which we may also develop new cognitive or meta-cognitive forms of being that *at/over the same space-time-scales* transcend this very same problem of intrinsic limitation due to contingency and finitude even as they (we) then co-create new epistemic problems not owed to the older questions (which finally show themselves moot or not well formed), now resolved by this local epistemic transcendence and *in a form of perpetuity both endlessly progressing and regressing*. We are not trapped by any hard-stop and finite cognitive limit, we are just "self"-limited by being trapped in our contingent forms of thinking-cognition/conception as much as we are trapped in our contingent forms of living embodied perception and then finally we are non-intentionally trapped by the matter we necessarily supervene on and must "chew over" if we are ever to develop a bit further as a self in regards to others in some "life" (where here even rocks now have "lives" but never are really born or die, just materially perdure at the atomic level where they are not chemically or sub-atomically changed, but as physical heaps always recombinable with other matter at different or the same scales, always invoking the same-difference problem materialism will endlessly fail at solving, as much by definition as anything). But there is no mind control on offer here, no teen-aged boy forms of

wish fulfillment, no version of *The Secret*, just more meaningfully integrable paradox pointing to a meta-experiential opening, and not just towards an epistemic dead-end in the name of furthering more illusions of certainty and control.

My proposed method will not cover all possible and best communicative pathways now or ever, largely because of our current denigration of subjective “sciences”, so I am working here only to demarcate objective science, not all we might come to include as (true)science (but the intensional character of my analysis won’t rule these other possible sciences out, unless they prove too irrationally composed on the same terms, of course). However, the worst news is even if I make some progress towards a better demarcation of objective science, in doing so I still have the background concern that even this offered improvement in use--of only objectively aimed idealized rationality--might still be an evolutionary, even MEANING-AIMING dead end. The best news, somewhat in paradoxical self-denial, is I think adapting my communication model as the practice also best demarcating science from pseudo-science would serve wisdom and skepticism much better, as much because it leaves us back where we find Socrates drinking his hemlock as a spiritual metaphor, and because reflecting more on Socrates’ end and its hidden causes inevitably leads us to see and better embrace the deeper path of evolutionary possibility open to us ***within*** instead (if we could only get over our attachment to HUMAN BEING, so finally taking the bankrupt ‘man is the measure of all things’ meme away with it).

The “Screen” of Knowledge is a Plurally Divergent Para-Meaning Structure, Not a “Flat” Ground for Facts

I am invoking a trans-universal teleosemantic account, one by which absolutes are (somehow) constructed over pure differences—and where we must be extra careful not to mistake the representations with their targets—only the data ever gets encoded, the more ontically basic *and only ever representationally targeted, but never known* phenomena remain as mysterious in essence as any real unrepresentable “no thing” ever could, but they are what must be seen to metaphysically cause or at least allow for the BBS’s real existence and essential nature. Therefore, any story by which some non-intentional part (or at least non-representational form of *as if* or pseudo intentionality, such as in how I’ve asserted DNA “represents”) of an otherwise determined and more purely material totality is told demands our base source of all knowledge and experience is always due ***some transcendent integration/interpretation always made over pre-and-post material difference and difference.***^{NOTE}

NOTE: But remember! I think we are epistemically trapped within *perception-as-reality* more than both rationalism **and** empiricism otherwise assume we are, all necessity-contingency, analytic-synthetic and *a priori-a posteriori* debates enter here and are made pseudo-problems; they anti-reduce only to para-linguistic data, never to finitely singular and in perpetuity, answerable debates.

Here I am still endorsing the premise mind-independence and vitality-independence are naturally prior forms of “cis/trans” universal manifestation, but by this not also saying the entire universe can’t still be in a very epistemically apt sense already, generally speaking, dispositionally alive and thinking *in real as-if-ness and unstoppable potentia* during such epochs.

I am saying that without realizing *original intentionality* first nothing in the universe could ever communicate about the mind or vitality independent epochs to any of its complex enough sub-parts as either intention, experience or thinking. If original perception is always achieved first as the particularly-blind, so always-guessing and general-but-closely-non-local “seeing” of an always beyond absolute representation of some *this* or *that*, that may always appear as a sign to fundament, but never could target more than the always finitely empty heart of IDENTITY. All of this is also, then, meant to be fairly consistent with current informational/teleo-semantic thrusts in the philosophy of mind working from the premise when non-derived natural data is first encoded for a whole-body attender that is also the first time non-derived natural data has been integrated to natural information, if only realizing a natural kind of meaning and not yet non-natural meaning or semantic information. I do not find it surprising the import of use of Shannon’s theory as a backbone of many models of the mind and consciousness have been paralleled by the slow shift to favouring forms of dual-aspect or neutral monism, but as for the concept EMERGENCE, then getting begged as a conceptual-placeholder metaphor (and for this, I think, ends up invoking a buried form of Parmenidean Mysterianism). This hope to explain the essence of the perception of absolutes as due only biofunction working over always semantically mute data differences does more to expose the need for a pre-ontological approach than going any ways toward salvaging a limited form of either hard physicalism (so to “save” hard science as the crowning form of knowledge) or any other sort of too classical monism.

The deeper error is in continuing to tacitly endorse seeking epistemic totalization by first assuming fundament must reduce to substance so naively, but at the same time have no clear understanding what numbers are, so by this combined lacuna risking in same and different contexts both over-determining and under-determining what mathematical models “really” represent of (what then turns out just sub-or-supra-aspects of) reality. If instead we grant the possibility of the trans-real actuality of plural levels of pre-ontology, we might actually begin to see how knowledge actually represents in even the hardest sciences sub-diverges at its own level in an epistemically plural way in regard to its actual proper targets. So, in where we have, metaphorically speaking, already decided (quasi-wrongly) where the “screen” for said targets rests we have been, more precisely, “plurally and para-directionally” wrong about that.

So, the path to the project of pre-ontology is better paved by/as an onto-epistemic pluralism, i.e., knowledge of reality is never as “flatly” aimed at some singular aspect of itself as we’ve assumed because we still have not yet properly conceived of “reality” in the correct aspective terms in the first place. What I am grasping at is there is not one form of epistemic traction granted by use of quantity in model building but a series of at least 3 paradoxically entangled ones, each meaning differently in terms of the things supposed to only exist concretely as matter or exist concretely and functionally as 2nd-law denying life, and/or finally as the purely abstract contents of what are still assumed concretely material and abstractly functional minds. There is not one level/target/scale in regard to the “reality” of meaning-aiming granted by mathematizing observational quantification by the S.I. units, there are, prohibitively, at least three; there is ultimately an infinity of them (now channeling Spinoza again).

Again, I believe quantum mechanics is not a direct, and/or only a theory of some most or more “real” sub-microscopic realm otherwise relatively closed-off from direct perception, but only a theory of a *far* pre-ontological/trans-ontic realm, one first and most essentially epistemically targeting the/its *close* emergence of/as *original intentionality* (the *farthest* present-to-past-looking objective account possible as things stand, as *close* as we can ever perceive of *far* “reality” as we naively take it in direct enough terms). What quantum mechanics really tells us, *is trying but has so far failed in communicating to us*, is how what is prior to life must *necessarily be non-locally—yet can only contingently and locally be perceived as*, is itself, even now, being “seen” through an ontic/pre-ontological opening made in dimensionally expanding recapitulation to the lowest scale opening possible, that of the singularity, and so even life itself is never really letting us “see” essence behind or through the gap much, if at all; only a fractal point-to-volume-along-a-line-with-a-twist echo of it is.

QM, then, is largely a theory mapping out the *close, the own-scale* informational structures and dynamisms of a gap (gap_0) and should be recast as an emergent—not universal—eigen-law (explaining why QM is not as easily and directly applied at scales up from here to things like baseballs). QM is only first epistemically aiming properly at scales defined as equal to that of the least materially sufficient diameter of the smallest free-living cell possible as a quasi-computational quantum “lens”, one decoding even as it re-encodes some extant partial decompression and re-compression the original least probable message contained in/as the BBS phase space (and even back then, by some much more efficient means than just what is achieved in the determined random walk leading to the undifferentiated syntax-content “machine” we call the DNA/Developmental complex, and only lately by us with our as complex as the universe universal modelling brains!). So, when we finally “see” the data that lets us build the Standard Model we are in effect seeing back in time through this lens virtually in some bifurcation, to the pre-real, but also orthogonally to *reality-as-perception at its own fixed scale just as much*.

As such the Standard model is not deemed about something totally unreal, but need be recast as a “pre-virtual” representation, only appearing as a paradoxically dis-entangled image/source complex having as its own source, *quantity-as-degraded-sub-stance*. When the realm referred to by The Standard Model is

turned inside out in passing through the BBS (*but in this being epistemically wound up, not unwound*) over a pre-material quasi-concrete/quasi-abstract twist to first become living matter, is by/as that now perceived/perceiving matter also made the back-image of itself, of its own paradoxically unwound source. The Standard Model is more epistemic back-projection than an informing about either substance or fundament *or how they are to be identified with each other* (shown by how the deeper/smaller in scale and, by this the *farther back and within* time we look the less the very idea of finding any sort of substantive and fundamentalizing mereology seems likely, rather its opposite starts to insist, everything becomes a mixed non-Derridean and Derridean counted paradoxical whole). String theory, I think, is something “aimed” beyond and around what the Standard Model only reveals as a virtual image, so is speaking more of the infinite nature of pre-reality than of its finitely representable reality (in part explaining its own auto-pluralization in so many currently irreconcilable string theories as due its fatally non-finite and much more vanishingly substantialized essence).

QM, now presented as a trans-epistemic *a posteriori* grounding in which its proper lawfulness only first appears as its proper objects do, so never an *a priori* one, reveals just one onto-aspect or way of knowing about the otherwise endlessly plural pre-ontological grounding of all dated *beings*; so is only first a model of how the background from which encoded differences first arise come into being as . . . *(gap₀)/(sensorily registered)perception-as-reality/gap/* . . . and **not ever** as either a direct nor indirect representation of the pre-real or fundamentally real at all (but not entailing all is constructed, as I have argued something of the essence of the pre-ontological grounding always gets “straight” through, first as existing, then living/feeling, and only lately thinking/conceiving).

Again, QM is more a model of how perception (smallest small mind) first arises out of *dedomena* (or the vacuum, etc.) than of reality as it is in itself at the sub-microscopic level (the contingent fact perceiving only begins atomically simply marks the boundary between what is real in my sense of reality of what gets perceived versus what perception is grounded by in some further pre-source of the “real”). (The dual forms of) Relativity, then, is really only a model(s) of how *perception-as-reality* gets conceived of universally when finally subsumed under the unity of experience, which follows just one path pulled out of the entire trans-universal GR configuration/phase space. So, QM epistemically represents how *perception-as-reality* tracks with *pre-reality* locally and *close* to its own proper scale only (mostly) and GR represents how concepts track *reality-as-perception* into conceptual transcendence as conceptual non-existence (you know, where one can “see” unicorns and “the future” equally as infinitely *far* percepts). Entailed is that the various conceptual borders of existence/sensory-registration, sensory-registration/perception, and perception/conception are pseudo-boundaries, the perception-cognition divide is a residual red herring of too classical premising and the problem of where to place conception—before or after speaking/thinking—is simply not epistemically well-aimed either; it is all *universal* cognition all the time and never just the humankind. What we have in the puzzle of the placement of first conception, in analogy, is another epistemic Necker cube variously seen by theoreticians in differing contexts from different presuppositions, but often meta-inconsistently and as

if the same face of the cube is being presented all the time (i.e., no one is seeing the epistemic illusion on offer as most are still trapped by the implicit logicism, materialist or idealist, realist or irrealist).

This is What Numbers Really Are

Also entailed is another clue as to what I think numbers really are: manifest as a binding of *pre-reality* as non-existing, non-living, non-thinking but sub-finitely—rather *infinitesimally* degraded being, but only as they run through *reality-as-perception* back to their concepts and symbolic effigies on the way to what does not exist at all but for in the imagining of it. So, numbers do in this rarefied sense run through the world but are not ever in it as matter on any ontic terms, only by passing from their source as “pre-materially vanishing forms of concretization” through *reality-as-perception* into “post-material-abstraction and semiotization” are they made so functionally manifest. It takes these “tri-parts” being pushed together by conception over a series of hidden paradoxical twists to finally make numbers extant in use through representation; so, numbers (quantity) both anticipate and then transcend brute material existence in one fell ontology-obscuring three-swoop, so will never appear in reality-as-perception ontically (so, let’s stop looking for them here).

But the counting here is both Derridean and non-Derridean, of course.

The final entailment is all *living intentional “experience” (conscious or non-conscious) as reality in the middle as classical space-time-scale* has, by the functional aspects of materially grounded perception, already been reduced out of pre-ontologically fractal and meta-plural paradox from, by analogy again, a two-facing-mirror-like pre-and-post existential ground, and so—respectively—representing both imagistic pro-gresses and re-gresses; each taken from an infinite pre-plurality always capable of conceiving both within and beyond what exists in this reduction, both back to the singularity and so grounding the unity of experience, but also always concomitantly re-forwarded to its own re-transcendence, thus also always a de-grounding, *endlessly risking to ontically peel off* this same unity (hence the Sartrean and other forms of **ANXIETY!**).

De-incommensurating Quantum Theory and Relativity: Revisited

This is a meta-abduction “explaining away” the metaphysical incommensurateness and subsequently owed methodological incompatibility of QM and GR, but you will dismiss this claim out of hand unless you have or have already had the same sort of epiphanic experiences I had leading me to this

conclusion. There is no doubt *reality-as-experience* is a unity, but as it is always built over a duality of (in late epistemic fashion) equally incommensurate informational aspects is one ultimately leading back not to any ontological monism of dual-aspects that is epistemically totalizable (how is that not a contradiction of terms?) as the all-too-mad and all-too-human psyche insists (or we are forced to give up the quest for control and certainty forever) but I think shows the better need for an abductive trans-rational conception of a “real” pre-ontological pluralism (as given by all the non-flatly given epistemic structurations all ism and ology self-construct themselves as, most of which go well beyond what exists to the naivest forms of perception) but I digress, and risk showing my full hand far too soon.

How are Absolutes Made “Seeable” out of Differences, Exactly?

Of course, the problem as to how encoded differences extracted from a delimited (and sooner or later idealistically conceived) field of phenomena are filled in with property and thing bearing experience is a deep one, and not one I have directly answered here either. But we are being charitable to the Naturalistic Project and assuming in tracing the path of contingency as determined by the local lawfulness’ entailed—the many perceptual constancies assumed for perception to work over—and assuming the fact the universe is never all order nor all chaos (so is always anarchic if only bearable in some deep and endless denial by any creature so desperate for certainty and control over the Logos) such an explanation is the one aptly sought for. I strongly think it is the right project and it does start with the matter of things, but not just as things are just in *perception-as-reality*, but only with the right pre-ontological rephrasing of questions and extant answers made first. Some of these by now very old chestnut problems will be shown plainly not well-formed or pseudo-problems, some not, some will require reinterpretation shaking the power of those who endorse their content as currently right in representation but turn out wrong about that.

By re-tracing how we have learned to best rationally listen to and understand nature (being charitable now where I have otherwise been a critic and skeptic about most of the unwashed and even many washed masses) in terms of how this form of natural communication works in the ideal (where a perfectly enough demarcated science yields lasting and actual knowledge, not just relatively useful, better or simply constructed belief) and then by showing how this method would be useful to improve on our naive and lately very corrupted forms of normal “communication” (many of which due to the internet have been made even more superficial and empty). Doing this may also reveal those norms more deeply owed to the source of our original sin, that reactive moment of first self-reflection or finitely embodied “God Consciousness” and how the ego came to set itself against that, reducing not expanding our consciousness from that moment forward. Finally, if this method works not only for better demarcating what a proper science and ideal rationality is, but if it also proves as useful in other non-scientific or pseudo-scientific domains, then the need for demarcation is dissolved even as its

explicative case is made (as too, I think, we must work in this way with egos, make them healthy even as we aim to best transcend them at the very moment of their empty perfecting).

A Problem is Being Defined, More Than a Solution Offered

Again, I must stress I am not offering a panacea here, nor offering any solutions at all. I am still trying to define a problem (one that is no problem at all) by following the materialist thread in the context of current takes on the natural emergence of mind regardless as to what ontology turns out the right one (none of the current ones, yet all of them *somehow*) but with the intuitive arrow being that evolutionary thrust which has made us and only us so significantly more evolved as the ‘man is the measure of all things’ meme assumes. So, which of these premises I aim to more deeply lampoon not even I can say for certain. But I do believe within certain well circumscribed political and cultural practices, particularly those which emerge at the ethical level, by adapting this ideal method by which I suppose science best communicates with nature (so with herself as well, always with some parts to other parts or wholes, or some wholes to other wholes or parts, and always from the past to the future as just that same matter, but now across plural and pre-ontological essence: matter as existence, life as intentionality, mind as meaning) a boon of better use of reason is on offer, at least.

This would be particularly true in those contexts whereby governance, advocacy, political or legal power, etc. are rendered assuming we see much of our current practice devolving into high-school like cliques and elitist or populist power plays having little to nothing to do with best use of reason, just more of the cult of personality, more original sin, more knee-jerk imposing of rights over others, less responsibilities for ourselves, lately re-fostered by these many echo chambers of tribalism and fascist and PC pathology that have been allowed to thrive because the communicative space in which we are lately operating has little to no intention toward epistemic humility or listening to evidence at all let alone for at extreme ideological poles (so there is no baby at all, and it would best to empty the tub completely or let it first be made full, many dirty babies and all).

The Fallacious Reasoning Behind Most ‘It From Bit’ Theorizing

But the biggest asks, hand waving glosses, and knee bent irrational pleadings coming from all and any physicalists invoking ‘it from bit’ kinds of thinking lies with the invisibly concomitant problem invoked proposing a real nothing as the source of all only material being in the first place, combined with confusing the **vehicles** by which intentionality is first **only theoretically** constructed over, i.e. *the literal*

data, the physical (non-semantic)“information” **with** their entailed targets: dedomena. Here is exactly where both I and all monists of any ilk summarily commit a subtle form of logical Hari Kari by confusing an easily shown materially rendered vehicle, as/containing a datum, with what is only in proper epistemic terms its pre-real target; an always non-concrete and so purely *a priori* abstract form of **difference** actually referring to a veiled **pre-difference** (so, endlessly speaking of material things with an idealist’s tongue)!!!

Treating what might only really be/appear as a singularity in the real limits of the mathematizations *only as a null representation* (all the while uncertain as to quantity’s ontological and ontic essence) the BBS only describes a first possible (and least sufficient) difference between space-time-scale existence and “nothing” with this nothing “simply” being the point at which dynamic and finite lawfulness as CHANGE stops “stopping” and “starts” starting (over and over, over untold kalpas, if the Buddhists are right). The meta-background target of the representation of this real nothing could only be INFINITY itself, which in being unquantifiable—if only for not being a quantity at all—could never appear as a conceptually logical positivity in any TOE, so only “appears” as a conceptual but entailed absence of the entire model (and all other physical models will in turn negatively meta-represent in this way but only “locally” in terms of their eigen-objects, all of which are forever logically unrepresentable in any theory or model, if not always conceptually represented over some great distance as EXPERIENCE as only one of the many aspects of CONSCIOUSNESS PROPER). However, once we are “inside” space-time-scale, once real (my sense) things exist and interact under both synchronic local and diachronic non-local force then the differences over which we come to know are always, metaphysically speaking, “onto-orthogonal” to the existence/non-existence binary. But here is exactly where for CTM the wide and opaque error of treating the supposed vehicles, the data used to **represent** (so not be) existential cause and effect as if they were also the targets, spills over directly into language as the entire set of problems realist reductive forms of physicalism bear with the most epistemic recalcitrance. These local, material and proto or fully representational differences encoded/decoded via either cellular level detectors, neural function and ordering, or their meta-integrations—these many data too purely conceptualized by failing to ever address their real targets, are yet *now only as representations never touching their targets* hoped to be cogently stuffed into some epistemic foundation describing with certainty the entirety of whatever really does exist only as matter, so grounding all knowledge. But the way this is assumed done by CTM theorists has in this arbitrarily walled off any real need for vitality and mindfulness to ever be found in retro-diction in only the random, but always determined walk of $\sim 10^{80}$ protons (in this, of course, I am invoking a more pragmatic account of material evolution only taken up after the emission of the CMB).^{NOTE}

NOTE: Can we not look at the story and standard images and diagrams telling of the entire universe’s coming to be in *eMetaphor* as a metaphoric-analogue of the Derridean meta-story I am recounting? We are to believe something truly basic and all-encompassing of reality begins as a literally volume-less point somehow still stuffed materially full of not only this actual world but of all possible worlds as some Uber-config-space of spaces already

encompassing all of the past, present and future (the block universe)? Believing this in any reductive way transparently defines a stupendous kind of incredulity on my account. Then the universe magically expands faster than the speed of light up to the scale of the solar system (a clue, a clue, but an *eMetaphorical*, not logical one, our proper scale of local embedding pre-capitulated at the end of this linearly pro-generate phase of space-time emergence). At this phase before emission of the CMB all of being is both pro and con materially speaking (almost perfectly balanced matter and *anti-matter*) and could just have easily popped right back into non-existence by symmetric self-annihilation, but somehow there is a surplus of pro matter, one billion and one protons to each one billion anti-protons and all this resolving to such a conveniently found empirical tipping to this fine asymmetry by the time the universe is only 1 millisecond old!!! This is just the first “real” duality resolved onto-orthogonally to the non-existence/existence binary. Next the resultant but indistinguishable matter-energy and largely non-atomically particularized stew cooks up, not by adding heat but by removing it, all the basic and sufficient perception-level rawest ingredients for all subsequent forms of living and thinking (and following the fractalized churning and re-churning of this at the level of non-local galactic and local star system formation and violent death yielding all the sufficient precursors for first life, at least on Earth). The dinner bell heralding this universal self-eating of this chemical-level field of heaps is nothing more or less than the emission of the CMB marking the original radical temperature-dependent freeing of bosonic from fermionic particles, and so already biasing us to privilege the more tangible forms of matter as the explicative empirical grounding of all experience (but for the conceptual and literal seeings made by eyes only photons can grant) even as lately to account for inflation we propose forms of dark effect whose empirical confirmation seems much more elusive than the confirmation of the real existence of neutrinos ever was (and even here, at best we narrow in on, but have not yet determined the fundamental mass of the lightest neutrinos with sufficient precision). Worse, lately we are dealing with a duality of possible results for the Hubble Constant! Here the duality in play is sub-tipped within the pro-resolved duality of nucleosynthesis, but recapitulates the endless Derridean tensions always entailed for dual things to either co-create or co-destroy each other (but that really do both). My story of demarcation thus more precisely only begins with the emission of the CMB some 300,000 years after the Big Bang (on the same timescale that modern humans have been around, a coincidence?, maybe, maybe not, maybe an *eMetaphorical* “book-ending”?). The triumvirate of Planck’s time, the time of nucleosynthesis and of the CMB emission also speak of my proposed triumvirate of differently to be aimed at epistemic screens; within pre-reality the paradoxical Derridean structures sub-abound!

Is The Derived Data/Non-Derived Data Dichotomy Also False?

Another way to see the problem is when we ask, seeing we can’t take observation out of QM (so always insisting the subject is really what QM targets at its finest point of emergence) what chooses, what observes and so collapses the universal or any particular and otherwise wholly entangled and unobserved quantum system (they are all quantum systems at this point but for the gravity holding the bulk matter together enough to keep interacting and producing all those needed energy fluxes that life and culture exploits and would perish without)? What is the non-intentional source of the universe’s many required (necessary and sufficient) choices in first becoming and only later seeing itself as a *this* or

that (or *that* other *this* or *that*, or *this* other, other . . .) in any local act of changes in the precise way causality is properly conceived (and I think we are far from any stable disambiguation of CAUSE AND EFFECT).

If instead we embrace that QM (and in turn to a relative degree, the entire story of cosmology and the Big Bang) is really more a model of how living things come to be, see and think about what has always been a disposed to *live and mean* general thing called “reality”, and so is currently conceived in some intractable cart before the horse way by science (as it is wrongly assumes it already wholly targets the real beyond the gap). How could we find a classical world in this at all but for miscasting *reality-as-perception* as all of reality in the ways I’ve tried to show mind-independence let alone vitality independence would make summarily impossible. There is, then, in the final analysis no non-derived data in this *reality-as-perception* at all (and this will make what follows much more difficult, not less, to understand) but for the mistaken assumption how *dedomena* become data (in turn becoming (true)information in/over various leaps of data es/sense) is a description of the finite out of a nothing when it has always been *para-equally* about the finite out of the infinite (where here the sense of Platonism invoked is neither immanent nor transcendent, but pre-ontological, the infinity I am invoking is a vanishing one that can only be seen in how physicalism in ignoring its proper Derridean binary—it’s differences/*differances* all the way up and down in *reality-as-perception* after all—leads from assumptions about pure objectivity to an intractably re-insistent but logic denying need for some non-intentional form of subjectivity. We may start from reality naively given but always seem to end up promoting a hidden binary over the set of preconditions neo-empiricist forms of naturalism favour inexorably leading back to promoting the need for an underlying idealism, here not beyond but before and below the matter of things (so my God is fully degradable in its being too, explaining *The Problem of Evil* in the same fell swoop). This reasoned turn back to idealism is nowhere more cogently expressed than in the body of work concerning the philosophy of information due to Luciano Floridi.^{54, 55}

Both he, I and all mathematical Platonists are on the same relative pages here, it’s just my view is anti-transcendent (but for the conceiving, which is always transcendent in trivial ways for all abstract real things, and in non-trivial ways for non-existing “real” things) and somewhat debunks the assumed epistemic superiority of the supposed hardest of sciences, physics, by re-determining the real “epistemic screens” of quantity (degraded or infinitesimal beings, only bound into abstract reality by their concepts, running **through** but never materially **in reality-as-perception**) from a pre-ontological focus. So, neither the purely abstract and ideal (Platonism) nor the trans-concrete and constructed (Constructivism et. al.) view of the ontology of quantity are right, and on physicalism’s own terms number could never be material at all. All substance as matter in *reality-as-perception* is sub-made of degraded being as quantity in a pre-ontological Derridean boot-strapping as part of the process by which the finite spills out of the infinite through the tiniest opening for things to exist in relation to a “real nothing”, the BBS, only then (later in evolution) recapitulated as/by original intentionality through the smallest possible meta-trans-instantiation of a real **inside-outside** achieved by the smallest possible free-living cells.

But numbers are not finally made abstractly real until they are made to supervene *via complex recursive and self-conscious language* on their concrete and arbitrary symbolic effigies (in *reality-as-perception*) lately (later, still in evolution) through the next smallest possible *meta-meta/trans-trans* instantiation of a real ***within-without*** (where ***without*** is already sub-composed of a para-embedded ***inside-outside***) facilitated by some least sufficient number of neurons, at the right size and structure given only to date by the human brain (probably by the ego's entire emergence by selective natural information integration as/over those billions of ***inside-outside*** bearing/creating but always *solipso-functionally walled-off* cells as/by the entire nervous-system-body complex, so also by this re-presenting the intentional effects of all the derived natural data of sensory registration due to all those cell receptors and signallers whose data also ends up shared and integrated by the nervous system and brain).

But is this ever *just* data (*physical* information) being extracted in the conceptually wall-off way the idea of original intentionality supposes it, I am not so certain anymore, but must keep up the logistic talk I've adapted going in consistent with semantic-informational/externalist approaches none-the-less for reasons soon to be made "clearer".

A Hard Explicative Choice to Make

Thus, to provide my model of natural communication I must, ***only now***, make a choice between perpetuating the realist-materialist talk (and I have but only lately in regard to a pre-ontological account) or flouting a massive inconsistency in glossing over the *materialism-in-to-idealism-out* Derridean binary (the one telling against materialism as much by the internal self-inconsistency of its minimally motivating premises) and instead more transparently promoting an idealism.

Yes, either way I have made a mockery of the use of reason as only the use of logical inference, of rationality as only representable by a totalizing logic. However, if I am instead allowed to transcend the paradox of the relationship between Derridean and non-Derridean forms of counting to an *eMetaphorical* account the idealism I am proposing in being pre-ontological is no longer promoting an inconsistency; it is subsuming idealism (and I think, all other ology or ism) under an entirely new and trans-paradoxically warranted metaphysic (of the pre-ontological). I will however need, in my explication of ideal natural forms of communication, to be very careful with language, particularly with those senses of data and information I have already invoked and are in wide and deep use in both lay and formal discourse, even granting how opaquely inconsistent many of these uses across or even within disciplines are forwarded.

What my flipping of the Necker Cube of ism from materialism to idealism supposes is nothing more or less than the conclusion *the data-information dichotomy is also a pseudo binary*, the result of a

metaphysical mistake made about epistemology as it currently functions in concert with science, with math and logic as its heart, so is ultimately another unicorn. In *reality-as-perception* it is truly all information all the time, and data is only a conceit serving to shore up all the purely psychological intuitions behind the man is the measure of all things meme (the one I have tried to show has got it very wrong).

I will, however, by appending the re-use of QM as a theory of the *farthest* sources of *close* (past-looking) perception and invoking entanglement argue how accessing knowledge always involves a r(e)e-merging of dedomena from beyond/before the BBS as the deepest source of all materially and immaterially blended experience (with examples of the second being of those unicorns and sociopath detectives we all love, and now in some quasi-equivalence with all the numbers going out of reality-as-perception inside their concepts too!). So, I am now glossing two pre-ontological bootstrappings (to original intentionality and then to original semantics) and still speaking in the terms of the original realist/physicalist informational semantic approach lately favoured (I will have my pre-ontological cake while you still may eat it ontologically on the terms we composed going in I have tried to show will all flounder on the underbelly of the Western binary always expecting foundation to be found in the most basic, so always smallest-scale substantive mereological casting off of stuff) so we are still assuming a real mind-independent form of objectivity is possible (but, it isn't possible; there could never be such a thing in *reality-as-perception* as I've conceived it, but if you are following you should now see why this can't be, but it's retrodictably and paradoxically complicated right?). I was and to this point have still been working from the wrong realist metaphysic tacitly, still thinking I would find a story of data (physical "information") --> semantic information (data + intentionality) within *reality-as-perception*, but as with so much of this theorizing I am myself still mistaking the representation for the target, it is not the *represented* differences only that matter in reality as this is never what we directly see or conceive of by properties tied to extended substance—that is of wholes in later experience only—the thing of *pre-real* concern is dedomena, but this is an "inverted" form of idealism, "subscendent" not transcendent.

Two Roughly Inter-substitutable Meaning Spectrums

Here are the two roughly inter-substitutable meaning spectrums entailed:

Idealist:

(Pre-real) dedomena out of BBS (source:= quantity as degraded, as *Cantor Dust like* being) -> (pre-ontological) step from non-living but always disposed to life, to first life as both *reality-as-perception* and natural information (in DNA as a "model" of both all quantity and all emergent law taken in a quasi-

concrete to quasi-abstract sense) -> (post-ontological) step from living but non-thinking to thinking (quasi-abstraction to full abstraction in the irreal but imaginable) non-natural meaning.

Physicalist:

Data (Shannon's physical information) as the entirety of the meaning inherent to the intrinsic nature of the BBS -> naturally derived data (somehow without any life or mind) -> the naturally derived data encoded in DNA, parallelly re-de/encoding this same message in less partial completion as the always evolving developmental machinery of the cell -> the derived natural information of (somehow without any conscious minds yet) all living things, finally -> the non-natural (so doubly derived information, if you will) of human minds, exhibited most perfectly by those facts it turns out we really can be said to know with certainty for all time as expressed in natural *a priori* and emergent *a posteriori* law.

I will continue to use the second set of senses in what comes, but to see the implications only making sense on my completed pre-ontological theory of mind (mostly down in skeletal outline, with the problems properly defined but the full content largely missing as this requires a global and wide collective epistemic re-integration with the very notion of hard science made impossible as things stand) one (you) must substitute the idealist/pre-ontological terms for instead if you wish to see if and how it translates. I will not attempt that in this work; I will take it on faith it is possible.

The Demarcation of Science from Pseudo-Science as a Model of Ideal Communication Between a Mind Or Minds and the Data Of Nature: Finally

"Nature is the source of all true knowledge. She has her own logic, her own laws, she has no effect without cause nor invention without necessity." Leonardo da Vinci.⁵⁶

The Communicative Tip to Finite Existence

I can finally construct a novel approach to the demarcation problem in regard to the assumed epistemic superiority of the contents and methods of science by interleaving this exegesis alongside some further development of my "ideal" model of communication. But we must always remember this model is only ideal in the non-vanishing sense some practice of logicism is still warranted here (so I am always holding a transcendent tongue in my material cheek). We start our story with the assumed prior universal state

of the world as purely and so unproblematically material, with no living nor thinking things in it, both mind and vitality-independent. If we take the Earth as a very normal if not mundane planet in an equally typical and mundane part of the universe, but for the living and mindful things that on many a-materialist metaphysics *miraculously* inhabit it, then either we are right to do so because this is the only such planet, or there are many such planets, all of which follow some equally ubiquitous unfolding of life and mind from matter in parallel; in trans-relativistic lock-step even (but for the same conscious enough products always finding themselves displaced beyond any means of communication and cross-confirmation, perhaps?).

This means first life and first mind may have emerged in some one or other guises in some other or many other places well before or after they appear on Earth, but only by some Gaussian degree, so our assumed but possibly unknown (and very likely unknowable, perhaps simply more probabilistically localizable) point of reference for the emergence of general life and then general mind are likely to be at the same order of temporal-spatial magnitude and causal explanation relative to the BBS. This means the first part of our story covers the time (and all the space-scale that emerges) from the Big Bang to first life on Earth, taking approximately 10.3 billion years from the BBS (the visible universe is ~13.8 billion years old, Earth ~4.5 billion, with life showing up surprisingly early and insistently ~3.5 billion years ago⁵⁷).

Thus ~10.3 billion years on from the BBS and only one billion years after the Earth and solar system formed the universe suddenly goes, quite irrepressibly, from non-living and always lawfully determined matter to produce the first free-living cell(s) or, if universal life is non-locally emergent, many such cell(s) spread across all creation. Yet, *somehow*, this outcome and the forms realized and all those realized before it on which its subsequent emergence necessarily depends occur within/as an unfathomably wide space of evolutionary disposed and casually (perhaps even ontologically) open material contingency—one assumes due in whole or part to quantum uncertainty and the endless demands of symmetry breaking (the universe’s polyfurcative possibilities may be generally determinable, but not all the paths it takes locally ever are, expect perhaps in some meta-abduction over all inductions from all evident ossified forms of contingency as some long past *uber-entangled originating totality*).

For the non-local story of why it is certain paths were taken or not taken, when such “choices” are made non-intentionally and locally against the totality of the non-local background, at the moment of some category-changing “choice” (*when the spontaneous collapse of some otherwise here-to-fore unobserved local but coherent quantum system of many superimposed states causes some other new or recapitulated “emergence”*) quantum entanglement always lurks as the mark of the instantaneously mediating “background” by which any local QM choice may still determine the non-local as well. Perhaps it is in entanglement we will find the GR effect as well (so binding the incommensurate theories of QM and GR in all entangled local and non-local acts of emergence but never in some quantifiable categorical totality as one datum, ***QM or GR as para-datum are always the entire space-time-scale***

background of each other so can never be represented in each other's models in any logically consistent symbolic way).

That all novel categorical things coming to be as matter have their possibilities determined by universal lawfulness is not the same as claiming their existence was ever necessary, but for at the moment of their emergence when the fully determined background story may first possibly be retrodicted and told. Regardless, and considering the isotropic nature of it all—that the universe is a thing whose centre is everywhere and circumference nowhere, and thus “looks the same” from any point at the same relative space-time-scale position to the BBS—this universal and always relativistically inter-twined uniformity is explained in the mathematizations as due—in the *strongest assumed sense of retrodicted causal closure possible*—to the unfathomably rare nature and unknown *dynamismós-energeia* of the BBS's intrinsic informational phase space; to my thinking begging a too purely enumerated and vanishing form of Philosophical Mysticism.

This space-time-scale originating/tipping point or ***original existence*** is metaphorically captured as the “message” of highest improbability the universe must be seen as both encoding and decoding for—only lately, only ***now***—its most complex parts first able to represent and so “transcribe” this same message by a purer symbolic arbitrariness and is what leads to, by the vanishingly small and improbable gravitational seeding points measured as the variation in the later tipping of the CMB, all the relativistic galactic and cosmic scale structure, materio-developmental dynamisms and local forms of matter, energy, order ***and always non-locally mounting residual disorder*** we find in it (but always scale dependent in terms of the conceptual/semantic aspectivism from which any object is “see-able”).

The subsequent and persistent energetic flux-making and creative facilitating arising (with the concomitant universal cooling off and expanding) is inherently “caused” by this pre-existential background, one embedding this rarest of all possible messages from “before/beyond” space-time-scale, and so also encompasses the assumed Shannonian Uber-alphabet of laws determining all its possible emergences and sub-emergences. But before this epoch of cyclically churning material creativity dominates, the universe first progresses in a more linearly explosive form in a massive and ludicrously brief inflationary period (where even seconds appear as eternities) driven by a “dark” force/matter/energy belying to date all efforts to confirm its empirical reality. It is during this earliest and most ephemeral phase of the BBS's evolution the temperature of the universe drops enough (and very, very rapidly) for matter to *originally* coalesce within a now more slowly and well-behaved expanding space-time consisting mostly of vacuum, of empty-ish (in terms of the extreme diffuseness of found objects, all the 10^{80} protons extant now were extant then, just radically “un-heaped”) and now very dark space (as dark as it can be until heat death). By this inflation, all the remaining matter—effectively 10^{80} protons—now unchained from their primordial and always bound original matter-energy state (where is all the anti-matter, and why yet another “fine asymmetry” with no easy to find cause?) is left to passively clump and self-organize by what universal gravitational law allows.

Regardless, in passing through this hyperactive and earliest universal transition point the form and matter of all things continues to be causally *informed* by the BBS's informational legacy (*the metaphorical knowing ray of light always passing straight through*). The ancestral and extremely high (near infinite) temperature order/disorder variation inherent to the BBS's informational/entropic/energetic configuration space is always *exforming* universal change in time towards disorder; always imposing an *info-telos*. This begged point of zero volume containing infinite forms of matter-energy and exhibiting a total break down of natural lawfulness is always the *far* background condition leading to first life inexorably; it is nothing more or less than the *original* universal structuring cause of the very possibility of some local first life arising and in naturalistic terms is the proper place to start with the explanation of its emergence. The proper source *and locus* of the emergence of intentionality is thus due an always unfolding but never fully unfolded (**yet**, but the heat death always beckons) top-down fractalizing "collapse" into local sub-cosmic energy gradients and associated persistence of sub matter-energy fluxes arising at their own scales of space-time, down to what—by the time we appear—is very nearly the perfect middle of all the to-this-point purely materially emergent scales of creation.

Plus, let us not forget at the local microscopic and sub-microscopic scales gravity is always largely mute. Instead, here there is an endless concomitant bottom-up churning of vast collectives of bosonic (permeating all of space) and fermionic matter (clumping in very isolated heaps) only separable in such divergent ways after the CMB is emitted. Between the highest scale gravitational fluxes ordered as fractals in space-time and the lower scale emergences of atomic, molecular and materially aggregate complexes (the contingent heaping and annealing of *close* matter at only physical levels of order) life is first and **necessarily** facilitated by these stable energy fluxes and all the gross physical and chemical kinds and arrangements already developed (across the whole universe, the hyper-galactic, the galactic, the sun-systemic; each higher level of flux becomes recapitulated in a lower one, often transducing categorically and not just scaling down). This all too often glossed or neglected story describes the very cauldron in which life and mind are first made make-able by/as matter.^{NOTE}

NOTE: This is where—I assert, again—the naturalistic story really need start, but instead in explanations of mind we assume life to start, or worse assume life is irrelevant to mind and so a multiply-realizable universal spandrel; such zombie-like conceit.

The Communicative Tip to Life

In this step to first/*original* life the first cells, by leveraging these very stable and far-from-equilibrium energy fluxes and all the heaps of stuff already lying around, are cosmically re-embedded inside *all* matter even as they come to materially realize our first/*original* abstraction of (*inside-)*out-of-the-universe **general** to in-the-universe **particular** intentionality; the first/*original* functional realization (and so providing a quasi-concrete definition of our first quasi-material abstraction) of INSIDE-OUTSIDE. Burge's differing placement and version of intentionality still, I think, honours this sort of concern tacitly, but he has miscast a lagging phenomena—neural-based perception—as what first realized original intentionality and not life proper, not *original bio-function*, because like so many others he assumes an account of the background conditions and laws of nature are secondary to the local structural account of first/*original* representation. I am arguing this belittles the problem of both background conditions and nature of the alphabet one incurs, if invoking or allowing informational accounts of sensory registration as the data mutualizing ground of perception, and so appears to me a diffuse smuggling forward (so not, *smuggling in*) of what he is otherwise trying to show in its origin at the wrong tipping point (perhaps his tipping point is of *original experience/consciousness*, instead?). But he has missed the mark by ~3.3 billions years on my account, he has denigrated the first cell(s) and what the universe had really done in realizing this *intelligently*, perhaps not exactly as CTM theorists suppose but in some metaphorical allegiance, and in effect by reifying brains over cells as the real geniuses in first realizing original intentionality.

Rather, I would have my universally derived (general) form of embedded and only *first particular* intentionality explaining the very possibility of perception, not what it is identified with. In other words, Burge is very right about how and where neural forms of perception first emerge, but off the mark in locating intentionality by relatively neglecting the role the background conditions and alphabet of the universal play. This same problem often causes many to conflate DATA with (TRUE)INFORMATION. Life thus emerges as a locally embedded 2nd law denying functional form of not yet fully particular (contentful) intentionality, but at least realizes the first functional leveraging of mutual data morphisms facilitated by the determinable machinery of sensory registration and the entire genetic developmental complex (by now the DNA/developmental machinery presents as a-symbolic but still universal **epistemic-semantic** system, appearing with first life as only a sub-product, complete in one sense, incomplete in another, of the first stage of the BBS's aimed-for messaging; always as some in-parallel/lock-step dual-aspective de/en-coding recapitulating the now *turned-inside-out or exformed structure of the BBS's entropic phase space*).

Importantly, providing more interpretive support for pushing back original intentionality to the emergence of any or all first free-living cells, I and others have argued the genome exhibits a non-trivial form of representation of natural information, but if so I propose is one with no fine "subject", so simply as an "auto-presentation" never as a "re-presentation". In metaphor, what the genome/developmental-machinery as a whole accomplishes is a partial re-compression made "simultaneously" over its same partial de-compression of that pre-existential message once "inside" the singularity but now being unpacked outside of it, unfolding in space-time-scale as the first whole-to-part materialization of the

universe's (really, the infinite's) deepest secret, its least probable message. In effect, all the causally lawful "work" the universe did as and on itself before first life emerged allowed it to bootstrap its own intrinsic sources of substance and laws *beyond what they would otherwise never seem to allow for*, thus creating life. Further, that work was "perfected" as the now fully extrinsic and fully materialized but insuperable and inseparable **content-syntax machine** represented as/in DNA and the genetic developmental machinery as it first spontaneously arose under the sufficient material and lawful background conditions in fact necessary for it to arise due some implicit "endo-peri-potential" (:= that of what was only a potential "inside" now "outside") not of the finite universe's essence, but all of *infinite Being's* essence.

On my account life's emergence is not the improbability many would have it, but due an unstoppable, ineluctable, inevitable "force", a built-in entailment of the BBS's nature as Logos. What exactly, other than the superficial coding of genes, does/could DNA represent but *some* non-intentional yet self-reflecting aspect (from both down and up in scale over space-time back to the middle) of "universal-self knowledge"? Big E Evolution then is as much an abstracting away from and re-encoding of some or most of all its laws and contingencies and by this inevitably gets to the very point DNA and all the other chemical and environmental precursors on which we find life depends (but still can't say how as a difference, just as a *differance*) largely arise/have arisen of their own accord in the 13.8⁺ billion years of random walking the universe has already shown us transparently it has done. But the more simply coded information represented as genes for protein sequences is not, I'd think, the entirety of what DNA and its machinery is in essence, only superficially (so what we take as the sub-representation of protein sequences is nothing but a surface representation of what is more deeply functionally and non-intentionally, but still epistemically represented in any cell's totalized 2nd law freeing machinery; a mute but pristine and psychologically unadulterated form of "knowing" indeed!).

There is some missing and not yet interpreted and deeper aspect of essence in the original cell's developmental complex facilitating life's ability to reduce entropy towards survival against the 2nd law by exploiting stable energy fluxes (if only locally, non-locally we need a large, very cold and always expanding but at its visible limits potentially *unbounded* empty space to dump all that, according to the 2nd law, meta-lawfully produced consequential heat otherwise destabilizing and degrading all the hard-fought for complexity life produces *only boundedly*). I at this point can't say exactly what that missing core insight into DNA and the developmental complex' essence is, but it must function as a materio-causal *Sieve of Eratosthenes* of sorts, not ruling in novel chemical structure and function as if by knowing how to design, but by knowing indirectly of the entire history of the background conditions and alphabet from which the universe now continues to **as if** design against, so as to filter in (or "uber-knowingly" trigger and get out of the way of) what works *with a very high local probability* as if it were the path of least complex and not most complex resistance, and so—in a huge gloss—might be some kind of ontic recapitulation to the structure and pattern of prime numbers (a much earlier choice of analogy now making more sense?).

The *vital* developmental complex acts as some kind of radical existential fulcrum of matter-energy-conversion towards creating new bio-function and structure, the DNA simply “records” what works genotypically based on what phenotypes thrive in the present environment, but only mainly within the materio-abstracted “inside” that is the cell’s living body as a literal universal embedding (or possibly, *homomorphism*?). It is as if at this stage all of matter together across the entire universe now “knows” intrinsically what it might make of itself towards functioning away from entropy’s insistence back towards radical new forms taken out of some Spinozian plurality of pre-ontological levels of meta-complex order (so one *necessarily also a post-ontological* step-down from the inherent complexity and near-infinite energetic sources of the BBS, of course, just another *de*-capitulation of the infinite to the finite in/as time-scale-space) but this is just speculative distraction at this juncture. Importantly however, even here I am proposing a form of communication from the past to the future (and so of the infinite to the finite)—of all *Being* as an undifferentiated whole involving the encoding of enough non-derived data as certain morphism, with the background condition for the event marking life’s emergence being the entire past up to the point of the first cell’s emergence (always following necessary laws so always determined as a whole, but with locally contingent outcomes often involving symmetry breaking leading to sufficient but not necessarily necessary improvement in functional form). The, now, locally particularized alphabet being whatever the universe has in fact represented *inside* itself for the first time by the entire machinery and natural information (so not yet (true)information as non-natural meaning) encoded in and as the collective genome/developmental machine as the first, but forever undifferentiated wholly matter-based and matter-rendering content-syntax machine. It behooves reminding while all intentionality mute forms of latent data morphism first arise locally from the gravitation-dominated mid-universal/energetic-flux-sustained scales *down* that for each such environment arising there is always at the lowest scale equally supposed an in-parallel churning *up* over quantum transformations. Without these very *close* and very *far* forms of universally lawful dynamism being brought together over all of space-time-scale we could not communicate with nature nor with other lives and minds at all. Thus, in terms of demarcating science we must remember universal “self-communication” is then best represented as a locally “circular” method of data exchange but is also always falling away to a non-local spiral, i.e., knowledge is revised and expanded on even as what first comes to know the knowable evolves and expands, and so always does so over the real absences, the real *differences* we name by IDENTITY.^{NOTE}

NOTE: Also, do not forget any identity ultimately owes it elusiveness in analysis or observation to it being both a recapitulative *difference* and original *difference* relative to the BBS’s (also empty) identity. To my thinking this step from non-living to living is clearly an ontological step in the normally understood sense if any step is (one I wish to replace with a pre-ontological sense, of course) but for some reason—especially in CTM—we seem to have collapsed and crushed together two ontological tipping points, MATTER-TO-LIFE and LIFE-TO-MIND, as much to gloss the poor metaphysics which would make creating thinking but non-living (undead?) things the best goal of the evolution of technology, or even worse, the very entailed vector of BIG evolution itself (Kurzweils’ nightmarish-to-me singularity). What a denigration of the evolutionary and so naturalistically prior philosophical problem of life, the very problem assumed first solved by nature in lieu of the advent of any evolved minds as all evolutionary

theorists might agree, so by some *a posteriori* necessity, but one yet to be provided by biological science or any other science (again, I have tried my own hand at defining life in terms of the real concretely derived embedding it realizes in creating the first real dualized/oppositional abstraction: INSIDE-OUTSIDE). I presented the basic *valid* form of the abductively negative meta-induction earlier, recapped here: if all (conscious) thinking things we find are also living things then this might entail only a living thing could ever become a (conscious) thinking thing in the first place. Again, the argument is valid but can only be shown sound by an infinite regress of negative empirical results, so by a negative meta-abduction. My money is against a non-living mind ever being possible (or as a consequence, strong or weak forms of A.I. ever being truly realizable in any intentionality or consciousness involving manner, except in naming them so assertively and good luck with “self”-driving cars, what an irrationally motivated misnomer, like Real 3D®).

The Communicative Tip to Mind

Somewhere in the following 3.5 billion years life finally tips to mind, prohibitively on Burge’s account about 200 million years ago as some arthropod first leverages some sufficiently integrated and projected set of data morphisms by which it otherwise functions in mute intentional fitness into the first percept (so to survive, thrive and then evolve into something even better by way of environmental upset, population shrinkage and isolation, and the leveraging of whatever inert spandrels accidentally emerge and are lying around genotypically or phenotypically to make it so) so becoming the first mind exhibiting a universally general form of intentionality.^{NOTE}

NOTE: Recalling on the terms I am proposing for original perception saying it is universally *general* means it is originally limited only to “seeing” those properties, objects, or events in the local causal-functional environment not impossible to attend to with some very wide and always non-specific if not *closely* (my sense) limited whole morphic or sub-morphic certainty effectively achieving only one pure eigen-kind of very general “essence mode-locking” (a *popping out*, out of any of all the equivalently detectable “things”), so is a kind of perceiving that is never clear and never could be in any explicit way in being entirely and forever “mute” as to what is targeted to start, so could never be by what the indicated object’s phenomenal absoluteness is only much later derived from *just* bottom-up at all. But this entails data mutualization seems *a very qualitatively impoverished empirical epistemic ground*, forever only forwarding “up” unresolvable guesses of ‘*this* or *that*’ only integrable over (to absolutes) from the mind’s other “direction” by its much later evolving and emergent *bringing together* faculty of conception, describing here another kind of unbounded, even infinitely *far* (instead of *close*) kind of seeing drawn from the nowhere-to-be-found circumference at the limits of the visible universe along the abstract line falling from the future to the present of the uber-universal GR configuration space so as to “draw” from these *far* edges of some particular aspectual volume back around the real nothingness of some identity the BBS is always the Derridean *original instantiation* of, but now in some *machine-like iteration*. Thus, consciousness in its most phenomenally rarefied and special being is always *decapitulated* from the future **and recapitulated** from the past,

both merging to *Now* (the present) like so many windowed monads finally meeting their windowless para-opposites. If there is such a unicorn as we've named 'cognition' (if the term means it means too much or too little, and so means nothing at all) it looks to the finite from the infinite but in seeings made along two opposed "directions"; but always forward/back to the same source twisted back upon itself as both difference and *difference* by the very matter it sees itself through and as.

The Universe Learns as a Whole

We are not yet ready to either do or demarcate science, but have already seen any original capturing, or recapturing—any dredging up of the deepest morphisms of utility (of all the still non-derived or natural data) or novelly exploiting other morphisms lying around in the background as *dedomena* already appears as a form of *learning*, so life now appears as only the initial benefactor of this universal self-knowledge, not, better yet, *never* its subsequent and sole first creator. To first even see the need to demarcate science we need language and not any language but one with an unbounded power of recursion to allow for the all fine conceptual parsings by which accurate and inaccurate percepts, always built upon certain enough data morphisms, are first externalized from their place "inside" the structure and ordered firings of the neural system (another decoding-encoder, equally an encoding-decoder) back onto the arbitrary symbols by which we first discover/invent the languages of quantification and qualification.

Of course in this random walk of endless progress (at least: *endless change*) so much is built in less than ideal terms, so it is no surprise we found language so imperfectly realized in its folk expression for directly serving the logically communicative demands of science and mathematics (but, if you are on the epiphanic path, this is another human conceit, the languages we find are all "perfect" in their ends and means of representation as the deeper essence of the things so represented are, only an imperfect being could ever conceive of its own sins as the fault of a world neither perfectible nor needing perfection, but for the mindful abiding of it all). But, once Aristotle, Galileo, Bacon, Newton, Frege, Einstein, Schrödinger et. al. finally opened our rational eyes we have lately received much of what is inherent to the BBS' original message in the form of the sound and cogent contents of the combined deductive and inductive methods of mathematics and empirical science, and the imaginative, if not at times over-determining or under-determining abductive powers of philosophy. In passing from a living but non-conscious, so also possibly non-thinking mind we finally pass through the emergence of value (and its, in the human being's all too problematic promotion, potentially too arbitrary forms) heralding the naive, or divide and conquer use of reason, and its endless carving of an assumed only material and so at its own level value-less world into good and bad in ways I think matter much less than we suppose and hope for.

The problem for realizing any sort of ideal communication between humans (or between nature and humanity) is I fear we forget if there are facts at all, or *a priori* natural laws, or a finite closed past and open future, etc. and this has been communicated to us through nature in so many ways, by brute experience, by idealist armchair thinking, by the systematizations of the experimental methods of science, by the epistemic traction we have coincidentally found in how the deductive systems of mathematical objects often track with the evolution of bounded systems within nature (out to the limits of the unbounded whole) that these facts are much rarer and harder to reach than even the hardest physical science supposes. I think, but for in very rare circumstances, we spend more time skimming over just pre-conceived values and deceiving percepts in our meaning exchanges and much less frequently do the harder work—which I think actually best demarcates science in the first place – of always needing to confirm and endlessly reconfirm our beliefs by the non-derived and certain morphisms intrinsically and more purely owed to the “internal” nature of the BBS.⁵⁸ And by now the unlikely hope of purely separating the derived from the non-derived data and natural and (true)information only makes the problem worse, but as I am focusing largely on inductive empirical science, the science of the middle realm (where all the paradoxes go to be hidden by *perception-as-reality* as the unity of experience) we can instead imagine a world of only non-consciously living things or matter and then imagine a single naturalistically un-entangled mind popping into the world to observe it as a vast local and non-local other for the first time and in this further define the idealization of communication best demarcating science.

The Noble First Mind: Epistemic Humility Perfected by Omnipotent Independent Design (Via: The Disembodied Cartesian Soul)

So we begin by imagining a perfect or noble mind fit to conceive and perceive the world in some minimally sufficient and necessarily direct enough way without owing any casual allegiance to the naturalistic story as it has actually unfolded on this planet from this possibly special view from the centre to nowhere, so a mind existing without ever having been biased by the often spandrellic sources over which nature selects local fit function; feathers for heat regulation today, for flight tomorrow, or vice versa. It is an ideal mind, a *debiased mind*, one without any perniciously arbitrary values and for which all percepts are as accurate as possible (God, we assume, has sorted out the kludges to make an angelic mind). This is akin to taking the rationalist perspective in the extreme, i.e., every perceptually derived thought both is and directly represents an *a priori* and necessary truth as our angelic mind has an unmediated access to the real beyond what even the most optimistic naive realist might imagine is possible.

But in assuming such a perfect mind is possible we have not yet assured ourselves in any way the world as it really is is ever something fit to be so perfectly taken in by what it differently self-produces to “self-see” at all; hypotheses are now being multiplied beyond equanimity in two directions. We still can not say whether this perfect mind owes its perfection solely to its own form and function or now to the world being made itself or already being perfectly perceivable but for the flaws its self-produced see-ers inherit due to the spandrel character of evolution; so, this entire approach floats an epistemic pipe-dream (of course, but that is never the point of any gedanken, i.e., not that it is realizable, just conceivable enough). However, this facile analysis does show the broadest problem with too rarefied, too conceptually purified or too idealist approaches conceived of only from the rationalist armchair and serves as a base case of sorts (*a la* Burge) showing how these uses of pure and supposed unmediated reason (from the light of “clear and distinct ideas”. . .) often lead to very subtle abuses of anthropomorphic or circular reasoning.

If reality is in and as itself such that it can never be perfectly perceived (so the gap is of the essence of the mind-and-vitality-independently real) then even a perfect mind may only see veridically by accident, i.e. by *guessing correctly over the gap every time by improbable but not impossible chance*. If the gap is in the mind (and/or life) or in how it lays on all the stuff “really” making up the world then even if the mind-and-vitality-independently real may **be** perfectly gap free it can’t ever be seen that way, and so the only way to ever get beyond the gap of knowings is by assuming wrongly we already have, but not being totally wrong (or right) in that, but only *quasi* right (and/or quasi-wrong). But to say which is the case (and it might still be gaps all around, and running through it all) is effectively to solve the mind-body problem in the first place ***so it is by the expression/modelling of the gap’s finest instantiation it need be explained first and most of all if we are to start (or to have started) the epistemic project cogently at all, and so not first in terms of what is only supposed behind or beyond it only by assuming piercing or dispelling it was always possible, but turns out much more difficult than we’ve imagined, or even impossible in any form of representation.***

What is The Role and Proper Placement of Conception, Naturalistically Speaking?

This seems especially true for both Burge and myself in terms of the traditional premises made around the role concepts *must* play in our special recursive language-borne kind of cognition; taken to the far near-absurdist point of premising full-blown conception of universal objectivity must first be naturally realized internally to some mind as some kind of Ur-concept to even be able to consciously perceive at all.^{NOTE} But, babies can count by analog accumulation and make inferences about number and kind

conservation—hell—birds and bees can count, point to distant objects, and exhibit novel forms of play and even culture, and at least a few clearly sentient creatures seem to pass the mirror test and exhibit, even if only “semio-mutely”, a sense of awareness of self (or just of being a body), so bearing non-consciously at least an *as if* self-concept, also entailing on my account they equally bear an inseparably irrepressible, if not more tacit “unconscious” not expressly conscious *as if* concept of otherness too. The opposed view, the hyper-empirical view, I think, displays an epistemic excess of its own in lumping the philosophical problems of life with those of matter, as if the body/living-body tipping point 10 billion+ years in the making is somehow a trivial one in comparison to the measly 3.5 billions it then took some complex and further evolved enough life-form to emerge as some first mind.

The problem with pinning down the role of explicit concept-formation as necessary (or not) or sufficient (or not) for conscious perceiving in naturalistic terms becomes superficially less severe if we float proto-conception as a stop-gap for how non-conscious perception works. But here we are only premising *as if* concept use, so a form of “conception” not ever symbolized arbitrarily but only in some *as if* functioning tied to shape, *so both epistemically hedging and doubling down at the same time* (as the shape of molecules and their surface interactions determine proper bio-function materially, but for laying all the fine lawful details bare, so too do the surfaces and shapes of symbols or other physical vehicles allow meanings to fit their targets by some analogous psycho-material intermediation, one supposes?).

However, the problem of how some more basically sentient or mindful creature might bear proto-concepts and not speak of them, yet act *as if* it does have them is as daunting to explicate in its own way as was the obversely derived explanatory counter-boon granted by first premising a deep role for conception for all forms of perception, conscious or not, as the more easily found “clear and distinct” idea, especially for those already endorsing the ‘man is the measure of all things’ meme. I believe this tension over the first placement of real conception and concept use in the naturalistic story of mind’s emergence is due as much to the rationalist-empiricist divide itself being somewhat arbitrarily constructed—if only lately—out of the assumed necessary role for concepts in symbolic language in the first place (so an added rider is needed to say how any concept is to be held mutely for non-conscious perceiving, yet still be a real process of conception as only otherwise evidenced in recursively speaking self-conscious subjects; a BIG ask over a Necker Cube-like act of endless swings of argumentative flipping of premisings and favoured ologies and isms no comprehensive enough set of empirical data or logical argument can currently speak to in any hard ‘yea or nay’ sense, and I believe will never appear).

In addition, I think a too reified view of cognition as something only becoming special as we begin talking also does a general disservice to honouring deeper forms of evident and wide universal

intelligence, the quasi-computational and heuristic savvy's of any intentionality laden/leveraging—and non-trivially, non-derived *behaving thing* (as a fully vital agent acting at least *as if* it is intelligently aimed for its own *as if* goals as determined by its *as if* beliefs) is also a cause of this rationalist-empiricist stalemate. If our form of intelligence is special then it is only so as just a late-arriving species always seamlessly embedded beside and co-exploiting other agents or material forms of *as if* “cognition” already “intelligently” parasitizing the universal intentionality arising from the turning “inside out” of the BBS’s original state. At the most metaphysically deep level all forms and acts of intelligence must be seen as equally free-riding on the even more mysterious impetus for this singularity to cause space-time-scale existence and material objectivity in the first place (if there is cognition at all it is always universal).

I think—due to the too reified logicism—this set of problems around defining the role for concepts in conscious and non-conscious experience and behaviour, as well the associated one defining the perception-to-cognition tipping point, are actually pseudo-problems of a kind (and ones hard to see the undoing of without a trans-logical understanding of them). The “paradox” of concept-emergence placement, and of where perception tips to cognition is not the real question to answer at all; the real general meta-paradox is in coming to see logicism can only get us to this epistemic knot—to define its residual *virtual* structure and *epistemic* causes, but will never unwind, only tighten it like some in-reverse Chinese finger trap.^{NOTE}

NOTE: And in the further, albeit, lately waning insistence there must still be some reduction in physics to logical epistemic monism possible (granting A Theory of Everything) even if the world really turns out ontologically, *or better yet*: pre-ontologically plural, then what I am arguing is a not-well-formed conception of the perception-to-cognition tipping puzzle shows up as the (*eMetaphorically*) analogous problem in physics in terms of the methodological and metaphysical problems associated with attempts to integrate gravity with the other three forces (i.e. the role/placement of *conception*₍₊₁₎ in terms of *sensory registration*₍₁₎, *perception*₍₂₎, *cognition*₍₃₎ is the 3+1 *eMetaphorical* analog of the four forces of physical nature, of gravity's₍₊₁₎ sought-for integration with the strong₍₃₎, weak₍₂₎, and electromagnetic₍₁₎ forces, but where both of these “structures” or “knowledge shapes” are wrongly conceived). At this juncture producing a TOE only seems likely by first finding a third system to bind QM and GR within a further and equally *bi-non-incommensurate* system, yet this has to be one that besides explaining the totality also explains the apparent *logical and metaphysical* incompatibilities between QM and GR as they appear now (seems a logically solvable non-starter to me?). Yet, any hope of finding this final epistemic space of integration beyond the extant paradoxes is, due to the logicism, and I think without much warrant in already deciding only a **logically reductive** TOE could ever explain this state of affairs thereby denying the paradox is also quasi-concretely and not just abstractly real. Insisting in this way without seeing how the metaphysical contrasts of QM and GR are (*eMetaphorically*, at least) reflected in the unstable “sub-logic” of the denied Western Derridean binary naively linking fundament with substance by identity simply promotes more cutting off of epistemology's fashionably denied non-logical meaning nose to spite its too reified logical meaning face. Again, another worsening crisis for hard science lately is we now have no less than two statistically incompatible measures of Hubble's Constant.⁵⁹ The problem for philosophy also manifests in the shamelessly reified and not-very-subtle forms of CTM seeming to dominate lay and much academic discourse as if that ism has been confirmed by the hand of some

non-God or nature by the very assumption of it (or worse in the sense because we are trying to make an A.I. as a Turing Machine somehow any “seeming” progress achieved in this by itself proves the conclusions hoped for as entailed by the chosen course are also justified, which is only more fallacious horse pushing the cart reasoning).

So, this conception of some ideal, some unbiased mind ever being possible is likely empirically bunk, as is the idea perception alone, even when made as accurate as possible by some internally consistent and universal system of relative measure could ever both be just a sub-part of the real yet still be able to access the whole of it unproblematically (whereby numbers are first bound to secondary, only later to primary properties in an act of faith by the simple appending of units whose own consistent inter-conversions are what have made this tacking on of property to numerical identity logically consistent *only by an empirical finding and by fiat conventional tweaking* in the first place). But what would Derrida say about this, what words would I put into his mouth? Here the problem is not we are treating some iteration of essence or identity as purely separated by some machine like process, but in treating the lived experience of the easy separation of property-and-substance from quantity as if any measurement were always of one singular instantiation of some irreplaceable singularity and so *only because of this* fit to patch quality and quantity back together *as if they were never apart* rather than honouring where we really begin: *always with some legacy difference/differance having to do with some King having a certain length foot as a literally reified standard and going from there (yielding another set, this time of 7 basic units, another plurality!)*.

Every act of measurement is made at the bottom up over an arbitrary and contingent, and ***dual and perverse order-in-time-inverting found (so always closely perceived and assumed endlessly re-perceivable as same, ceteris paribus) relativization***, so always starting as a naively perceived outer difference, but where the always smuggled in assumption of naive realism goes begged as a hidden inner *difference* once the logical counting ensues.

The problem is two-fold. If one considers something like the length of a coastline there is no intrinsic *a priori* length ever to be found, only a series of eigen-lengths tied to the scale and resolution of measurement always *somewhat arbitrarily chosen by a mind*. The second problem is GR also denies there is any such thing as a framework independent proper length but as a falling-through to the middle or classical scale of our found *close* and very non-relativity-relative pedestrian experiences of velocity and default framework (the one the folk assume is stationary *because it feels that way*, but the learned know is actually non-inertial). Here again, I think, we start our melding of quantity to quality by a pure form of rationalist *a priori* assumption tied to an unwarranted empiricist realism, so we start with the assumption LENGTH is a non-empty concept and fall over another (the same?) Derridean binary to a denial of this. If our theories deny, coming out, the essence of the things we’ve assumed to naively and absolutely exist in some fixed and so non-relative essence going in why is this not interpreted as a grand or “meta-inductive” *absurdio reductio*?

Quantity And Quality: Opposites or Derridean Same-Differences or Both and Neither?

But I have also tried to argue charitably quantity and quality are only truly separable in the thinking over the pure symbol-target distances RTM assumes, yet if science is epistemically superior in the realist way hoped the literally foundational way these aspects of being must be instantiated in the most basic substance as that same matter could never be so particularly and purely separated in their targets (i.e. any real material object under consideration always owns both its substance-property-ness and quantity-ness intrinsically without any ontic or ontological distance between them, at least according to physicalism). Even FUNCTION must be re-interpreted as a relative and not absolute notion where at higher and lower physical scales the nature of the eigen-function at hand is tied to its always somewhat arbitrarily chosen (by a mind) scale of pure conception. Otherwise we can make no sense at all of how we find so many cross-levels of hierarchically determined heaping and functioning in, respectively, non-living and living things that only can really be said to emerge across the entirety of universal physical scale as holons (so the universe is always a holarchy in empirical essence, never a hierarchy but by the purifying rapaciousnesses of rationalist conception); points, strings, branes, quarks, protons, neutrons, electrons, atoms, molecules, polymers, mixtures . . . *ta da!* . . . cells, tissues, organs, systems, (. . . *ta da, minds!* . . .), populations, biomes, biospheres, geospheres, planets, solar systems, galaxies, galaxy clusters, . . . (and don't doubt that this is just the starting place of the very big), etc.

Yet these scale-dependent object-events, these many determined but always randomly walking material heaps and life's 2nd law denying bio-functioning are in this just different-level multiple realizations of an all-encompassing one-ness by/as its sub-parts, always and only made in that same finitely determinable and causally-closed matter such that were life and mind not structured at their essential hearts by goal-seeking behaviour would all be just more complex zombie heaps (as both eliminativists and even epiphenomenalists already so perversely insist is the case despite all their experiences to the contrary; most self-contradictorily lived by the particular one or ones they experience and then so hope to communicate the cogent denial of experience by, i.e. the one they are having even as they deny by the having it anything could be caused, but is what I must still assume is the fine edge of the epiphanic wedge by which they hope I am *caused* to believe the same as them; what a twisted not-having and not-eating too of an always experience-given-cake of things!).

Yet the matter of *all this found intentionality* is also to be finally *re-found non-intentionally* as the most tangible "same foundation" of both, somehow? It belies incredulity anyone can believe anything like this on *prima facie* terms at all, but for the madness inherent in the universal psyche first infecting best use of reason most of all by creating the human being to be its vehicle (as naked emperor, yet one always seen as splendidly clothed by the intentional sophistry of it all, so always unabashed but no less wrong about its state of dress for this).

The question then is not only in how we are justified to bring quantity and quality together for the first time, but to answer how it is we've wrongly come to see them pulled apart so as to be needing to be put back together in the first place; quantity as infinitesimally degraded infinite being, anticipating the pre-ontological leap to matter-perception emergence, grades into quality well before quantity determines how quality is to lawfully behave as/by that same quantity.

The empiricists would do better were their starting place just in the pure intentionality-absent matter of things, i.e., if they better recognized the epistemic peril of starting with any assumptions about non-thinking living things in their attempts to reduce vitality to some lawful determinism as I suspect the non-living to living tipping point is more profound, so perhaps even more mysterious than the (living)body-mind one. This means we begin (with our perhaps too arbitrary values, like the ones always needing to assume a naive realism about knowledge as the first norm of epistemic value, always pushing the widest possible negative forms of entailed epistemic humility and skepticism to the back burner) by deeming objective observation and measurement otherwise possible of, at least on principle, approaching absolute precision and accuracy when this very possibility might be wholly illusory, even if only at the residual poles of the always less the perfect means of selection made over variation first leading to original perception/mind, now re-interpreted as loaded with as many inaccuracies as accuracies (what are numbers, what is quantity, exactly?).

How—then—are we to pare away back down to the certain mutualized morphisms as quasi/proto-logical truths if we always risk promoting some subtle myth of the given if not for the deeper assumption of some shining light of essential ontic necessity always passing through the universal substance and fundament of things unmediated? But how is this anything but an act of blind epistemic faith without first knowing what numbers are as targets, and not just as a set of internally consistent symbol and inference moves at times lying so tractably on certain bounded “toy” systems, but far less than the lay imagine them to? What further thing makes our or any communication with, or our extraction of knowings by quantity from nature sound?

We may do this well enough, I am retrodicting, only by practising a re-idealized form of the original natural communication nature was already having with itself before life or mind existed, and so always owes an explanans right back to the ultimately a-lawful and perhaps unknowable pre-causal sources and nature of the BBS. The problem is we only seem to have started knowing already very far up the satisfaction condition (norm) spiral, and well before conceiving of any universalizing epistemic project based on classical logic, and also well before the creation of any science and technology as we have them mathematized (so also logicized) now. Given how many, if not most of the small but revolutionary epistemic advancements over which the radical cultural tipping defining the Modern Period was made a whole were, typically, only first naively realized, i.e. with no explicit plan first made aiming towards such a grand project or towards realizing the forms science and technology currently take (consider as just one example calculus was very well used long before the need to justify its infinitesimal methods was conceived, let alone confirmed) we should instead assume all our cognizing is riddled through and

through with many still hidden arbitrariness's and inaccuracy's, and only when we can successfully cross down, unwinding, noting and so obviating the effects of these misrepresentations in the theoretical unwinding of the naturalistic story made in retro-time from the mind back to living body and then from the living body back to the original non-living basis, so covering two not one very grand tipping points, can we come to see what really demarcates the practice of science as more rational and more tied to a specially apt logical use of reason.

If we fail to work harder to dredge up the deepest morphisms ensuring what is otherwise only now a too suspect faith in human intelligence, or if worse, there is no possibility of doing so, then all we really have to determine objective truth as fact are those all too problematically human persuasive means (social "intelligence") floating a kind of intelligence that is far too often a wolf in sheep's clothes, i.e. the oft-lying "epistemic" products due the corrupting powers of the cult of personality that often tacitly work more towards furthering epistemic fashion than epistemic humility.

No Ideal Finite Mind is Ever Possible

So, the dead in the water case of an ideal unbiased mind is blocked, at least if the naturalistic project is the right epistemic project for uncovering the mysteries of the mind and consciousness, and with this I hope you see I argue neither rationalism nor empiricism alone can make the case only from its isolated Derridean pole; rather it is within the ebb and flow of the contrasting and often incommensurate pre-suppositions (as with the problem of integrating QM with GR) and only by conceiving of a third system of integration beyond paradox that all these false dichotomies might show their broader meta-inductive meaning values, but only by some negative meta-abductio. The expected monistic totalizing of foundation and substance into one theory only because of the (quasi-wrong) insistence of the unity of experience is the thing blocking us from seeing from a new perspective this universe is pre-ontologically plural, currently exhibiting three grand pre-ontological levels . . . and always counting on more to come . . . and, perhaps, the "older" ones to go . . .

The problems with demarcating science might arise irreducibly, even with our best methods and vetting practices in place, if we deeply endorse any too arbitrary value and too inaccurate perception as epistemic base. This is certainly a reason why modern science took so long to emerge, but the scientific mind took some time to emerge also in part because the frameworks of conception over which culture develops, the always still-present hunter-gatherer, tribal, and religious memetic forms (with all their possible Yin and Yang, healthy and pathological aspects in the mix) preceding the modern forms of rationalism and empiricism had little need for non-Derridean quantitative use of reason as the magical and the divine were in these epochs self-evidently the power behind the wizard, and until modern forms of atheism emerged always both very, very widely assumed and felt to be the default case.

It is said cultures started by assuming too irrational sources of being often end up with hyper-rational systems (think: Nazism or the Aztec practices around appeasing their Gods, or any conspiracy theorist ever), while those assuming too rational sources often end up with irrationally functioning systems (think: any post-modern Russian novel, the movie *Brazil*, or this entire sad muddle we are all increasingly in, digging more holes in the ground to reverse a tacit course set on some otherwise avoidable collapse due primarily to releasing too much energy into the environment, even as we carelessly degrade the found living abundances otherwise bringing and keeping the planet at this stable middle ground).

This empirical claim about an inevitable para-tipping in how norms of rationality may invert over means to ends *in spite of intentions*, and so always by this risking the creation inappropriately kludged together means-ends complexes at best “half-rational”, seems true to me, but remember the same kind of contrast also shows up in going from any instance of the heaped or structured micro-particular to any instance of the general and vice versa (colours may belong to their proper objects in lieu of any of the conceptual means of minds, but only minds can “really” put them there as the ends of perception it seems).

Our current trend in means and ends valuing now starts largely from the assumption of a non-divine source—something neither immanent nor transcendent—i.e., a “real” nothing. While this seems a rational enough first step away from problems inherent with relying on faith too much in the face of always *seemingly* mounting counter-evidence from science, and even granting some, most, or all of this is now (finally!) determined by a more idealized form of rational means (for aptly taking the worst of the ‘super’ out of nature) it is still a view, I think, rationally falling down for pandering too much to a hyper-individualized view of value alone, but only if we look across the poles of the particular-general binary.

The view from here, the collective thrust we must lately be seen as aiming at implicitly as *general collective end* in spite of all our otherwise assumed casually walled-off (so, ideally) hoped for identity-conferring and particularly rational ends fails in *lived* paradox by this devaluing of the (actually material) collective; individual rights are wanted and defended, collective responsibilities not so much (instead Nimby rules, and power decides who suffers and who thrives for this, and of course, history reminds us most suffer, very few lastingly thrive). What goes missing is any represented need to recognize this project of “self” improvement or “self”-perfection, if only given by such idealistic conception of value, often fails *both going in and coming out* to own up to the material limitations inherent in the production of any and all wants for all wanters at or across all times, *and who all lately seem to want all of it right fucking now please* (and damn the consequences to those who do the real work or who must be consumed to make all this greed satisfied). The real risk I see is in getting to the end of nature’s found abundances towards partial or total collapse of civilization as quickly as we can; what/where is the *general* reason in that exactly?

Matter Walks and Matter Talks

So, to explicate the demarcation of science as an ideal form of naturally implicit communication, and not only as a model for bettering the much later-appearing forms of default communication from human mind to human mind, is to see determined matter as more, not less ideally capable of being communicative exactly as it unfolds as a whole in both en/decoding the BBS' intrinsic message in its earlier mind and vitality-independent phases.

Nature first begins this conversation with "God or The Infinite" as it passively (non-intentionally) undergoes a casual inside-outing of the BBS' informational phase space, which directly leads to the equally passive potential of it endlessly self-extracting possible proto-data-correlations only at this point very transitory and so not yet selectable poppings-out. So, any poppings out are at this point only manifesting as harbinger forms of data morphic mutualization due those material isomorphisms already lying around within and across the mind-and-vitality-independent universe as a whole.⁶⁰ But, these archaic morphic bubblings up are what first life, and only then mind exploited to both become and endlessly aim towards becoming more by new function becoming endlessly piled on top of older original function. Matter as Life first realizes goals by leveraging these locally found morphisms as the very negative irritants (needs) around which the layers of the ossified structuring causes may first round their inputs triggers into form to then be reliably re-invoked by their "pearl" outputs, those behaviours intelligently produced only by flying in the face of the second law of thermodynamics in the first place (bootstrapping up time's arrow in the process, maybe even objective time itself)! We as living and thinking things can only ever hope to communicate ideally by first accepting we are always starting over and looking through the derived data and informational obfuscations due the sliding and possibly accuracy-inverting scales of perception and the meta-sliding arbitrary scales of valuing.

So: we must always remember both vitality and intentionality also seamlessly arise as a parasitic result of this prior "auto-uber-communication" in the deepest and widest ontological and ontic senses entailed by physicalism, of the whole inside time first emerging from the whole outside of/prior to time, but also of the whole to its parts, its parts to its other different or same parts, and its parts to emergent higher-scale and sub-standing lower-scale wholes (again channelling Arthur Koestler⁶¹) and along all the local and non-local times (and spaces, and scales) of/as nature first communicating with itself as/by pure non-intentional but always lawful causation. If there is any knowing possible at all it must begin here, by producing a cataloguing of those natural informational contingencies that do become extant within/as the bedrock of concretely and so always and only matter-realized things, i.e. all the stable-enough categorical things (the natural kinds) as well as its more abstractly self-encoded auto-lawfulnesses (where now eigen-laws, not universal *a priori* laws only emerge with and at the same scale as their onto-novel objects do pre-ontologically).

So, chance and universality talk to each other across what only much later could any mind represent to itself and other in the entailed real dichotomies of: law and accident, necessity and contingency, foundation and substance, all played out within the Derridean bounds of the existentially limited negative background (all necessarily or contingently impossible things or events) and the existentially delimited positive foreground (all, in necessary fact or by accident possible things or events). The original sin in this is the all too human game of chaos-hiding and denying the game of hiding is even being played, and is instead often falsely called proof of rationality and the essence of reason, but is nothing more or less than a gloss of the Parmenidean paradox of change in other guises. And for the story following our info-semantic approach all of this *reality-as-perception* originally comes from the pre-vital universe of wide original non-derived data, so the hope for a deeper form of epistemic tractability more (and less) than what is represented as *justified true belief* assumes whatever derived data life encodes in and as the genome (it's displaced and "inverted" triggering causes appearing as proto-knowings derived in the pre-ontological leap from non-living to living matter) and its developmental machinery (appearing as the general or "Turing Machine" structuring cause of life's finer particularly fit functional, i.e. selected or filtered, and often much more accidental particular structuring causes) does not cloud our view of this original swathe of what nature is trying to "say" by too much error, too much inaccuracy in perception; over too much of a gap (and in same-different kind, the *same* problem redoubles with the mind's leveraging of many too arbitrary values, but *differently*).

That special day, post original intentionality tipping, when the first derived percept is finally experienced (regardless as to whether Burge or I are right of where O.I. first emerges, I think at the first free living cell, while he promotes the lagging notion of the first accurate full-body-as-an-attending-self moment as first perception; the difference is "only" 3.2 billion years, no biggie) is the first day some significant part, some (just finished matter-only)re-compression/(so, also a just starting and always lived)re-extraction of that least probable universal message is walled off inside a part of the universe. It has also, in becoming alive also first transcended its own inherent material eigen-law, that of—locally and temporarily at least—"disobeying" the 2nd law of thermodynamics, i.e., that point where time's experienced asymmetric arrow-ness appears somewhat mysteriously against a background of otherwise perfectly symmetric law.

In other words, even before we come along with our much more rarefied (reified?) and sophisticated (sophistical?) forms of representation, ultimately spilling over to a *within* built over a patchwork of relatively discontinuously functioning cells (but for all the communicative channels and signalling molecules and the neural orderings leading inexorably to brains) so integrating over these many billions of discontinuities what is otherwise just a heap, a many celled body only really exhibiting a pseudo, *a fractal holarchy of* material insided-ness (but always by this working towards novel forms of representation) living things are already fit to take all the local residual non-derived data (those morphic mutualisms that have become functionally disposed for subsequent contingent but always fit incorporation, shown by the trivial fact that genetic evolution really exists, and in its endless furthering of the developmental complexity of cells, bodies, populations, etc.).

By this cells start “knowing” and “speaking” even before any possibility of solving the symbol grounding problem or any need for even proto-conception arises by being the first to bootstrap up from the epistemic fount of all universal non-derived data, telling the residual story of both extant contingencies and also functioning as a live retro-diction to those contingencies also long gone and now irreversibly turned into other matter things, but which also tellingly *in absentia* mark the missing links in the complex story-web of natural diachronic (and, only for us in *close* perception **now**, synchronic) bio-complexity emerging on Earth all the way back to the first forms of natural data only emerging with the eruption of the BBS.

Much of our scientific content, I believe, is actually derived indirectly through what nature has condensed and walled off into its post-ontological self, i.e., what it has necessarily learned to first live!, and so is very dependent not only on the superficial coding of proteins but on the deeper *eMetaphorical* function of the entirety of all DNA ever, now or in the future found as part of the universal genome as a post-ontological encapsulation of new, of many vital “eigen-laws”; now found locally paradoxical for its 2nd law flouting and onto-novel lawlessness most of all. This introduces the first problem for how communication with nature through living nature goes, i.e., as it first passes through the relative accuracy and possibly radical inaccuracies of non-conscious forms of perception.

How does science, then, first deal with this inherent problem? No more or less than by the creation/discovery of the logically consistent set of relativized units we now call the S.I. units, which I think in effect work to ensure, at least, the sorts of quantificational/observational/measurement precision and accuracy required only minimally and sufficiently, but never essentially nor absolutely (but for the Gaussian or other variability that is ineliminable if only because by this point so much derived data has been mixed into the background of non-derived data never the twain shall part). Life adulterates natural data into natural information but also into suspect derived data as well (reflective mind adulterates all data and natural information much further, all the way to unicorns and such) and this natural information is then fit to be further made into (true)information by symbol grounding, so there is lots of potential for inaccuracy and arbitrariness being passed through in this as well.

These perhaps too whimsical, too metaphorical claims are supported if one takes the time to consider many of the long dead debates over the nature of things like impetus and force, and over much later things like the *élan vital* and the *aether*; those defending the wrong sides of these debates before they were resolved were in these times seen as no less rational for turning out wrong after all.

Additionally, those interpretations winning over the folk or other obtuse or obscure senses proposed were no more or no less those that in fact turned out mathematizable within the singular and internally self-consistent but always relativist (by some King’s foot) 7-unit-system standardized by the first post-modern period minds to see the need for it in the first place; less so than those won over by impassioned and persuasive argument (so, perhaps this is where the question as to the ontology of

numbers first gets deeply begged). This does not, however, ensure science is not built today upon inaccurate percepts or concepts, or other empty terms, but does ensure some core of sound logical communication is at hand and has *prima facie* epistemic warrant, if not for the outstanding (in both senses) problem of numbers. Things only really took off in science when all the problematic philosophical aspects of numbers, the traditional denying and warding off of negative numbers, irrationals, of zero, of complex numbers, etc., finally gave way as one after another these most problematic mathematical objects (in both aesthetic and existential terms) were found to critically and cogently map to useful meanings in the models of reality first emerging with Galileo, really getting traction with Newton and Leibniz, but ending with the irrealisms of QM (where the complex numbers show their best work and where the risk of real infinities defines the current problems inherent in the limits of the separate but hoped to be unified systems, each which proposes a view of the underlying metaphysical and methodological intuitions as logically incommensurate in regards to the other).

But, of course, I have skipped over the tip to mind here already, so while non-conscious and many conscious but non-thinking/non-recursively-speaking and more complex animals and animal-environment relations and transformations continued to evolve we should expect even more inaccuracies to have be incorporated side-by-side with the reams of otherwise supposed natural information now representationally embedded and accessible in/by the biosphere as a whole (like the computer planet in *The Hitchhikers Guide to the Galaxy* our planet might be as much the first quasi-computational model of the whole universe to get to the whole next level of universal message en/de-coding). And worse, only superficial and late comer bugs are likely to ever be so easily incorporated out by the same processes that built them in. Like those deep legacy bugs in the Linux or NT kernel never to be found, but always lurking to cause unintended function, even total in-the-moment functional failure, deeply embedded epistemic bugs are as likely built-in right from the base up such that digging them out risks taking down the whole house of cards; rather we must label and negotiate them, not ever hope to remove them!

But, we *human beings* only come along to read off the program at the end of perception, not the beginning. So by the time we come along motivated by our naive biologically derived values and so set on knowing and controlling all we purvey we are also adding/have already added a layer of perhaps too much arbitrary value onto how we communicate with nature, now by representing both derived and non-derived forms of data and natural information as if they were the unadulterated source speaking by rawest and purest dedomena from the BBS, when for the first 10 billion years or so they were already adulterating and collating each other into the very material and dispositional basis of life, already guided by a universal telos, if only one falling out of a random walk “as if”. How can we be sure we now have the right values, the most accurate percepts so easily to hand at all here? Well, I suspect those most laudable perennial values, the ones we often fail most at practising and defending do shine through as the first light of that arrow of the BBS’ message we have been burdened/blessed with en/decoding and are what we should further, especially if we are not instead to be summarily pushed aside by our excesses, our endless greed and other denied forms of irrationality. This ethical and moral guiding light

shows us the way to whatever our singular minds might manifest in the world meta-collectively, if we can only get past our egos where its sprandrelically derived “necessities” pre-load most of the suspect values and inaccurate percepts it must promote against the wishes of nature’s more ideal forms of communication and of meaning-content (not *this*, but *that*, but not *that* either, but you’re on the right wrong track . . .).

Science here is panacea enough, but only if we stay the course, rebuild trust in the methods of vetting and confirmation and finally transcend just the objective means and ends by equally promoting the possibility of sciences of subjective means and ends, those which concern not just improving what is going on the inside of the brain, but aim at rationally developing the *within* of what self-reflective consciousness emerges from but that the ego also must, *to keep functioning—to stay alive long enough to reproduce the mostly behaving animal it somewhat destructively supervenes on*—endlessly deny and denigrate, that being the infinite source of the logos, what the finite and always fearful and all too-animal human brain is the first to name as chaos, as death, and as a real “real nothing” both no thing and the supposed source of every real thing (some God-damned way?).

With the right values, TRUTH, TRUTHFULNESS, JUSTICE, COMPASSION, APPEARANCE-REALITY GAP (due to those perceptive inaccuracies contingently unavoidable, selected for working *at something fit enough in some context* but not for the accuracy of it much if at all) we compose the right sorts of logically accurate percepts, always compiled by the integration of now billions of cells’ wide registration of certain data morphisms and in turn through the neural and developmental integrations leading to brains (as each cell finds a way to shout to/as the ego-one-body whole across each sub-personal many-celled INSIDE-OUTSIDE separation . . . see, even cells are natural informational solipsists on this basis, but they only proto-represent this as *The Problem of Other Bodies*, not minds). By this we first see through to/by those certain morphisms as/by their supervening scientific facts and laws. But it is only one channel ever opening, now passing through two further inter-mediating onto-filters, and still guided by the insistent light ray always passing directly from the BBS determining each and every point of view within the universe taken from that same BBS now, if only in the unwound space-time-scale legacy of it all as “equally” an always unchanging NOW.

And here, if you are thinking of Derrida you have been taking my meanings aptly, as I would argue each point in space-time-scale is nothing but a recapitulation to that same impossible point beyond space-time-scale. There is, then, no pure iteration of this point ever possible, it is not simply repeated as if by some materially determinable and logically reducible machine output, instead it subsists as a generally relativistic and inter-tangling web always as that same point, but only now paradoxically as a multiplicity too, and the universe made so much bigger for this, but where the whole, borne by the essential emptiness of concepts such as SELF or IDENTITY may now be re-interpreted as always center and circumference of the very same BBS re-writ in this now Derridean form of counting, not just in the one logicism insists on but was always only non-paradoxically right in promoting, yet not right in reifying (but for *this* or *that* length of *some* King’s foot first being made a *general equivalent* both concretely and abstractly in one fell speech act swoop!).

The Return to Original Intentionality as Original General-to-Particular Universal Communication

We can then, finally, turn to and imagine an idealized moment when that first morsel of non-derived, but same-level transitorily adulterated original data is first post-mutualized in some functionally persistent ossification by the forms, and inputs and outputs of vitality's onto-and-phylo-genetic machine intelligence as if the historical contingency of it all was and is always purposeful (and it always is in a non-watchmaker kind of way just as Daniel Dennett supposes in his inverting of this particular "master-slave" dialectic; that of design out of contingency, not by necessity⁶²). This first non-conscious perceiver, this first single-celled but content empty mind is also the first perfect or perfect as could ever be scientist (it is non-vested by not being able to represent any intention towards vesting, and vetted by determined matter evolution writ wide and most random).

But even here the hard lesson leaps out. If our story, of Burge's outline derived from the latest and very detailed visual part of the story is apt, then is it by nothing more or less than this science gets it endless and relatively negative forms of disconfirmation, never absolute confirmation of any kind but by an implicit recognition and sucking-it-up of the problem of induction: that purely local habits of the being of universal dynamism may be easily mistaken as arising due to laws. This problem should, most of all, motivate the institutions involved in valuing reproducibility by endless replication of results and of humble submission to the probably endless need for constant dredging up of hidden assumption in interpretation, but I suggest is failing woefully in this as I write this sentence in very early 2020. Even at the start of life the messages received as "facts" derived from the mutually morphic are never certainties of essence, they are epistemic contingencies of the sort we will never experience directly except as wholly negative absences due the reassertion of chaos, such as the sun not rising tomorrow (remembering as well to say it rises at all is nothing but a *facons de parler*). *But it is a contingent certainty, not a necessary impossibility the sun one day does not rise over the earth, but instead redly and giantly swallows it whole* (with a nod to adverbial theories of perception ;).

So, nature in this first non-intentional step to the intentional shows us any and all empirical fact is endlessly suspect and no communication is perfect unless it has some non-zero and epistemically appropriate cyclical/spiral pattern of—at the limit: a countably infinite form of reconfirmation—of recapitulation to the original well communicated meaning, but equally as a Derridean would mean it and never reducing to just some logical form of counting. At the near pole this means at best a meaning is always indexed to some epiphanic moment, at the far pole we assume nothing from this; the fact may persist (if law is in play), the fact may vanish (in always being a unicorn "law"), the model may mutate, in this case the meaning was never one dying ossified in apt translation but one only borne fit to develop as tree to seed with its apt meanings branching without bound, even violating the law of non-contradiction over these different moments of meaning conveyance, reinterpretation, and debunking; what I am proposing requires a trans-logical form of extensionality and intensionality that is not a duality and yet is both as one.

What Would Voltaire Say?

The ideal form of communication sought for, the one so sorely first needing a collective pre-commitment to some “normal” Voltaire-like pre-disambiguation and de-polysemanization in any and all meaning-exchange, not so much to facilitate conversation by more forms of empty semantic power but to disavow the truth-corrupting effects of that power is always where we need start (so, to honour an irreducibly pluralistic form of *fractalized* semantic holism, the one logicism denies but exhibits by its own failed unification, lately manifesting as many logical methods, never just as one logic to rule them all). This means as much as we might disavow elitist hierarchization of knowledge as the best means to mete out power that epistemic and ethical credentials and their deep and wide vetting really do matter regardless as to how privilege might unjustly inform and bias them (but wisdom would always seek to mitigate the unfairly privileging biases through other channels than political correctness alone).

But, even in having done this the next step, requiring even more suspensions of disbelief and impatience beyond what most if not all “normal” communicative-seeming exchanges typically demand, asks much, much more of us. It requires we first come to see we owe all our precious claims of knowledge (where it is actual (true) information and not just fancy false data in invisible finery) to those cells first unthinkingly and unseeingly coming to reduce the regularities of its locally found environment through to a noiseless and unbiased view of same/otherness right back to the BBS. But the superficial illusion remaining uncontested is that our exchanges and warrants of meaning only ever require one back and forth channel. The problem with relying on only one channel is this risks too much use of opaquely chosen senses of terms that then might mean only by accident and largely serve to acquiesce to an irrational form of normalcy—all *unconsciously meant* (yes, here I invoke the hated term directly, as I need also invoke its penurious intent to repress) to *irrationally* maintain our collective illusions of certainty and control, on my albeit very speculative account (of *original sin due all minds and the universal psyche equally*).

The ideal natural communication that pre-vital and mind-independent forms of matter only first realize by closing the intentional circle from inside to outside (and going up from the quasi-concrete to the quasi-abstract in the same process) also requires a second channel to oversee the endlessly needed process of successful (Derridean and non-Derridean) reconfirmation of any (certain-data) meaning exchange. The original meaner—here Nature as a whole—is always and only the final arbiter of having meant well enough, that said meaning was well enough understood, and not just known as some Janus faced meme, half-truth, half-lie and ethically worse for this than pure and transparent malice, and ***Nature says this has been done no more or less perfectly than by becoming alive for the first time in this very process!!!***.

So, because the model I have proposed for better human communication is one our own cells have already perfected this alone explains the need for always producing a deep orthogonal account by first

deconstructing all in-play-for-meaning norms right down to the certain morphisms re-centered in a renewed collective epistemic humility and healthy skepticism first. The hard epiphany required (hard for such a rapaciously self-esteem seeking thing as the ego that has no deep default need or intent to be *known* right, just *believed* right, so mostly just *seeming* right so to access *power as illusion*) is one understanding we may at best have constructed too much of our otherwise laudable epistemic project on too arbitrary value (inherited from the biological biases no longer making sense in culture) and the inaccurate percepts we still rely too heavily upon (as much for the reason just bracketed, but also because the absoluteness of things is never to be found in the *dedomena*, only in the bringing back together of the original datum and its background in conception over some always ultimately empty form of identity, leaving only the extensionality and intensionality to trace out the always absent essence of any and all finite things).

We must embrace both the superficial epistemic differences (the memetic “knowings”) and deeper *differances* (the epiphanic experience of deep subject-to-object understandings of a more intimate kind of causality) as a seamless one-many thing if we are to mean well or lastingly at all. How you might conceive of and render this program of ideal communication working only from where I have led you to the water’s edge by actually “drinking” the water matters more than any details of method I might create beyond this. I am confident I’ll know you’ve done it right when I see it finally well practiced and in ideal non-arbitrary terms, valued accurately.

“If you wish to converse with me, declare your deepest and most certain data morphisms first.”

Lost in Translation, Again

But I’m not really finished with the model building of a renewed kind of already “perfected” form of communication, and must return again as if for the first time to this:

“The title of this work is a metaphorically sympathetic nod to the movie *Lost in Translation*. There is an apt metaphorical resonance between that movie and this work, as the all-too-human epistemic tragedy risked in both cases is the unsuccessful sharing of *meaning by intentionality by what “only” materially exists.*”

Communication always starts with meaning, and meaning is always endlessly ambiguous and elusive (and never as logicism supposes will it ever reduce to some perfectly coherent, consistent, and complete truth-functional language, but not because language or logic might not be able to do so in some other reality, but because our reality in all it targets is already paradoxical to the heart, and as such we are not ever able to just count essences in non-Derridean ways, but must also count them non-logically).

So, we must always make and then remake the (same-different) commitment to disambiguate the ground of each and every purported meaning to some degree if the logical analyses are ever to carve out some rational enough model for some, what always reduces to a “toy” system on the way to stitching some all-compassing plural model of it all together. In addition, as required, we must always be aware of the various norms of data, accuracy, and value in play to ensure our metaphysics don’t slip and slide moving up or down the normative spiral, especially when we cross the mind-body tipping point in any direction (but going down without being transparent is much worse for those seeking reductions than those seeking emergences, even if both groups turn out identically deluded for both being wrong!). Penultimately, we must always be prepared to make sure for disguised speech acts and other kinds of value norms we are not passing them off as facts without also showing how the perceptions on which they are based are accurate enough, and ultimately that some certain data morphisms underwrite their grounding in only the cold-dead-matter view of the thing(s). Of course, if we can’t do that at all this is a very clear and distinct sign we may not be dealing with a fact at all—or at least—what we’ve taken as a fact turns out only a fact about the content of some otherwise wholly unjustified and possibly unjustifiable belief exchange (conflating the meta-factness aimed at by the non-truth functional assessment of a sentence being accurately re-instantiated and confirmed only in the “truth” of what was literally said, but by that in total lieu of what its propositions might always be saying wrongly on the original lower level truth-functional assessment).

If we are dealing with any aspect of culture we should expect to first be most, not least explicit about our values. The same is, in relative eigen-turn, then subsequentially needed done down the entire spiral for the accuracy of all involved percepts, now asking that very clear inferential and/or evidential ties are being made between how the accuracy of said percepts align or misalign with the values already shown non-arbitrary enough. Only after this do we finally need dredge up the certain morphisms, but always now in a Derridean light as well as a non-Derridean one, counting as one, two, three, . . . and by oneness, one/two-nesses, one/two/three-nesses, . . . as well.

More Thinking Slow, Please

But the most important and still missing thing, the extra bit of sorely needed structure best fit to optimize an ideal intention towards communicating some or any meaning is in always in having that second, all too often neglected, or worse, assumed unneeded channel explicitly in play to adjudicate differently the endless fits and starts always pragmatically arising, so to address the often unpredictable need for assessing and/or reassessing how all the disambiguations and such are going.

Overall these *slowing downs* rather than *speedings up* are motivated and guided by the over-riding caveat that only the (truthful) meaner may say when their terms are satisfactorily defined for the technical or special uses at hand and each party must thus agree to the same sense or senses of each key term before proceeding invisibly from the assumption instead that all the important shared senses are already the same, or worse that only one person has the best or right sense for all times and contexts. So this is never done the same for all conversations, and must be redone each time, and it is always possible diametrically opposed meanings may be soundly cross-taken even using the exact same set of terms and evidence, but only as a consequence of the fact the senses in play for many words are so vague in collective meaning as to often risk meaning the opposite in sliding contexts if and only if power or persuasive affect determines more than intention that the aptness of some meaning invisibly invokes only those meanings already reified above all others (such as we only assume science achieves but I have tried to show has missed the mark, even if the arrow aimed flies true off the bow).

This is OK (that the same words and/or sentence might mean in differing contexts not the same but even the opposite thing) unless no one notices and cross-senses are being differently expressed opaquely so most of what results is talking past, or worse only some show of power, the cult of personality or some other kind of a-rational seeming instead wins the epistemic day; in these cases, meanings are rarely if ever well conveyed. Of course, people can agree to disagree but I'd have to think these sorts of stalemates are rarely due to lack of good evidence or argument, but are actually the result of normalizing basic forms of dogmatism on one or both sides of some logically (in the rationalist or empiricist senses and methods) divisive topic by fiat, i.e., as fashion, not fact.

I believe if people were actually willing to take the recommendations of Voltaire combined with the addition of an explicit second channel for meta-communication and actually show the patience required to first agree about what senses of terms are in play according to how the meaner might otherwise rationally see fit to use them this alone would go a long way towards much better meaning exchanges. Being willing to take more time to not conflate norms as facts would take the ideal hopes for rationality even farther, as would always being mindful of one's metaphysics at the mind-body tipping point. Ensuring the percepts involved are accurate enough, and grounded in certain data transparently only then finally take us all the way to some kind of certainty and control, but one always conveyed by epiphanic experience and not just truth-functional assessment of those propositions that win some kind of popular or even elitist belief reifying contest.

I sadly doubt most would have the patience let alone see the need for such *thinking slow* as determining the more required norms for ideal communication, but that speaks not of good use of ideal reason nor rationality, just more irrationality and "social intelligence", more seemings, more favouring the leveraging of lies and power over truth seeking, and by this favouring winning an argument over ever making any effort to understand those who don't think or believe like you at all. Sadly, I fear, more so due to social media, but in ways I doubt have ever really changed, not much deep communication goes on at all these days, particularly when it matters most: in the methods and ideals of governance.

How to Rationally Re-inflate a Flat Earther

Let's briefly consider the case of the Flat Earth Society to describe a relevant case of a failure of rationality whose debunking resides somewhat deeply (as all morphisms must) but fairly transparently in furthering data morphisms even a grade 10 high school level of problem-solving skill should directly allow. I suggest the, in this case dis-confirming data morphisms most directly but incontrovertibly exposing the lunacy of the flat-earth hypothesis requires such "theorists" first commit to some flat map/model (*representation*) of the earth, by this unambiguously fixing all relative positions of major cities on the Earth disk (and each crack pot even here will likely fail to agree with all others already, and this task alone will show incompatible distances in many triangulations, but not in any singular general knock-down way combining representation with experience, which I've argued is always required for meanings to be understood and not just known by their contents superficially).

Then from this "map of the major cities of disk-world" determine their associated flight paths in terms of hypothetical average flight times for some particular aircraft (and, of course, likely needing *ceteris paribus* corrections due to variations in wind and weather, etc., when the live experiments are finally carried out). By this each nut at least logically commits to some representation of those flights times internally self-consistent (assuming that is not already contingently impossible to do) as the resultant model. Now, after dealing with their endless paranoia as to how the clocks are fixed or how the pilot deliberately changed direction to add flight time (of course removing flight time is a whole other kind of impossible trick to pull off, so maybe those times radically underestimated are best for them to experience the impossibility of) they then fly those flights paths least consistent with their logically derived and so rationally incontrovertible hypothetical flight times having been determined by there favoured solution as to where all actual major cities in fact are to be placed on the Earth disk, and one hopes by this get the confirming eureka (more a, *you rationally reek a*) moment, one of honestly felt chagrin.

So, I propose (and think a general proof might easily be forwarded on geometrical terms) it will in each and every case of some proposed Flat Earth rendering of flight paths and times turns out impossible to reconcile most (and certainly never all of) the actual measurement of the actually experienceable flight times to any and all such flat models. Here, in rebuttal, one suspects anomalous forms of spontaneous teleportation across the under-determined times and intrinsic and mysterianistic slowings-down of the over-determined times will be proposed to fix the irreconcilable data points like so many epi-cycles. But, of course, as Kripkean Dogmatists they are still rational enough, because I am also sure most of these zealots really know their position is untenable and are really seeking social **not** epistemic power most of all, so they are still clever enough to know not to agree to do any of this, but an unwillingness to look into a telescope is no proof the heavens are not mutable; so much again for sound use of reason.

In fact, the best way to interpret their behaviour in this case is that they are irrational to the core. Why would anyone making factual claims then reject the well vetted rational means by which they might be proven right? Why, because they *unconsciously* “know” they are wrong and are simply proud of the fact they can get off by yanking the chain of those also more given to such juvenile and clearly self-serving, narcissist even, use of “reasons”.

Once again, my ideal model is so widely and deeply applicable in its ethical and methodological character I am at best waving with some diffuse precision rather than producing a fine fixed logical structure to directly leverage at all. I am instead offering a signpost to forms of novel possible behaviour I believe any truly rational enough person actually belonging in the extension of MAN IS THE MEASURE OF ALL THINGS would immediately take to heart, so as to internalize a new communicative ethic and return to a more a-rational conception in progressing the use of reason past the roadblock I have argued it has constructed for itself in so perversely supposing its real targets could ever be made consistent with the monist view of reality it has assumed going in.

Ideal communication seems impossible as long as the human egotistic view of what I think, if we look around at how people really behave—especially in terms of the cult of personality and the endless abuse of power it allows, continues to endorse way too many too arbitrary cultural values (always biologically derived if not, only lately, invisibly tipped to overwrought valuing) in failing to see accurately what we currently risk in perpetuating our current economic model without significant (metaphysical?) revision. The first premise, the one most in need of revision but least consistent with the metaphysics of physicalism (but, a direct entailment of idealism) is this: infinite growth *within* reality-as-perception is not only assumed possible it is assumed a necessary good. The second suspect and lately well debunked premise is in assumption that pure rationality always dictates how people act within this system of reducing all value to quantity; can anyone keep a straight face about this claim anymore, I mean, seriously?

Instead I would argue metaphorically it seems to me our unexpressed aim is closer to trying to stuff all of reality back into the BBS as the only way possible to realize any lasting forms of certainty or control, so to tacitly keep shoring up the concept HUMAN BEING, which like all concepts cross-defined using IDENTITY is ultimately found to be empty, shown by the lack of real grounding in any deep morphic certainty of either evidence or inference as to what the essence of such differences lie in (in the end, there is no diachronically hard conceptual/logical differences between categorical entities nor even between natural kinds ever to be found, the whole fractal shebang blends back together over synchronic para-*differences* as one “same-difference”).

The naive, but I’d think relatively inaccurate view of how intelligent we all are (which literally can’t mean about all of us identically, right?, just some of us relatively, and don’t kid yourself that such accidental and self-selecting meritocracies can be easily swept aside), largely underwritten in assuming there are hard or more basic sciences with special access beyond the gap when I have done so much to argue by this we measured quasi-wrongly, seems a case of hasty generalization combined with blind optimism (so

to feed the rapacious need for “self”-esteem even for those disinclined by either fate or effort to develop their “intelligence” in the ways mathematician, philosophers and hard scientist always must and generally do).

So, while we might be disposed to think ourselves the default natural boon hearkening the proper measuring of a new form of access to and experience of *inside and outside*, we have otherwise simply measured wrongly, i.e., while man might be conceived and identified in the West and in an expanding global sense as the measure of all things it is pragmatically at this time more accurate to say “man is the measuring *ceteris paribus* wrongly of most knowings”. But, even if this “error” I’ve proposed were an inevitable outcome it need not be a fatal one for the promotion and furthering of the best of Nature’s intentions towards developing our special kind of rationality further, if only first by some needed re-valuing of the missing humility serving to first acknowledge (and only then redress) the missing of the proper targets of our most cherished knowings.

To close this book, I will attempt to reinterpret the climate crises and show how things are possibly much worse than they have even been allowed to appear and by this exhibiting exactly the structural sort of problem often damningly forestalling both authentic forms of communication and that because of this also puts more meat onto the bones of my metaphor delineating the problems inherent with the naive, or divide and conquer uses of reason we still favour in most “normal” discourse. This meta-abductive argument will attempt to recast the climate crisis as a Big Evolutionary Crisis, but also as a calling to re-choose the path we have always been on for which we had less control going in than we supposed, but where the possibility of something more than control still divinely subsists, if we can only change our values to be less arbitrary so we might see more accurately what all the certain morphisms actually are trying to tell us:

“It is a sin to think you are God, but it is also a sin to think you are not God”

Chapter 10: The Climate Crises Strawman: A Meta-Structural Example Of The Endless Irrationalities Of Normal Use Of Naive, I.E. Divide And Conquer Reason

As a final polemic, and also a final example of how often irrational means are used to forward supposedly rational ends I will epistemically re-contextualize and logically re-interpret the lately less divisive but still widely denied claims higher levels of atmospheric CO₂ are the poster-boy cause of a heating planet and tipped or tipping climate change (heralding many *crises*, not one crisis), and this entire outcome is human-caused, specifically by the excessive and wide consumption of non-renewable fossil fuels. What I want to show is yet another wolf in sheep’s clothing structural outcome typical of too

much divide and conquer use of reason (and the endless pandering to ignorance this always invites by elites to the “man” on the street just trying to get by) as well as showing how the pernicious way the popular debate is now couched and *entrenched* serves mostly to deny any sort of needed depth *and* breadth in analysis, and so can only be seen as resulting from more deeply hidden and so still invisible collective biases evident in both the washed and unwashed masses equally (due the madness inherent in the universal psyche, of course).

While the aim of the popular debate appears to empower some well delineated expert-mediated and free discourse centred in appropriate forums of what should motivated deeply and widely a transparently shared *collective* rational concern all I see in the way the debate has been structured is to make resistance to change stronger (and I am arguing, this is no innocent accident). So, a subtle and even more invisibly entrenched reinforcement of the status quo has actually resulted, and this is more ideal for the deniers and detractors and their bank statements than denying climate change wholesale ever was. This endorsed uncertainty in interpretation appears as a purely equivocal and endlessly contentious inductive abstraction and so becomes the content of greatest defining or *represented* concern, reified to the point such that other issues of similarly wide environmental or social concern that aren’t immediately assimilable to the same one issue, to the same finger-pointing and wagging debates over cause and blame, or that otherwise can’t be reduced to this straw man vector of single (particular) cause and (general) effect, get buried even deeper. But the evidence here, taken wholly in lieu of the main role we have given to the protagonist FOSSIL FUELS -> CARBON DIOXIDE, even though even more easily justifying these wider and deeper concerns and are for this even more troubling to deny, have by now been made to wait in line for justice until the trial of the proximal villain, CO₂, is first decided. But the jury was hung going in by this, so now the entire race risks a collective hanging by pending unknown events manifesting local collapse entirely peripheral to the carbon problem.

This causes these wider and deeper concerns and evidence to become stone-walled from much more widely and desperately needed *proactive* debates concerning sustainability in the context of growing global economic disparity in particular. What we risk in our continued denial the problems we face are real, wicked and only ours to mitigate, and by now could never be reversed, stopped, and maybe not even slowed in their entirety—if at all—is directly “provable” by the on-the-ground epiphanic experience of all the already unfolding and worsening global-scale geospheric, biospheric, culturospheric, atmospheric, etc., ***of all the lived, living and soon to be randomly alive crises now unfolding to plain sight!***

Thankfully, one way more concern for this problem will be motivated is that natural disaster targets the rich and poor almost equivalently in its most extreme expression; disaster, man-made or not, is the greatest class leveller, not ideology, not even revolution. I simply cannot believe most people are not by now well aware of these unsettling changes on the basis of all too regular personal experience (but then, again, most people have little access to or even desire to experience unadulterated forms of nature and instead get their warm feelings about it from the animals featured in Telus commercials and

such; sadly, probably of animals soon enough only existing as effigies in these commercials as no one notices the real differences, the real *losses* behind the *representations*).

What this already very troubling magnification in intensity, frequency and local inappropriateness and outright biblical bizarreness (*at times*, as I type this it has been raining iguanas in Florida and there is no snow at all over much of the Greater Toronto Area in a winter of dire predictions of extreme cold and snowfall—and then came the *coronavirus*) of weather, pollution, extinction, geophysical, social and climate events foretell without any need for more statistical analyses and endless collection of data at all is a story of an invisible resignation to the worst outcomes, but still one endlessly couched (to keep the illusion of control any form of blind positivity demands) in terms of how business as usual will thrive in facing the coming wave in due to entrepreneurial zombie optimism and blind faith in endlessly furthering computational and over-ambitious technological solutions.

But the real goal here is not solving climate change, it just needs to seem that way; the real goal is to create new revenue streams *ex nihilo* and *non fini*; ideally initiating waves of profit-friendly washing away of the best to be discarded old practices and products—those “bad” fossil fuel consuming ones—and replacing them with all the “good” products, now consuming back on the infinite growth train only by use of renewable sources of energy; methinks the size and destructiveness of the possible waves coming might be sorely underestimated.

And, finally, is this ever what happens when some new technological marvel is touted as a universal ethical good? Did the computer lead to less or more use of paper, did the introduction of LEDs lead to overall energy savings or more per capita energy consumption, did improving endlessly on the strength of opium derivatives help people manage pain better or spiral into causing many fatal addictions, did the over-use of antibiotics over-kill all the bad bacteria, *or did something else happen?*

Will the electric car and its infrastructure ever wholly replace the internal combustion engine and its infrastructure, *or will we simply all now be expected to own both kinds of vehicles?*

The Real Cause of All Our Looming Crises?

So, I must ask:

Is it not the more basic and unstoppable growth in our species’ number and global *per capita* consumption of energy, including our slice of all and any energy consumed simply to build and maintain infrastructure and the best of our democratically—or by other political means—implemented institutions of social justice, remediation and opportunity in the first place, that is the most proximal

cause of a warming and culture-relatively destabilizing planet? No? Then it must be God (or the Devil) itself. The biggest problem every single life form on this planet is by now wholly embedded in is that even if you and I might endeavour to use less as radically as possible, this alone does not mean less is being used on our behalf, probably more and more is used on our behalf every damn day regardless as to what we might chose, is what I think instead.

And must I also point out exactly what it is consuming most of this energy? Technology, duh, and so much of it is lately simply consumed so far beyond any sane or proportional need, also deeply entrenched in furthering forms of mass production exploiting economies of scale in ways that legitimize waste by design (and so entrench and could never confront this problem only by going forward), with the tacit ends aimed for at the most consumptive tip of the most entitled consumers wants largely being the endless shoring up of identity and a very thin kind of walled off “self”-esteem.

By couching any debate involving any wicked enough problem—and don’t kid yourself the sustainability of human civilization in it current modes of valuing is a speeding train on the rails to many possibly outed bridges—in such narrow and naïve ‘yes’ or ‘no’ *only-going-to address-the-tip-of-the-iceberg* terms—when the number of factors of real and always causally disentangleable concern actually soundly invoked behind the red herring of *just* the problem with the planet’s average temperature going up should already swamp out how this debate is currently centred and make the wider periphery the greater concern, but the mad centre of it all instead holds fast. By this repression of all these too easy to see effects of excessive forms of human agency, good or bad, as the dominant triggering cause (if not the structuring cause, that is the BBS’s “fault”, always) of most current global scales of disruption of nature’s course, so much easy to grasp evidence that should matter becomes invisible. Seriously, what the hell else could be causing these changes but collective human agency, *especially if we are also right to keep promoting the man is the measure of all things meme, exactly?* If there is culpability in play it is owed all of us or none of us (and blame, too, is both owed all and none of us, somewhat mitigated in terms of past choices we’ve made in relative ignorance motivated by our best of intentions, you know when we first committed to this particular road to hell).

However, even if we are not the cause of anything bad at all (and, by this not of anything good, either) this alone would not obviate the evidential potential that none-the-less we face in the near future the dire consequences of failing to accept our fate more proactively. That fate is we are now living on a clearly recently destabilized planet in terms of maintaining the same level of homeostasis and found abundances it settled into after the last ice age, only 10,000 years ago. This is obvious, yet the debates are instead ruled by fools wading in from both extreme poles, and so rarely from the middle, by this denying the wiser need to adapt more cautious forms of agnosticism from which to start the debates.

Sadly, it is really only by exploiting a mis-reading of the import of the problem of induction against otherwise very high confidence intervals in the supporting inductions, and cross-confirming evidence coming from many independent researchers and their models that a whole-world shoulder shrugging

now ensues. The real blind personal risk we all face is in only being forced to admit we were wrong and irrational in this as the “wave” crashes down particularly on us, but who will hear us then? Worse, we continue to hide our heads in the sand even though in other voices we are still so endlessly self-congratulatory about our faith in our tools of control, and by this we now seem fit to wait to the very moment of widest collapse to pull some magic rabbit out of our speech act hats to save the day (this is where and when the aphorisms you can’t eat money will bite back the hardest). The much wiser perspective required is sanely agnostic and bi-skeptical, one promoting neither optimism nor pessimism as its opening rallying cry, so neither a *doom and gloom* or *salvation and joy* view^{NOTE}.

NOTE: And both radical optimists and pessimists alike are fools when they promote their positions as certainly right, as no one ever knows a damn thing about the future but by the blind luck of finding one’s past mind fitting the present world, but remember the law of large numbers: not only must some fool be right simply for stating what was not ever impossible giving the *billions of fools now given equal platforms to believe not only beyond but often in lieu of any evidence or argument*, yet some one fool will also have to be right over and over. But this does not mean they knew a damn thing when they predicted outcomes; like all forms of deep perception, conceiving claims about the future are largely and forever guesses, especially if I am right about perception and even more so if I am right to have debunked the notion of FUNDAMENTAL SCIENCE.

The patently evident root cause of any potential over-running of nature we and we alone have caused could be nothing *in first rational principle* but the entire post-modern industrialization complex with its vast demands for endlessly leveraging speech acts into satisfaction by all our created webs of energy consuming and material transducing cultural networks. So, in asking ‘who caused this?’ the obvious conclusion is in one sense none of us are particularity at fault now as we didn’t live in the times when these problems really started, and this wasn’t 10 years ago, 20 years ago, 100 years ago, even 400 years ago, it was when we first corralled fire to our intentional use; it was when we both individually and collectively became Prometheus’.

And worse for the ethics and wisdom behind it all, we wrote all the needed counter-acting parables long ago (the parables emerge with their materially unpredictable causal objects towards some mitigating effect by the more sane essence of the universal psyche, one also supposes) but we no longer see how the best meanings they contain matter, they no longer get directly applied to individuals in their originally locally meant senses, but the only hope I see now resides in applying these sage morals to the collective as a whole, but who will blink first? Only Mother Nature I suspect, one massive hurricane at a time, with ever increasing frequency and mounting destructive effect.

All this harried work to keep the debate about the risked negative consequences of perpetuating current default and normalized forms of human behaviour and valuing in such clearly excessive and hyper-individualized modes reduced to a simple ‘yes or no’ answer about some meek and cherry-picked effigy

of too fine, too thin cause effectively drags the debate about what we really might need to, and can actually pragmatically do about this issue (not much) to a standstill (but for in the manufacture of even more representations to lose ourselves in further). But, even not knowing for sure if we are too blame, there is ever mounting evidence the planet is heating very rapidly now and this is no joke. And here is the deepest data morphic denying way the debate has been too dumbed down, where too many people (and this is still 99% of humanity, myself included) simply fail in such transparent ways to not only not be able to access these confirming morphisms but by this could never even admit they, simply:

1. Don't understand much if anything at all about the nature of the very wide and deep statistical problem of picking the supposed confirming signal of human agency out of the background representations of the unfathomably vast ebb and flow of epochs of linear and cyclical geospheric tumult forever beyond our causing, nor controlling of it (but this should not be surprising as most people still probably can't even add, subtract, divide and multiply fractions, let alone derive the Gaussian curve from first principles. I can do the first set still and very well, but have only seen the other done in outline, and certainly am unlikely to be able to reproduce it on my own, but I do understand the controversial and less controversial aspects of its semantic import much more than most, I'd think.).
2. Don't understand science or statistics much, if at all, and learning how to use some statistical program or hand calculate means, modes, and standard deviations grants no assurance of understanding statistics in the deeper way the issue of determining the causes of climate change relies on one having as some expert in the relevant fields. And the wider background data involved goes well beyond the facts of climate science alone, it ultimately rests on the most fundamental sciences completely; oh, and that is going to be a problem too, especially if I am right about how we are all quasi-wrong about the existence of such "hard" sciences.

How Do They Separate Out the Climate Change's Causal Signal?

I really wish to avoid making a fine explication of how statisticians and climate scientists do in factual method separate the pro case from the con case by seeking the hoped-for strong (very high probability, one hopes 0.95 confidence intervals at least) and cogent inductive signal by peeling away in representation only those conceptually isolable contingent effects of present and historical human agency from those always overriding or indifferent to it.^{NOTE} The deep methodological problem is all the

NOTE: And notice the tacit worry assumed is the pro case is the true case, our intuitions going in were always pessimistic in rational terms, not optimistic. Any optimism was always about more opportunities to leverage control over Nature entrepreneurs might then fund and sell products by. But can we, for example, stop the relative

form and order of seasons? No, but they are surely delayed or shifting their relative borders; the nicest parts of spring and fall seem shorter, lately it is all heatwaves or polar vortices and chaos in between, and we've been at least part of the cause of this and certainly need to start reacting to it better. To my mind the only sane response is to take our foot off the gas as widely and as soon as is possible, prepare to rebuild and strengthen infrastructure and hope the system hasn't already tipped too far; not make even more twenty-something billionaires at the endless expense of the poorest and worst off who do the shittiest work at the bottom for such empty luxuries and never really benefit for the grinding hell of it at all.

systems in play needing representation in some conceptually pure relation of untangled causation really function as a seamless material whole at a level of complexity basically including the entire biosphere and geosphere and even much of the solar system (but, the idea solar activity is the cause has already been ruled out, for example). So, to even ask the question first requires knowing with confidence many only retrodictable facts concerning many thousands, if not hundreds of thousands of millennia of the earth's history at the right levels of precision and accuracy as background knowledge (a system even approaching the complexity of the human brain) making any deductive conclusions impossible and the inductive ones very conditional to start.

The second problem is more social. Answering the question, as cogently as it has been framed amongst scientists, may only be done very superficially for the lay mind. This dumbing down, I think, fatally glosses so much of the technical understanding minimally required this only makes the critical evidence and arguments harder to express well to the lay mind. So, attempting it this way in most situations (especially when someone with most of the right facts still wishes to favour a mind-less optimism in some defence even after endorsing the negative induction) I think, simply adds weight to the denials they already favour for reasons having nothing to do with best use of reason at all, but arises because at the point in some otherwise sound attempt to teach them what they minimally need to not only know, but understand, all their childhood issues with past intellectual failure in school or life come flooding back in.

In other words, a negative *emotional* reaction to some technical explanation is often passed off as naive evidence such evaluations are overwrought and besides the point: *everything will be fine, it has to be*, especially when trying to understand the evidence mattering most is by this threatening to someone's self-esteem, who otherwise has convinced themselves they are already smarter than everyone else. I'd have to believe as I write this the pro case of there being a real cause and effect relation between our use of fossil fuels, combined with our being still in the explosive part of our natural growth curve (with the entire environment of Earth our "jar of sugar water") combined with how our economic system is only stable in its most valued form when it is always directed to more, never to less, that the inductive case has been won; climate crises are a real present short-term and mid-term threat to any hope for continued human progress (assuming industrialization is proof of that progress; I think it is a dead end and we should pull back from it for food production in particular, and in all production to some degree, but that is a much larger argument) but the reason people can't grasp this does not reside in a failure

due the soundness or cogency of the involved representational content at all, but is instead due the fact most people have not even begun to develop their rational tool kit in the way required, and worse, probably think they have no need to and can decide on the basis of feeling or by other fallacious sources of authoritative or popular warrant, or by other normally endorsed memetic, but endlessly vague, ambiguous, inconsistent and confused uses of “clear and distinct ideas”.

The Methodological Problem in a Nutshell

Bother it all then, here is the methodological problem in a nutshell.

Yes, the planet has been both much, much hotter and much, much colder in the near and far past, and in addition the cycles by which this happens are themselves hardly sinusoidally regular to begin with, have become endlessly more fine grained in complexity over the development of life in particular, and much of the data retrodicted by these many interleaving and always potentially suspect inferential reconstructions only comes from many indirect sources (about the oceans, glaciers, rocks, tectonic plates, fossils, ice cores, geophysical stratifications, about 150 years of reasonably trustworthy historical weather records, even mythological lore and cultural anecdotes) but there has been a clear overriding trend for this planet to become “better” stabilized at some middle-temperature scale ideal or attractor exactly as its most recent long-tail abundances of extant life forms shows, particularly as those energy wasting forms of display and behaviour tropical plants and animals alone favour.

It is as much due the endless ways life drives rather than just thrives under these accidentally optimal conditions that it acts as a very effective buffer against rapid environmental change. All the complex multi-tiered *self-circular* and *other-spiral* paths and feedback loops by which energy-flux excesses coming from either outside or inside the planet, and equally occasional energy deficits, are negotiated in very adaptive ways help fuel this overall trend towards realizing some least sufficient Garden of Eden state; one also turning out the first least sufficient background against which a talking monkey might first emerge to take over the entire food chain and then begin imposing all its speech act driven wants on the world as false needs.

This alone should stand as a knock-down argument against any claims we are not the main cause of what has now been deemed the 6th mass extinction event (the 7th if the recent claim we have missed one is warranted⁶³, another plural set of 7, like the S.I. units, coincidence or metaphysical pattern?). Yes, the planet has experienced massive die offs before, yes, the planet has in short order (on proper geological not cultural scales) rapidly entered or left periods of ages of ice or sweltering tropicality, yes, these things will keep happening (until the sun starts its progression to red giant) and have kept happening without human input or output ever being cause or effect of much if any of this (but we’ve

reaped the boons and called them of our own making if only for being so adept at grinding these found riches down and transducing them categorically them into furniture of culture, much of it actual furniture now laced with fire retardants with effects as bad as the fires they are meant to prevent cause) but—and the only thing about the signal of human cause we are trying to confirm or disconfirm—is at no time in the recent millennial-scale past have these events unfolded with such rapidity where instead of 100's of, 10's of, or even bare millennia being required for such poles to tip to their opposites we are in the main looking at changes on the same scale now happening in barely 150 years (unless one starts to see that this problem really is much older, as old as the homo genera perhaps).

What people who can't understand the immense impossibility of any one individual ever representing inside themselves an epistemic reconciliation of all extant facts (let alone all the false ones we all bare differently, but equally) of microscopic and cosmic scale back to the middle, classical or Newtonian world of mundane perception, *but who in at least making the attempt have been made to feel by this so very, very small and decentred*, can never do is judge well over such scales at all.

Those who have never really contemplated the unfathomable depths and heights by which these many, many orders-of-magnitude-crossing exponential scales are actually made universally manifest are simply to my experience (BSc in hard science *with distinction* and BEd, and a late master's in philosophy) incapable of ever understanding how the question gets asked, let alone answered.

And a well vetted advanced degree in hard *sciences* and *maths* is, other than accomplished spiritual practice or random peak experience, the only thing likely to allow us to grasp these rarefied and ephemeral epiphanic experiences when our normal daily concerns are focused on very local forms of feeding, fleeing, fighting or fucking, rather than noumenal appreciation of nature's true transcendent vastness, complexity and outstanding, endless and likely forever unrepresentable mystery. The judging of these issues is pragmatically impossible unless one first acquires the very rare ability of adopting and holding to mind the right relative levels of both abstracted (represented) scales and targeted (concrete) scales by which passing epistemic judgment is made possible.

Without both understanding this need and *doing the actual technical work to either replicate the studies to either confirm or debunk them all by one's self*, one will endlessly mask this ignorance, this failure to even be fit to judge by covering it up with some other kind of warrant that could never take any belief to fact, but for by some tribal endorsement. These sorts of paper-thin warrant always amount to some appeal to magical thinking and conceiving in the end serving blind psychological need far more than honouring the real prior demands for making truth-functional inductive assessments, which necessarily requires an endless teasing apart, evaluating and, improving of the quality of the evidence (pro or con) in perpetuity (only stopping when experience makes this moot).

This is the very way the question has been motivated and constructed in the first place; as a scientifically inductive question aimed at millennial scales of change, so one never yielding any

certainty of conclusion just a probability and so one that could never be felt true or false at any personal scale of local experience, so furthering any need to be absolutely certain about the reality of climate crises or thinking what non-scientists feel about this issue matter much, if at all, is by this alone made a very perverse epistemic situation.

But then, isn't this largely how the entire call to action has been forestalled; not in waiting for Guffman, but in waiting for a kind of certainty and mass human feeling inappropriate to the kind of proof at hand?

Whack This Mole

I'm whacking moles here, but I believe the last time the planet warmed or cooled by more than one degree Celsius, assuming we can even localize and determine some past time frame for this well enough, it took thousands of years, not 150, and worse the last time so many animal species perished in such short order it took either a massive meteor impact, a massive global volcanic event, or both to drive this, but even here nothing perished as rapidly as species currently are in this narrow time frame of possible human-caused effect post-industrialization (many continents were once covered with docile top-herbivores, giant beavers, giant mammoths and sloths, etc. and there is clear evidence a large number of these species were summarily decimated by humanity *starting at the far end of the last ice age!*⁶⁴).

Are you, is anyone else going to argue we aren't the thing pushing most of these species to the brink and many over it already? If so, you'll also have to say why consistent with this argument we aren't directly and incontrovertibly responsible for making us and our mammalian food stocks nearly all of the extant mammalian biomass on earth now.⁶⁵

The Neglected Periphery of The Climate Crises Debate

The result of neglecting all these facts tellingly, if only peripherally adding weight to the more general claim humans can now easily (and do) mount the energetic and productive means to alter the planet *unpredictably* at its own largest biological and geophysical scales (to the limits of the exosphere and beyond!) is rather than marshalling people to the eyes-open need for renewed collective efforts towards immediately accepting wider individual and collective ethical responsibility to change by adapting even the smallest possible side-ways moves in behaviour and other easy to do things *right fucking now would be good* it instead has caused the opposite; a foot-dragging crises of monumental stupidity.

Yet, the entire unicorn-effigy contentiousness of the debate and our wide collective failure to do more than wave our hands at more empty words, the one largely tacitly warranted because people *wrongly* expect a certain answer from a kind of warrant that essentially only yields probable claims, and so by this error being normalized as the best use of reason serves to “rationally” justify all this foot-dragging indefinitely only because people think the truth-assessment of some equivocal black and white proposition need be answered with absolute certainty first before they could risk making even the smallest change on their own (Gotta be certain the planet is in peril *deductively* before we control it more, right)!

It seems the mass of people are waiting on a kind of confirmation that will never come (except in the worsening experience of things predicted) all so we can perpetuate the denial of the worst outcomes we could still easily avoid, and all by internalizing an endless kind of reaction to these crises in inner sayings and re-sayings of this learned general form of an irrational use of the law of large numbers, all achieved by believing ‘meh, it won’t effect me and there is nothing I can do about it anyways’ and then going back to normal feeding out of the tragic trough of slop we call the status quo (mo’ money, mo’ power, no problems).

This seems patently and perversely unwise to me.

The Pointlessness of The Blame Game

What should matter is the likely fact of the change, and its many associated *crises*, not primarily who or what caused it (do we wait to find out what cut a spurting artery before we put on the tourniquet?). So, we should be collectively focused on what we are all going (to have to give up) to do about it before it is moot. Instead, everything has ground to a halt because of what is basically a pointless blame game. And this is the genius form all blame games take generally as I’ll show by an exemplar with this childhood story.

I once accidentally broke off and then accidently shoved the narrow end tab of a wooden tinker toy bar well under my nail bed when I was about 5 years old. You can imagine the existential horror and disproportionate pain one feels in these situations. While my parents were certainly concerned about having the probably bacteria-laden piece of wood removed from its current place in the quick of my nail-bed this project was not allowed to begin until the “debate” over blame was first resolved. I kid you not, rather than take me directly to the hospital, which both my mother and father agreed was necessary, a 5-minute yelling match ensued over whose fault it was that my tinker toy so violently assaulted me (it was no one’s fault in the sense requiring determination of personal blame, of course, it was an

“accident”!). As you can imagine, even at 5 years old I was struck by the absurdity of this; sound familiar?

The problem with reducing a wicked problem (the wickedest humanity has ever collectively faced), one touching on future concern in regards to every current effort humans have made or are making towards social progress or global productivity, to a narrow and superficial placeholder “debate” is this prevents any consideration of the much more insidious causes of our malaise of inactivity and simply serves to make caring about its resolution completely besides the point; instead the endless intractability of the debate becomes half red herring and half straw man.

What this subtle bait and switch does accomplish is to falsely recouch the terms of blind risk as one of blind optimism and reward, so only furthering superficial change even when it finally happens, not deep change at all. So “change”, even when finally embraced only entails wide furthering of more red herrings or straw men by the obfuscation of what I see as the most needed kind of agency we must all support autonomously or have way more less manageable chaos imposed upon us. That, I believe, is to endorse and then figure out how to enforce some kind of Voluntary Global Austerity, and by this the effective re-instilling of a general and wide ‘less is more’ ethic. What should be the irrational cause of deepest concern, man’s rapacious need to submit nature to our cultural wishes with little regards for easily predictable in general negative future consequences, but never in particular responsibility (so easier to deny), lately keeps, instead, falling away into debating about whatever pointless kinds of agency are more suited to furthering the current excesses and injustices of our economic system (the real cause of our sustainability problem) as the solution, not by addressing facts at all, but largely by placating fear just enough to make people accept some tiny sliced off “safe” bit (in the sense of not being too upsetting to any small and emotionally fragile but always woefully uninformed mind) of the much larger scope of dire rational concern, but not too afraid, and so never fully confronted with the forms of argument and evidence actually needed.

The demeaning and elitist assumption of those who manipulate the discourse this way is the masses simply do not have either the emotional nor intellectual capacity to understand what is at stake well, if at all, so by this they justify only furthering more false hope, failing to confront otherwise easily dispelled ignorance, and mostly are just promoting more buying and selling of magic bullet solutions (like painter’s masks are being snapped up pointlessly in response to the Chinese Coronavirus sweeping the world as I type this!).

Rational concern about the real losses we face, those the unborn will have to face while we are comfy in our mahogany plywood coffins, get replaced with some naive and self-serving “build it and they will come” approach to “problem solving” that in many guises is only furthering the problem as the values and suspect percepts by which the debate currently gets cast rarely touch their data morpheic supervenience base much if at all. Someone, many think it was Einstein, but only a commonly found poster is evidence of that, said insanity is doing the same thing and expecting different results. This is

how I see most of the ideas around addressing climate change and all the other relatively neglected threats of concern (i.e. massive and perpetually mounting loss of fisheries and coral reefs, levels of normalized air pollution hurting developing children most of all even in the first world, depletion of ancient water tables, acidification/salinization of oceans/fresh water, plastic pollution now found in every corner of the planet, deforestation of the tropics and other rain forests, growing anti-biotic resistance, terrifying loss of insects, loss of general biodiversity, loss of wild spaces not trammelled and crisscrossed by fire and forest roads, destabilization of the jet stream, mounting personal debt to wealth ratios, etc., etc., etc.) tend to go; in the same too fine and largely now moot way the debate over the red herring CO₂ still goes: more of the more problem will still solve this (somehow).

“I’m crazy, over you, I don’t know what to do.”⁶⁶

You will do the same damned thing you did before to no useful effect, I suspect.

The Highest Scale “Geometrical” View of the Irrationality of the Debate

The additional structural problem with naive use of reason I wish to argue the entire character of the climate crises exhibits (even this late allowed slip from the aesthetically neutral ‘change’, which always may be good or bad, to a real ‘crisis’, which is always bad, finally, is just another hedge, another concession to the need to “change”, but without really changing) shows we are making at best a weak nod to the depth of the problems we collectively face. Yes, we now admit we need to change our “ways” (not our values nor our percepts yet) but only in the sense instantly entailing and justifying even more of the sorts of use (both wise and unwise) of technology that got us into this problem in the first place, so always promoting more MORE, not more LESS (thus, ignoring the real conceptual valuing problem).

This sort of mock conceding can only be endlessly meant to placate irrationality rather than honour the more desperately needed dispelling of very wide ignorance concerning how this debate should be most critically centred in scientific rather than political or popular means and evidence. By this it subtly recapitulates the percolating ideological and quasi-illogical bog by which the Western binary equating substance with fundament always tends to flounder, *in passing from naive realist to hidden idealist model building*.

That is a stretch and too hyperbolic perhaps, but there is a hiding of the other pole of another binary in play here, and one already tipped to the more irrational way to couch the debate (that *not* being, in matters of greatest potential risk the wisest course is always restraint not reckless indifference; think of the outcome of the Cuban Missile Crisis as an example of how restraint combined with wisdom, force

and compassion can win out even on the edge of a precipice, nothing in the climate crises debate seems to invoke this sort of metaphor, in spite of our endless love of metaphors of war).

Of course, the pessimistic pole of the climate debate is not mostly now, can no longer be about what is best for us to do in the long run (the optimistic pole) but what we risk and would otherwise wish to avoid in the short run (too idealistic *freedoms-to* need take the backseat to honouring pragmatic/empirical *freedoms-from* more); this entails a loss of hope for the project of endless secular progress must be confronted and accepted in the short run most of all. It has become more about an uncontrolled on the ground test of the 'man is the measure of all things' meme, but perhaps has come to this only because of our very deep embedding within original sin as much owed to the madness inherent to the universal psyche rather than just to the actions of a minority of weak-minded or otherwise intellectually incapable shill particulars simply somehow dissuading all the other deeply concerned and better informed people; all are complicit in this until the revolution needed takes place before or after some monstrous disaster finally wakes more people up (and not gently).

Were these better times for the aims of human intelligence we might instead be "arguing" about making small and steady positive changes more gently over the unavoidable paradoxes of the always developmentally regressive generational fluxes to further certain less-arbitrary secular values rather than now having to change course so late on previous means and ends instilled in the 17th century and still assumed a unquestioned good now. And I have no quibble with the hypothesis capitalism might have been the best recourse to solve the problem of the commons on the local scales it was emerging at then, but the scale is now fully global and the one-time solution now seems the heart of the problem it was always going to end in because it was always disposed to become this problem even as it solved the one it was created in rational reaction to, now having tipped in its own denied form of Derridean para-counting. One man's local cure has become a non-local poison, now showing clear even if unintended wide and deep harm is risked if we can't confront its perpetuation as the central ground of concern for a long-and-sorely-needed value revolution.

What I think is, sub-consciously, the more our identity or tribe is vested in preordained and purely reflexive status quo endorsement, the more such endorsements should be seen as at best a-rationally motivated exactly in times of looming crises, i.e., use of reason never really touches them. As such, in some other possible-world case of contingent historical outcome having instead gone differently for this same contingent actual world, for an example, where the tacit view and concern was instead always taken as pro from the outset (i.e. that not only was climate change likely, but was inevitable once industrialization and capitalism were made such bedfellows from the first promotion of the evidence, and this appeared in academic literature as early as 1837)⁶⁷ one suspects this more wise and earlier outcome would have seen the deniers far less effective at obscuring the facts for their own tacit ends having little to due with truth and more with accruing social power. We would instead now have a more tempered form of capitalism not so blind to any and all responsibility for its externalities (and not also legally endorsed in this, as it is now) and might now be living in a much more equitable and peaceful

world in some better balance with nature, all for starting with warranted pessimism rather than the blind optimism and denial institutions like Facebook should be shuttered for, if only because their real agency is only in promoting lies and deception (imagine instead we have built social media without it being paid for by the crassest forms of advertising and with built-in deep vetting of identity and credentials and non-punitive forms of arbitration, building-out any possibility of anonymity or software robots infecting it).

So, there was a counter-factual chance at least humanity might have started to address this last-possible-scale problem of the commons far more proactively exactly when the problem first really started, when the literal **gas** pedal was first pushed to the floor. If this is not a random outcome (and it can't be if the man is the measure of all things meme is truth-apt) then we might have *chosen* differently, so why didn't we?

Why Has The Debate Been So Superficially Constructed?

I will try to show prohibitively why things went this way by considering two recent cases where we did act collectively, proactively and without any certain, just probable evidence, but where the problems, the debates ensuing were much more locally manageable, and assuming the pro, not con view of things was where we started from. i.e. the blind optimism or self-righteous power of non-secular forms of ideology did not win out at the start to set the tone and burdens of the debate, and because of this these movements ended up producing more immediately proactive, compassionate and rationally informed outcomes warranted right down to their grounding morphisms as required and directly evidenced by the positive and intended results very swiftly being institutionalized and forwarded, even celebrating the point of relative agnosticism (or total lack of it in the case of CFC's) by which both debates were rightly conceived (but where there has lately been back-sliding in both, here is evidence of back-sliding on the Montreal Protocol at least⁶⁸; I think it is much easier to see the live back-sliding on a women's right to chose without the need for much but personal experience).

As a first comparison, consider the debates proceeding the establishment of a women's right to choose (also under threat lately). Here the status quo detractors, those fighting for access to abortion, not as a form of birth control, but rather meant as a fail safe for cases where on the whole the mother, possible child, *and society* would likely face worse outcomes for making the religiously determined moral choice the circumstances of their life's were already making a mockery of. In this case the ethically more evolved side, at least in terms of the scientific data, which is largely agnostic and can not say much if at all exactly when a heap of cells really becomes a person (hence motivating choice as the rational freedom to promote, but also within opposed and equally rational meta-limits) was always against the (many religiously informed long-standing sources of the) status quo with some inevitability for the

simple reason more than half of all humans by biological default have no *close* skin in the game at all for either never having a uterus, not being sexually mature, fecund or female, or being past reproductive age either necessarily or by accident (not to mention that faith and the power of oxytocin, not reason was always behind the choice of original belief).

We can see a parallel in the second example with how quickly and effectively humanity moved against the problem of CFC's destroying the ozone layer. As the nature of the changes required only focused on a very narrow set of problems much easier to understand and accurately represent with way less need for pandering to either fear or ignorance it was very easy to, respectively, replace the entire offending class of compounds in an economically neutral way with other compounds, and to make less overt changes to the on-the-ground institutions and norms required to allow abortions to happen legally and safely rather than illegally and so, avoiding much worse outcomes for all involved. Because of this there wasn't a lot of opportunity for all people's esteem or identity to be summarily threatened as directly nor as comprehensively by any endorsing of either the negative claims or positive changes needed (or not as much because one outcome was about furthering an uncertain choice, not making the default choice more certain, so was really a step back, not forward, the other only perjured the role the economy played as deeper cause in a 'meh' kind of response as nothing needed be consumed less overall in the longer run, the change in use of chemicals required was a sideways not head-on confrontational move; no surprise that we've seen the ozone layer continue to recover except for recent illegal back-sliding from Asia, the late masters of productive fraud, most troubling for food in particular).

These cases it turned out were not too wicked problems to address rationally and proactively in the end, but the many climate crises certainly are, as much because one of the most powerful and profitable industries *of all time* is behind furthering the use of fossil fuels over other renewable carbon neutral sources, but also because there is not a person on Earth but for the very poorest and most neglected not owing some or much of their own too consumptive forms of identity-conference (where it is lately more in the having of things than in any purposeful using of them we see the most empty forms of dopamine-milking and knee jerk reactivities of too easy judgment of others whose only real fault is they don't value what you do but are no less rational for that) to all those cultural artifacts that without the long history of being forwarded by the free lunch of all this black gold we are all very unlikely to have ever so pathetically made the centres of our now global value and identity worlds in the first place! We all have negative skin in the climate crises debate and outcome, as well as all having NOW the same relative things to lose and negatively experience (but at random, once again, the greatest disparity equalizer is always natural chaos; it kills the poor almost as easily as the rich as its scale of effect grows).

Yet, what I think most naively believe is personally speaking we will have to give nothing up in the transition away from fossil fuels in terms of what we can replace them with, because it is the "system" that will do this all on its own.^{NOTE}

NOTE: Of course, the biggest problem here making any furthering of problem solving a worse than useless kind of doubling down is if we can't mitigate very hard, and today would be a very good day to start as Gandhi would have us (BE THE FUCKING CHANGE ZOMBIE, THE SYSTEM IS NOW THE PROBLEM NOT THE SOLUTION!!!), things like our economically normalized forms of waste and toleration of externalities in general, then all we have available to power the needed productive means for replacing current infrastructure could only increase not decrease the burning of fossils fuels in the short and likely even longer run. But, if things have already tipped, this will only exacerbate our climate problems further and cause more disasters sooner just as likely, and so be even more likely to derail efforts made to complete the transition, so undermining the very project to replace the problem causer, but here only by *intentionally* doubling down on the problem as a "solution".

When is the need to consume less and waste nothing, and share and care for more so as to have to produce less going forward ever considered?

Never.

The Emperor's New, New Clothes

Instead, this need to promote a LESS IS MORE valuing more than any other value gets denied as even a morsel for consideration by the sham way the climate crises get so superficially reduced to the most contentious but fully distal problem, just due, or not, to the "bad" CO₂, when it is always the all too normalized human behaviours of endless excess mattering more, causing mo' problems by the endless pursuit of mo', mo', mo', that takes endless root.

So, because the tacit and default "normal" case is each and every one of us is now more conditioned to find happiness in the endless and delimited experience of wealth, instead of in seeking more of the rare experience of developing *within*, that even an honest, reflective and more unconditioned mind is prevented in saying this, even if they can see how intractable these problems really are, how wickedly wicked, all to ward off being blamed for the real and socially marginalizing angst always coming more with not the mute seeing of what's likely coming, *but in daring to declare the Emperor naked not as a powerless child, but as an adult with power to lose.*

So even the most rational and informed and concerned of us don't ever get to bring forward any consideration of the deeper and most appropriate responses required, to promote and adopt either the necessary forms of austerity we might wisely chose rather than have those forms of austerity imposed on us when it is too late for any form of control to be effective (if that is not already the more likely outcome). As no mind conditioned to a blind and slavish endorsement of capitalism being necessarily

and soundly perpetuated without recourse—so belying any need for radical overhaul of its false premisings and anti-scientific imposing of speech acts—could ever identify with or get happiness from any form of voluntary austerity in the short or long run without a massive value overhaul and rethink of the reification of individualism over collectivism, of wisdom over instrumental reason, we *instead* mostly irrationally re-hedge maintaining the status quo even as more and more marginalized citizens of the world press for real change (and they have nothing to lose, no power, so they speak without reservation, but are literally sinking or drowning as they speak, soon to be silenced by this, so power feels no threat from this at all). The risk here is more of being *lost in representations*, where the endorsement for the need for radical change all by itself becomes proof such change is already underway, but nothing of the sort has happened yet, instead the opposite has.

The end result, I am arguing by these comparisons, is the current form the debate and problem-solving has been “designed” to take has in it a too naive and self-serving, and too unenlightened egoistic view of things being forwarded, not to end debate and spur on heroic cultural change but rather to keep dragging the debate thru the mud of obfuscations doing more to deny from conscious purview the deeper concerns, evidence and arguments that might make the current debate seem pointless, and so ethically bankrupt.

How to Make The Pro Conclusion Knock-Down: Economics as Bereft Science

Here is what I mean. Let’s remember that the original coining of this bogeyman of human caused environmental destabilization started with the problematic eponym of ‘global warming’. Why use ‘global warming’ to start, and not ‘climate change’ or what is now being forwarded as a ‘crisis’ (but I am going to show are really very, very many looming crises going well beyond just impacting the ‘climate’, only made the main object of concern because many people simply have no real understanding of what climate is, and mostly conflate it with weather, so another tacit move to keep the zombies feeling informed and understanding when neither of these things have really happened)? Here is another case by which certain contentious and ego-destabilizing criticism of any long-standing form of human agency, here industrialized capitalism, is forever forestalled as the more deeply embedded, real (and easy to see) problem created by allowing the “science” of economics to stand beside natural science as equally rationally motivated; the absurdist notion I’ve ever seen promoted with a straight face. Here’s why:

Science use speech acts humbly and very neutrally in seeking mainly to mitigate inherent biases going in to open a logical, but always circular and spiral bi-channel for nature to communicate truths as fact to us. Here the intent and character of the speech acts used serve as structuring causes for seamlessly allowing for both positive and negative forms of possible confirmation for which each outcome is in general epistemic ethic and theory, if not particular fact, equally considered valuable.

Consider the recent confirmation of the existence of the Higgs Boson. Some were elated, but just as many were not, as they were hoping for a revolution rejecting, not solidifying the Standard Model as a vast knowing of the foundational and substantive realm below the gap.

So, science done most rationally must always be OK with epistemic uncertainty even when our means for achieving epistemic control is exactly what makes these experiments and their ideal methods the gold standard of epistemic humility; we clear a path for nature to tell us the truth and accept, even hope at times to be surprised. Anything being called a proper science need show the same kind of restrained and neutral use of speech acts (and that is why forms of divining relying on pre-established texts and content never vetted in this way should be seen as endlessly suspect). Controversially, any practices instead reversing the relationship between method and how the outcomes of any prohibitive knowing are meant to be confirmed or dis-confirmed by working more towards a form of certainty in outcome embedded in one endlessly uncertain about right (at least, better) method could not even be considered a pseudo-science, let alone a science, but could only be seen as always conceived of and endlessly furthering literally anti-scientific ends, so more properly called an anti-science than a science (*so a technology or pseudo-technology at best*).

For example, isn't any and all of the products of engineering not anti-scientific in this productive sense: that the proper aim of this intentionality and language borne self-reflective consciousness is to make the world fit the expectations of some mind or minds, rather than have minds simply observe more passively what the knowings say by what has been "engineered" to allow some mind to fit the world? Is not most furtherance of technology, to start at least, more productively anti-scientific than scientific in this opposing sense, so not in any sort of perjury-making sense, nor in the sense an anti-particle annihilates its proper particle, but in the sense technology seeks more to remake than to take in the world as it is in its most logically communicative self? I think so.

So, the problem with calling economic theory a science *full-stop* is the same as treating an entire set of norms only arising as a consequence of another prior set of speech acts as caring less what the world might be trying to communicate to us, but are instead going to make it into, to force into being something never arising of its own *non-intentional* accord, and only then studying certain abstract results this creates *as representations only* "scientifically". But isn't this more like when people in power rely on astrologers or such to make political decisions or social policy rather than evidence-based science; isn't it a little terrifying, even if one sees some value in these forms of (being charitable) at least a-rational means of knowing, to discover the circumstances of your life may have been determined in part by how Mars and Jupiter might line up in some future-indicating way? It sure is for me. How, then, is economic theory and its practitioners not more like a closed-off anti-universal (not involving the universe much or at all in its divinations), more like a bereft anti-science than even astrology particularly because the only objects it rightly claims to study are mostly the effects of speech acts already assuming all the objects and values by which economic theory works have been vetted right down to the morphisms, when by design this not only never happened, it can't happen, i.e., our current economic

system is and has always been constructed over ideals, so has always been furthering a form of idealism, of abstract positivities (but for the use of numbers, and what are numbers again, it really matters even more to determine if economics is a science in this) only made real through material general equivalents endlessly conflated as apt replacements for them.

And let's not even mention the premising of infinite growth on a materialist's always finite world, and of its always rational agents, hahahahahahahahaha, what a farce to base a science on such confused mixing of norms in the first place, crossing the mind-body tipping point as if it never matters, or worse not even caring to start in the real matter of things at all, just imposing certain unicorn outcomes on the world as if they are made horses by their negative unicorn effigies. So what economists most directly study are largely the unicorn products of speech acts that have never, and likely could never be determined a sound model of the world (but an always valid one for the transparently false premises on which it is first made) so what they are "objectively" observing is nothing more than whether or not these institutions have made the world what we want the world to be and so not what it might otherwise become were we to have a sounder economic model, and so we could never be hearing what the world might otherwise be trying to communicate to us about the error of our speech act ways (at least if this inconsistent *ass-backwards* defining of economic theory as a science is meant to be of the *concretely found and non-derived data of nature alone*).

In the practice of economics we are simply dictating what we wish to observe and if economics is a science it is simply a science meant to take all the "facts" showing how the model gets it wrong! So, in this endless and largely *virtualized* feed-back loop never ever touching the deep morphic matter of materiality at all, it simply achieves a form of normative error correction (just as the house conspires to tip the odds so it always wins overall, economists must always bank on seeming right more than being right) so not ever obviously clearing a better way for that light of truth to beam into us more logically. Rather, we use a free-floating logically walled-off model entirely conceived as a (false) version of the reduction of, increasingly, all value to only quantity (and all with no clear idea as to what numbers are at all) but only within the vacuum of a made-up web of speech acts whose intent is the exact opposite of realizing any sort of world-to-mind confirmation at all, really only world-to-mind-to-world confirmation of norms walled off from the data morphic bases of reality, summarily and by intentional design.

Economists use speech acts with often blind hubris in always seeking to impose certain biases and burdens on Mother matter going in, all to impose a free-floating and unsound, a *too illogical* model (because it is unsound in so many damning ways at its intentional and empirical heart) but by this never opening any direct material channel for nature to tell the cultural-economic world it is not sure it can go along with this much longer without some rational remediations of the sort I've spread throughout this work (and the more we consume the more we lose any and all chance to converse with nature in its more unadulterated forms, so wasting more opportunity to learn from nature even as we dictate more spoilage on it).

Does physics change the universe when it tries to know it? Yes, but only going in methodologically, never coming out epistemically. Does economic theory seek to change the universe coming in, or going out? Is an entrance an exit, is left right? Is economic theory a science then, or is it not simply a too idealistic and arbitrary-value-as-absence imposing technology?

Knitting the Pieces of the Sweater Together

To tie up this attempt to show the more deeply irrational or perhaps a-rational way the climate debate has been centred I can knit together the pieces argued for by various analogies and recast the lingering denials as perversely getting the whole debate ass-backwards, and with some malicious and/or willed ignorance always being behind this. What if instead of our current issues with sustainability and looming social unrest and still growing forms of disparity (is this what democracy was for after all, if so why have we bothered with promoting universal rights at all?) the question first promoted for public consumption was to ask the much easier and way less contentious and more general question in which the entire debate is actually embedded. That being:

Is there any sufficient enough evidence that:

1.

The transparent effects of human productive activity combined with unchecked population growth (the false teat on which capitalism claims to feed milk to all citizens of the world more equitably, but lately is only furthering a back-sliding in this) provide many instances of knock-down evidence this activity causes changes to the environment at and beyond its proper scale unpredictably, and . . .

2.

If we are never able to mitigate these excesses (or change the way the whole damn thing has been made to work as an idealism imposed on, but never honouring a materialism) they will continue to effect the entire planet in obvious negative and worsening ways in regards to the furthering of any of those gains currently offered up as the proof of lasting human ethical, social, and intellectual progress (you know, the ones best captured by the 'man is the measure of all things' meme). Instead, we risk a back-sliding, or worse, collapse of much of the most stable current forms of culture and a return to meaner forms of living and worsening abuses of power in the name of social control.

Is anyone going to argue we are not the animals depleting water tables around the globe, over-fishing the oceans, making that giant island of plastic already the size of Texas bigger and bigger, driving the

choking air pollution increasing without bound in many cities, even where the air is supposed clean only for seeming clean (see about the increased levels of particulate matter now in the air all over Europe due largely to the Volkswagen fraud, that air is no longer safe for any children who live by roadways in major urban centres, and yet we claim to ‘love our children’ most of all, such that we would kill for them, yet seem indifferent to how they are also being developmentally undermined for this), are the direct cause of the loss of animal habitat driving many non-domesticable species to the edge, etc., etc., etc. I mean it, seriously, and is anyone going to argue it is not us, right now, allowing the putting of so many satellites into orbit we risk trapping ourselves on Earth for good??? Of course not, no sane, honest, and informed person could ever deny these causes due human production in its most industrialized forms are not clearly effecting the planet at its own scale, best intentions be damned!

Then the second question is if any of this is a possible problem?

Well, do you like to drink clean water, eat fresh fish without mercury or worms that isn’t being fraudulently misrepresented, breathe air that doesn’t just seem clean but is clean, retire in luxury and not have to work yourself to death in debt, see a Dodo or Black Rhino in the wild, even *see the wild*, etc., etc. . . ?

If the loss of future access to any of this list of desires, or of any desires on your own preferred list that would be impossible to access without industrialization and modernity, is risked by any of those effects humans are clearly causing at a whole-Earth scale then I really don’t see why it is so hard to immediately see and feel in some required *but unavoidably negative epiphany* the conclusion lying there to draw, even if you have no idea what $2/3$ divided by $1/2$ is (it’s $4/3$). In many, if not most of these cases the evidence is not only easy to access in both knowing and understanding, but for many I fear the positive behaviour changing epiphanies won’t come until it is too late, and will only appear as mourned for negativities.

But we can’t eat ‘meats’ any more than we can eat money.

So, let’s re-interpret the probable claim humans cause, or are causing the release of many unstoppable and/or stoppable sources of CO₂ (and other “bad” gases) directly such that the climate has tipped or is tipping in both predictable and (the real concern) unpredictable and “bad for humans” sorts of ways as just one more inductive example or counter-example of the more easily confirmed inductive case humans can and already do cause the planet to change in ways very concerning that it wouldn’t were we not here, or were there less of us, or if we consumed less and valued and perceived differently. Let’s see how the denier’s case appears in this view from outside just this one case.

Base Case:

There is an always growing giant island of plastic in the Pacific, and only human activity could have caused this as we are clearly the only species making and using plastic. As Texas is an object appearing just below the scale of continents, this entails a continental-scale level of effect is being carelessly imposed by us on the Earth's oceans at least (not to mention this is hardly the only such plastic "island").

Confirmed, base case established.

First Inductive Step: Water tables are in many places around the globe being recklessly depleted (often for ends now having little to do with direct human consumption or agriculture, but to extract hard to access fossil fuels and other base resources more violently, even causing earthquakes and the obvious poisoning of connected water tables still used as sources of potable water) well beyond any natural means of regeneration in terms of being there for near future use for more furthering of human civilization.

Check: base case extended by another clear instance in which human activity effects the Earth's found abundances at the scale of the entire planet, furthering the strength of the induction to the claim human activity already causes and has caused such Earth-level effects.

Second Inductive Step: The 5th largest body of fresh water, the Ural Sea has all but been completely drained for agricultural use, and this effect can be seen in a very short-term diachronic sequence of satellite photos, or by not now being able to swim in most of the once-a-much-bigger-lake-not-a-sad-vanishing-pond, and this is so clearly human caused I will let you draw the further strengthening of the inductive case all by yourself.

I can, of course, go on like this all day. In doing that—only by the hand waving here—I also make the probabilistically strongly warranted step of inducing from the base case over the many particular reconfirming cases to make the general case cogent, *as this becomes the best explanation possible, the most parsimonious abduction to make*. And by each and every further particular case subsequently provided or providable where humans and their collective and individual agencies are equally as trivially determined as the first and fine *intentionality-mediated* cause of some other emerging Earth-scale change that would never have occurred in our absence or in the absence of our particularly rapacious forms of culture, the overall conclusions is only made stronger and stronger.

So, it is also by the mass of all this evidence taken together, not just in isolated regard to some peripherally walled-off step in which some marginal *con* case might be made denying what humans don't or can't cause that the case is made. What flips in taking this much more warranted wider and "other-side" view of things is the denials still entrenching only this one debate *as if it were the only datum of concern* about whether we have caused climate change now still appears, but no longer as a strong nor cogent datum of doubt. It now looks more and more like an instance in which all things are not equal, i.e., even if it turns out we did not cause the planet to warm this is only an exception

“proving” the rule, and so not some King argument to knock-down the more general concern about how humans have caused so much destruction, waste, and pollution on ever increasing scales as I think many continue to **not** believe (and yes, the normal healthy cycles of nature can safely process much of this, but certainly not all of it, and certainly not as fast as we’ve created these problems).

There is a deep rational failure here too; to fail to see the best pace possible for some natural recovery against our excesses—even if we take our metaphorical foot off the gas as much as possible, and right now would be best—will take millions of years for recovery from species loss alone, by which time we will be long gone anyways. The claim humans can effect things at an Earth-level scale in the end only becomes more and more strong and cogent by this interpretive inversion and particular to general expansion of concern as well.

Inductively strong and highly probable cogent conclusion:

Humans can easily effect the planet at its own scale, and these many man-made causes are also likely to increasingly have very negative and/or unpredictable, and much worse, irremediable local and non-local effects (in destabilizing both the passive processes by which the found abundances of life and the local geothermal minima preceding industrialization post-last-ice-age otherwise moderated away from these effects occurring even as it paved the way for us to do so as a direct consequence). If we can’t address the deeper and wider causes due our too arbitrary values and productive, population and disparity trends to excess—those that would have an assumed finite material reality keep cashing out infinite idealist cheques without any recourse—it simply won’t matter if the climate change deniers win the day because they were right all along.

Why the Sane Bet is that Climate Crises is Real Too

If instead of reifying the false dilemma of asking did we by production of too much “bad” CO₂ cause climate change what seems to have happened as a consequence, I suspect, will instead lead to worsening outcomes as much by walling off the more general debate in which climate change is only one sliver of particular concern. If instead, we accepted we really have no idea about how bad, good, or neutral these consequences will turn out due to how modernity has wrought the found world all for the furthering of human value progress (and I don’t think we have a real clue about these limits at all) wouldn’t this background inductive step of just the particular case of CO₂ *pro* or *con* not instead by its closeness to the more general fact we already do effect the planet at its own scale justify tipping the conclusion climate crises is also man-made because there is little doubt to be conjured up in any of the other cases I’ve induced over?

I sure do.

Thus, in some Gaussian capitulation shouldn't we by this not sagely hedge the CO₂ case as *very probably pro too*? If there are fires, there is smoke, and there is a lot more fire these days as well; but who caused, not all the particular instances—lightening is always in play—but who made these conditions possible, much of it due to anthropocentric value-driven interference with the natural purpose and normal course of forest fires, driven by our putting out too many small forest fires with a zeal it turned got it rationally backwards, and by this setting up the unnatural conditions now causing these massive firestorms, exactly?

Such is the mad form this debate takes exactly when every one has guilty skin in the game and no one wants to be the first to give up a damn thing to do anything about, so has in this invisibly with some malicious pandering to ignorance and denial instead decided to entrench the larger very pro, strong and cogent case of concern in that outlier representation of effect most marginal, and so most easily leveraged to create endlessly juvenile forms of resistance not only to change, but also to any need to feel the problem (and nothing makes this easier to accomplish than our current zombie brain-eating forms of blind positivity).

A Needed Coming Day of Collective Mourning?

I think, as a born empath, the many crises of mental illness are not due any intrinsic or local pathology, except at the long end of the long tail (and even here, compassion, not pills are needed more). Rather, this endless need to banish any form of sadness from any person's experience as proof of ideal affect seeks instead to disavow what we all need to feel first before any real change will ever occur. Rather, by pathologizing mid-to-long-tail psychological difference just because we label them 'bad' so arbitrarily we have cut off the very grounds of experiencing some epiphany of collective sorrow; one we all need to feel over our monstrous ways of excess and denial most of all.

But, like all entrenched addicts we are stubbornly waiting to fall further still seeking the empty highs of wealth and power acquisition only a few ever get access to, and by this failing to see the bottom is already coming up at us from the future as an unstoppable wave of answers that won't need representing to be understood. Until there is some felt, lived and tolerated day of "depression" for what we are wreaking on ourselves and on each other lately in only defending certain value quantifications as the only possible exchanges of value, and never seek out the endlessly needed and always confronting qualifications possible of an ever developing consciousness turned *within*, we will remain *lost in representations* (where by now adulthood is where childhood forms of wisdom go to die and be repressed, and the most superficially childish forms of "adulthood" now take over, with everyone not

only wanting to live forever, but be ‘forever young’ if only in the total neglect of any responsibility for changing a damn thing).

I would hope to put an end to the climate change denials by this, but suspect I would never be allowed to mount such a defence in any forum, and this is by subtle design of the madness inherent to all our psyches and the universal psyche too. However, by this I am not clear whether we race to the eye of the needle with purpose or purposelessness; it seems a mix of both, the path always beckons most when one falls off it.

Chapter 11 – Denouement And Summary

And so here we are, with so much ground already covered, now to be neatly summarized and the main conclusions restated, but I am so tired, and pressed to finalize this work, as much because it always threatens to never be done, because what it really represents *in absentia* is that negative background I think all physical model always invokes, but not in any universal or totalizing way as supposed, but in the ortho-or-eigen law sense I have argued is more appropriate. The denouement of this work is an argument to that effect, one aiming to show how consciousness is a “thing” not only never representable in any model, yet still both the forwarder and negative lurker in every form of *presented and represented* existing, experiencing or knowing. So, I tackle one final seemingly impossible problem: define and locate *consciousness proper*, if only generally and always at some representational distance from what it looks at/as even as it is also all that is (but is thus only “material” in terms of *reality-as-perception*), so I end with a bang even as my energy is whimpering to put this all down, maybe for good.

But before this final go at invoking some further epiphanic experience, of either ideological camaraderie or even more reactivity against (although I would be surprised if anyone stayed the course with this work if their main feeling was to deny it meaning *something*) I must revisit the ground and many signposts of philosophical revisions/revolutions covered; it holds together in these many proffered solutions or it says nothing at all and has wasted your and my time in doing that. I offer no apologies because that is not how I feel; to me it makes the most sense of all, but by that alone I can not know I am right about anything. I need this general meaning, these many particular meanings understood first, to be rejected, modified or exulted as required.

Let’s review the key content chapter by chapter in baby steps, but sometimes leaps over heaps.

Chapter 1

I am in this work trying to, in a sense, eat my cake and have it too, to build in only the entailments of my prior and largely withheld and more authentic sources of argument and evidence supporting my novel metaphysics and fuller model of the mind. I feel justified in this because to come in headfirst with my real metaphysic and lynchpin insight or nearly finished model is to be summarily labelled as a crackpot, so I instead tease; right and wrongheadedness is variously mixed throughout this work.

Thus, this work asks for charity variously, novelly, and somewhat opaquely: the first ask is to be allowed a novel meaning method and only then offering up contents known by that method, one I argue transcends logic even as it starts largely from empirical evidence and naive experience, not from too rarefied armchair intuitions. I am partially denying logic's central place as the best form of warrant, but still insisting many (most?) have work to do first to get up to the logical level as part of *trans-rationally* going beyond it (so in these still very early days of use of reason what I ask you to pick up as means ends up what you finally put down again, but there is no way around this, only through it).

My arguments are meant as more than logical, but less than metaphor; I have coined this variously, trans-, meta-, *eMetaphorical*, even here trying to deconstruct any ground for the meaning representation of terms I use and invent ever residing in some one-to-one logical reduction of senses to referents, or of ever having purely walled off *non-Derridean* sub-senses at all. Meanings, like numbers, may need counting as a Derridean would; so, I argue in this chapter for a paradoxically relational account of counting as the logically bottomed-out target of Derrida's deconstructive take on Western metaphysics, and—at least—wave at empirical and analytical cases for which such counting is already warranted on *prima facie* terms. I also try to clear the way to understand some well motivated philosophical conventions, as much to show while the endless burrowings in, the delimited inner conceptual parsings analytical philosophy favours often clear certain semantic confusions going in, they also just as often—as for the grandest of all concepts, THE GOOD, THE TRUE, and THE BEAUTIFUL—never seem to rest coming out bearing some perfectly delineated meaning yielding some necessary and sufficient conditions as definitions (intensions) and thus often lead to fractal rather than pure extensional determinations. I start with the problem of personal will and what I think is the rather spurious conception of “the unconscious”. Even here I am questioning the notion of objectivity and subjectivity being different kinds of problems.

I also make a few attempts to show, not so much by logical argument, but aesthetically the way the mind-body problem is analytically defined would seem to make it impossible to solve, and here and throughout this work I try to chip away at what I think wrongly motivates this perverse epistemic stalemate: largely a one-sided adherence to a needed identity between fundament and substance making any hope to find some basic substantive mereological theory to rule them all also self-defeating, also mainly on empirical terms. I also argue in places we continue to conceive of the mind in too Newtonian terms and variously show how we are often conflating representation with targets in very subtle ways over the same binary, the one that comes out denying itself, but then forwards interpretations of QM doubling down on, not untangling another binary (data <--> information).

I also, of course, introduce the two aspects, one perhaps more metaphorical than the other (and even I am not sure which is which) of the polemic conclusions I wish to forward, motivated by a great ethical and compassionate concern for the individual and collective soul of humanity. The first serves as an analysis of our current human rational malaise:

1. All of us individually, and as a collective, are currently very *lost in representations* in the sense that although many of our current instrumental means are very particularly rational our tacit ends often seem generally the opposite; they all, lately, seem aimed towards implicitly irrational ends, intended or not.

The second polemic problem expresses a need to deny a certain tacit endorsement we keep making about the cognitive superiority of *homo sapiens* and so forwards the need for . . .

2. . . . debunking my extended meaning of the ‘man is the measure of all things’ meme. I am in part invoking the problem of relativism because that problem is very alive right now, but I am also trying to show even if we have measured well in the ways we’ve used logic *as pure means* we still may have “measured” more poorly by the final *end* interpretation in terms of our most cherished *hard* or most fundamental sciences, physics in particular.

I also introduce the concept of *original sin* as a metaphor not only for the root causes of these problematic aspects of human nature, but as a background against which to hammer on the one question I introduce but do not fully warrant the answer for in this work:

What are numbers, ontologically and epistemically speaking, exactly?

Finally, weaved throughout are some initial breadcrumbs leading to the tacit model of ideal natural communication I am waving at in this work, if only in some diffuse precision in terms of method; there remains—even after reading this entire work—much for you to read and breathe more life into here.

Chapter Two

This chapter is much less problematic. There is a tension between (sometimes: non-conscious) experience and (the experience of) representation tracking not only with the mind-body problem but with the same long-standing tensions between rationalism and empiricism. I am very concerned there is some putting of the logical cart before the meaning horse here, and this is not something I alone speak to. The problem is that many centres of epistemic and social power seem to have, in spite of all the agnosticism-as-the-right-stance argument and evidence, already adjudicated towards an ultimately self-

serving and a-rational position: whatever we get combining CTM, Logicism as I've defined it, and Scientism.

I also introduce the artistically resonant work of film I think means as much as what I am trying to in this work, if only more on the naively lived surface of it all, not within these esteem-challenging and always risked empty language games of the negative science. I also come clean on my somewhat tongue-in-cheek ontological position as a realist (but only, later, in how I define "reality-as-perception"), a physicalist (but only in a quasi or pre-ontological sense), an RTM supporter (but more as echoes than "re-presentations", not as objects so purely cleaved from their targets as linguistic arbitrariness supposes, instead I try to expose how this thesis along with how physicalism is defined only makes the mind-body problem more intractable). I also redefine naturalism. There are, of course, many other Easter eggs lying about, and I am always throughout this work revisiting these tidbits, slowly expanding on them all towards supporting the two aspects of the main thesis. To say more is to repeat myself beyond necessity.

Chapter Three

In this chapter I introduce what I think is the most problematic term used in both philosophy and science, "information", not because it doesn't mean well, but because it means too much and not enough in various ways due to both basic misunderstanding, but more deeply to the failure to communicate well specifically about this term and its often-conflated partner, data. Then I go a bit off the rails laying groundwork for my various polemic pot-shots, all intended to start the disambiguation of what I mean by humanity being "*lost in representations*". I introduce the Myth of Benign Effect and rail against poor rational use of the term 'proof' as a different example. I also introduce Frege's problem; yet another *prima facie* bit of naive warrant that logicism is perverse. Most importantly I introduce and define the very live and technically complex lynchpin neo-empiricist project of central concern in both analytical philosophy of mind and cognitive and psychological science (not art): explicating the natural origins of the kind of intentionality marking the mental, *original intentionality*, equally first mind, first perception, and first non-trivial representation.

As always peeks ahead and looks back around and I see little point in delineating that for each review following, and will simply take it you already understand the madness behind this method. There is more metaphor and ambiguity, etc., left over in even the most lauded philosophical and scientific texts. Perhaps even more than is supposed evident in the worst sorts of lay nonsense only fit for brain-eating zombies and fed by trolls. In the end, I believe, even philosophy and science risk and I think currently are more driven by the power of epistemic fashion than ideal use of reason.

Chapter Four

In this chapter I start dropping epistemic bombs, attempting to resolve so many long-standing philosophical problems I would seem a crackpot simply for daring to try, but I stand by the coherence of it all even if I introduce so many new interpretative dependencies as to belie any hope for credulity. But, even as I argue about the Necker Cube character that emerges when trying to pin down an final *logical* placement for the role of conception, I think the real epistemic revolution required is not one ever made possible by turning over cards (unknowns) one at a time such that some one special card finally shows us the clue to epistemic salvation by reconciling QM and GR, rather in analogy to how a deck of cards may also be flipped *in one fell swoop* by lifting a single card at the end of all the cards fanned out, so too must the sought for epistemic revolution go, all or nothing, throwing out the baby and bathwater seems appropriate in this approach. Here are the problems I attempt to solve, with no review of how I did it:

1. Quantum Indeterminism (albeit in terms of a rather vaguely given reinterpretation of Burge and of original perception as general form of detecting everything as either *a this* or *a that*, but never absolutely, so invoking a new problem here only solved by re-interpreting GR and furthering the pre-ontological account to have a paired post-ontological step as well, anticipating epistemic pluralism, if only a quasi-ontological pluralism).
2. The Measurement Problem.
3. Provide the missing intensional piece of the concept LIFE.
4. Redefine REALITY in partial terms as a forever embedding, not transcending, of the appearance-reality gap.
5. Provide the *quasi-physical* origins of abstraction.
6. Debunk the idea of hard or fundamental science, with it the idea of universal *a priori* law.
7. Debunk the centrality of logic in analogy as a “virus” on meaning (in non-pejorative terms).

All this only makes sense if you buy my Derridean deconstruction of the Western binary as it supports my redefinition of what becomes a perceptively/conceptively limited form of reality, yet is one I think still honouring both the folk and academic views. I simply argue if the gap has not been epistemically penetrated as assumed, then there are clearly forms of the real which are endlessly still prior and posterior to representation, so that maybe only non-dual forms of experience of *within* could ever provide warrant for them. For this we need subjective “sciences” to work along side the objective kinds or we risk cutting off our possibly much more deeply open experiential noses just to spite our representational faces.

There are also many other points of interest or polemic concern mixed throughout this chapter, but these are not really concerned to be in any one or many chapters at all. They are meant to develop in

fits and starts over all of them, only furthered as the technical arguments by which they are more deeply warranted in the morphisms might be cogently shown. If there is a King proposition to upset the man is the measure of all things apple cart most of all it is in my conclusion I have provided the epistemic revolution sought for, but it is wholly negative to start, not positive as assumed. We can't keep seeking forward without knowing what numbers are first, as we otherwise remain for this damning lacuna not able to say why quantity yields, when tied to controlled and internally self-consistent observation and measurement, the epistemic traction on the real that it does. This grand reinterpretation of all of hard science will, if accepted as true because it means something true, present a huge blow to human notions of epistemic superiority, unless we humbly accept the correction and then renew our efforts toward knowing once again centred in more epistemic humility and with a healthier skepticism from that point, so without only forwarding more ideologies of certainty and control.

In the models of Don Beck and Ken Wilber this heralds a fuller step up into the next level of the endless development of consciousness, realizing the Green meme or Pluralism. This leap would allow us to finally put down our efforts at shoring up and pointlessly tweaking the status quo of the now hyper-rational and too individualistic orange (rational-scientific) meme, and finally bootstrap the sorely needed value revolution. Only then, by building new institutions over these new values from the grass roots, meaning to replace, not perpetuate, these now 400-year-old institutions (with so many formed from dark and pessimistic origins and only celebrated positively by false myths, feeding the wolf in sheep's clothing danger we call psychological positivity) could we ever face our current excesses.

But, the built-in expectation, the always unavoidable problem even here, is that at its own next tipping point, all the green level progresses over will sooner or later also lead to its own self-denying problems emerging at its own higher scale para-epistemic limits, and then the Yellow meme will beckon us to collective enlightenment, perfecting our minds as the entailed parts for the next great leap in universal development (perhaps even as we are finally able to leave our bodies more fully behind, or at least abide in them with less of the angst the existentialists are always on about). We can see the problem of solutions always leading to different downstream problems right now, exactly as the mechanistic and too classical scientific world view is in large part now the "innocent" cause of many of our looming social and environmental problems (a whole-globe tragedy of the commons) even though (we once may have believed) it aptly solved this same problem at its own level in the modern period. I for one, am not so sure it solved a damn thing.

Chapter Five

Chapter five presented a dizzying mix of polemic and technical work. In order to say with some analyticity what has naturalistically caused us to become "*lost in representations*" I need borrow conventions from John Searle and Donald Davidson; these conventions are introduced and modified in

chapter five for this use in chapter six. I also introduce the trinity of satisfaction conditions tracking differently with sensory registration, perception and conception (because cognition has been miscast and too anthropocentrically conceived).

Continuing with my efforts to either solve or debunk long-standing problems I finalize my debunking of linguistic arbitrariness, take down CTM, and show how the cultural objects MARRIAGE and MONEY are more built over absences than presences. To show what CTM assumes might be too irrationally hopeful to promote I debunk the belief a non-living thing could ever be a thinking thing (as well as debunking the whole 'the universe is the matrix' fantasy).

I clarify the structure of PROOF to help those who misuse it understand the depth they gloss, which might not undermine the power they get from use of the term, but at least shows many do not use it rationally at all.

Towards my polemic end I attack the very problematic conflation of truth and truthfulness.

I also argue minimally here and later as well if we learn then the universe does too, and what we learn is as much indirectly due to what is encoded in our DNA, developmental machinery, and all other the structures and default behaviours by which we overrun biology towards culture-relative arbitrariness.

There is one other invention introduced here, very close to my missing lynch-pin argument about what I think the real source of the gap is due: (entangled) INSIDE-TO-OUTSIDE/OUTSIDE-TO-INSIDE POPPINGS OUT. Here I find resonance with the recent neo-empiricist inspired philosophical turn to favouring structural accounts more honouring the interpretations of scientists first, showing a humbler philosophical bent than those armchair philosophers who feel they have no need to. Of course, if this notion is warranted as "real", then physicists, empirically minded and scientifically expert philosophers of science, and even the worst language game players (Neo-scholastics?) have all still missed the same shared and hidden, but as I have reinterpreted, trans-logical problematic of their own and other perspectives equally; they all are stuck invisibly endorsing the Western binary to some extent and all equally believe in universal, or *a priori* law still. I have tried to show how they are all wrong in this even as each thinks they are right specifically and only their antagonists wrong (such is the how the endless intensional ambiguity of false belief always plays out).

Chapter Six

From this chapter on the same blend of widening polemical but zooming in analytic and logical argument both ensue. In metaphor, somewhere in chapter five, in analogy to how I think the mind does, my aims and content begin to turn inside-out exactly as/by the more technical work done to define my terms I can finally really begin to lay bare some serious problems with human rationality in its current

modes of normative engagement, meaning both lay and academic people are equally impugned, if not at their own levels more tellingly and exclusively.

In order: I tackle the current and I think overwrought gender norms debate and wade in on the side of Jordan Peterson, but with a very different sort of argument.

I finally introduce the work filling much of the background of this tome, that being Tyler's Burge's neo-empiricist, cognitive science driven, and genius rethinking in *The Origins of Objectivity*, but as is always due my arrogance—one supposes—see fit to correct him radically too.

I extend my weak argument for conception being the post-ontological step reality takes, but you shouldn't be convinced by this as it is too preliminary, but the coming-in-to-going-out "onto" symmetry is telling as trans-logical warrant for the whole, nonetheless. Many other whimsical and seemingly non-sequitur examples are forwarded even as my terms of analysis get finer and finer. Marriage is revisited, as are other examples, largely of norms being reified to facts or dealing with meaning inversions hard to account for if humans are as rational as those most optimistic champions of humanity suppose. I finish, I think, with one of the best examples (a tragically funny, or "fragile" one, at least) of how even when human beings make some kind of ethical progress seemingly due good use of reason there is always the risk of irrational doubling down or back-sliding; puns ensue. Thankfully, even as the final chapters become denser in meaning they are less in need of precise review and the last three chapters may be summarized more briefly.

Chapter Seven

In this chapter I try and show the risk to ideal use of rationality in variously glossing the mind-body tipping point combined with not being transparent about one's metaphysics when invoking it, explicitly, tacitly, or implicitly. I attack the concept of EMERGENCE non-reductive materialists now favour as a logically useless and invisibly Derridean-infected metaphor, and re-invoke an extended meaning for the Parmenidean Paradox of Change, one I think neither dualism, nor materialism could ever solve, but only a pluralism that regresses to a pre-to-post ontological account ever could; other revisitings and extensions ensure as throughout, as always.

Chapter Eight

In this chapter the analytical focus gets as fine as possible, I get down to the nitty-gritty of teasing apart levels of satisfaction conditions by many pet peeve examples, 'nuf said'.

Chapter Nine

I finally attempt, as an overriding and supportive parallel to my tacit model of ideal natural communication, forwarding a self-annihilating solution to the Demarcation Problem in Science and by this also directly support the main thesis of this work: that humanity, even our brightest and intellectual best are “*lost in representations*” due to a failure to work to make sure our values are not too arbitrary in any idealist sense, by always doing the harder work to show these “real” or “best” values are consistent with accurate perception (where the possibility of complete inaccuracy in perception might still serve fit function) and then right down to the certain data morphisms. I really don’t see the need to summarize this chapter more than that, reread it if you’ve forgotten what you would otherwise expect me to regurgitate here. These final chapters literally speak for themselves, or have fallen like epistemic still-births, only experiencing an ‘a ha’ moment will do here.

Chapter Ten

In this chapter I try to tie all the polemic, *eMetaphorical*, and analytical content into a seamless whole by essentially arguing the only “true” distal causes of our many looming crises are the too arbitrary values and inaccurate percepts motivating the ethically and epistemically bankrupt values behind capitalism and economic theory, and not CO₂, or even overuse of fossil fuels for that matter. This argument is meant to give us the highest structural view possible of our being trapped in forwarding what, yes, are always very rational instrumental means, but nonetheless could only be seen as aiming at equally irrational ends, and I teased at the hypothesis that in some way this is what we want because Alan Watt’s is *eMetaphorically* right: We ARE God hiding from itself as the finite out of the infinite. If you can’t see the problem for rationality here then you might want to consider your set of beliefs is a big part of it, but I expect most to be unconvinced (so few will even read this sentence, but that is OK, it needed to be written anyways).

I try most of all to show the wide, deep and very original-sin-driven insanity of trying to get what you believe is a finite materialism on one set of terms to cash out an idealist wet dreams only the greediest and most locally selfish of us could ever think possible or want; if there is a simplest way to metaphorically define the collective problem humanity faces in Western philosophical terms, then this is it.

Now for the final Easter Egg to wrap this monster up and put it down, like Smaug in *The Hobbit*, asleep on piles of gold forever hidden away, until . . .

So, we are finally at the end (of a newly offered epistemic means beginning) and whether you agree we are *lost in representations* or not, or whether you now find the “man is the measure of all things” meme as overwrought as I do, agreeing if we have measured well to date by all these clearly *instrumentally*

rational means we have still measured to the wrong interpretive ends, if you have read this far, that is *not nothing*, even if this doesn't mean it is something either (with a nod to mathematical intuitionists).

So, in thanks, and to push the envelope one bit farther I will close this work by trying my hand at solving one more long-standing philosophical and scientific problem; that of defining what CONSCIOUSNESS PROPER is. I will do this “meta-negatively” in terms of all physical models by a least sufficient meta-induction, by providing a three-phase structural or “geometrical” argument by analogy consistent with my reinterpretation of the singular datum (thinly, red herringly, and strawmanly) representing the ongoing contentious debate that climate crises is/is-not man-made (for irrational reasons, I also argued by this structural reinterpretation, by what its actually too-thin, too divide and conquer form denies as wider evidence of concern about human excesses having nothing to do with fossil fuels, but indirectly and in a way failing to excuse culpability for all but the poorest and most materially bereft).

At each of the three levels invoked, tracking with my pre-ontological “spectrum” of *existence*, *intentionality*, and *meaning* I will consider a problem associated with each of three eigen-models in turn. I will then suggest in all three cases what is negatively—in *novel trans-logical terms*—entailed as the proper background target of each and the entire set of models (when counting like a Derridean) is nothing more or less than how the referred representational/material aspects invoked of consciousness must re-appear at that level of “emergence” but only *in abstentia*. The conclusion I will draw by this, not a meta-abductive inductive *absurdio*, but a meta-abductive inductive *ratiocinatio*, will stand or fall *eMetaphorically* as crowning warrant for the whole, or not at all. It will come down to the having of yet another epiphanic moment, or not be felt at all. I have no intention to argue by only logical meaning anymore; that was the point of it all coming in, to put the cart back behind the horse, to show the door really open to us *within*. I hope you enjoy this last Derridean counting adventure. I have enjoyed imagining someone might actually take these meanings to heart, but all I might be able to do is figuratively put them down, and, well, then literally put them down. I think I was born too soon, but then I won't be here for the worst of it if I am right, and humanity has been wrong about what it knows all along, and so continues to think it has been licensed to grind up the world as the only way of certainly knowing it, all to further the illusion of control the mad psyche of the world has expressed through us. I hope it comes to better ends, but . . .

The Denouement: The Argument Consciousness is Forever Unrepresentable in any Physical Model yet is always invoked as the Proper Missing (“Meta-Negative”) Epistemic Background of any and all such Theories, but only in an Eigen-Scale Relative Way Determining a Fractal/Plural Epistemic/Pre-To-Post Ontological Derridean-Counted Spectrum.

We start with a gentle reminder of the most epistemically damning conclusion I've drawn. I am trying to forward for serious consideration quantum theory is more, or in the Derridean sense I've tried to normalize "just as much" (hence the use of 'quasi') a theory/model of original perception than one pointing to the paired fundamental and substantial nature of reality below/beyond or at the bottom of some gap as universal law. This is the most damning result showing us "*lost in representations*" as it most impugns those otherwise considered more rational for their logical, scientific, and mathematical acumen most of all; this is indeed a generally bitter epistemic pill to swallow. But, I at least am convinced that in this quasi-sense (where what is baby and what is bathwater I can not yet largely say but by more waving of this hand, and then another hand . . . therefore . . .) QM is only more properly epistemically "aim-able" to start largely at the fine opening—relatively quantified *slightly up* as the diameter of the smallest free living cell—of the original, but delayed manifestation of the body-mind gap in terms of its literal materiality—one first built over non-intentional data differences, otherwise problematically termed "physical information"—than a "fundamental" science.

The miscast value-hierarchy-invoking term 'fundamental science' need be replaced with a plural spectrum of more relative-value neutral eigen-scale dependent sciences, now all equally valued at their own proper scales and with none of them reaching all targets across the entire spectrum. In other words, we have not pierced the appearance-reality gap with "hard" science exactly as we've pre-supposed, now largely as metaphysically and quantitatively reconceived in S.I. units since the Modern Period, just (here, focusing in on QM) narrowed down our epistemic focus in a past-looking way to that material tipping point and eigen-scale at which (non-conscious) "seeing" first becomes contingently possible by/as bio-function, but where the seeing and the matter of the seeing also first begin to "interfere" with each other in terms of that same functioning (live and very *closely* perceived targets and their representing but onto-equivalently matter-made vehicles are never as ontically separable as it is otherwise assumed for the more absolutely arbitrary forms symbolic content takes as linguistic vehicles in some recursive language for those same targets only much later in conscious conception, so even this assumed pure conceptual gap of linguistic arbitrariness between symbol-to-meaning becomes suspect if we wish to keep all of this explained only by the matter of it all).

It is this functional matter/"self"-interference that both leads to and equally is the pre-ontological (or "quasi-ontological") bootstrapping of first psyche out of substance, and only way down the evolutionary line shows up in the re-presented incommensuratenesses of QM and GR (so these two "emergences" are not ever made over/as one conceptually pure ontological leap nor explainable by any monism, they are just the first and second original quasi-concrete/quasi-abstract "same-different" leaps made as/by *reality-as-perception*, the first coming into reality out of infinitesimally degraded "in-substance", not substance, the second already with a non-existent foot out the door).

In further other words, quantum mechanics is not a necessary universal law at all, it is (quasi-ly?) an eigen-law belonging and epistemically targeting primarily to its own contingent point of emergence ("same" for general relativity, but the feature tracked here as eigen-law is conception/conceiving, going

out and "future-looking", instead of perception/perceiving coming in and "past-looking"). I believe reinterpreting the epistemic focus of the main opposed results of the smallest and largest scale physics in this "quasi" or "pre-ontological" way, while not integrating them, instead shows why they are never integrable and points to the real existence of a quasi-ontological matter-mind knot coming into being with first/original mind (equally first/original perception, first/original intentionality, first/original representation, all non-conscious) but then is really only trans-paradoxically doubled-down on by self-reflective consciousness (and so expressed in language in a way never to be made fully consistent within some totalizing monist form of logicism, but where whatever materially grounds the recursive features of language is also what first reduces the plurality of onto-essence down to the unity of experience, like some obverse undoing of the experience of the ordered plurality of image regression seen when standing between 2 facing mirrors).

So rather than integrate QM and GR by some further mathematization (what are numbers, exactly?), some TOE, we need instead seek to dissolve the real epistemic-matter paradox first by instead building a better model of the finest point of emergence of the gap over which original intentionality first emerges and only then by this show how GR and QM become one "same-different" trans-paradoxically paired quasi-rational para-model of the *closest* and *farthest* (and differently open-ended) poles of *reality-as-perception* and never of the sources of reality in any just immanently empirical (or just transcendently idealistic) way.

Otherwise, we will simply further being invisibly stuck in a reverse Chinese finger puzzle for trying to push together what has always been apart in both trans-epistemic and trans-logical essence.

Immediately on even this very cursory (and incredulous) re-interpretation, we can see why the measurement problem and the apparent ineliminable need for an observer still insists in the face of the supposed modelling of pure objectivity QM is taken to be; if QM is really a theory about the emergence and limits of (non-conscious) perception this is exactly what we should expect! That there is no seeing literally physically possible below the contingent scale of the atom in empirical terms means no seeing at or of this level in any direct epistemic way is possible either, ever, but only in a "quasi" way for showing how differences first become blindly represented as absolutes as Burge describes (and Rationalism, whether its supporters know or believe this or not, still starts over this same opening, this same, if we are to believe it, *literal space-time-scale-less* point!).

The Reverse Order Base Case: Why Do Bicycles Not Fall Over (When Ridden by Minds, at Least)?

An analogous problem of interpretation showing what is basically the same mistake of conflating the wrong or incomplete targets with their representative vehicles is in the similar claim the laws of Newtonian physics do not explain fully why a bicycle is stable while moving (does not summarily fall over) in the sense the model doesn't express that outcome explicitly in terms of some variables, only

implicitly in terms of what some mind causes as first experience. But then, the Newtonian model of a bicycle is always a model of the naively real and never doubted experience (so denying skepticism, and naively invoking perceptual and phenomenal realism) bicycles are always found to be made stable in this intentional way in both *prima facie* and *sin qua non* terms in universal and mind-full, not mind-less perpetuity.

So, in the final analysis to expect more than implicit description from the re-presentations of what is with greater epistemic priority already taken as "the real experience of a mind of riding a bicycle" is just more putting the cart in front of the horse (experience pulls up its own models more explicitly and with more priority in the lived order of explanation than the models ever push out the real experiences implicitly, *this is not really a contentious claim, right???*). It is finally only "really" the experience of bicycles being stable under intentionally willed forward motion that motivates the model, the same in analogy with QM: it is the first blind and non-conscious "experience" of original "seeing" that motivates QM implicitly, but only in retro-temporal-dictating terms from the character of seeing as we only lately experience it as full of similarly cross-"interfering" representational and phenomenal content.

The First Reverse-Order Inductive Step: From Conscious To Original Non-Conscious Mind

QM does not as an eigen-law make seeing so in the implicit way hard science would have it—as the reductive or supervenience basis for functional level realization of higher scale dynamically emergent wholes—so QM can't explain below (or much above) its own point of emergence in any sort of pure ontological or universal fashion, nor explain at all without the origin of subjectivity it is in fact an "anti-model" of reasserting itself explicitly as the proper and entire epistemic meta-background of QM; *as the entire naturally opposed theoretical background "object" (an always unrepresentable one) and implied experiential—not alphabet (code)—but what all alphabets (codes) are always written on, for that model it only belongs to it as anti-datum, i.e. consciousness proper.*

We are now reduced to looking down onto and at a very fine and vanishing pre-ontological point, not through it, but now in only representative *abstentia* as any and all placeholder observers already, or soon to be materially disposed to observe forever outside of all and any representation within any singular physical or logical model until some experience or proto-experience occurs (and is always what we only now may call consciousness by this new definition I am still building), are forever cart, never horse in this.

To be very clear about the structurally-inductive step: the background piece that is absent but fills in all the gaps explaining what is missing from physics to say why a well ridden bike (and most, even the clumsiest and most fearful minds can master this) always, *ceteris paribus*, stays up (in some great defiance of its unstable place under gravitational effect, with its centre of mass so high above its various fulcrums) is the learned fed-back effects of a mind intending not so much to stay up at first, but initially only not to suffer the negative values entailed in falling over (so even here, small consciousness is

assigned to reality as an *original* form of willing away from “bad” valence, if only at this highest level of intentional in-existence).

In structural analogy, what is missing from the background of QM is nothing unreal, rather it has been representationally de-substantialized to a minimal point, yet one always opening as *Logos*. The meta-background of QM is non-conscious content-empty proto-egoic non-experience, but even in being this is still the proto-cause of all more sophisticated forms of intentionality, experience, and finally phenomenal consciousness falling from this, but only over many more Derridean tipping points, so entailing new models emerge as new tracings of some yet to be, but also soon to be representable aspects of *consciousness proper* are now fit to emerge in stuff (as the subject of one level of consciousness becomes the object of the next level^{NOTE FORTHCOMING}).

But *consciousness proper* is by this always pushed away as unrepresentable in perpetuity *in any and all models of experience, if not as experience, which it always is, except at the BBS*.

The Second Reverse-Order Inductive Step: The Big Bang Singularity

Having laid down the base case and warranted the structurally induced inference of sameness of character over different evolutionary scale I can now make the overall induction cogent and all cases strong by finishing the reverse ordering showing how consciousness is always meta-background (anti-datum) to all physical model or theory. I do this both by confronting the absurdities of ever proposing the existence of a real nothing (one still, somehow, having intrinsic and mathematizable essence explaining all we contingently find in informational terms in the visible universe) by replacement of a higher order Derridean absurdity built over the finite/infinite, zero/all positive number, or simply the 0/1 Western binaries.

Let’s momentarily put this incredulity I have tried to get you to feel over ever believing a finite universe could emerge out of a represented nothing down for a second and take it in the most innocently held *prima facie* terms we can, but only now looking at it from its structural place in the 3-part geometrical argument *structure* I am making. Thus, convinced I am OK in drawing an analogy between the bike riding and original perception cases I wish to extend the inference consciousness is the meta-background, both epistemically and pre-ontologically (so *plurally*) of all physical theory or model (assuming relative cogency or soundness in the models only at their own scales). Thus, given we, with a straight face, take the representations by which Big Bang Cosmology has been rendered as unproblematically targeting something real nothing only existing physically it seems to me the entire model is nothing but an eigen-level *absurdio*, yet it is never interpreted this way! Why, well because the epistemic traction yielded by the logical semantic webs shored up by all these versions and extensions of quantity, predications of primary properties and unquestioned faith these methods are still the *sin quo non* of best use of human

reason as subsumed under some ideal universal expression of it through its lawfulness. I heartedly concur.

Well, what are numbers, exactly?, and it matters, as they are expressed as infinite sets, so how all this is meant to cohere inside some nothing is well beyond my seeing, and this is already failing to remember that all the laws, and time and space and scale them/it-self are also vanished, at infinite energies, as some limit within this unicorn point as well. Unicorns, all the way up and down, it seems to me, and not a single turtle at all.

And people think Creationist's are more rationally perverse in their beliefs why exactly?

So, in a seeming hypocritical epistemic about face I will now further championing a realist version of Big Bang Cosmology, but only by adding the missing meta-background piece entailed across this geometrically back-inferred meta-induction. Then the conclusion to draw is the real reason the origins of the universe as *original existence* reduce to such a nothing *still full of causal-informational essence* (such that—in metaphor—the universe contains and by this intends to express some least probable message back to its finite self) is because the meta-background of this must be: The informational and casual “emptiness” of Infinity.

But, this is no infinite foreground; it is only the infinite epistemic background of what only now, only in taking my meanings to heart first, is recast as *reality-as-perception*, but was “then” (before *reality-as-perception* existed *qua* itself to pose all paradox as unity) just “in-substance”, i.e. whatever is really below the gap QM—as a finite local model of *original perception*—both limits and delimits, but not in being pierced as supposed, so remains very unknowably pierced, and may thus never be directly or indirectly knowable at all, just “pre-unrepresentable” for always being below where perception first becomes contingently possible.

But what could this “infinity” otherwise be called? Well, the clue here is in, once again, in bringing together by trans-logical integration the Western and Eastern binaries, and not furthering more divide and conquer use (this doubling down on, not unwinding of the gap). But here only an *eMetaphorical* inference could ever work, and to do so is also to re-purge, but only after mastering the virus of meaning we call logic, all forms of representation, which I think, taking Buddhism as possibly the most rational of the subjective sciences, means to return to a form of unrepresented non-dual being *only possible in ego-less experience*, i.e. that state we are born from and die into at different ends even though there are no ends nor doors to it all. The mythological, perhaps, but well vetted claim that a permanent state of enlightenment, one in which we want what we get more than we get what we want, is not only real, but possible and exactly where we've always been headed, but for this side-show we call “advanced” culture is the view of future potential for humanity I would defend above all others (even though I fail at this as well as you probably do).

The meta-epistemic background of both the respective model and original target of Big Bang Cosmology and the singularity is nothing other than non-dual Consciousness as the ground of not only all being, but all *non-being* (see, once we pull back from this endless choosing of poles this regress becomes the way to integration, a going back and putting together to go forward, not more pullings apart).

Spinoza was on the right track, but before there was **God or Nature** as *reality-as-perception* there was **No God or Infinity** as *being-and-non-being* . . .

. . . and then God got bored with omniscience and omnipotence once again, so asked its non-self:

‘Should I start another finite universe?’ And **God or Infinity** answered:

‘**Yes!** (--> the BBS), and **No!** (--> Consciousness as always unrepresentable background)

For any and all physical models combined with its proper scale taken as a datum, from the Big Bang singularity (a “real” nothing???) through first life and then to my bicycle case, *non-dual consciousness as infinity, original intentionality, and full-blown self-reflective consciousness* respectively serve as the entailed proper (but always meta-representationally excluded) target of each respective model even as no symbol represents them in their models at all or ever could!

The final induction to make is **Consciousness Proper** can never be found as a representation in any physical model, but is always entailed by them at their own-level of manifestation for the real and now always fully intentional phenomena so modelled that they are most essentially only found and known by in experience first (and so only in representation as an always lagging echo of their owed materiality that even as it leap-frogs itself *in the reflecting*, makes by this another meta-frog to need leap over next *ad nauseum*, always falling away from *that* experience to its own (finite) representations of it, never ever to be captured as all of it *all as one-space-time-scale event*—“it” now only being made “whole” as a process from *that* experience to *this* lagging re-presentation over a same-different Derridean difference and differance).

This final result alone bears much epistemic value as it seems negatively, but in wide operational terms, to define CONSCIOUSNESS PROPER as that which no model may ever intrinsically measure by observation, but which is always also that by which such measurements are always experienced, so it is always the non-thing modelled over an unrepresentable gap, the same one we call the appearance-reality gap, but I think is fully embedded within *reality-as-perception* in a way yet to be disentangled. So, the disappointing negative epistemic revolution I must further first may finally become the trans-logical blending of new forms of representation and experience integrated towards the much more positive epistemic revolution entailed, if only we can reclaim the ethic Socrates died for:

‘All I’ve learned is I know nothing about no-things at all’.

Namaste. (e)M. Brian Palmer, BSc, BEd, MA, 1st Draft pdf: 4/4/2020, 2nd Draft pdf: 1/6/2023

Post-Script

A snippet of a scene from *Lost in Translation*:

Bob:

What do you do?

Charlotte:

I'm not sure yet, actually. I just graduated last spring.

Bob:

What did you study?

Charlotte:

Philosophy.

Bob:

Yeah, there's a good buck in that racket.

Charlotte:

Well, so far it's pro bono.

Ouch, *touché* ;)!

(Rough) Glossary

Trans-Rational (also *Meta-Rational* or *Para-Rational*):

Pointing to a practice of reason that does not seek to reduce all meanings to logical ones, so an epistemic view ultimately going beyond paradox and making paradox the epistemic thing to explain from, not what need be explained away. In many cases I will use a set of words to mean one “same thing” as entailed above. However, by this do not assume identity, as aspects/senses may endlessly differ (and even invert) and this is not due to just what is intrinsic or *intensional (definitional)* to some logically perfected meaning and whatever properties the real referents bare. Meanings shift across indices of time, space, scale, but then also *not at all*. Ya, I get it, you don’t like uncertainty in meaning, not my problem. I am arguing no such certainty in meaning is ever universally recoverable in any only logically reductive set of representations, but I can’t argue for that using logic alone now can I?

Incommensurate:

Things that are incommensurate don’t or can’t come together in some sense of shared co-meaning or co-being. The sense I most commonly use entails logical incommensurateness, meaning the two semantic (represented meaning) objects in question, be they propositions, webs of the same, theories, or models are inconsistent and/or incoherent when combined at their own level of premising (and often the tacit level of deepest premising is metaphysical, but when metaphysical entailments are denied or not seen each position may become dogmatic, i.e. asserting without either evidence or argument, just “clear and distinct ideas”, or un-analyzable intuitions). In this sense any and all of the historically important conceptual dichotomies over which philosophical debate is centred in the endless swings between the favouring of one pole over the other, largely as epistemic “fashion” never “fact”, appear co-defined by some irreducible incommensurateness, e.g., Rationalism vs. Empiricism, Internalism vs. Externalism, Realism vs. Irrealism, etc.

Epistemic:

As an adjective it simply means “knowledge related”. If I instead use the words ‘knowing’, ‘knowledge’, ‘theory of knowledge’, etc. in place the risk is that informal uses of these words will obscure the technical and theoretical weights entailed, but epistemology is nothing more or less than the collected practice and results of trying to know how knowing works, if you feel me. In most cases just find the grammatically appropriate modification of ‘know’ or ‘knowledge’ and you’ll get this meaning straight soon enough. We need compressions like this so we are not dragged too deep into side areas of deeper concern not appropriate to the meanings at hand, to avoid using awkward and too wordy phrases over and over, and because it minimizes uses of phrases ending up sounding too “woo-woo” or vague.

Semantic:

This term means ‘meaning-related’ just as epistemic means ‘knowledge-related’. Largely this term was coined to address the theoretical aspects of how words and proposition mean in truth-functional ways and so by this also say how all meaning(s) works, but we have not moved much beyond this even though a finalized and complete semantic theory needs to also explain how things also mean without needing the literal use of words or propositions at all, such as use of tone accomplishes. Using this term also serves to block completely the sense of ‘meaning’ that also might mean ‘purpose’ to a lay person, just like use of ‘intentionality’ is meant to tease apart the sense of intending to possibly mean ‘meant to’ in the sense of agency, rather than in the sense of some one thing being about some other thing, like how ‘c-a-t’ is used to refer to, to intend in meaning towards actual cats either concretely or abstractly. Much of the semantic creativity poo-pooed in philosophy by non-philosophers is actually well motivated due to the fact lay senses of naively found words often blend into each other in ways logic can never allow (Natural Language is Derridean to the core, and I think Derrida’s point is even though technical languages are assumed non-Derridean at their cores that at their fringes they remain Derridean; you can push away irrationality in meaning to the edges of representation but by this do not change either the irreducible paradoxical nature of the world nor the true essence of meaning).

Species Sub Aeternitatis (Latin):

The (epistemic) view from everywhere or anywhere taken all at once, *even across incommensurate models of reality*, a view no human could but imagine, and but for the death of God, only God could see from literally.

Ceteris paribus (Latin): = ‘all things being equal’

Its memetic purpose is to remind us for any induction (which is the proof-pudding truck of all experimental sciences) the conclusions drawn are always only probable and pragmatically non-ideally made, so never certain conclusions. In cases where all things are not equal we assume something, some variable or auxiliary hypothesis supposed controlled for has not been. *Ceteris paribus* clauses are meant to capture the truism sometimes exceptions “prove” the rules they’ve just apparently broken; as long-tail error cases neither confirming nor dis-confirming for their own owed essence of being inequitable in exactly these *logically anticipated* exception cases, in regard to some ideal but very improbable context in which such exceptions would otherwise never occur (i.e. such as when viewed *sub specie aeternitatis*, would never arise as finite inductive motes of evidence, exactly because from this view we could see that was true much more directly).

Diachronic (Latin derivation, but English word):

:= (literally) *across some fixed or fixable duration of time*, so never primarily concerned with being NOW, but concerned with the relative history of its becoming or that process by which it becomes. Analogous in this sense, how one’s life might “flash before one’s mind” entails a diachronic view.

Synchronic (Latin derivation, but English word):

:= (literally) *at a time*, so never concerned with coming to be, but being NOW (or THEN, always at some “frozen” time, so looking at some object or phase of some event like those computer-generated shots in an action film where the motion freezes and the view rotates around the frozen objects or event in a fashion meant to be read as happening *outside of time*).

Epiphenomenal:

The word phenomena as root can be taken to mean a mix of existing and being disposed to being experienced as an other by some mind. The prefix ‘epi’ serves to deny in spite of the direct and naive experience of some phenomenon as real it turns out this is an illusion, just as a stick in water might appear bent, but isn’t. The experience of the stick being bent is epiphenomenal, it goes beyond what any real stick can do essentially (they can’t be bent and not bent at the same time in one context, right?).

Meme:

A meme is meant in analogy to be like a gene at its own level of manifestation (DNA and the developmental machinery for genes; words, sentences, etc. and the brain’s “meaning-machine” for memes). Memes are ideas tending to be replicated (or not) in total lieu of their truth-functional status. The house rule for any meme you might believe but have little warrant for doing so is it mostly reduces to a coin flip whether you are right about any meme’s content, regardless as to how widely it is endorsed. The meme we only use 10 % of our brains is a classic example of a meme not only wrong and completely unwarranted, but it also literally makes no sense (the missing inference is about mental capacity, not about how parts of the brain are used or not, when first spoke this metaphorical phrase got mis-interpreted as a literal proposition, which is what gave it its viral edge, as who amongst us would not believe we are capable of more, you know to maintain our thinnest forms of self-esteem). You use all of your brain all the time; the question that matters more is: ‘Are you using it well, or not?’.

Intentionality:

See the note about Intentionality referenced in Chapter 3, on pg. 30. Many think notes are optional, I would prefer readers were more honest about the need to read them exactly when it is the very difficulty entailed for lay people to separate the needed formal uses from the “folk” uses that caused me to write them. I did not put these notes in just for other philosophers of mind after all.

Intensionality:

See the in-place text on pg. 31, *ibid* in terms of the entailed rant. This was one of the hardest things for me to grasp the conceptual motivation for (as well as trying to understand singular propositions, which are said to “include” as well as represent their objects, whatever that could possibly mean? Lately, I

finally get that!). The too easy to state definition appears opaque even after many readings, it is only by the examples that the need to define this property only some special sentences exhibit, propositional attitude largely, is made clear, but if you find the problem somewhat contrived and would simply respond, 'But Lois is wrong Clark Kent is not Superman, I don't see point of dragging all this other stuff in to explain why her sentences seem inconsistent and she is not being irrational in this' and I'd be with you on that, but this is not how most philosophers of language feel about the matter's need to be logically resolved exactly at the point the use of logic failed, i.e., when terms of identity get mis-conceived of as cases of non-identity only inside some mind. If one is intuitively uncomfortable with the very idea logic is the method to rule all knowings already this is how one "resolves" this problem negatively, but that can't be the way anyone endorsing Logicism even partially sees the matter, as then we risk throwing out the baby with the bathwater and can't speak logically at all without it *being* a counter-example to what we've just absolutely claimed is epistemically useless for solving Frege's problem as not well-formed, moot, or a pseudo-problem (which I still believe it is, but my argument is differently and quasi-positive, not ever wholly negative).

Ontology/Ontological:

Ontology is the philosophical study of Being (*approximately*: all dated existences) so an ontological concern is simply one about how the referenced things exist and/or comes to exist. Ontology and metaphysics overlap. One could think of ontological questions as always belonging to particular things, while metaphysics looks at how all ontologies comes together or fall apart.

Ontic:

The property of "really" existing, as opposed to the property of how one exists, or came to exist. Again, if I use the word 'exist' in certain technical situations I risk begging in too many informal senses. Sherlock Holmes, informally speaking, both "exists" and "does not exist" in differing informal contexts/frameworks often begged, implicit or tacit. The ontology of Sherlock Holmes starts with Sir Arthur Conan Doyle, but a deeper ontology would rest on the sub/meta-ontology of FICTION, for an example of how these erudite terms interplay. However, only the stories as physically encoded texts and their variously manifest supervenience objects have onticity in obvious material terms.

Metaphysics:

This class of philosophical problems started as those Aristotle felt were outside the reach of his version of Science, *of the study of Physis* (Nature) (where we get our word 'physics'). In post-modern terms metaphysics is often seen as the discipline to ground all other results in philosophy, but because much of its proper content was determined so contingently the word 'ontology' started to be favoured. Looking online will help define the term beyond this. Pejorative uses of the term abound. The problem with ridiculing the term is that one becomes what one mocks in doing so. To say metaphysics is bunk is in effect to say there is no underlying view of the entirety of existence or Being ("reality") possible, which is to forward a metaphysical premise, making one a very thin and hypocritical metaphysician, but a metaphysician none-the-less. It is impossible to think and not at times practice metaphysics!

(I am sure there should be other words finding their way to this glossary specifically to assist any lay reader who stays the course, but in the meantime there are these concrete and virtual things called dictionaries and I recommend you start a document of the terms that give you the most trouble *in your own experience of words* to aid with the internalizing of apt enough meanings. How do you think I managed to read a large junk of Jung's works, particularly *Alchemy and Psychology*, yikes, was that man ever verbose!)

(Rough) Notes and Bibliography

As this work is only a first (now, second) draft I am not at this time providing a “proper” series of notes or bibliography. Instead, I am simply providing information about sources, but for quotes, where I do try to include page references. They are numbered in order of appearance in the book, but do not include the in-place notes (yes I expect you to read all of them!)

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